ORDER : In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 12/3/2021 in Application No.4/2019 on the file of the Labour Court, Hubballi, allowing the application in part. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties in this writ petition shall be referred to in terms of their status and ranking before the Labour Court. 3. The relevant facts for adjudication of this writ petition are that, the Applicant has filed application before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) claiming arrears of salary by contending that the Applicant was appointed as conductor and he met with an accident in the year 1996 and thereafter, he was not able to discharge his duties and therefore, he made an application to respondent-Corporation seeking change of cadre. Thereafter, the Applicant was sent for Medical Board and Medical Board, in its certificate, stated that, Applicant is having disability to an extent of 50% and accordingly, the respondent-Corporation changed cadre of the Applicant from March 2003. It is the grievance of the petitioner that the petitioner was not able to work from 1/1/2001 till 9/3/2003 and accordingly, filed an application before the Labour Court seeking arrears of salary to an extent of Rs.2,02,049/-. The said application was contested by the respondent-corporation by filing objections stating that there is delay in approaching the Labour Court and further, the Applicant has no leave at his credit at the relevant point of time and therefore, it is contended by the respondent-corporation that relief sought by the applicant cannot be accepted. 4. In order to prove their case, the Applicant was examined as AW.1 and has not produced any document before the Labour Court. On behalf of the respondent- corporation, an Officer of the respondent-corporation was examined as RW.1 and produced 17 documents and the same were marked as Ex.R.1 to R.17. The Labour Court, after considering the material on record, by order dated 12.03.2001, allowed the Application in part, holding that, the Applicant is entitled for arrears of back wages from 01.01.2001 to 09.03.2003, without interest. Being aggrieved by the same, the Corporation has preferred this writ petition. 5. I have heard Smt. Veena Hegde, learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation and Sri. Ravi Hegde, learned counsel for the respondent-applicant. 6. Smt. Veena Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the corporation made two fold submissions. Being aggrieved by the same, the Corporation has preferred this writ petition. 5. I have heard Smt. Veena Hegde, learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation and Sri. Ravi Hegde, learned counsel for the respondent-applicant. 6. Smt. Veena Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the corporation made two fold submissions. Firstly the Application made by the Applicant under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, is not maintainable on the ground of delay and laches. Secondly, she argued that, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, unless there is a pre-existing right accrued in favour of the Applicant. Accordingly, she sought for interference of this Court. To buttress her arguments, with regard to the maintainability of the Application, she places reliance on the Judgment of the Apex in the State of U.P. and another Vs. Brijpal singh, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58 and in the case of Bombay Chemical Industries Vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner and another, reported in (2022) 5 SCC 629 . 7. Per contra, learned counsel Sri. Ravi Hegde, appearing for the Applicant, sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Labour Court. He contended that, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain an Application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, as already pre-existing right accrued in favour of the Applicant as there is no dispute with regard to the payment of arrears of salary by the respondent- corporation. He also invited the attention of the Court to Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and argued that, in view of the disability suffered by the Applicant on account of accident, there is no need to approach the Labour Court prior to filing of an Application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. In this regard, he places reliance on the Judgment of this Court in W.P.No.18604/2014, disposed of on 20.08.2016 and submitted that in an identical case, this Court has allowed the writ petition with a direction to the respondent therein to pay the arrears of salary. He further contended that, though the Applicant was unauthorizedly absent, the respondent-corporation has not taken any action against the Applicant nor conducted departmental enquiry against the Applicant and therefore, sought for dismissal of the petition. 8. He further contended that, though the Applicant was unauthorizedly absent, the respondent-corporation has not taken any action against the Applicant nor conducted departmental enquiry against the Applicant and therefore, sought for dismissal of the petition. 8. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, it is not in dispute that the Applicant has suffered an accident during the course of employment in the respondent-corporation. Thereafter, the Applicant made an application seeking change of cadre. Pursuant to the same, the Applicant was referred to the Medical Board for assessing disability, and accordingly, the Department of Neurosurgery, NIMHANS, Bengaluru (Annexure-J) by letter dated 11.09.2022, opined that the Applicant is having disability to work as a Conductor. 9. The core question to be answered in this writ petition is whether, the Applicant is entitled for payment of wages from 01.01.2001 to 09.03.2003, whereby, in the said period the Applicant was not working with the respondent-corporation. In the backdrop of these aspects, I have carefully considered the language employed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under: “33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer – (1) xxxxx (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a period not exceeding three months] [Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.]” (Emphasis supplied) 10. Perusal of the plain reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that, there must be a decision/award by the Labour Court or any competent Court before initiation of Application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act as the word ‘due’ connotes proved facts by the Applicant before a competent Court of law, which must be construed as a ‘claim’ by the Applicant. In that view of the matter, it is relevant to cite the law declared by the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India Vs. Ram Chandra Dubey and others, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 73 . The observation made at paragraph No.8 of said Judgment, reads as under: “8. The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows: Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered, just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages.” 11. It is also relevant to deduce the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Brijpal Singh (supra), wherein the Apex Court at paragraph No.13 has enunciated the law that, in order to get the benefit under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, the Applicant must show a pre- existing right or an award/order passed by the competent Court. Section 33-C(2) of the Act is only a provision which provides for an execution of the order passed by the Labour Court. Therefore, I find force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. At this juncture, it is also relevant to cite the observation made at paragraph No.8 of the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bombay Chemical Industries (supra). The same reads thus; “8. As per the settled proposition of law, in an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. As held by this Court in Ganesh Razak, the Labour Court’s jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an executing court. As per the settled proposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.” 13. The issue relating to the interpretation of Section 33-C(2) of the Act had come up before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd., Vs. The issue relating to the interpretation of Section 33-C(2) of the Act had come up before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd., Vs. P.S.Rajagopalan, reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 and at paragraph No.18 of the Judgment, it is held as follows: “18. Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his` existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under s. 33C (2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under s. 33C (2),it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests.” 14. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and another, reported in 1995 LAB.I.C.330, the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.12 and 13 held as follows: “12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under S.33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen’s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under S. 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen’s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under S. 33C(2) of the Act. It I only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or endorsement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court’s power under S.33C(2) like that of the Executing Court’s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. 13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent- workmen who were all daily-rated/casual workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. The workmen's claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" being disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33-C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Section 33-C(2) of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. Respondents' claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made Linder Section 33-C(2) of the Act by these respondents.” 15. In the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made Linder Section 33-C(2) of the Act by these respondents.” 15. In the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Shri Birendra Bhandari, reported in AIR 2006 SC 3220 , the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.8 and 9 held as follows: 8. The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows: Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33 C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33 C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right The difference between a pre- existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33 C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom, a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom, a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages. 9. The position was reiterated by a three Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. and another Vs. Brijpal Singh ( 2005 (8) SCC 58 ).” 16. Following the law declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned case, I am of the view that, the Labour Court ought not to have accepted the Application filed by the Applicant under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, in the absence of pre-existing right of the applicant, wherein the ‘due’ or ‘claim’ is disputed by the corporation and Applicant is yet to prove the existing right, unless there is an award passed by the competent Court, creating right in favour of the Applicant before passing any order directing the respondent-corporation with regard to the payment of arrears of salary. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that, the Labour Court ought to have dismissed the Application at the initial stage itself as the Applicant has not proved his pre-existing right insofar as claiming arrears of salary is concerned. However, liberty is reserved to the Applicant/respondent herein to approach the competent Court for redressal of his grievance in a manner known to law. In that view of the matter, I pass the following: ORDER : The writ petition is allowed. The order dated 12.03.2021 in Application No.4/2019 on the file of the Court of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubballi, is set aside.