ORDER : Ramesh Sinha, J. Heard Mr. Anil S. Pandey, learned Counsel for Petitioner. Also heard Mr. Avinash Singh, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for Respondent-State and Mr. T.K. Jha, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.2-Society. None appears for Respondent No.3/ Complainant/Victim, though served. 2. Challenge in the present Writ Petition is to the Order dated 25.9.2019 (Annexure P-1) passed in Criminal Appeal No.39/2019, whereby the Appellate Court i.e. the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatapara, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara has rejected the objections raised by the Petitioner with regard to the maintainability of the appeal filed by Respondent No.2 Society. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the Complainant/Victim i.e. Respondent No.3 Lakhan Baghmar had lodged a written report in the Police Station, Suhela alleging that Rs.5,30,000/- has been fraudulently withdrawn by some one from his Account No.624053030021 of District Sahakari Kendriya Maryadit Bank, Branch Bhatbhera by using his Kisaan Credit Card at Suhela SBI ATM and Hirmi SBI ATM centers between 14.6.2017 to 23.7.2017. Upon investigation, on the basis of CCTV footage and memorandum statements of the witnesses, the Petitioner was arrested and the matter was put to trial before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga, Distrit Balodabazar-Bhatapara for the charges under Sections 409, 418 of the Indian Penal Code. The Trial Court, by its judgment dated 3.2.2018, after considering the entire pleadings and the evidence, acquitted the Petitioner of the charges under Section 409, 418 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Thereafter, the said judgment dated 3.2.2018 passed by the Trial Court, was subjected to challenge before the Appellate Court in an appeal i.e., Criminal Appeal No.39/2019, filed by Respondent No.2 herein i.e. Primary Krishi Sakh Sahakari Gramin Sewa Samiti, Suhela, though the said Society was not a party before the Trial Court. However, the Appellate Court, by the impugned Order dated 25.9.2019, entertained the appeal filed by Respondent No.2 rejecting the objections that were put forth by the Petitioner in respect of the maintainability of the said appeal filed by Respondent No.2. Hence, the present Writ Petition has been filed by the Petitioner seeking for the following relief:- "10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the records from the Court below. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, thereby setting-aside/quashing the impugned Order dated 25.9.2019 (Annexure P-1). Hence, the present Writ Petition has been filed by the Petitioner seeking for the following relief:- "10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the records from the Court below. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, thereby setting-aside/quashing the impugned Order dated 25.9.2019 (Annexure P-1). 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the entire proceedings of acquittal appeal pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatapara, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara in Criminal Appeal No.39/2019. 10.4 That, any other relief/order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including the award of the cost of the petition may be given." 5. Contention of learned Counsel for Petitioner primarily is that the impugned Order passed by the Appellate Court is unjust, illegal and bad in law, for the reason that the Respondent No.2 was not a party to the proceeding before the Trial Court and the Respondent No.2 as such has no locus to file the appeal against the judgment passed by the Trial Court. The said judgment was not even challenged by the State or by the Complainant/Victim himself and the Respondent No.2 was not at all an aggrieved party to the said proceeding. The Respondent No.2 had not even filed any application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Trial Court before the Appellant Court. 6. Further contention of learned Counsel for Petitioner is that the Respondent No.2 Society has filed the said appeal through Shri Dhwaja Ram Sahu in the capacity of his being the Branch Manager of the said Society. The Respondent No.2 has been described as witness by the Prosecution in the proceeding before the Trial Court and the statement of Shri Dhwaja Ram Sahu was recorded before the Police. Therefore, the Respondent No.2 cannot be in any manner said to be a "victim" in view of Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel for Petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of "National Commission of Women Vs. State of Delhi & Another" reported in 2011 Cr.L.J. 962. 7. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel for Petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of "National Commission of Women Vs. State of Delhi & Another" reported in 2011 Cr.L.J. 962. 7. On the other hand, learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 Society submits that since the Petitioner was an employee of the Society and the Credit Card of the Complainant/Victim was stolen from the possession of the Society, the Manager of the Respondent No.2 Society would come under the definition of "victim" in view of Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore he was competent person to file the said appeal and the Appellate Court has not committed any illegality or infirmity while entertaining the appeal filed by the Respondent No.2. In support of this contentions, learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "Jagjeet Singh & Others Vs. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Another" reported in 2022 SCC OnLine 453. 8. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of record, it would be relevant at this juncture to take note of the definition of "victim" as provided under Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which for ready reference is being reproduced herein under:- "2.(wa) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression “victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir." 9. From the plain perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the Respondent No.2 Society is not covered under the definition of "victim". It is not in dispute that the Respondent No.2 was not a party to the proceeding before the Trial Court. The Respondent No.2 also does not appear to be a victim or an aggrieved person but was only a witness in the said case. There is no fact or foundation that may indicate any loss having been suffered by the Respondent No.2. Therefore, the Respondent No.2, in our opinion, does not fall within the definition either as a guardian, legal heir or victim himself, more so when the Complainant/Victim himself has not come forward to file the appeal. There is no fact or foundation that may indicate any loss having been suffered by the Respondent No.2. Therefore, the Respondent No.2, in our opinion, does not fall within the definition either as a guardian, legal heir or victim himself, more so when the Complainant/Victim himself has not come forward to file the appeal. Even before this Court, the Complainant/Victim did not care to come forward and put forth his contentions/objections, if any, though he has been duly served. 