ORDER : (S.K. Mishra, J.) 1. This order arises out of an application filed for initiation of a contempt proceeding against the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 (Respondent nos. 1 and 3 of the Letters Patent Appeal, bearing L.P.A. No. 181 of 2005, disposed of on 24.08.2016 by a Division Bench of this Court. 2. The facts leading to filing of this contempt application are that the petitioners filed C.W.J.C. No. 644 of 2000 (R) seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari to the respondents i.e. the Jharkhand State Electricity Board (the then Bihar State Electricity Board) and to quash Annexure-6, being a circular dated 14th September, 1999, alleging, inter alia, that it tantamount to amendment in the tariff of 1993. It was also contended by the petitioners that the aforesaid circular also discriminate between the varieties of customers. The third ground of challenge to the said notification is that it was operative retrospectively from 01st July, 1993, which is not permissible under the law. 3. As per the judgment passed on 27th March, 2000, the writ petition was dismissed and against which, an intra court appeal bearing L.P.A. No.155 of 2000 (R) was preferred by the appellants, which was also dismissed on 09.05.2000. A civil review petition being Civil Review No. 47 of 2000 (R) was preferred by the applicant, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench vide order dated 28th June, 2000. The parties moved the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil), which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 3370 of 2001. The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 27th April, 2001 remanded it and directed the learned Single Judge to reconsider the matter and decide the same on merit. The said C.W.J.C. No. 644 of 2000 (R) was again heard and decided on 29th October, 2004. 4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, a Letters Patent Appeal, contempt of which is alleged in this civil contempt application, was preferred. It was registered as L.P.A. No. 181 of 2005. The said L.P.A. was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. 4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, a Letters Patent Appeal, contempt of which is alleged in this civil contempt application, was preferred. It was registered as L.P.A. No. 181 of 2005. The said L.P.A. was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench after considering the matters and the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the parties did not find any reason to entertain the Letters Patent Appeal, inter alia, holding that the tariff applicable in the present case is of the year 1993 and the period involved in the case is 01st July, 1993 to 31st July, 2002. The contention that was raised before the Division Bench in the aforesaid intra court appeal is that if a consumer consumes less than the minimum guarantee unit, then for the rest of the units, the consumer, who is appellant no. 2 in the appeal and likewise the appellant no. 1 has to pay for the minimum guarantee units, for which there is no dispute at all in the matter and the question that has been raised is that for the units, which are not consumed by the members of appellant no. 1, whether they are liable to make payment of fuel surcharge on the said unconsumed units. The Division Bench answering the question in affirmative on the question of the minimum guaranteed units are to be kept ready by the Respondent-Board and the Respondent-Board has to incur expenses for the same. The concept of fuel surcharge is that every now and then, the tariff is not being amended, whereas, the manufacturer of the electricity has to pay for the enhanced cost towards the fuel etc. and, therefore, to compensate these additional expenses, the fuel surcharge is to be levied. For the minimum guarantee units, the Division Bench further held that the Respondent-Board has to keep that much of units ready, for which the Respondent-Board has to incur expenses towards fuel etc. and, therefore, even if the minimum guarantee units are not consumed, they are bound to make payment for the fuel surcharge. The Division Bench further held that the Circular dated 14th September, 1999, which was under challenge in the writ petition is not an amendment of the tariff, rather it is a mere clarification of the Circular and the said Circular never intends to amend the Tariff, 1993. The Division Bench further held that the Circular dated 14th September, 1999, which was under challenge in the writ petition is not an amendment of the tariff, rather it is a mere clarification of the Circular and the said Circular never intends to amend the Tariff, 1993. The Division Bench further held that Clause 16.10.1 of the aforesaid tariff charges is applicable to Commercial Service Categories II and III, L.T. Industrial service, H.T. service, EHT service and Railway Traction Service therefore, there might have been some confusion for CS Category Nos. II and III and L.T. Industrial Service, otherwise the tariff, 1993 is explicitly clear and there is no ambiguity at all. Clause 16.10.1, 16.10.2 and 16.10.3 are unambiguous and unequivocal. The Division Bench further held that sometimes, it happens that few consumers are making hue and cry for their liability and, therefore, the Circular is to be issued for few of them, which is by way of clarification, but, that does not mean that the circular dated 14th September, 1999 is applicable only to those consumers, for whose clarification, it is made. The applicability of tariff, 1993 is to be adjudged from Clause 16.10.1 and not from the circular dated 14th September, 1999. Thus, there is no amendment in tariff at all vide circular dated 14th September, 1999. Dealing with the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Division Bench further held that the said circular has been made effective with retrospective date because the circular has been issued on 14th September, 1999 and given effect from 01st July, 1993. The Division Bench further held that it has to be kept in mind that whenever any “clarificatory circular” is issued, it clarifies the original clauses of the Act, Rules or tariff etc. for which the said circular is issued. Clarification is not an amendment at all and clarification is always having retrospective effect because it clarifies the concept of confused minded persons. The Division Bench further held that what was written in Clause 16.10.1 in the tariff, 1993, as has been reiterated in the circular dated 14th September, 1990, nothing has been added or taken away vide the aforesaid circular from clause 16.10.1 of tariff, 1993. The Division Bench further held that what was written in Clause 16.10.1 in the tariff, 1993, as has been reiterated in the circular dated 14th September, 1990, nothing has been added or taken away vide the aforesaid circular from clause 16.10.1 of tariff, 1993. Lastly, it was held by the Division Bench that the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the said circular is discriminatory in nature, because the said circular is not applicable to rest of the consumers, which are referred to in clause 16.10.1 The Division Bench was not in concurrence with this contention, mainly for the reason that the circular dated 14th September, 1999 is only clarifying the position for CS I & II and LTIS, because, there was some confusion for few such type of consumers because repeatedly before the Board, otherwise, there was no need for such circular to be issued at all and there may not be any confusion in the mind of rest of the consumers, otherwise, there would have been need for one more circular for rest of the consumers also. In fact, clarificatory circulars are being issued always later on, upon the doubts being raised. The doubts having been raised by the CS I & II and by LTIS consumers, and hence, the circular dated 14th September, 1999 has