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2023 DIGILAW 404 (AP)

Koduri Lakshmi Padmavathi v. Life Insurance Corporation Of India, LIC

2023-02-16

RAVI NATH TILHARI

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Ms. Tadasina Alekhya, learned counsel, representing the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Battula Raj Kiran, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 i.e., the Life Insurance Corporation of India (in short, the LIC) and its authorities. 2. For the order proposed to be passed issuance of notice to the unofficial respondent No.4 is dispensed with. 3. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for the following relief:- “It is therefore prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ or order or direction more particularly one in nature of Writ Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents 1 to 3 in changing the nominee name high handedly, without following due procedure and seeking to disburse the amounts under Policy Nos.673751840, 673841179, 673841180, 673670739 into 4th respondent by passing of order dated 08.11.2022 thereby rejecting my claims as illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional and consequently, direct the Respondents to pay the amounts under the above policies to the petitioner with nominal interest of 12 percent till the date of payment and pass such other order or orders may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 4. The petitioner's paternal uncle i.e. her father's brother, Lingala Sai Babu, was the policy holder of some policies from LIC under 3 policy Nos.673751840, 673841179, 673841180, 673670739, the petitioner was made nominee by the policyholder. The policyholder died on 02.07.2022. The petitioner claimed the amount under the policy. Her submission is that the original policy is with the petitioner and consequently no change could be made in the ‘nominee’ as the original policy document is required for making such change, and consequently the claim in favour of the 4th respondent is not justified. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that change in the nominee from the petitioner's name to the 4th respondent in the policies of the policy holder was without following due procedure and consequently the rejection of the petitioner's claim by the authorities and their proceeding to make payment to the 4th respondent is illegal. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner is entitled for the payment of claim amount under the policy, as the policyholder executed will dated 21.12.2021 in favour of the petitioner. 7. On 09.02.2023 this Court passed the following order:- “1. Ms. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner is entitled for the payment of claim amount under the policy, as the policyholder executed will dated 21.12.2021 in favour of the petitioner. 7. On 09.02.2023 this Court passed the following order:- “1. Ms. Kotha Veera Naga Pallavi, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner’s paternal uncle was the policy holder of various policies of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, out of which in 3 of the policies, the petitioner was made the nominee after change of the earlier nominee. The policy holder died on 02.07.2022. The petitioner submitted the claim, which has been rejected by the impugned order dated 08.11.2022, with respect to the policy Nos. 1) 673751840, 2) 673841179 and 3) 3673841180, on the ground that the nominee in those policies is the respondent No.4, Lingala Dilip Kumar, who was made nominee after changing the petitioner’s name and consequently, the claim under the policy shall be settled in favour of the respondent No.4, without any reference to the petitioner. 2. It is further submitted that the original policies are with the petitioner and for change in the nominee, the original policies are required. The copies of the policies as annexed with the petition does not show the respondent No.4 as nominee and it is the petitioner whose name is there as nominee. She further submits that, if some change is made in the nominee, the prescribed procedure has to be followed. 3. Sri Rajesh, learned counsel, representing Sri B.Raj Kiran, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3, raised preliminary objection that the writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner is raising the dispute of nominee, which is a disputed question of fact and can be determined in suit in the Civil Court. 4. He further submits that the petitioner is taking a contrary stand, referring to Para No.6 of the affidavit, as on the one hand, the petitioner submits about the nomination by the policy holder in petitioner’s favour, but on the other, the petitioner has referred to the will by the policy holder in petitioner’s favour. 5. 4. He further submits that the petitioner is taking a contrary stand, referring to Para No.6 of the affidavit, as on the one hand, the petitioner submits about the nomination by the policy holder in petitioner’s favour, but on the other, the petitioner has referred to the will by the policy holder in petitioner’s favour. 5. The LIC is a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.C. Chacko and another vs. Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others, 2008 1 SCC 321 , in which it has also been held that its action must be fair, just and equitable. 6. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is the recorded nominee, which is prima facie evidenced by the document, copy of the policy annexed to the affidavit. If there is change in the nomination, in favour of the respondent No.4, that can be easily ascertained from the records of the LIC. Whether the procedure for change of nominee was or was not followed by the LIC can also be ascertained. This does not require leading of evidence by the parties. If there is an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power by the State or its instrumentalities, without due regard to prescribed procedure or/and in violation of the principles of natural justice, the writ petition cannot be said to be not maintainable. Even the existence of remedy of suit, cannot operate as an absolute bar to the entertainability of the writ petition. 