ORDER : Nisha M. Thakore, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 7.2.2017 passed by the learned 7th Additional District Judge, Vadodara in Civil Miscellaneous Application No.96 of 2015 under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), whereby, learned Additional District Judge has dismissed the application filed by the present appellant under Section 34 of the Act challenging the preliminary award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal (Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C.K. Thakker, Retired) dated 30.11.2013. 2. The case of the appellant in short as reproduced in the memo of appeal is summarized as under: 2.1. The father of the present appellant viz. Shri Pravinchandra Shah and father of the respondent no.1 late Shri Vasantlal and mother of respondent no.2 late Smt. Chandrakantaben were real brothers and sister. The parties are thus first cousins. 2.2. In the year 1981, the aforesaid parties have started with a partnership firm in the name of Unik Industries wherein originally four partners were engaged viz. (1) Shri Kiritkumar C Shah (Respondent no.2) (2) Shri Chetanbhai V. Shah, (3) Shri Atulbhai P. Shah (Appellant) and (4) Shri Pareshkumar V. Shah (Respondent no.1). Subsequently, one of the partner viz. Shri Chetanbhai Shah who was the cousin of the present appellant and the respondent, chose to retire as a partner and had left the partnership firm w.e.f. 30.11.1994 leaving the partnership firm to be continued by three partners having equal share and rights in the business. For which a fresh partnership deed came to be executed between the appellant and respondents on 16.2.1995. 2.3. The aforesaid partnership firm was engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling of machinery spares and other engineering products and the factory premises was located at 893/2, GIDC, Makarpura, Vadodara. It is the case of the appellant that though three partners were there, however the affairs and management of the firm was mainly looked after solely by the present appellant. 2.4. It is contended by the appellant that the additional structure was raised behind the existing factory premises, which was given on rent initially to M/s. Castex Industries, which was in fact run and managed by father of the respondent no.1. 2.4. It is contended by the appellant that the additional structure was raised behind the existing factory premises, which was given on rent initially to M/s. Castex Industries, which was in fact run and managed by father of the respondent no.1. The said additional structure was subsequently vacated way back in the year 1996-97 and the rent amount was cleared till period for which was used by the said firm. 2.5. Thereafter, the said portion of the property was handed over to M/s. Ganesh Computer Forms Pvt. Ltd way back in the year 1998-99 on rental basis and the rental amount was paid by the said firm regularly through cheque in the name of partnership firm. It is contended by the appellant that the regular books of account were maintained. It is further contended that separate electricity connection has also been availed by the said firm and sale tax registration under the SSI under said address of the rented premises has been obtained by the said firm. 2.6. The dispute seems to have started in the year 2007 as contended by the appellant when the respondent no.1 on one or the other pretext inspite of receipt of his share from the partnership firm started harassing the appellant. It is contended by the appellant that initially unsecured loans and financial assistance availed towards security of the house of firm. The appellant claims to have cleared such outstanding loans from the banks pursuant to the efforts of him and by the end of financial year 2006-07 all the outstanding dues were cleared and the partnership firm was free of it’s liability. However, with a mala fide and ulterior motive the respondent started to harass the appellant with an intention to secure more money from the partnership firm. It is contended by the appellant that all through these years respondent no.1had settled in Mumbai and respondent no.2 was based in USA. 2.7. On 17.3.2008 the respondent no.1 by letter addressed to the partnership firm sought retirement from the business of the partnership firm w.e.f. 18.5.2008. It is contended by the appellant that all through these years respondent no.1had settled in Mumbai and respondent no.2 was based in USA. 2.7. On 17.3.2008 the respondent no.1 by letter addressed to the partnership firm sought retirement from the business of the partnership firm w.e.f. 18.5.2008. It is the case of the appellant that though the respondent no.1 had retired from the said firm, however had not returned his capital and share in the partnership firm and on the other hand, the appellant herein had continued to give his share of an income from the partnership firm which is evident from the correspondence as well as accounts of the firm. It is further contended that in absence of any further letter seeking withdrawal of his intention to retire, the respondent no.1 stood retired from the said partnership firm w.e.f. 18.5.2008. 