JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the Shri H.R. Mishra, learned counsel assisted by Shri Krishna Mohan Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. 2. Petitioners by the instant writ petition seek a direction to the State/respondent competent authority to release 3,480 square feet of land of arazi (khasra) No. 24, situated in Village-Muhai Sugharpur, Tappa Haveli, Post Haveli, (Parwatia Shivpuri Colony), Tehsil Sadar, District Gorakhpur, declared surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (for short ‘Act’) in view of the Repeal Act No. 15 of 1999, w.e.f. 31 March 1999. 3. The facts giving rise to the instant writ petition, as pleaded are that the petitioners are subsequent purchasers of the land declared excess, i.e. arazi khasra No. 24. The original land owner was one Ram Kisun, son of Kodai, duly recorded in the revenue record. 4. It appears the original land owner submitted statement under Section 6(1) of the Act, being case No. 3658, wherein, khasra No. 62 and 85 at Village-Chilmapur; khasra No. 42 and 43 at Village-Mohai Sugharpur, and khasra No. 43 and 44, at Mirzapur, was filed in the return, including the residential building. Upon survey and inspection, a draft statement came to be prepared under Section 8(1) which was duly served upon the land owner on 17 June 1979, by registered post which appears to have return undelivered, consequently, another notice along with the draft statement was issued on 3 June 1981, duly served on the land owner on 25 June 1981. The land owner did not file any objections with respect to the draft statement. The competent authority noted that the name of the original land owner is recorded in khasra No. 24 of Village-Mohai Sugharpur. Similarly, in respect of other plots, the competent authority passed an order under Section 8(4). Thereafter, final statement came to be issued under Section 9 on 24 August 1981. After the stage of Section 9 of the Act, notifications under Section 10(1) was published in the State Gazette on 17 July 1982, followed by notification under Section 10(3) on 28 July 1990. Consequently, the excess vacant land came to vest with the State, including, khasra No. 24. Thereafter, notice came to be issued under Section 10(5) by the competent authority on 19 December 1992. Consequently, the excess vacant land came to vest with the State, including, khasra No. 24. Thereafter, notice came to be issued under Section 10(5) by the competent authority on 19 December 1992. The authorized representative of the competent authority on 3 August 1996, had taken possession of the surplus vacant land from the original land owner. 5. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition, it is pleaded that arazi khasra No. 24, came to be transferred to the mother of the petitioner, i.e. Smt. Ahilya Devi, in 1985, by registered sale-deed. It is alleged that the name of the Ahilya Devi, came to be mutated in the revenue record, it is claimed that since then petitioners are in possession and have constructed their residential house. It is further submitted that the mother of the petitioner died in 2020, thereafter, petitioners approached the Nagar Mahapalika, Gorakhpur, to get their names mutated in the revenue record. However, since the land in question which originally belonged to Ram Kisun, was declared surplus and vested in the State Government vide notification dated 28 July 1990, it appears that the name of the petitioner was not mutated. 6. Aggrieved, petitioners approached the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, claiming to be owner in possession of the disputed land over which residential house was constructed in 1985, after purchasing the plot from a Housing Society in the name and style Parvati Housing Co-operative Society Limited. In the representation, petitioner sought release of the property from the ceiling proceedings. 7. In this factual backdrop, it is submitted that in view of Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short ‘Repeal Act’) which came into effect on 18 March 1999, the land and property of the petitioner be released. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner is in possession of the plots even after repeal of the principal Act. It is urged that at this stage, petitioner cannot be dispossessed from the land declared surplus. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner is in possession of the plots even after repeal of the principal Act. It is urged that at this stage, petitioner cannot be dispossessed from the land declared surplus. Reliance has been placed on the decisions rendered by Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram, 2013 (120) RD 241 as well as, decisions rendered by this Court in Ram Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2020 (147) RD 1 , Ikrar and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2020 (2) AWC 1288 and State of U.P. vs. Jagdish Chandra, 2014 (1) AWC 864 . 9. It is not the case of the petitioner that the original land owner at any stage had protested with the declaration of surplus land or had objected before the authorities with regard to dispossession not being in accordance with the law. 10. In State of Assam vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma and Others, (2015) 5 SCC 321 (Paras 16, 17 and 19) the Supreme Court was of the view that any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of dispossession and the land owner in not doing so must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Paragraph 16, 17, and 19 is extracted: “16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. 