7. In the facts of the present case, this Court is not inclined to uphold the objective against maintainability of the writ petition, which preliminary objection is rejected. 8. On reading of Para No.6 of the affidavit; this Court does not find any contradiction in the averment regarding nomination and will. 9. As requested by Sri Rajesh, for the respondent Nos.1 to 3, list the matter on 14.02.2023, to enable him to obtain instructions, based on the record of the LIC, with respect to the change in the nominee, and the procedure followed for such change and place relevant record. 10. List on 14.02.2023. 11. Issuance of notice to respondent No.4 will be considered on the next date.” 8. 10. List on 14.02.2023. 11. Issuance of notice to respondent No.4 will be considered on the next date.” 8. On 14.02.2023 this Court passed the following order:- “Sri J. Sunil, learned counsel, representing Sri Bathula Raja Kiran, learned standing counsel for LIC, submits that he could not receive the instructions from respondents No.1 to 3 and prays that the matter may be posted day after tomorrow. As requested, list on 16.02.2023. If the instructions are not available by that date, the 2nd respondent-Divisional Manager, LIC of India, Machilipatnam Division, shall appear before the Court with relevant records to assist the Court.” 9. Learned Standing Counsel for LIC has received instructions. Sri K.Murali Krishna, Administrative Officer in the Office of the 3rd respondent, is also present with records. 10. Learned Standing Counsel submits that as per the instructions and the record the policyholder in his lifetime was issued the duplicate policy as per the prescribed procedure, in May, 2022. Thereafter the policyholder applied for change of nomination on 01.06.2022, upon which the nomination was changed in favour of the 4th respondent, by following the procedure for change of nomination. He further submits that the payment under the policy had already been made to the 4th respondent/nominee on 13.12.2022 and 14.12.2022 prior to filing of the writ petition for the prayer not to settle the amount with the 4th respondent. 11. In view of the aforesaid no case for interference is made out in the exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly when the nomination was changed in favour of respondent No.4 and the amount has already been paid to respondent No.4 even prior to filing of the writ petition. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there being a will in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner is legally entitled to receive the amount under the policies in question. 13. The law is well settled as has been laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Sarbati Devi and another vs. Smt. Usha Devi, 1984 1 SCC 424 , that on the death of the policyholder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Insurance Act operates as a third kind of succession. 14. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Insurance Act operates as a third kind of succession. 14. It is apt to reproduce Para No.5 of Sarbati Devi (supra) as under:- “We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of section 39 of the Act. The said section provides that a holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death. If the nominee is a minor, the policy holder may appoint any person to receive the money in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. That means that if the policy holder is alive when the policy matures for payment he alone will receive payment of the money due under the policy and not the nominee. Any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed, but before such cancellation or change is notified to the insurer if he makes the payment bon fide to the nominee already registered with him, the insurer gets a valid discharge. Such power of cancellation of or effecting a change in the nomination implies that the nominee has no right to the amount during the lifetime of the assured. If the policy is transferred or assigned under section 38 of the Act, the nomination automatically lapses. If the nominee or where there are nominees more than one all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment the money due under the policy is payable to the heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate. It is not necessary to refer to subsection (7) of section 39 of the Act here. But the summary of the relevant provisions of section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. If that is so, on the death of the policy holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a 'statutory testament' in paragraph 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal ( AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315). If section 39 of the Act is contrasted with section 38 of the Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenuous character of the right of a nominee would become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold that section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered.” 15. If the petitioner has any grievance with respect to the amount paid to the nominee/respondent No.4 and if the petitioner considers herself legally entitled for the payment of that amount, then it is open for the petitioner to take recourse to such legal proceedings as may be available under law before appropriate forum, if so advised. 16. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.