JUDGMENT : Heard learned Counsel for the appellants and learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. The present appeal is filed being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 18/01/2003 passed by the learned Joint District Judge, Amravati in Regular Civil Appeal No.109/2000 confirming the judgment and decree dated 22/03/2000 passed in Regular Civil Suit No.82/1998 by the learned Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Morshi. 3. The brief of the appellants case is as under : The father-in-law of the appellant No.1/original plaintiff No.1 namely Januji Babuji Bondarkar was cultivating the field Survey No.21 of Shri. Eknath Dinkar Chandurkar from 1950-1951 as a tenant of the said field. Accordingly, certificate of purchase issued to this effect on 21/03/1994 and registered sale-deed was executed by the Tahsildar on 22/03/1994. The father-in-law of the appellant No.1 got the absolute ownership and title of the suit field. But after death of Januji, his son namely Sitaram Januji Bondharkar being a legal representative got the title and possession of the suit field. Sitaram effected a family partition on 21/08/1997 and transferred the title and possession of the suit field in favour of the appellant Nos.1 to 4 who are the original plaintiff Nos.1 to 4. In view of partition by registered partition deed, the appellant/plaintiff got the absolute ownership and title of the suit field. The 7/12 extract statements are recorded in the name of father-in-law of the appellant No.1 as a cultivator of the suit field. 4. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 is having no concerned with an intention to obtain unlawful possession started to obstruct the possession of the appellants over the suit field and they have started causing obstructions first time on 01/07/1998, therefore appellant No. 1 filed a complaint to the Police Station Shirkhed and also issued notices to the respondent hence appellant constrained to file a suit for declaration and permanent injunction restraining the defendant for causing any obstruction. The learned Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division Morshi dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed the suit before the learned Appellate Court and learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. Hence the appellant filed the present appeal. 5. The learned Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division Morshi dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed the suit before the learned Appellate Court and learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. Hence the appellant filed the present appeal. 5. This Court vide order dated 11/08/2003 framed following substantial question of law for consideration : (a) Whether Civil Court have jurisdiction to decide who is the tenant of suit land after the issuance of purchase certificate Exh.79 under Rule 20 and Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kuchha area) Act 1958 in view of the guideline given by the Apex Court in case of Saraswati Tryambak Gaikwad Vs. Damodhar D. Motiwale reported in 2002 (3) Mah. Law Journal page 69. (b) Whether the Civil Court or lower Appellate Court can sit as a Appellate Court to decide the issue of tenancy after the issuance of sale certificate. (c) Whether the Civil Court or lower Appellate Court has jurisdiction to discard the sale certificate issued under Rule 20 and Section 43 of B.T. and A.L. Act, 1958 in favour of the father-in-law of the Januji. (d) Whether the appeal if filed within a period of limitation. 6. It is the contention of the appellant that the sale certificate issued by the Agricultural Land Tribunal has been produced at Exh.79 and it positively shows that the ancestor of the plaintiffs; namely Januji was the holder of this property being acquired under B.T. and L.A. Act hence there was no difficulty for the learned Lower Courts to accept its sanctity. It is further contended that the submission made in Index No.2 has been prepared by the Sub Registrar on the basis of Exh. 79 and it corroborates with the contents of the appellant. It is further contended that after the death of januji, Sitaramji inherited the property and the Exh. Nos. 71 to 75 shows that partition was effected by Sitaram in respect of the suit property which has been effected by the Revenue Authorities by effecting mutation entry No. 577. It is further contended that both the learned Lower Courts failed to appreciated the abovesaid facts and circumstances and evidence placed on record. 7. The learned Counsel for Appellant relied on the following judgments : (1) Govardhandas S/o. Paikaji Brahmane Vs. Shridharprasad Rautrai, reported in 2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 921 . (2) Ramesh Ramrao Hate Vs. It is further contended that both the learned Lower Courts failed to appreciated the abovesaid facts and circumstances and evidence placed on record. 