17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram's case (supra). That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram's case (supra) considering whether the word ‘may’ appearing in Section 10(5)gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5)and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5)prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so. 19. In support of the contention that the respondents are even today in actual physical possession of the land in question reliance is placed upon certain electricity bills and bills paid for the telephone connection that stood in the name of one Mr. Sanatan Baishya. It was contended that said Mr. 19. In support of the contention that the respondents are even today in actual physical possession of the land in question reliance is placed upon certain electricity bills and bills paid for the telephone connection that stood in the name of one Mr. Sanatan Baishya. It was contended that said Mr. Sanatan Baishya was none other than the caretaker of the property of the respondents. There is, however, nothing on record to substantiate that assertion. The telephone bills and electricity bills also relate to the period from 2001 onwards only. There is nothing on record before us nor was anything placed before the High Court to suggest that between 7th December, 1991 till the date the land in question was allotted to GMDA in December, 2003 the owner or his legal heirs after his demise had continued to be in possession. All that we have is rival claims of the parties based on affidavits in support thereof. We repeatedly asked learned counsel for the parties whether they can, upon remand on the analogy of the decision in the case of Gyanaba Dilavarsinh Jadega (supra), adduce any documentary evidence that would enable the High Court to record a finding in regard to actual possession. They were unable to point out or refer to any such evidence. That being so the question whether actual physical possession was taken over remains a seriously disputed question of fact which is not amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution no matter the High Court may in its discretion in certain situations upon such determination. Remand to the High Court to have a finding on the question of dispossession, therefore, does not appear to us to be a viable solution.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 11. In Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra) followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Shiv Ram Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2015 (7) ADJ 630 the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of laches, observing as under: “We must also advert to another aspect of the matter particularly having regard to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra). The petitioner moved the first writ petition in 2002 nearly three years after the Repeal Act had come into force. The petitioner moved the first writ petition in 2002 nearly three years after the Repeal Act had come into force. After the earlier writ petition was disposed of by directing the District Magistrate to pass an order on the representation of the petitioner, an order was passed by the District Magistrate on 10 May 2007. The petitioner thereafter waited for a period of over two years until the present writ petition was filed in July 2009. If the petitioner had been dispossessed of the land without due notice under Section 10(5), such a grievance could have been raised at the relevant time. As a matter of fact, it has been the case of the State all along that a notice under Section 10(5) was, in fact, issued in the present case which would be borne out from the original file which has been produced before the Court. The issue is whether such a grievance could be made long after, before the Court. The petitioner had waited for nearly three years after the Repeal Act came into force to file the first writ petition and thereafter for a period of over two years after the disposal of the representation despite the finding of the District Magistrate that possession was taken over on 25 June 1993. In our view, such a belated challenge should not, in any event, be entertained.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 12. In Shivgonda Anna Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 wherein, the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 10 of the Act held that the writ petition under Article 226 for reopening the proceeding on the ground that the competent authority had not taken into consideration certain fact, filed after ten years, after the excess land was vested in the State Government was rightly summarily dismissed by the High Court. 13. While deciding the question of delay and laches in preferring the petition under Article 226, the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar vs. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 held that the equitable doctrine, namely “delay defeats equity” has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law. 14. Recently, in Kapilaben Ambalal Patel and Others vs. State of Gujarat, 2021 (12) SCC 95 Supreme Court declined to accept the pleas setup by the legal heirs/representatives of the original land holder on the ground of inordinate delay. The Court noted the submission of the land owner: “Feeling aggrieved, the landowners have approached this Court. It is urged that there is no title of evidence to substantiate the fact asserted by the respondent State that physical possession of the land in question has been taken over on 20-3-1986. It was merely a paper-possession in the form of possession panchnama. According to the appellants, de facto possession of the subject land as on the date of the Repeal Act is crucial and entails in abatement of all the actions of the State authorities under the 1976 Act. Mere issuance of notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act regarding deemed vesting of the land in the State is not enough for the purposes