ORDER : 1. In all these petitions, a common question of law and fact is involved; therefore, they are clubbed together, heard together and decided finally by this common order. 2. The petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balodabazar, in Criminal Complaint Cases filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. whereby a direction has been issued to the concerned Police Station to register FIR and submit the final report. 3. Facts of the cases (CRMP No. 808 of 2015 and CRMP No. 993 of 2016) are as follows: (i) Sudhir Agrawal (petitioner in CRMP No. 808 of 2015) is the owner of land situated on the main road Pangaon Sonadi Marg and the other side of the road, respondent No. 1 and his family members own a plot. (ii) Petitioner No. 2 and 3 in CRMP No. 808 of 2015 are staff of petitioner No. 1 Sudhir Agrawal. (iii) At the relevant time, construction of a petrol pump on Pangaon Sonadi Marg was under process. On 25.06.2014, respondent No. 1 visited the site and started creating problems and thereafter the petitioner lodged an FIR against the respondent party and consequently, the police registered offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 294, 506 II of the IPC and Sections 25, 27 of the Arms Act, in which charge-sheet has been filed and the case is pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balodabazar. (iv) On 17.09.2014, a complaint was made by respondent No. 1 against the petitioners in connection with the incident that took place on 25.06.2014 making allegations that the petitioners assaulted and abused him using filthy language and also threatened him for life. Further case of respondent No. 1 is that when no action was taken, a complaint case was filed under Section 200 read with 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for registration of offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 341, 294, 506 II of the IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act (alleging that petitioner No. 1 Sudhir Agrawal brandished a revolver). Vide order dated 22.11.2014, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued a direction to the concerned Police Station to register an FIR, conduct the investigation and submit a final report. 4. Vide order dated 22.11.2014, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued a direction to the concerned Police Station to register an FIR, conduct the investigation and submit a final report. 4. The facts of CRMP No. 62 of 2016 are as follows: (i) Respondent No. 3/Spiritual Regeneration Movement (SRM) Foundation of India is a registered Society that owns various lands at different places in Chhattisgarh, including one at Pangaon village. (ii) In the year 2013, respondent No. 3 approached petitioner No. 1 and 2 to sell a plot ad-measuring 5 acres, situated at Pangaon village, Tahsil Baloda Bazar, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara. (iii) One Mr. A. K. Ratnakar represented himself as the power of attorney holder to manage the affairs of the said society. (iv) Petitioner No. 1 and 2 purchased plots from respondent No. 3 through registered sale deeds dated 20.09.2013. Petitioner No. 1 bought a plot ad- measuring 0.62 acres for a consideration of Rs. 6.50 lakhs, while petitioner No. 2 purchased a plot admeasuring 4.38 acres for consideration of Rs. 10 lakhs. (v) Petitioner No. 3 and 4 are attesting witnesses to the sale deeds. (vi) Respondent No. 2 raised a dispute during the mutation of the property and filed a civil suit on 09.04.2014, challenging the sale deeds dated 20.09.2013, claiming to be the power of attorney holder of respondent No. 3/Society. (vii) A complaint was made by respondent No. 2 before the concerned Police Station on 20.03.2014. (viii) Respondent No. 2 filed a civil suit before the High Court of Delhi bearing Civil Suit No. SC (OS) 3221/2011 and Civil Court at Balodabazar, where respondent No. 2 and 3 claimed themselves to be the real owners. (ix) The learned Civil Court granted interim relief and during the currency of the interim orders, plots were sold to innocent purchasers, including the petitioners. (x) A contempt petition was filed in which petitioner No. 1 and 2 were impleaded as respondents. (xi) Respondent No. 2 subsequently filed a complaint case against the petitioners under Sections 200 and 202 read with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. alleging therein commission of offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 167, 212, and 217 read with Section 120B of the IPC. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 10.11.2014 issued a direction to the concerned Police Station to register an FIR and submit a final report. 5. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 10.11.2014 issued a direction to the concerned Police Station to register an FIR and submit a final report. 5. The Facts of the case (CRMP No. 94 of 2016) are as follows: (i) Petitioner No. 1 was Nayab Tahsildar, petitioner No. 2 was Revenue Inspector, and petitioner No. 3 was Patwari at the relevant time. They purchased a plot from respondent No. 3, but later on, respondent No. 2, who claimed to be the power of attorney holder of respondent No. 3/Society, raised objections and filed a civil suit which is pending before the District Judge, Baloda Bazar and another Civil Suit bearing No. CS (OS) 3221/2011 is pending before the High Court of Delhi, where a stay order was passed. (ii) On 30.10.2014, respondent No. 2 filed a complaint case under Sections 200 and 202 read with 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. against the petitioners alleging therein commission of offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 167, 212, and 217 read with Section 120B of the IPC. (iii) The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baloda Bazar, on 11.10.2014 issued a direction to the concerned Police Station to register an FIR and submit the final report. 