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2023 DIGILAW 403 (CHH)

Ramlal S/o Shankarlal v. State of Chhattisgarh

2023-08-11

DEEPAK KUMAR TIWARI

body2023
ORDER : 1. By this Revision, the applicant is challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.01.2014 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti in Criminal Appeal No. 168/2011 affirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sakti, Janjgir-Champa vide judgment dated 24.09.2011 passed in Criminal Case No. 1361/2000, whereby, the applicant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Section 304 (A) of the IPC RI for 6 months Section 3/181 of the Motor Vehicle Act Till rising of the Court with fine of Rs. 500/- In default, 15 days additional R.I. 2. According to the prosecution case, the incident is said to have taken place on 21.03.2000 in the noon at about 2 PM when the complainant Jugalkishore Agrawal (PW-2) was standing in front of his house and saw that the deceased Jolobai @ Dhobanibai is washing the utensils in front of the house and at the same time the accused, who was coming from Sakti, while driving the jeep bearing No. MP-26-F/1801 in a rash a negligent manner, dashed the deceased, as a result of which, deceased bumped into the wall. Thereafter, she was referred to the hospital where she has died. 3. After the aforesaid incident, the complainant Jugalkishore (PW-2) lodged an FIR (Ex.P-1) at Police Station Sakti; Spot Map (Ex.P-3) and Panchnama (Ex.P-4) were prepared by Investigating Officer H.K. Sabari, Sub Inspector (PW-7) and postmortem of the deceased was conducted by Dr. D.D. Mishra (PW-5), who vide his postmortem report (Ex.P-6), found the cause of death to be accidental in nature. During the investigation, vehicle of the applicant was also seized vide Ex.P-8 and its registration documents have been seized vide Ex.P-5. 4. Charges were framed against the applicant under Section 304-A of the IPC and Section 3/181 of the Motor Vehicle Act and same were explained to him. However, the applicant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to prove the charges against the applicant, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses. Statement of the applicant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein the applicant pleaded innocence and false implication. However, the applicant did not examine any defence witness. 6. However, the applicant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to prove the charges against the applicant, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses. Statement of the applicant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein the applicant pleaded innocence and false implication. However, the applicant did not examine any defence witness. 6. On the basis of material available on record and after hearing learned counsel for the parties at length, learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the applicant as mentioned in Para-1 of this order. On appeal preferred by the applicant against his conviction and sentence, learned Additional Sessions Judge has dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed on the applicant by the learned trial Court. Being dissatisfied by the orders of both the Courts below, the applicant has preferred the instant revision. 7. It is contended by learned counsel for the applicant that judgments of conviction and order of sentence are bad in law as the same have been passed by the Courts below without appreciating the evidence in true perspective. The prosecution has clearly failed to prove the rashness and negligence on the part of the applicant while driving the said jeep. Therefore, this revision deserves to be allowed and impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is liable to be set-aside and the applicant deserves to be acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 8. On the other hand, learned State Counsel supports the impugned judgment. He submits that there is cogent evidence available on record establishing involvement of the applicant in commission of crime in question and sentence is also just and proper and does not call for any interference invoking revisional jurisdiction. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 10. Bajrang Lal (PW-1) has categorically deposed that he was not present at the spot at the time of incident. Complainant Jugal Kishore (PW-2), who lodged an FIR, has deposed that at the time of incident he was inside the house and after occurrence of the incident he came outside and seen the incident. 10. Bajrang Lal (PW-1) has categorically deposed that he was not present at the spot at the time of incident. Complainant Jugal Kishore (PW-2), who lodged an FIR, has deposed that at the time of incident he was inside the house and after occurrence of the incident he came outside and seen the incident. The only witness upon which both the Courts below have placed reliance is K. Jaggannath Rao (PW-3) who said to have seen the incident, however, in his evidence, he has not stated as to in what manner the applicant was driving the jeep nor stated anything about the rashness or negligence on the part of the applicant. However, in his cross-examination, he has clearly stated that vehicle was being driven slowly. Further, Pushpa (PW-4) in her cross-examination, has stated that she has not seen the incident. 11. Except the evidence of aforesaid witnesses, no other material witness has been examined by the prosecution to corroborate the version of the prosecution in respect of rashness and negligence. However, both the Courts below only on assumption have drawn an inference that at the time of incident the applicant was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. When the witnesses present on the spot have not stated anything about the rashness or negligence on the part of the accused/driver, then general presumption of innocence of accused is always available. It cannot be taken for granted that the driver of the vehicle is guilty for the crime. Ordinarily, it is for the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused and the prosecution has to prove not only the rashness and negligence of the driver but also must prove that the rashness or negligence is responsible for the accident and for causing injury or death of a victim. There can be no presumption of negligence from the mere fact that a man is knockdown and killed in the accident. It is well settled that when there are two views are possible, then inference should be drawn in favour of the accused. The aforesaid analysis shows that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in correct perspective in respect of the rashness and negligence and thus conviction of the applicant under Section 304-A IPC is not sustainable. 12. The aforesaid analysis shows that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in correct perspective in respect of the rashness and negligence and thus conviction of the applicant under Section 304-A IPC is not sustainable. 12. So far as offence under Section 3/181 of the Motor Vehicle Act is concerned, at the time of incident the Investigating Officer (PW-7) has not served any notice to the accused. This witness in his evidence has not stated anything about the driving licence or that applicant was not having any valid driving licence at the time incident. As the burden always lies on the prosecution to prove the charges and in the instant case prosecution has failed to produce any evidence to establish that notice has been served on the accused and during trial also, such evidence has not been produced by the prosecution, however, learned Court below, in the impugned judgment, in paragraph 17, has wrongly shifted such burden upon the accused that he fails to produce the valid driving licence. Even in the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. no question in respect of the said offence or about the valid driving licence has been raised. Thus, finding recorded by Court below in respect of offence under Section 3/181 of the Motor Vehicle Act is also bad in law. 13. In aforesaid view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and the Courts below also committed error in recording a finding of conviction against the accused/applicant as referred to above. 14. Accordingly, the impugned judgments of conviction and sentence passed by the two Courts below are hereby set aside. The accused/applicant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. As the applicant is already on bail, his bail bonds stands discharged. 15. Consequently, the revision is allowed. 16. Along with the record of the Courts below, a copy of this order be sent to the concerned Court for necessary information and compliance.