ORDER : Chandra Kumar Songara, J. Instant second appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellants-defendants under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 challenging the judgment and decree dated 24.11.2020 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, No.1, Alwar (hereinafter referred to as "the Appellate Court"), in Civil Appeal No.18/2016 (CIS No.24/2016) titled as Ramdei and Others v. Smt. Nanagi Devi, whereby the Appellate Court had dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2016 passed by the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Alwar, (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial Court'), in Civil Suit No.52/2012 titled as Smt. Nanagi Devi v. Smt. Ramdai and Others. 2. The respondent-plaintiff had instituted a civil suit against the appellants-defendants for specific performance and permanent injunction alleging therein that an agreement to sale dated 02.06.1990, alongwith power-of-attorney, duly witnessed, signed and notarized, was executed in respect of residential Plot No.161 situated at Kabir Colony, Scheme No.6, Alwar, mentioning that the defendant No.1 deceased- Chotelal was the owner of the said plot-in-dispute and he had entered into an agreement with the respondent-plaintiff and agreed to sell said Plot @ Rs.30,000/- and the possession thereof was delivered to the respondent-plaintiff. In the suit, it was further alleged that in the year 2010 when respondent-plaintiff applied for transfer of the name at the U.I.T. Alwar on the basis of aforesaid agreement to sale, the U.I.T. Alwar vide its letter dated 20.07.2010 refused to transfer the same on the ground that such agreement is unregistered and registered sale-deed has not been submitted to prove the title. The respondent-plaintiff requested the appellants-defendants to execute the sale-deed in her favour but the appellants-defendants did not turn up, therefore, a legal notice was sent on 11.10.2012. The appellants-defendants had refused to execute the sale-deed vide reply dated 17.10.2012. Hence, suit for specific performance and permanent injunction was instituted by the respondent-plaintiff. 3. The said suit was opposed by the appellants-defendants and submitted written-statement denying the allegations and further contending interalia that Chotelal neither entered into an agreement to sale in respect of disputed plot nor sale consideration amounting to Rs.30,000/- was received by him nor any power-of-attorney was executed by him in favour of husband of the respondent-plaintiff. The respondent-plaintiff Nanagi Devi was living as tenant and paying rent @ Rs.300/- per month and she had not paid the rent since June, 1990. The respondent-plaintiff Nanagi Devi was living as tenant and paying rent @ Rs.300/- per month and she had not paid the rent since June, 1990. The appellants-defendants asked her to vacate the plot-in-dispute and pay the arrears of rent but she, with the malafide intention prepared forged and fabricated agreement to sale and the power-of-attorney to get the possession of the said property. The agreement to sale is unregistered and not duly stamped, therefore, the same is not admissible in evidence. The limitation prescribed for filing suit for specific performance is three years, whereas she instituted suit after twenty-two years, therefore, the suit is barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed, as no cause of action arose for the respondent-plaintiff to institute the aforesaid suit. 4. The learned trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, decreed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 30.04.2016 against which the appellants-defendants had preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Court. The said appeal came to be dismissed vide its judgment and decree dated 24.11.2020. Hence, this appeal. 5. During the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants, has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) K.S. Vidyanadam and Others v. Vairavan, AIR 1997 SC 1751 and (ii) Sanjeev Bhardwaj v. Yogeshwar Swaroop Bhatnagar, in DB CWPs.No.15760/2015 and 6437/2013, RHC dt. 04.09.2019, whereas, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) S. Kaladevi v. V.R. Somasundaram and Others, (Civil Appeal No.3192/2010) SC dt. 12.04.2010 and (ii) Rathnavathi and another v. Kavita Ganashamdas (Civil Appeal No.9949-9950/2014) SC dt. 29.10.2014. 6. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants as well as learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff and perusing the judgments cited herein-above, it appears that both the learned Courts below have come to the conclusion that vide agreement (Exhibit-1) the appellants-defendants have received total amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs.30,000/- in cash from the respondent-plaintiff and the possession of the plot has been transferred to the respondent-plaintiff. No exchange of money is due between the parties. Now, the respondent-plaintiff is free to use and consume the said plot. The appellants-defendants would also be available to provide signatures for registration related work, whenever required. Undisputedly, the aforesaid claim was first raised before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alwar on 05.11.2012. No exchange of money is due between the parties. Now, the respondent-plaintiff is free to use and consume the said plot. The appellants-defendants would also be available to provide signatures