6. From documents, it transpires that against the orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balodabazar, Criminal Revision was preferred before the learned Sessions Court and the same was dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baloda Bazar for the registration of FIRs were done in a cryptic, mechanical, and casual manner without applying the judicial mind. He would further submit that said orders violate the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Priyanka Shrivastava and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2015) 6 SCC 287 . Learned counsel further points out that in the first batch of cases, the complaint was initially made only before the Police, and after a considerable period (21 days to 4 and 1/2 months) complaint cases were filed. It is also stated that the father of respondent No. 1 has filed a civil suit. Learned counsel further points out that in the first batch of cases, the complaint was initially made only before the Police, and after a considerable period (21 days to 4 and 1/2 months) complaint cases were filed. It is also stated that the father of respondent No. 1 has filed a civil suit. He submits that from a perusal of the complaint case, it is evident that no complaint was made to the Superintendent of Police as mandated under Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. and affidavits were also not filed in support of the complaint cases. He submits that Priyanka Shrivastava (supra) judgment, though passed in 2015 but shall apply to complaint cases filed prior to the date of the said judgment. He placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Maksud Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 668 , Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2015 SC 1742 and Babu Venkatesh and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Another, (2022) 5 SCC 639 . 8. He further submits that change in law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court may be applied retrospectively and the impact of the change in law will affect the pending cases as the present petitions are a continuation of the complaint case filed by respondent No. 2. On this point, he has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Anant Gopal Sheorey vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915 , Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Others vs. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 , Darshan Singh vs. Ram Pal Singh and Another, AIR 1991 SC 1654 and University of Kerala and Others vs. Merlin J.N. and Another, AIR 2022 SC 5041 . 9. He also cited the principles of statutory interpretation authored by Justice G.P. Singh in “Principle of Statutory Interpretation, 11th Edition, 2008,” to demonstrate the position regarding retrospective operation of statute. 10. Lastly, he again highlights that this Court has previously quashed the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s order for the registration of FIRs in cases where complaint cases were filed before 2015, and placed reliance upon Amit Joshi vs. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR Online 2021 Chh. 86 and Sanjay Narang vs. Dr. Rashmi Priyanka Keshav Rao Dubey, AIR Online 2019 Chh. 1739 in support of his contention. 11. 86 and Sanjay Narang vs. Dr. Rashmi Priyanka Keshav Rao Dubey, AIR Online 2019 Chh. 1739 in support of his contention. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents would argue that the ratio laid down in the case of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra) is not an amendment in the Cr.P.C. They emphasize that from a bare reading of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. it is evident that there is no requirement to make a complaint before the Superintendent of Police before filing of a complaint case under Section 156(3) or 200 of the Cr.P.C. They further submit that there is no provision to file an affidavit in support of the complaint case under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and this was settled for the first time in the case of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra) to curb the increase in the filing of complaint cases under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. as mentioned in para-31 of the judgment. They further submit that in pursuance of the orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, FIRs have already been registered and the orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baloda Bazar, have been executed. They would rely on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India vs. Madras Telephone SC & ST Social Welfare Assn. (2006) 8 SCC 662 to support their contention. 12. They would further argue that matters that have already been decided cannot be reopened. On this point they rely on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 . They stated that the law laid down in the case of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra) was not in force at the time of the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baloda Bazar thus, the judgment would be prospective if not specifically provided so. Therefore, the petitions bereft of material substance are liable to be dismissed. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents with utmost circumspection. 14. After careful scrutiny of all the complaint cases, it is conspicuous that on account of a certain dispute complaints were made before the concerned Police Stations and thereafter, complaint cases under Sections 200, 202 and 156(3) Cr.P.C. were filed before the Court having territorial jurisdiction. 14. After careful scrutiny of all the complaint cases, it is conspicuous that on account of a certain dispute complaints were made before the concerned Police Stations and thereafter, complaint cases under Sections 200, 202 and 156(3) Cr.P.C. were filed before the Court having territorial jurisdiction. It is not in dispute that in relation to two matters, Civil Suit was filed, which is pending before the concerned Civil Court and High Court of Delhi respectively. In the complaint cases there are certain allegations of commission of certain offences. The concerned Magistrate after perusal of the contents of the complaint case; recorded its satisfaction and passed the order for registration of FIR against the petitioners. 15. Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. which is relevant for the disposal of the present petitions is reproduced herein-below: 156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case: (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned. 16. From a plain reading of Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. it is evident that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. has the authority to take cognizance of any offence based on the receipt of a complaint, facts mentioned in the police report, or upon information received from a source other than the police officer. Additionally, any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. may order an investigation into any cognizable offence. 17. Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. deals with information in cognizable cases, same is reproduced herein-below for ready reference: 154. Information in cognizable cases. Additionally, any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. may order an investigation into any cognizable offence. 17. Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. deals with information in cognizable cases, same is reproduced herein-below for ready reference: 154. Information in cognizable cases. (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read Over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence. 18. Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrates, it reads thus: 190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub- section (2), may take cognizance of any offence: (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. (b) upon a police report of such facts. (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. 19. (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. 19. In the matter of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra), the issue was with regard to appreciating applications under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. in a casual manner without any responsibility, especially when certain individuals choose to prosecute others by filing applications under Section 156(3) despite having other remedies available to them. The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized the need for Magistrates to carefully and responsibly examine such applications and not treat them lightly, considering the serious consequences on the accused persons. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra) has observed in Para 27 to 31 as under: “27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice and then he may pass the requisite order. The present is a case where the accused persons are serving in high positions in the bank. We are absolutely conscious that the position does not matter, for nobody is above law. But, the learned Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution covered under the SARFAESI Act, invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and also there is a separate procedure under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution and circumspection has to be adhered to. 28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the application” to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in the society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages the unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like the respondent no. 28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the application” to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in the society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages the unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like the respondent no. 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions on their knees. As the factual exposition would reveal, he had prosecuted the earlier authorities and after the matter is dealt with by the High Court in a writ petition recording a settlement, he does not withdraw the criminal case and waits for some kind of situation where he can take vengeance as if he is the emperor of all he surveys. It is interesting to note that during the tenure of the appellant No. 1, who is presently occupying the position of Vice-President, neither the loan was taken, nor the default was made, nor any action under the SARFAESI Act was taken. However, the action under the SARFAESI Act was taken on the second time at the instance of the present appellant No. 1. We are only stating about the devilish design of the respondent No. 3 to harass the appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment of loan. When a citizen avails a loan from a financial institution, it is his obligation to pay back and not play truant or for that matter play possum. As we have noticed, he has been able to do such adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction that he will not be taken to task because an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is a simple application to the court for issue of a direction to the investigating agency. We have been apprised that a carbon copy of a document is filed to show the compliance of Section 154(3), indicating it has been sent to the Superintendent of police concerned. 29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same. 30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. 31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.” In the case of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra), it was emphasized that an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. has to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the person who seeks the investigation, and the Magistrate has to verify the truthfulness and veracity of the allegations before taking any action. In Para 31, it was observed that before filing an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. there should be a prior application made under Section 154(1) and 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. This shows that the complainant should first approach the concerned Police Station and thereafter to the Superintendent of Police with the complaint before seeking the Magistrate’s intervention under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 21. Now, dealing with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the mechanical orders passed in all the cases by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baloda Bazar, on 22.11.2014 and 10.11.2014 for registration of FIRs. Now, dealing with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the mechanical orders passed in all the cases by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baloda Bazar, on 22.11.2014 and 10.11.2014 for registration of FIRs. The orders read thus: ^^22-11-2014 & ifjoknh lfgr vf/koDrk Jh tokgj tk;loky mifLFkrA ifjoknh }kjk ÁLrqr ifjokn i= dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA ifjokn esa tks rF; ÁdV gksrs gSa mu ij foLr`r vUos"k.k iqfyl ds }kjk fd;k tkuk mfpr Árhr gksrk gSA vr% ifjokn i= ds ,d Áfr /kkjk 156¼3½ naŒÁŒlaŒ ds rgr ÁFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ dj vUos"k.k mijkar vafre