been issued, which does not mean that Clause 16.10.1. is ceased to be applicable to rest of the consumers viz. HT service, EHT service and Railway Traction Service. It may also happen with the Government Corporation or Electricity Boards that by mistake few consumers are not issued the bills properly. The Division Bench further held that the Government or the Boards have to take work from honest hands and from different employees, who may be corrupt or dishonest and at the same time enthusiastic or lethargic persons. Be as it may, if few consumers are not being issued the bills towards the fuel surcharge, either by mistake or by misinterpretation or by mistake of aforesaid type of combination of the employees of respondent-Board that does not mean that the appellants are not liable to make payment of fuel surcharge for the unconsumed minimum guarantee units and hence, none of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants were held to be tenable at law by the Division Bench. Thus, from the aforesaid observations, made by the Division Bench of this Court, while disposing the L.P.A., it is apparent that the present petitioners being the appellants in the L.P.A., had sought for quashing of the bill raised against them for the period, stated above on the ground that certain other consumers have not been levied fuel surcharge, as they have been levied. However, the Division Bench came to a clear finding that only because bills have not been raised properly against certain other consumers, the petitioners-appellants cannot submit that they are not liable to pay the amount for the unconsumed units and for fuel surcharge. 5. Now the petitioners-appellants in the L.P.A., have filed this application for civil contempt, inter alia, alleging that the respondents are violating the order of the Court by not raising the bill against other consumers for the units not consumed by them in relation to the minimum guarantee consumption and fuel surcharge etc. Now, it is clear that the petitioners do claim that the amount should not be charged from them because in similar matters, surcharge have not been charged against some other persons, however, such submission has been negated by the Division Bench of this Court and it has to come to a definite finding that it cannot be a ground for quashing the electricity bills, not raised against the appellants-petitioners. 6. Now, by filing this contempt application, the petitioners are in fact seeking initiation of contempt against the respondents for willful disobedience/disregard/violation of the order of this Court, passed on 24.08.2016 i.e. the observation that other consumers are also liable to pay the bill. So the net result is that the petitioners– appellants wants that the respondents should be directed to raise bills against some other persons, not parties to any of the proceedings. 7. So the net result is that the petitioners– appellants wants that the respondents should be directed to raise bills against some other persons, not parties to any of the proceedings. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners would rely upon the reported judgment rendered in the case of Surinder Nath Kapoor Vs Union of India and others, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 297, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was clear and unambiguous, there was no scope to interpret that order to mean that the stay of the sale in operation, was no longer there and the Commissioner was free to deal with the appeal and that was a clear case of violation of the order, passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it does not come to the rescue of the present petitioners. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relies upon the reported judgment rendered in the case of Gauri Shankar Pd. Rai Vs Sajal Chakroborty, Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand and others, (2015) 8 SCC 163 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows: - “Though the complainants were initially appointed to the services in the erstwhile State of Bihar, subsequently on the bifurcation of Bihar and Jharkhand States, the services of these complainants have been transferred to the State of Jharkhand and they have been functioning as such in the posts of Assistant Engineers. Therefore, the contention that the notification issued by the erstwhile Bihar State cannot be applied to the complainants who have been transferred and fall under the jurisdiction of Jharkhand State, is wholly untenable in law for the reason that prior to their appointment to the posts of Assistant Engineers in the State of Jharkhand, they have discharged their work as a permanent nature as Junior Engineers from the year 1981 in the erstwhile State of Bihar and therefore, treating their services as ad hoc, after promoting them to the said posts of Assistant Engineers, without giving them pay scale payable to the said permanent posts in the State of Jharkhand is erroneous and contrary to law.” 9. The facts of the aforesaid case and this case are different. This case involves a prayer to initiate contempt against the respondent nos. The facts of the aforesaid case and this case are different. This case involves a prayer to initiate contempt against the respondent nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that they have, allegedly, violating certain observations made by the Division Bench, as noted earlier, the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, the L.P.A. was also dismissed and in course of dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench examined certain aspects of the case and made certain observations, so the question is whether the petitioners can initiate a contempt application against the respondents for alleged violation of discussions made while deciding the lis before it. 10. Contempt has been defined as follows under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:- “2.Definitions- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.- (a) “contempt of Court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt; (b) “civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court; (c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which – (i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;” 11. Thus, it is clear that whenever a contempt is alleged, the Court has to satisfy itself that there has been a violation of a judgment/order or directions, issued by the Court or that the respondent/contemnor has violated any undertaking given by them. In this case, the Division Bench has held that as a cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussions, there is no substance in the Letters Patent Appeal and hence, the same was thereby, dismissed. Moreover, there has been no adjudication, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to those consumers, who admittedly are not arrayed as parties to any of the proceedings, that they are not being levied with electric charges as per the Tariff, 1993. Hence, a contempt will not lie for a non existence order. 12. Moreover, there has been no adjudication, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to those consumers, who admittedly are not arrayed as parties to any of the proceedings, that they are not being levied with electric charges as per the Tariff, 1993. Hence, a contempt will not lie for a non existence order. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not also satisfy that any undertaking was given by the respondents and they have not fulfilled the same. 13. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the contempt is not maintainable and for the reasons, as stated hereinabove, this Court further held that on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, the contempt is, hereby, dropped. 14. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of. 15. Grant urgent certified copy of this order as per Rules.