7. The learned Counsel for Appellant relied on the following judgments : (1) Govardhandas S/o. Paikaji Brahmane Vs. Shridharprasad Rautrai, reported in 2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 921 . (2) Ramesh Ramrao Hate Vs. Parvez B. Bhesania, reported in 1997 (1) Mh.L.J. 295 . (3) Shrikant Gangaram Teli Vs. Bhaskar Narayan Kuvalekar and others reported in 1999 (1) Bom.C.R. 49 . (4) Pushpalata Narayan Thorbole Vs. Purshottam Dattatray Prabhu, reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3160. (5) Saraswatibai Trimbak Gaikwad Vs. Damodhar D. Motiwale and others, reported in 2002 (3) Mh.L.J. 69. 8. The Respondent’s contention is that the land was given to Tanba, their father as tenant and the order of deemed owner had been issued in his favour. The payment of purchase price was directed to be deposited. It is contended that the certificate should have been issued in the name of Tanba, but as the proceeding initiated by Savitribai was pending, Sitaramji took advantage of it and got issued the certificate in the name of his father Januji. In fact, Sitaramji and Januji had no concern with the property and they are trying to dispossess these defendants. In fact, Tanba was in possession of the property and after his death defendants came in possession. The learned Counsel for respondents contended that the learned Judge has rightly held that the property was given to Tanba and not Januji as canvassed by the plaintiff. He relied on the documents produced by the defendants in the lower Court and made a submission that the learned Judge was quite right in holding that the plaintiff has failed to establish the case and dismissed the suit. 9. The learned Counsel for Respondents relied on Sitaram Deoba Marathe Vs. Hawadya Piraji and others, reported in 1975 Mh.L.J. 521. 10. I have heard both the parties at length. Perused record and proceedings. The plaintiff’s case is that three brothers namely Januji, Tanba and Shivram were the tenants of the land. The said land was belonging to one Dinkar Chandurkar and it was given on lease to these three brothers in the year 1958. The landlord initiated proceeding under Section 36 read with Section 38 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (BTAL Act) in the year 1960. The said land was belonging to one Dinkar Chandurkar and it was given on lease to these three brothers in the year 1958. The landlord initiated proceeding under Section 36 read with Section 38 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (BTAL Act) in the year 1960. The same came to be dismissed in 1961. After the death of said Dinkar Chandurkar the Tahasildar initiated a proceeding under Section 46 of BTAL Act. In the year 1964 one Savitribai, wife of Dinkar Chandurkar came to know about this proceeding. She filed petition to MRT and then in the High Court bearing Special Civil Suit No.684/1973. This Court remanded the matter with the direction to S.D.O., Morshi to hear legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar on the point of delay. 11. As against this, case of defendant was that the Tahasildar has fixed the price of the land. The said suit field owned by one Dinkar Chandurkar was given in possession of Tanuji as per Revenue Court’s order. Tanuji was declared as owner of the suit field and Tahasildar had ordered Tanuji to deposit Rs.3,569/- in 12 installments towards purchase price. Since 1951-52 Tanuji was in possession of suit field till his death. Dinkar Chandurkar filed another case under Section 38 of the Tenancy Act for getting suit field for his own cultivation. The said case was dismissed due to death of Dinkar Chandurkar. The legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar filed application for condonation of delay in filing application for restoration. The Tahasildar heard parties on the point of condonation of delay and rejected the application. Writ Petition came to be filed before this Court by legal representatives, wherein, it was directed by this Court to the appellant to file fresh application for condonation of delay, if the original application is not there in the record. After remand, the S.D.O., Morshi after granting due hearing dismissed the application vide order dated 12/10/1999. It is the contention of the defendant while preferring the appeal the legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar wrongly mentioned the name of Januji Bondarkar (father in law of plaintiff No.1) instead of Tanaji Bondarkar as party respondent. Sitaram Bondarkar, son of Januji took disadvantage of wrong name which was mentioned by the legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar. It is the contention of the defendant while preferring the appeal the legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar wrongly mentioned the name of Januji Bondarkar (father in law of plaintiff No.1) instead of Tanaji Bondarkar as party respondent. Sitaram Bondarkar, son of Januji took disadvantage of wrong name which was mentioned by the legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar. In Appeal before MRT on that basis