Áfrosnu ÁLrqr djus ds funsZ'k ds lkFk Fkkuk ÁHkkjh flVh dksrokyh cykSnkcktkj dks Ásf"kr fd;k tkosA ÁFke lwpuk Áfrosnu ntZ djus ds laca/k esa ,d lIrkg ds Hkhrj ikyu Áfrosnu fn;k tkosA ifjoknh dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og vius i{k leFkZu esa ÁLrqr nLrkost Fkkuk ÁHkkjh ds ikl ÁLrqr djsaA Ádj.k Áfrosnu gsrq fnukad 29-11-2014** ^^10-11-2014 & Ádj.k dk voyksdu Ádj.k lUKs; vijk/k gksuk Árhr gksrk gSA voyksdu ls Árhr gksrk gS fd vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo:} ÁFke n`"V;k vijk/k gksuk Árkar gksrk gSA vr% Ádj.k esa vko';d vUos"k.k fd;k tkuk vko';d gSA bl laca/k esa Fkkuk ÁHkkjh dks vko';d vUos"k.k gsrq Kkiu tkjh dj ;g vafdr djsa fd vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo:} ÁFke lwpuk i= ntZ dj foLr`r vUos"k.k mijkar vfHk;ksx i= U;k;ky; ds le{k is'k djsaA Ádj.k vko';d vUos"k.k mijkar vafre Áfrosnu gsrq fnukad 15-12-2014A** 22. From a bare reading of the aforementioned orders, it is evident that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed a mechanical order without application of mind. When exercising such power, the Magistrate must remain vigilant about the nature of allegations made in the application and should not issue directions without a proper application of mind and should verify the truth and veracity of the allegations made, considering their nature. The power under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked by a litigant at their whim to harass others; it can only be invoked by a principled and genuinely aggrieved citizen approaching the Court with clean hands. 23. In Maksud Saiyed (supra) it was observed that where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. In Ramdev Food Products (supra) similar proposition of law has been expounded. 23. In Maksud Saiyed (supra) it was observed that where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. In Ramdev Food Products (supra) similar proposition of law has been expounded. In Babu Venkatesh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court followed with approval the principles of law laid down in Priyanka Shrivastava (supra). 24. Now coming to the next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding application of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra). In the matter of Anant Gopal Sheorey (supra), it is held that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode and change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively. Para-4 of judgment of Anant Gopal Sheorey (supra) reads as under: “(4) The question that arises for decision is whether to a pending prosecution the provisions of the amended Code have become applicable. There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on p. 225; Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. vs. Irving, 1905 AC 369. In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective.” 25. In the matter of Lakshmi Narayan Guin (supra), while dealing with scope of change in law during the pendency of appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 9 as under: “9. In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective.” 25. In the matter of Lakshmi Narayan Guin (supra), while dealing with scope of change in law during the pendency of appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 9 as under: “9. That a change in the law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will govern the rights of the parties was laid down by this Court in Ram Sarup vs. Munshi, 1963) 3 SCR 858 : AIR 1963 SC 553 , which was followed by this Court in Mula vs. Godhu, 1970) 2 SCR 129 : AIR 1971 SC 89 . We may point out that in Dayawati vs. Inderjit, 1966) 3 SCR 275 : AIR 1966 SC 1423 at p. 1426 this Court observed: “If the new law speaks in language, which, expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance.” Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Amarjit Kaur vs. Pritam Singh, (1975) 1 SCR 605 : AIR 1974 SC 2068 where effect was given to a change in the law during the pendency of an appeal. relying on the proposition formulated as long ago as Kristnama Chariar vs. Mangammal, (1902) ILR 26 Mad. 91 (FB) by Bhashyam Iyengar J. that the hearing of an appeal was under the processual law of this country in the nature of a re-hearing of the suit. In Amarjit Kaur (supra) this Court referred also to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, 1940 FCR 84 : AIR 1941 FC 5 in which the Federal Court had laid down that once a decree passed by a Court had been appealed against the matter became sub-judice again and thereafter the appellate Court acquired seisin of the whole case. Except that for certain purposes, for example execution, the decree was regarded as final and the Court below retained jurisdiction.” 26. Except that for certain purposes, for example execution, the decree was regarded as final and the Court below retained jurisdiction.” 26. In the matter of Lakshmi Narayan Guin (supra), it is held that if during the pendency of appeal there is change in law, then the Court of appeal has to take into consideration such changes which would govern the rights of the parties. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Darshan Singh (supra), while dealing with the order of continuation in Para 34 held as under: “34. The meaning of the word ‘contest’ is, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, to make defence to an adverse claim in a Court of law; to oppose, resist or dispute; to strive to win or hold; to controvert, litigate, call in question, challenge to defend. The contest continues right up to the final decision or, in other words the right to contest comes to an end only when a final decision is given one way or the other putting an end to the litigation between the parties with regard to the alienation. It is well settled proposition of law that appeal is a continuation of a suit and any change in law, which has taken place between the date of the decree and the decision of the appeal has to be taken into consideration. When a suit filed by a reversioner is dismissed and he files an appeal then before the appellate Court also he is contesting the alienation. If he does not contest or challenge the alienation, then he cannot achieve success. Therefore, when the axe has fallen before the contest was over, let the axe lie where it falls.” 