10. Furthermore, the Trial Court has not find any evidence worth the name to prosecute the Petitioner, but that is a different matter altogether which can be looked into when the appeal is filed by an aggrieved person or any other person who may fall within the definition of the word "victim", as aforesaid. The right of filing the appeal, as has been conferred under section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been given to a victim who has been defined under section 2(wa) to mean a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression "victim" includes his or her guardian or legal heir. It cannot be said that the Respondent No.2 would be any person, who could be considered to have suffered any loss or injury. In the aforesaid circumstances, we prima facie do not find any locus of the Respondent No.2 to file the appeal against the judgment of the Trial Court acquitting the Petitioner of the charges levelled against him. 11. The aforesaid view of this Court stands fortified by the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "National Commission of Women Vs. State of Delhi & Another" (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:- "8. In P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalm And Another (1980) 3 SCC 141 , this Court was dealing with the locus standi of a private person in this case a victim's brother, who was neither a complainant nor a first informant in the criminal case but had filed a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalm And Another (1980) 3 SCC 141 , this Court was dealing with the locus standi of a private person in this case a victim's brother, who was neither a complainant nor a first informant in the criminal case but had filed a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This Court observed that the strictest vigilance was required to be maintained to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court, more particularly, in criminal matters, and ordinarily a private party other than the complainant, should not be permitted to file an appeal under Article 136, though the broad scope of the Article postulated an exception in suitable cases. It was spelt out as under:- "7. Specificity being essential to legality, let us if the broad spectrum spread out of Article 136 fills the bill from the point of view of "procedure established by law". In express terms, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. The discretionary dimension is considerable but that relates to the power of the court. The question is whether it spells by implication, afair procedure as contemplated by Article 21. In our view, it does. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This Court functionally fulfills itself by reaching out to injustice wherever it is and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Article 136. Is it merely a power in the court to be exercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no procedural limitation in the manner of exercise and the occasion for exercise? Is there no duty to act fairly while hearing a case under Article 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or, after such grant, in the final disposal of the appeal? We have hardly any doubt that there is a procedure necessarily implicit in the power vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Article 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. We have hardly any doubt that there is a procedure necessarily implicit in the power vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Article 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding fathers unarguably intended in the very terms of Article 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of th land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well established by precedents in our jurisprudence. Judicial discretion is canalised authority, not arbitrary eccentricity." The Court then examined the implications of completely shutting out a private party from filing a petition under Article 136 on the locus standi and observed thus: "Having said this, we must emphasise that we are living in times when many societal pollutants create new problems of unredressed grievance when the State becomes the sole repository for initiation o criminal action. Sometimes, pachydermic indifference of bureaucratic officials, at other times politicisation of higher functionaries may result in refusal to take a case to this Court under Article 136 even though the justice of lis may well justify it. While "the criminal law should not be used as a weapon in personal vendettas between private individuals", as Lord Shawcross once wrote, in the absence of an independent prosecution authority easily accessible to every citizen, a wider connotation of the expression 'standing' is necessary for Article 136 to further its mission." "9. A reading of the aforesaid excerpts from the two judgments would reveal that while an appeal by a private individual can be entertained but it should be done sparingly and after due vigilance and particularly in a case where the remedy has been shut out for the victims due to malafides on the part of the state functionaries or due to inability of the victims to approach the Court. In the present matter, we find that neither the State which is the complainant nor the heirs of the deceased have chosen to file a petition in the High Court. As this responsibility has been taken up by the Commission at its own volition this is clearly not permissible in the light of the aforesaid judgments." 12. In the present matter, we find that neither the State which is the complainant nor the heirs of the deceased have chosen to file a petition in the High Court. As this responsibility has been taken up by the Commission at its own volition this is clearly not permissible in the light of the aforesaid judgments." 12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the legal proposition propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "National Commission of Women" (supra), we do not find force in the contention raised by learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 that the Respondent No.2 would come under the definition of "victim" as defined under Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Respondent No.2, therefore, had no locus to file the said appeal before the Appellate Court against the judgment of the Trial Court and the said appeal clearly was not maintainable. 13. So far as the judgment cited by learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 in support of his contentions, referred to in the preceding paragraph, perusal of the facts of the said case would reveal that the said judgment has been passed under entirely different factual background and in exercise of altogether different jurisdiction. 14. Consequently, the impugned Order dated 25.9.2019 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatapara, District Balodabazar- Bhatapara in Criminal Appeal No.39/2019 as well as the entire proceeding of the said Criminal Appeal both stand quashed/set-aside. 15. The Writ Petition, accordingly, stands allowed. No costs.