he got prepared false documents and succeeded in entering the name of Januji Bondarkar after his death in the record of rights in collusion with Talathi. Subsequently with his malafide intention he got prepared false partition deed and mutated name of plaintiff in the record of rights and filed false suit. 12. As against this, case of the plaintiff was that on rejection of application of legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar, tenancy Tahasildar suddenly pleased to fix purchase price of the suit field and declaration of ownership only in the name of Tanbaji Bondarkar. The said declaration in favour of father of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 Tanbaji is issued only because he used to represent matter before the Tenancy Court on behalf of his remaining two brothers. It is further contention of the plaintiff that the purchase price was first paid jointly by all brothers. However, last installment was deposited by Sitaram Bondarkar who is husband of plaintiff No.1 in the year 1994. The purchase certificate was issued in the name of Janoji Bondarkar. It is also one of the contention that there was family arrangement between Sitaram, Tanbaji and Shivram on 13/09/1993. 13. It is a matter of record that vide Exh.173, wherein Tenancy Tahasildar declared Tanbaji as owner of the suit field vide order dated 31/07/1970. Accordingly price was fixed and Tanbaji was directed to deposit purchase price of Rs.3569/- in twelve installments. It is the contention of the defendant that Tanbaji was in possession of the suit field since 1951-1952, till his death. Sitaram Bondarkar or Januji Bondarkar were not having any concern in the suit field and they were never in possession of suit field. It appears that there was mistake committed by legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar in mentioning name of Januji instead of Tanuji in the appeal before MRT. Sitaram Bondarkar or Januji Bondarkar were not having any concern in the suit field and they were never in possession of suit field. It appears that there was mistake committed by legal representatives of Dinkar Chandurkar in mentioning name of Januji instead of Tanuji in the appeal before MRT. The question now before this Court is; “(i) Whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide who is the tenant of the suit land after the issuance of purchase certificate Exh.79 under Rule 20 and Section 43 of the BTAL Act. (ii) Whether the Civil Court or Lower Appellate Court can sit as Appellate Court to decide the issue of tenancy after issuance of sale certificate. And whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to discard the sale certificate issued under Rule 20 Section 43 of BTAL Act.” 14. Learned Counsel for appellant relied on Gowardhan Das (supra), in support of his contention that if any suit instituted in any Civil Court, involves the issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such an issue under this Act, the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination. Learned Counsel for appellant also relied on Shrikant Gangaram Teli (supra), in support of his contention that the sale certificate issued by revenue authorities has become final and conclusive which was issued in the year 1960. However, facts involved in the matter are distinguishable. In the said matter Tahasildar after holding enquiry held that petitioner was tenant in the suit land and was entitled to purchase the same. Subsequently petitioner filed application claiming to be tenant occupier of land on 1st April 1957 seeking right to purchase the land and objecting to issue of purchase certificate to the respondent No.1. In this background it is held that Tahasildar subsequently cannot declare petitioner as a tenant once purchase certificate attains finality. The only remedy the petitioner is having is by way of appeal and upheld the order of Collector as well as MRT declaring Tahasildar’s second order as illegal. In the present matter the tenancy rights are crystallized in favour of Tanbaji by the Additional Tahasildar and also fixed the purchase price. It also appears that statement of Tanba came to be recorded by Additional Tahasildar, Morshi. In the present matter the tenancy rights are crystallized in favour of Tanbaji by the Additional Tahasildar and also fixed the purchase price. It also appears that statement of Tanba came to be recorded by Additional Tahasildar, Morshi. He was tenant since 1958 and was paying rent to Savitribai by money order. On this statement, order came to be passed declaring Tanba as deemed purchaser. When purchase notice is issued to Tanbaji as per rules, sale certificate also ought to have been issued in favour of Tanbaji. The certificate is not issued in the name of deemed purchaser. 15. Learned Counsel for appellant further relied on Saraswatibai Trimbak Gaiakwad (supra). This citation is also of no avail to the Counsel for appellant as in the said matter before Apex Court certificate of ownership issued to deemed tenant after fixation of price. Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is conclusive proof for purchase of land. Here in the present matter, the order declaring deemed purchaser is in favour of Tanuji after conducting due enquiry as per provision of law and purchase price is also fixed. Not only this Tanuji paid the installments and only last installment was paid by Sitaram S/o. Januji by playing fraud. As such, there was no question of determining tenancy by the Civil Court as the same was determined by competent authorities under BTAL Act. 16. Learned Counsel for the appellant also relied on Ramesh Ramrao Hate (supra), in support of his contention that once purchase certificate is issued in favour of Januji it is conclusive proof that he was a tenant and the Court is precluded from considering other evidence. This Court in Ramesh Ramrao Hate (supra), relied on judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Smt. Somawanti and others Vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in AIR 1963 SC 151 , in view of Section 4 of Evidence Act, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that : “When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court, shall on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it." This paragraph thus provides that further evidence is barred where, under the Evidence Act, one fact is regarded as proof of another. But it says nothing about what other laws may provide. But it says nothing about what other laws may provide. There are a number of laws which make certain facts conclusive evidence of other facts : (see Companies Act, 1956, section 132; the Indian Succession Act, 1925, section 381; Christian Marriage Act, 1872, section 61; Madras Revenue Act, 1869, Section 38; Oaths Act, 1873, section 11). The question is whether such provision also bars other evidence after that which is conclusive evidence is produced.” 17. Since evidence means and includes all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made, when the law says that a particular kind of evidence would be conclusive as to the existence of a particular fact, it implies that fact can be proved either by that evidence or by some other evidence if the Court permits or requires it to be advanced. Where such other evidence is adduced it would be open to the Court to consider whether, upon evidence the fact exists or not. When certain evidence is conclusive, it shut outs any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence. However, in the present matter purchase certificate issued in favour of Januji would be conclusive proof of his ownership but for the reason that Tanuji was declared as deemed purchaser, he has paid installments also of purchase price and by fraud Sitaram S/o. Januji succeeded in obtaining purchase certificate in the name of his father Januji. The certificate which is not issued as per procedure of law cannot be the conclusive proof of his ownership. As such, with due respect to the principle in the citation it is of no use to the appellant. 18. The learned Counsel further relied on citation Pushpalata Narayan Thorbole (supra). However in the said matter Hon’ble Apex Court referred Madhav Kesu Khupse Vs. Sundrabai Mugatrao Phadatare (through L.Rs), [1978 Mh.L.J. 289], wherein it is observed that : “14. ... While interpreting Section 85 of the said Act ousting the jurisdiction of the civil Court, the learned Chief Justice Mr. M.C. Chagla observed (p. 948) : ... It is clear that the jurisdiction of the civil Court has been only ousted in respect of valid orders made by the Mamlatdar. ... While interpreting Section 85 of the said Act ousting the jurisdiction of the civil Court, the learned Chief Justice Mr. M.C. Chagla observed (p. 948) : ... It is clear that the jurisdiction of the civil Court has been only ousted in respect of valid orders made by the Mamlatdar. It is only when the Mamlatdar makes an order "with jurisdiction, or, in other words, makes an order for the purposes of the Act or an order required by the Act, that that order cannot be questioned in a civil Court. If the Mamlatdar while passing a valid order deals with any of the matters under Section 70, then those matters cannot be dealt with by the civil Court. But if the order made by the Mamlatdar is not for the purposes of the Act or not required by the Act and the order is incompetent or ultra vires, then the order is a nullity and it can be challenged in a civil Court. 