28. A bare reading of Para 34 of Darshan Singh (supra) makes it clear that the right to contest does not come to an end until a conclusive judgment is pronounced, either in favor of one party or the other, effectively concluding the litigation. It is a well-established principle of law that an appeal is taken as a continuation of the original case. Consequently, any changes in the law that occur between the date of the initial decree and the final decision of the appeal must be duly taken into consideration by the appellate court. 29. It is a well-established principle of law that an appeal is taken as a continuation of the original case. Consequently, any changes in the law that occur between the date of the initial decree and the final decision of the appeal must be duly taken into consideration by the appellate court. 29. In the matter of M.A. Murthy vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 2003 SC 3821 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 8 as under: “8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the approach of the High Court is erroneous as the law declared by this Court is presumed to be the law at all times. Normally, the decision of this Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases irrespective of its stage of pendency because it is assumed that what is enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in fact, the law from inception. The doctrine of prospective overruling which is a feature of American jurisprudence is an exception to the normal principle of law, was imported and applied for the first time in Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab. In ECIL vs. B. Karunakar the view was adopted. Prospective overruling is a part of the principles of constitutional canon of interpretation and can be resorted to by this Court while superseding the law declared by it earlier. It is a device innovated to avoid reopening of settled issues, to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, and to avoid uncertainty and avoidable litigation. In other words, actions taken contrary to the law declared prior to the date of declaration are validated in larger public interest. The law as declared applies to future cases. [See Ashok Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P. and Baburam vs. C.C. Jacob] It is for this Court to indicate as to whether the decision in question will operate prospectively. In other words, there shall be no prospective overruling, unless it is so indicated in the particular THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH W.P. No. 3257/2017 (State of M.P. vs. Maharaj Singh) decision. It is not open to be held that the decision in a particular case will be prospective in its application by application of the doctrine of prospective overruling. It is not open to be held that the decision in a particular case will be prospective in its application by application of the doctrine of prospective overruling. The doctrine of binding precedent helps in promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions and enables an organic development of the law besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequences of transactions forming part of the daily affairs. That being the position, the High Court was in error by holding that the judgment which operated on the date of selection was operative and not the review judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma case. All the more so when the subsequent judgment is by way of review of the first judgment in which case there are no judgments at all and the subsequent judgment rendered on review petitions is the one and only judgment rendered, effectively and for all purposes, the earlier decision having been erased by countenancing the review applications. The impugned judgments of the High Court are, therefore, set aside.” 30. In the matter of Laxmi Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-29 held as under: “29. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the said decision is not applicable: (a) as it was rendered in 2006 whereas the cause of action for filing the writ petition arose in 2002. (b) a distinction must be made between the appointment on ad hoc basis and appointment on compassionate ground. As to the first submission above, it is worth mentioning that judicial decisions unless otherwise specified are retrospective. They would only be prospective in nature if it has been provided therein. Such is clearly not the case in Umadevi (supra). Accordingly, even though the cause of action would have arisen in 2002 but the decision of Umadevi (supra) would squarely be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Secondly, before a person can claim a status of a government servant not only his appointment must be made in terms of the recruitment rules, he must otherwise fulfill the criterion therefor. Appointment made in violation of the constitutional scheme is a nullity. Rendition of service for a long time, it is well known, does not confer permanency. It is furthermore not a mode of appointment.” 31. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 11th Edn. Appointment made in violation of the constitutional scheme is a nullity. Rendition of service for a long time, it is well known, does not confer permanency. It is furthermore not a mode of appointment.” 31. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 11th Edn. 2008, Justice G.P. Singh has stated the position regarding retrospective operation of statutes as follows: “The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes. As stated in Craies and approved by the Supreme Court: For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a preamble, and also the word ‘declared’ as well as the word enacted. But the use of the words ‘it is declared’ is not conclusive that the Act is declaratory for these words may, at times, be used to introduce new rules of law and the Act in the latter case will only be amending the law and will not necessarily be retrospective. In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the Corm. If a new Act is ‘to explain’ an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended. The language ‘shall be deemed always to have meant’ or ‘shall be deemed never to have included’ is declaratory, and is in plain terms retrospective. In the absence of clear words indicating that the amending Act is declaratory, it would not be so construed when the amended provision was clear and unambiguous. An amending Act may be purely clarificatory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. In