of the Repeal Act. Reliance has been placed on Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar vs. Collector and Competent Authority, (2012) 4 SCC 718 , State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 , Gajanan Kamlya Patil vs. Additional Collector and Competent Authority (ULC), (2014) 12 SCC 523 and Mangalsen vs. State of U.P. (2014) 15 SCC 332 . The consistent view of this Court is that physical possession must be taken by the State authorities, failing which the proceedings shall abate on account of the Repeal Act. The appellants have relied on revenue records to show that the continued possession remained with the appellants/landowners even after the possession panchnama was made on 20-3-1986. The revenue entries have presumptive value and the respondent State had failed to rebut the same.” 15. In Paragraph 25 of Kapilaben Ambalal Patel (supra), the Court noted the delay and declined to interfere with the order of the High Court. The revenue entries have presumptive value and the respondent State had failed to rebut the same.” 15. In Paragraph 25 of Kapilaben Ambalal Patel (supra), the Court noted the delay and declined to interfere with the order of the High Court. Relevant portion reads thus: “Furthermore, in the grounds all that is asserted is that the High Court erred in holding that there was delay of 14 years in filing of writ petition and in not appreciating that the notice under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act dated 23-1-1986, was not served upon Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel as he had already expired on 31-12-1985 and notice sent to him was returned bacy on 2-2-1986 un-served with remark “said owner has expired”. Further, the legal heirs of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel ought to have been served with the said notice.........Be that as it may, we are not inclined to reverse the conclusion recorded by the Division Bench of the High court that the writ petition filed by the appellants was hopelessly delayed and suffered from laches. That is a possible view in the facts of the present case.” 16. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner rendered by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Ram (supra). The Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra), on considering Hari Ram (supra), was of the view that the word ‘may’ appearing in Section 10(5) gave the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in Hari Ram (supra). Thereafter, the Court proceeded that even taking a case of the appellant regarding dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because the erstwhile land owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so. 17. That is because the erstwhile land owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so. 17. The predecessor in interest of the petitioners is a subsequent purchaser, probably, from a Housing Society. In any case, the excess land declared surplus pursuant to notification under Section 10(1) could not have been transferred in view of Sub-Clause (4) of Section 10. The transfer is a nullity in the eye of law. 18. The relevant portion of Section 10(4) is extracted: “10(4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3): (i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void. (ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land.” 19. It is evident from the facts pleaded by the petitioners themselves that the notification under Section 10(1) was notified on 17 July 1982, followed by notification under Section 10(3) notified on 28 July 1990. The predecessor in interest of the petitioner purchased the property in 1985, i.e. after notification issued under Section 10(1). Accordingly, the transfer would be null and void, no right would accrue to the petitioners in respect of the said property. As per the Scheme of the Act, the excess land beyond the ceiling limit is to be determined on the date when the Act came into force, requiring every person holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement of his holding (Section 6). The other persons/third party/subsequent purchasers have no locus or authority to file objection until then. The provisions of Section 8 and Section 9 of the Act, make it incumbent on the competent authority to issue notice to or provide opportunity to be heard only to the ‘person concerned’ i.e. person who has filed the statement under Section 6 of the Act, [Refer paragraph 14 of U.A. Basheer through G.P.A. Holder vs. State of Karnataka and Another, Civil Appeal No. 3032 of 2010, decided on 17 February, 2021]. It is only after notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, the claim of other persons/subsequent purchasers are to be considered. 20. In the given facts, petitioners are subsequent purchasers of the declared excess land after notification under Section 10(1). They have no locus, nor, the transfer of excess land after the stage of Section 10(1) is permissible in law [Section 10(4)]. The possession/reoccupation of the excess surplus land at the hands of the petitioners is of on consequence. 21. The instant writ petition has been filed after 22 years from the date of the Repeal Act and after a lapse of over three decades since notice under Section 10(5). The only stand taken is based on a bald statement that petitioners are in possession of the declared excess land. Petitioners admittedly are subsequent purchaser having purchased the surplus land after issuance of notification under Section 10(1), in view of Sub-section 4 of Section 10 of the Act, the transfer of the declared excess land is a nullity and does not confer any right, title or authority upon the petitioners. 22. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, petition being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.