for registration related work, whenever required. Undisputedly, the aforesaid claim was first raised before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alwar on 05.11.2012. The learned Courts below, after perusing the notices on record, came to the conclusion that registered notice (Exhibit-10) dated 11.10.2012 was served upon the appellants-defendants from the respondent-plaintiff. The appellants-defendants gave reply to the said notice vide Exhibit-11 dated 17.10.2012. As per the said reply, the appellants-defendants refused to get the sale-deed registered. The learned Courts below also came to the conclusion that as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, if there is no limitation period prescribed for instituting the suit for specific relief in the agreement then limitation period shall start from the day when the appellants-defendants refuse to perform their part of agreement. The said agreement (Exhibit-1) does not contain any limitation period and in the reply of notice dated 17.10.2012 given by appellants-defendants, they refused to perform their part of the agreement. The limitation period, therefore, shall be considered to begin from the date of issuance of notice and date of notice received. Under these circumstances, the respondent-plaintiff considered the aforesaid refusal through notice dated 17.10.2012 by appellants-defendants as cause of action and instituted the suit on 05.11.2012. 7. In the judgment of Rathnavathi and another (supra) relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :- "47. Since it was the case of the plaintiff that she paid the entire sale consideration to defendant no. 2 and was accordingly placed in possession of the suit house, the threat of her dispossession in 2000 from the suit house coupled with the fact that she having come to know that defendant no. 2 was trying to alienate the suit house, gave her a cause of action to serve legal notice to defendant no. 2 on 6.3.2000 calling upon defendant no. 2 to perform her part and convey the title in the suit house by executing the sale deed in her favour. Since defendant no. 2 failed to convey the title, the plaintiff filed a suit on 31.3.2000 for specific performance of the agreement. 48. 2 on 6.3.2000 calling upon defendant no. 2 to perform her part and convey the title in the suit house by executing the sale deed in her favour. Since defendant no. 2 failed to convey the title, the plaintiff filed a suit on 31.3.2000 for specific performance of the agreement. 48. Article 54 of the Limitation Act which prescribes the period of limitation for filing suit for specific performance reads as under: 54 For Specific Performance of a contract Three years The date of fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. 49. Mere reading of Article 54 of the Limitation Act would show that if the date is fixed for performance of the agreement, then non-compliance of the agreement on the date would give a cause of action to file suit for specific performance within three years from the date so fixed. However, when no such date is fixed, limitation of three years to file a suit for specific performance would begin when the plaintiff has noticed that the defendant has refused the performance of the agreement. 50. The case at hand admittedly does not fall in the first category of Article 54 of the Limitation Act because as observed supra, no date was fixed in the agreement for its performance. The case would thus be governed by the second category viz., when plaintiff has a notice that performance is refused." 8. As per aforesaid analysis, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants that the suit is not within prescribed period of limitation, has been rendered meaningless. 9. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants in the case of K.S. Vidyanadam (supra) fails to advance the case of the appellants-defendants. 10. The learned Courts below have perused the agreement and the power-of-attorney annexed Exhibit-1 and 7 respectively, which are verified and notarized by the notary. The respondent-plaintiff and witnesses appeared on her behalf, have proved the execution of the aforesaid documents Exhibit-1 and 7. The respondent-plaintiff has proved by her evidence that she has paid total consideration amount for the sale and received the possession on the same day. The agreement did not prescribe any period of limitation. The respondent-plaintiff and witnesses appeared on her behalf, have proved the execution of the aforesaid documents Exhibit-1 and 7. The respondent-plaintiff has proved by her evidence that she has paid total consideration amount for the sale and received the possession on the same day. The agreement did not prescribe any period of limitation. In this matter, total consideration amount of sale under the disputed agreement has been received from the respondent-plaintiff by the appellants-defendants and the possession has also been given to the respondent-plaintiff of the sold property and no date has been fixed for execution of sale in the aforesaid agreement. From the aforesaid consideration, it is clear that the documents (Exhibit-1 and 7) are admissible as evidence, despite being unregistered. Therefore, the argument of the appellants-defendants that the aforesaid documents, being unregistered, are not admissible as evidence, has been rendered meaningless. 