the absence of clear words indicating that the amending Act is declaratory, it would not be so construed when the amended provision was clear and unambiguous. An amending Act may be purely clarificatory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and, therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the constitution came into force, the amending Act also will be part of the existing law.” 32. In Amit Joshi (supra) as well as Sanjay Narang (supra) this Court following the law laid down in Priyanka Shrivastava (supra) set aside the mechanical orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate concerned. In the above decisions, the issue concerning the filing of affidavits in support of a complaint case filed under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. according to the law laid down in the case of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra), particularly in complaint cases filed prior to 2015, was neither raised nor considered. 33. Now dealing with the judgment cited by the counsel for the respondents. 34. In the matter of Madras Telephone SC&ST Social Welfare Assn. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Para-21 as under: “21. Having regard to the above observations and clarification we have no doubt that such of the applicants whose claim to seniority and consequent promotion on the basis of the principles laid down in the Allahabad High Court’s judgment in Parmanand Lal case have been upheld or recognised by the Court or the Tribunal by judgment and order which have attained finality will not be adversely affected by the contrary view now taken in the judgment Madras Telephones. Since the rights of such applicants were determined in a duly constituted proceeding, which determination has attained finality, a subsequent judgment of a court or Tribunal taking a contrary view will not adversely affect the applicants in whose cases the orders have attained finality. We order accordingly.” 35. In the matter of B. Karunakar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-44 has held as under: “44. The need to make the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan cases prospective in operation requires no emphasis. We order accordingly.” 35. In the matter of B. Karunakar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-44 has held as under: “44. The need to make the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan cases prospective in operation requires no emphasis. As pointed out above, in view of the unsettled position of the law on the subject, the authorities/managements all over the country had proceeded on the basis that there was no need to furnish a copy of the report of the enquiry officer to the delinquent employee and innumerable employees have been punished without giving them the copies of the reports. In some of the cases, the orders of punishment have long since become final while other cases are pending in courts at different stages. In many of the cases, the misconduct has been grave and in others the denial on the part of the management to furnish the report would ultimately prove to be no more than a technical mistake. To reopen all the disciplinary proceedings now would result in grave prejudice to administration which will far outweigh the benefit to the employees concerned. Both administrative reality and public interests do not, therefore, require that the orders of punishment passed prior to the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case without furnishing the report of the enquiry officer should be disturbed and the disciplinary proceedings which gave rise to the said orders should be reopened on that account. Hence we hold as above.” 36. Based on the above elaborative discussions, it can be summed up that: (i) The Magistrate while dealing with an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. (ii) Power under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. warrants application of judicial mind. (iii) There has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. while filing a petition under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. (iv) 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. (v) A change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective. (v) A change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective. (vi) A change in the law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will govern the rights of the parties. (vii) The case which has already been closed cannot be reopened. 37. It is not in dispute that the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered a judgment in the matter of Priyanka Shrivastava (supra) on 19.03.2015, making it mandatory for the first time to file an affidavit in support of an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and the petitioners counsel’s submission is that the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court applies retrospectively and will impact pending cases, while the learned counsels for the respondents contend that closed cases cannot be reopened. Based on the legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in above discussed decisions, it can safely be held that the matters that have been finalized and decided by the Court of law before 2015 cannot be reopened. However, the cases in which orders were passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrates prior to 2015 but the parties are continuing to contest the matter, and the matters that are still pending before the higher courts, would be considered as a continuation of the initial proceeding and in such cases, filing of an affidavit in support of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as held in the matter of Priyanka Shrivastava (Supra) shall apply with full force. 38. From a perusal of the documents annexed, it appears that Civil Suits regarding the land dispute are also pending before the Civil Court at Baloda Bazar and in the High Court of Delhi, which indicates that complainants have given a criminal hue to a civil dispute. 39. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the legal provisions discussed above, the impugned orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balodabazar, dated 10.11.2014 and 22.11.2014 are liable to be and are hereby set aside and subsequent FIRs registered against the petitioners are hereby quashed. Accordingly, the petitions are allowed.