2.8. It is the case of the appellant that inspite of the aforesaid circumstances, the respondent no.1 with mala fide intention and ulterior motive, preferred an application under Section 9 of the Act before the learned Principal District Judge, Vadodara. In the said proceedings, initially no order was passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Vadodara. Subsequently, the appellant was served with a letter dated 17.5.2011 informing about the appointment of Mr. V.K. Bhatt, Advocate as sole arbitrator and further informing about first preliminary meeting to be scheduled on 2.6.2011. The appellant had appeared before the learned Arbitrator and had objected to his appointment. On the other hand, the respondent on the very first meeting submitted the statement of claim before the learned Arbitrator, which was accepted, however no order was passed. It is further contended by the appellant that considering serious objection raised, Mr. V.K. Bhatt had subsequently withdrew himself from conducting arbitration proceedings. 2.9. In such circumstances, the respondents had approached this Court by instituting proceedings under Section 11 of the Act, which came to be registered as Arbitration Application No.2 of 2012. Upon hearing the respective parties, this Hon’ble Court by order dated 24.2.2012 allowed the said application preferred by the respondents seeking appointment of sole arbitrator and referred the dispute between the parties to Hon’ble Mr. Justice C K Thakker (Retired) to resolve the disputes arising out of the partnership agreement between the appellant and respondents. 2.10. Upon hearing the respective parties, this Hon’ble Court by order dated 24.2.2012 allowed the said application preferred by the respondents seeking appointment of sole arbitrator and referred the dispute between the parties to Hon’ble Mr. Justice C K Thakker (Retired) to resolve the disputes arising out of the partnership agreement between the appellant and respondents. 2.10. The matter was taken up by the learned Arbitrator whereby notice came to be issued on 5.3.2012 thereby informing about the preliminary / first meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal, which was fixed on 22.3.2012. The appellant and respondents appeared before the learned Arbitrator. On 5.4.2012, the respondents had submitted their statement of claim whereby the prayer was made for dissolution of the partnership firm along with all consequential reliefs. The aforesaid statement of claim was seriously objected by the appellant by tendering written statement as well as counter claim was raised by the appellant on 14.6.2012. It was mainly contended by the appellant that the partnership firm had suffered business loss of an amount of Rs.4,63,940/- because of the illegal act of the respondent and therefore, had prayed for such amount with 9% interest to be realized from the respondents. The parties were permitted to lead their evidence and were duly cross-examined by the advocates representing them. After considering the record as well as hearing the learned advocates representing the parties, learned Arbitrator proceeded to frame issues on 8.9.2012. 2.11. The learned Arbitrator after hearing the argument of the advocate for both the sides chose to pass preliminary award on 30.11.2013. It is contended by the appellant that though all the issues have been dealt with by the learned Arbitrator, however for the reasons best known to the learned Arbitrator chose to pass preliminary award in respect of issue nos. 1 to 5 and rest of the issues were directed to be decided as per the final award. It is further contended by the appellant that having chosen to pass preliminary award, the learned Arbitrator has declared the partnership firm in the name and style of Unik Industries to stand dissolved w.ef. 22.3.2012. However, so far as rest of the issues though answered at preliminary stage were subjected to the outcome of the final award. With further direction to the appellant to render true and correct account of the business of the partnership firm upto 22.3.2012. 22.3.2012. However, so far as rest of the issues though answered at preliminary stage were subjected to the outcome of the final award. With further direction to the appellant to render true and correct account of the business of the partnership firm upto 22.3.2012. The learned Arbitrator directed the appellant to file statement of account within a period of 8 weeks from the date of order after servicing copy thereof to the advocate for the respondents. The operative part of the aforesaid order dated 30.11.2013 passed by the learned Arbitrator reads as under : “1. It is hereby declared that the partnership firm in the name and style of M/s. Unik Industries, 893/ 2, GIDC Makarpura, Vadodara stands dissolved on and with effect from 22 March 2012. 2. The respondents is directed to render true and correct accounts of the business of the partnership firm in the name and style of M/s Unik Industries up to 22 March 2012. 3. The respondent will file Statement of Accounts as aforesaid, within eight weeks from to day after serving a copy thereof to the claimants/ claimants’ Advocate. 4. In case, the respondent fails to file Statement of Account as aforesaid, it will be open to the claimants to file Statement of Accounts after serving a copy thereof to the respondent/ respondent’s Advocate within eight weeks thereafter. 5. The matter shall then be considered by the Tribunal on such Statement of Accounts on merits for passing Final Award in accordance with law. 6. The matter is ordered to be kept on 12 April 2014.” 2.12. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the preliminary award issued by the learned Arbitral Tribunal dated 30.11.2013, the appellant preferred an application under Section 34 of the Act before the learned 7th Additional District Judge, Vadodara, which came to be numbered as Civil Miscellaneous Application No.96 of 2015. Though, the respondents chose not to file any reply, a separate application under Section 34(4) of the Act came to be filed vide Exh.7 in the aforesaid proceedings. The appellant had replied to such application of the respondents and the matter was kept for orders. The application of the respondents came to be rejected by order dated 6.10.2016. Though, the respondents chose not to file any reply, a separate application under Section 34(4) of the Act came to be filed vide Exh.7 in the aforesaid proceedings. The appellant had replied to such application of the respondents and the matter was kept for orders. The application of the respondents came to be rejected by order dated 6.10.2016. It is contended by the appellant that since the matter was adjourned on various occasions for orders the appellant and his advocate were under the impression that the matter is still retained for orders on the application Exh.7. However, to the shock and surprise of the appellant on 7.2.2017 when the advocate representing appellant was not present and in absence of the appellant, the learned Judge proceeded to decide the Civil Miscellaneous Application No.96 of 2015 on merits and dismissed such application by order dated 7.2.2017. 2.13. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the ex-parte order dated 7.2.2017 passed by the learned 7th Additional District Judge, Vadodara in Civil Miscellaneous Application No.96 of 2015, the appellant preferred an application under Order IX Rule 5 to 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking quashment of the aforesaid ex-parte order. The learned 10th Additional District Judge, Vadodara without appreciating the facts of the case once again proceeded to dismiss such application by the reasoned order after hearing the parties at length on 25.4.2018. Thus, the appellant being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the aforesaid order dated 25.4.2018 passed in CMA No.97 of 2017 as well as order dated 7.2.2017 passed in CMA No.96 of 2015 has approached this Court. Initially, the appellant had preferred writ petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No.17094 of 2018 on 11.5.2018, which according to the appellant was precisely filed within 16 days of the passing of the impugned order. Subsequently, having realized that the appeal would be maintainable against such order, the aforesaid writ petition was sought to be withdrawn on 12.10.2021 with a liberty to file appeal under Section 37 of the Act. Hence, this appeal. 3. It transpires from the record that the present appeal was filed on 22.10.2021 with office objections. Initially, time was granted to remove the office objection within stipulated time by order dated 21.7.2022. However, appellant failed to remove such office objection rendering the appeal as dismissed for non removal of office objection. Hence, this appeal. 3. It transpires from the record that the present appeal was filed on 22.10.2021 with office objections. Initially, time was granted to remove the office objection within stipulated time by order dated 21.7.2022. However, appellant failed to remove such office objection rendering the appeal as dismissed for non removal of office objection. Subsequently, Miscellaneous Civil Application for restoration No.1 of 2022 came to be filed by the appellant. Such application filed by the appellant was allowed by order dated 14.11.2022 thereby restoring the First Appeal to its original file on condition to remove the office objection within stipulated time period. During this period, the delay of 1061 days has crept in. The Civil Application No.3364 of 2022 was heard by this Court and considering the aforesaid circumstances, this Court by order dated 22.3.2023 condoned the delay and First Appeal was placed for admission hearing before this Court. 4. Mr. Tarak Damani, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Anshul Shah, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondents-original claimants. 4.1 At the outset, Mr. Damani, learned advocate has invited our attention to the findings recorded by the learned District Judge. He submitted that without entering into the merits of the case put forward in application under Section 34, the learned District Judge on erroneous ground refused to entertain the application by holding that by passing preliminary award no right or liability of either of the party is decided thereby disposing the application under Section 34 as not maintainable. 4.2 While finding fault about the manner in which the learned Arbitrator chose to pass preliminary award, though having made up his mind by answering issue nos. 1 to 5 and rest of the issues though being answered, being subjected to the final award, he urged for the admission of the present appeal. Mr. Damani, learned advocate has invited our attention to the facts of the case and has referred to the issues framed by the Arbitral Tribunal. 