11. In the judgment of S. Kaladevi (supra) relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :- "15. The issue before us is only with regard to the admissibility of unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 in evidence and, therefore, it is neither appropriate nor necessary for us to consider the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents about the maintainability of suit as framed by the plaintiff or the circumstances in which the sale deed was executed. If any issue in that regard has been struck by the trial court, obviously, such issue would be decided in accordance with law. Suffice, however, to say that looking to the nature of the suit, which happens to be a suit for specific performance, the trial court was not justified in refusing to admit the unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 tendered by the plaintiff in evidence. 16. The argument of learned counsel for the respondents with regard to Section 3(b) of 1963 Act is noted to be rejected. We fail to understand how the said provision helps the respondents as the said provision provides that nothing in 1963 Act shall be deemed to affect the operation of 1908 Act, on documents. By admission of an unregistered sale deed in evidence in a suit for specific performance as evidence of contract, none of the provisions of 1908 Act is affected; rather court acts in consonance with proviso appended to Section 49 of 1908 Act. 17. By admission of an unregistered sale deed in evidence in a suit for specific performance as evidence of contract, none of the provisions of 1908 Act is affected; rather court acts in consonance with proviso appended to Section 49 of 1908 Act. 17. The result is that appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court dated 13.11.2008 and that of the trial court dated 11.12.2007 are set aside. The trial court shall mark the unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 tendered by the plaintiff in her evidence and proceed with the suit accordingly. The parties shall bear their own costs." 12. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants in the case of Sanjeev Bhardwaj (supra) fails to advance the case of the appellants-defendants. 13. As per Exhibit-1, the responsibility to get the sale-deed registered was on the appellants-defendants because they had received whole consideration amount for the sale. The respondent-plaintiff has proved that she had made a request to the appellants-defendants to get the sale-deed registered and executed in her favour. The appellants-defendants have shown the respondent-plaintiff to be in possession as the 'tenant' of the property but they have not produced any rent agreement or any receipt of rent or any other evidence in this regard. On the other hand, the respondent-plaintiff has denied the fact of being the 'tenant' and proved by evidence her possession of the property as purchaser. 14. After recording the findings, both the learned Courts below have decided the Issue Nos.1 to 4 in favour of the respondent-plaintiff and the Issue Nos.5 to 7 against the appellants-defendants, which are being reproduced herein-below :- "1. Whether Late Chotelal has executed an agreement with the plaintiff to sell the house described in Para No.1 of the plaint and gave the possession to the plaintiff? Plaintiff 2. Whether Late Chotelal has executed the power-ofattorney in favour of husband of the plaintiff- Hariprasad? Plaintiff 3. Whether the appellants-defendants (heirs of Late Chotelal) have refused to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff? Plaintiff 4. Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform her part of the sale-deed? Plaintiff 5. Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the property as 'tenant' and not entitled to execute the sale-deed? Defendants 6. Whether the agreement is admissible in evidence due to being unregistered? Defendants 7. Whether the suit of plaintiff is barred by limitation? Plaintiff 4. Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform her part of the sale-deed? Plaintiff 5. Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the property as 'tenant' and not entitled to execute the sale-deed? Defendants 6. Whether the agreement is admissible in evidence due to being unregistered? Defendants 7. Whether the suit of plaintiff is barred by limitation? Defendants." 15. In absence of any substantial question of law, the second appeal is not liable to be entertained. The substantial questions of law, as proposed by the appellants-defendants in appeal memo, are essentially questions of fact, which require re-appreciation of evidence. Re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible within the scope of section 100 of C.P.C. until and unless there is some illegality or perversity in the findings of impugned judgment. None of the issues framed fall within the purview of substantial question of law. In order to exercise the scope of section 100 of C.P.C., involvement/formulation of substantial question of law is sine-qua-non. Otherwise also, it is a case of concurrent findings of the facts, even if erroneous, cannot be disturbed in exercise of powers under section 100 of C.P.C. 16. Since no substantial question of law is involved in the present second appeal, thus, the same is liable to be dismissed. Therefore, the defendants are not entitled to get any relief. There being concurrent findings of the facts of both the learned Courts below, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. 17. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed. 18. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.