15. While dealing with the argument in that case that it was open to the landlords to prefer an appeal against the decision of the Mamlatdar and that instead of preferring an appeal they had filed a suit in a civil Court, the learned Judges posed a question whether the fact that a statute provides for a right of appeal against an order made by an authority set up under that statute would make any difference to the position when the order made by the authority is an invalid or ultra vires order. The learned Judges answered that question and the argument as follows (p. 949): ... It is clear that if the order itself is ultra vires, it is a nullity and there is no obligation upon a party against whom the order is made to prefer an appeal against that order. The appeals that are provided for under Section 74 are strictly appeals against valid orders made by the Mamlatdar and orders made with jurisdiction. It may be that the Collector could have corrected, the Mamlatdar and could have held that the order of the Mamlatdar was ultra vires, But the question is not whether the opponents (landlords) could have appealed to the Collector and could, have got the necessary relief. The question is whether the opponents (landlords) are bound to appeal and, are prevented or precluded from going to a civil Court. The question is whether the opponents (landlords) are bound to appeal and, are prevented or precluded from going to a civil Court. In our opinion, on principle it is erroneous to argue that merely because a statute provides for a right of appeal, the party against whom the order is made is bound to appeal although the order made is a nullity. If the order is a nullity, the party is entitled to ignore it, to treat it as waste paper, and to go to a civil Court for a declaration that the order is a nullity and no action should be taken against the party under that order which would prejudice his rights." 19. In my considered opinion that question of tenancy is not involved at all, it has already been determined by the Tahasildar by holding that Tanuji was a tenant in consequence to which Tanuji had already paid substantial installments of the purchase price. Once there is this determination by the tenancy Tahasildar, there is no question of issuing any certificate in somebody else’s name. Moreover, this finding has been rendered on the basis of evidence that Tanuji was the tenant since 1958 and there was agreement between him and the landlord Chandurkar. The Courts below have not determined who is the tenant but merely recognized that it is Tanuji who has been declared as a tenant and deemed purchaser. Therefore, the Civil suit by necessary implications stands excluded unless the fundamental principles of procedure are followed by the Tribunal/Authority constituted under the land under BTAL Act. 20. The learned Counsel for respondent relied on Sitaram Deoba Marathe (supra), in support of his contention that land is vested in Tanaji from tiller date and he has become deemed purchaser. This Court held as under : “The language of sections 46 and 49-A and the scheme of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (V.R.) Act show that irrespective of any other things like custom, decrees or contracts all lands held by tenants which they were entitled to purchase from the landlords stood transferred to and vested in the tenants from the date of vesting and from such date the tenant shall be deemed to be full owner of such lands. With the intention of emphasising its intention the Legislature has used three different expressions “shall stand transferred to”, “will vest in” and “shall be deemed to be full owners of” The intention is thus clear that an absolute transfer was intended. The vesting is complete either on 1-4-1961 or 1-4-1963 and the tenant gets full title which is defeasible only it he is unable to fulfil the conditions for retaining the title. There is no scope in the scheme of the Act to infer that the former tenant who becomes owner can still be described as tenant for certain purposes. The deeming provision obviously means an introduction of legal fiction. Even if some formalities had remained and were to be performed later and even if due to inability to comply with those provisions in some cases the sale was to be declared ineffective, until that stage is reached the earlier tenant is deemed to be full owner for all purposes.” 21. As such, after considering the arguments advanced by both the parties and on perusal of record and proceedings, I am satisfied that there is no merit in the appeal nor it is necessary to refer the matter to the competent authority as right of tenant is already decided by the Additional Tahasildar in favour of Tanuji. In absence of any purchase notice or any order declaring Januji as deemed owner the certificate issued fraudulently in favour of Januji is nullity in the eye of law. For the reasons stated above, I answer issue No. (a) in the affirmative. The issue No. (b) does not survive as Civil Court is not sitting as Appellate Court to decide the issue of tenancy. In fact the issue of tenancy is already decided by the competent authority. As to question No. (c), the Civil Court has justified in discarding the sale certificate issued in favour of father in law of plaintiff. Hence, appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Decree be drawn accordingly. At this stage, learned Counsel for the appellants seeks protection for eight weeks which was granted by order dated 07/09/2007. The said protection will continue for another eight weeks.