4.3 He has further taken us to the findings and reasons recorded by the learned Arbitrator and has submitted that the claimants – respondents herein for the facts stated herein above had no locus standi to initiate such proceedings before the learned Arbitrator, more particularly, when the respondent no.1 had already resigned from the partnership firm as evident from the letter dated 17.3.2008. He has further invited our attention to the order passed by the learned District Judge who according to the appellant had erred in not considering the fact that respondent no.1 had not only represented his case but in capacity of power of attorney holder of the respondent no.2, had invoked the arbitration proceedings. In such circumstances, in absence of any verification of Statement of Claim on behalf of respondent no.2, the same was not maintainable in eye of law. 4.4 He further contended that the statement of claim must be signed and verified by the claimants. On merits, challenging the preliminary award, he submitted that the partnership firm was a “Partnership at Will” and the resignation tendered by the respondent no.1 having been accepted by the appellant, no proceedings at the behest of the respondent no.1 was maintainable. 4.5 He further submitted that the learned Additional District Judge as well as Arbitrator ought to have appreciated that in the facts of the present case serious disputed question of fact had arose for consideration which can be adjudicated only when the evidence comes on record. In such circumstances, the learned Arbitrator ought not to have passed preliminary award. 4.6 Mr. Damani, learned advocate for the appellant has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Karan Paper Mills vs. M/s. Shah Paper Pack Industries reported in 2023 (1) GLH 1. Relying upon para 9 of the aforesaid decision, Mr. Damani urged this Court while examining the order passed by the Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Act dealing with rejection of order by Arbitrator under Section 16 of the Act, by referring to the Hon’ble Apex Court decision in the case of Deep Industries Ltd. Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and Anr. reported in (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1602 has set aside interim award was passed by the Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Act without going through the drill of Section 16(5) and 16(6) of the Act. He therefore, urged this Court that present case may be considered in light of the aforesaid decision and prayed for admission of the appeal. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Anshul Shah, learned advocate for the respondents has opposed the present appeal and requested to dismiss the present appeal. 6. We have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties at length. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Anshul Shah, learned advocate for the respondents has opposed the present appeal and requested to dismiss the present appeal. 6. We have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties at length. Having noticed the facts of the case, admittedly the challenge in the present appeal is to the preliminary award dated 30.11.2013 passed by the learned Arbitrator against the respondent – appellant herein. By such award, learned Arbitrator has dissolved the partnership firm in the name and style of Unik Industries w.e.f. 22.3.2012 which is the first date of hearing fixed before the learned Arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator has further directed the respondent to render true and correct account of the business of the partnership firm in the name and style of Unik Industries upto 22.3.2012. The respondents are further directed to file statement of account for which time of 8 weeks was given and the matter was thereafter to proceed before the Arbitrator on merits for passing final award in accordance with law. We have carefully gone through the preliminary award drawn by the learned Arbitrator while passing such preliminary award, the Tribunal has taken into consideration the proposed issues by both the parties and has ultimately framed the issues as narrated in the award. Issues nos. 1 to 5 reads as under : “I. Whether this Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain, deal with and decide the dispute in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in N. Radhkrishnan vs. M/s. Maestro Engineers & Co. (2010) 1 SCC 72 ? II. Whether the Statement of Claim filed by the claimants is maintainable at law ? III. Whether Claimants have locus standi to file a claim petition? IV. Whether the claimants can ask for dissolution of partnership firm? V. Whether the claimants have made out a case that dissolution of partnership firm is the only solution of disputes between the parties?” 6.1. These issues mainly relates to the maintainability of the claim before the Arbitral Tribunal. The learned Arbitrator has carefully taken into consideration the objections raised by the respondent- present appellant and has dealt with such objections by giving cogent reasons. We could notice that the main allegations raised by the respondent relates to the respondent way of doing business ignoring rights of the other partners and his liabilities in accordance with the provision of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. We could notice that the main allegations raised by the respondent relates to the respondent way of doing business ignoring rights of the other partners and his liabilities in accordance with the provision of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. In substance, the learned Tribunal concluded that the partnership in the instant case is “Partnership at Will” and therefore, considering the provisions of Partnership Act, it is held that the partnership firm can be dissolved at the instance of any of the partners of such firm. It is in this peculiar facts, the learned Arbitrator has held the arbitration proceedings being maintainable and the ratio laid down in the case of N. Radhkrishnan vs. Mesto Engineers & Co reported in (2010) 1 SCC 72 being not applicable in the facts of the present case. So far as maintainability of the claim at the behest of the respondent no.2 through respondent no.1 as power of attorney holder is concerned, the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Travancore vs. Kingstone Computers (I) Pvt. Ltd reported in (2011) 11 SCC 524 was distinguished. 6.2 The learned Arbitrator on facts had noticed that in the present case the statement of claim was forwarded for verification by Email to respondent no.2 which was duly affirmed in the form of affidavit dated 26.6.2012. In such circumstances, the statement of claim were treated as duly verified and affirmed by the claimants and were therefore, held maintainable. 6.3 On the issue of locus standi, the learned Arbitrator noticed that admittedly both the claimants are partners to the partnership firm, of which, dissolution is sought for. Hence, the said issue was answered in favour of the claimants. 6.4 In respect of issue of dissolution of partnership firm. The learned Arbitrator has followed the legal principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V H Patel & Company vs. Hirubhai Hemabhai Patel reported in (2000) 4 SCC 368 and was convinced that the Arbitral Tribunal can exercise such powers which can be exercised by the Civil Court including dissolution of the partnership firm. 6.5 Lastly, the learned Arbitrator has proceeded to answer issue no.5 as regard maintainability of the proceedings for dissolution of the partnership firm in the facts of the present case. 6.5 Lastly, the learned Arbitrator has proceeded to answer issue no.5 as regard maintainability of the proceedings for dissolution of the partnership firm in the facts of the present case. The learned Arbitrator has taken into consideration the clause 1 to 5 of the partnership deed executed between the parties on 16.2.1995 as well as clause 9 to 14 of the said deed. The learned Tribunal has also examined the relevant provisions of the Partnership Act. Upon appreciation of the terms of the partnership deed, the learned Tribunal has formed opinion that the partnership in the instant case is “Partnership at Will” and considering Section 43 of the Partnership Act such firm can be dissolved by giving notice of dissolution to other partners. Thus, learned Arbitrator has answered the said issues in favour of the claimants. 7. In view of the aforesaid reasons recorded by the learned Arbitrator and having carefully considered the preliminary award, we are of the firm view that the reason and finding recorded by the learned Arbitrator does not makes in susceptible to be treated as ‘patent illegality’ as discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Apt would be to refer to relevant observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited reported in (2022) 1 SCC 131 . The same are reproduced as under : “28. This Court has in several other judgments interpreted Section 34 of the 1996 Act to stress on the restraint to be shown by courts while examining the validity of the arbitral awards. The limited grounds available to courts for annulment of arbitral awards are well known to legally trained minds. However, the difficulty arises in applying the well-established principles for interference to the facts of each case that come up before the courts. There is a disturbing tendency of courts setting aside arbitral awards, after dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the cases to come to a conclusion that the award needs intervention and thereafter, dubbing the award to be vitiated by either perversity or patent illegality, apart from the other grounds available for annulment of the award. This approach would lead to corrosion of the object of the 1996 Act and the endeavours made to preserve this object, which is minimal judicial interference with arbitral awards. This approach would lead to corrosion of the object of the 1996 Act and the endeavours made to preserve this object, which is minimal judicial interference with arbitral awards. That apart, several judicial pronouncements of this Court would become a dead letter if arbitral awards are set aside by categorising them as perverse or patently illegal without appreciating the contours of the said expressions. 29. Patent illegality should be illegality which goes to the root of the matter. In other words, every error of law committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression ‘patent illegality’. Likewise, erroneous application of law cannot be categorised as patent illegality. In addition, contravention of law not linked to public policy or public interest is beyond the scope of the expression ‘patent illegality’. What is prohibited is for courts to reappreciate evidence to conclude that the award suffers from patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, as courts do not sit in appeal against the arbitral award. The permissible grounds for interference with a domestic award under Section 34(2-A) on the ground of patent illegality is when the arbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible one, or interprets a clause in the contract in such a manner which no fair-minded or reasonable person would, or if the arbitrator commits an error of jurisdiction by wandering outside the contract and dealing with matters not allotted to them. An arbitral award stating no reasons for its findings would make itself susceptible to challenge on this account. The conclusions of the arbitrator which are based on no evidence or have been arrived at by ignoring vital evidence are perverse and can be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Also, consideration of documents which are not supplied to the other party is a facet of perversity falling within the expression ‘patent illegality’. 30. Section 34 (2) (b) refers to the other grounds on which a court can set aside an arbitral award. If a dispute which is not capable of settlement by arbitration is the subject-matter of the award or if the award is in conflict with public policy of India, the award is liable to be set aside. Explanation (1), amended by the 2015 Amendment Act, clarified the expression ‘public policy of India’ and its connotations for the purposes of reviewing arbitral awards. Explanation (1), amended by the 2015 Amendment Act, clarified the expression ‘public policy of India’ and its connotations for the purposes of reviewing arbitral awards. It has been made clear that an award would be in conflict with public policy of India only when it is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in violation of Section 75 or Section 81 of the 1996 Act, if it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or if it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. 31. In Ssangyong (supra), this that the meaning of the expression ‘fundamental policy of Indian law’ would be in accordance with the understanding of this Court in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. In Renusagar (supra), this Court observed that violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, a statute enacted for the ‘national economic interest’, and disregarding the superior courts in India would be antithetical to the fundamental policy of Indian law. Contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or public interest cannot be a ground to set at naught an arbitral award as being discordant with the fundamental policy of Indian law and neither can it be brought within the confines of ‘patent illegality’ as discussed above. In other words, contravention of a statute only if it is linked to public policy or public interest is cause for setting aside the award as being at odds with the fundamental policy of Indian law. If an arbitral award shocks the conscience of the court, it can be set aside as being in conflict with the most basic notions of justice. The ground of morality in this context has been interpreted by this Court to encompass awards involving elements of sexual morality, such as prostitution, or awards seeking to validate agreements which are not illegal but would not be enforced given the prevailing mores of the day.” 8. We are conscious of the scope of the present appeal invoking Section 37 of the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in various decisions has time and again by judicial pronouncement has elucidated the principle for interference with an arbitral award by Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. We are conscious of the scope of the present appeal invoking Section 37 of the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in various decisions has time and again by judicial pronouncement has elucidated the principle for interference with an arbitral award by Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Considering the laudable object of the Act which aims to bring domestic as well as international commercial arbitration in consonance with Uncitral Model Rules, New York Convention and Geneva Convention with an object to make provision for an arbitral procedure which may prove more fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration and to pronounce the supervisory role of the Court in the arbitration process and to permit Arbitral Tribunal to use mediation, conciliation or other procedure during the arbitral proceedings in order to settle the dispute, we refrain ourselves to exercise the powers under Section 37 of the Act at this stage of challenge to the preliminary award. The Hon’ble Supreme Court on number of occasions has disapproved the judicial interference by the Courts against the arbitral award and has desired the High Courts to adhere to the mandate strictly in accordance with law and within the confines of Section 34, thereby to refrain from the appreciation or re-appreciation of matters on facts as well as on law. In our opinion, no ground is made out by the appellant pointing out patent illegality while challenging the aforesaid preliminary award drawn by the learned Arbitrator. So far as the submission made by the learned advocate on the approach of learned District Judge while deciding application under Section 34 of the Act is concerned, we are of the view that as discussed earlier the issue Nos.1to 5 mainly dealt with maintainability of Arbitral proceedings rather claim of the respondent which in no manner finally adjudicate on the rights of the parties. This Court is of the view that said objections, set out by the appellant in the arbitration proceedings can always be considered later by Court when the parties challenge the final award passed by the learned Arbitrator under Section 34 of the Act. 9. For the foregoing reasons, we are not inclined to entertain the present appeal. Hence, present appeal fails summarily at admission stage. In view of the order passed in First Appeal, Civil Application also stands dismissed.