ORDER : 1. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 16.7.2015 passed by the learned Seventh Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur in Criminal Revision No. 313 of 2013 whereby the revision preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur in Complaint Case No. 110 of 2009 dated 2.7.2013 has been affirmed. 2. The facts of the present case are that a complaint case was filed by husband of the petitioner, namely, Ramnarayan Dewangan under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. for registration of a complaint case for commission of offence punishable under Sections 294, 506B, 323, 379, 447, 452 and 454 of the Indian Penal Code against respondent No. 1. Learned trial Court after examination of the complainant took cognizance of the matter and thereafter, process was issued to respondent No. 1. 3. During pendency of the complaint case, on 14.1.2012, the original complainant, namely, Ramnaran Dewangan expired and thereafter, an application was moved by the petitioner seeking permission to continue with the complaint case. Aforesaid application was rejected on 2.7.2013 by learned trial Court on the ground that there is no material to establish that the petitioner/wife of the deceased was co-complainant and she sustained any injury in the incident as alleged in the complaint case, therefore, no such permission can be granted. Thereafter, the learned Revisional Court vide order dated 16.7.2015 affirmed the finding recorded by the learned trial Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the learned Court below ought to have permitted the petitioner to continue with the prosecution after death of her husband according to the provisions of Section 302 and 256 of the Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chand Devi Daga and Others vs. Manju K. Humatani and Others, (2018) 1 SCC 71 . 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. He would submit that the Courts below have rightly rejected the application moved by the petitioner as there was no averment to the effect that any injury was sustained by the petitioner in that incident. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 7. It is not disputed that the petitioner is wife of deceased/complainant. He would submit that the Courts below have rightly rejected the application moved by the petitioner as there was no averment to the effect that any injury was sustained by the petitioner in that incident. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 7. It is not disputed that the petitioner is wife of deceased/complainant. The complaint case was filed by original complainant on 23.10.2007 and after recording the statement of the complainant and his witnesses, process was issued to respondent No. 1. 8. During pendency of the complaint case, the original complainant died on 14.1.2012 and thereafter, an application was moved seeking permission to continue with the prosecution and the learned trial Court rejected the application on the ground that no injury was sustained by the petitioner. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court have been affirmed by the learned Sessions Court in the revision preferred by the petitioner. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chand Devi Daga (supra) has held that in case of trial of summons case it is not necessary or mandatory that after death of complainant the complaint is to be rejected in exercise of the power under proviso to Section 256(1) of Cr.P.C. It is also observed that according to provisions of Section 302 of Cr.P.C. the permission to continue the legal heirs of deceased/complainant to prosecute the case can be granted. The relevant paragraphs No. 10 to 15 are reproduced herein-below: “10. In this context a reference is made to judgment of this Court in Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SCC 983. In the said case this Court had the occasion to consider the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. The complainant had filed a complaint against the appellants. The complaint was filed under Sections 498 and 496 IPC. The accused was summoned. However, during the pendency of the complaint, the complainant died. The complainant’s mother applied for substituting her to act as complainant and continue the proceedings. The Magistrate permitted the mother of complainant to pursue the complaint against which revision was filed before the High Court which was dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court the appellant had come up before this Court. The complainant’s mother applied for substituting her to act as complainant and continue the proceedings. The Magistrate permitted the mother of complainant to pursue the complaint against which revision was filed before the High Court which was dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court the appellant had come up before this Court. In the above context this Court considered the pari materia provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 with regard to Section 247 (now Section 256) it was specifically held that said provision does not furnish any valid analogy. In paragraph 4 of the judgment following was observed: “4. Mr. Keswani for Vyas, in support of the abatement of the case, relied upon the analogy of Section 431 under which appeals abate and Sections 247 and 259 under which on the complainant remaining absent, the court can acquit or discharge the accused. These analogies do not avail him because they provide for special situations. Inquiries and trials before the court are of several kinds. Section 247 occurs in Chapter XX which deals with the trial of summons cases by a Magistrate and Section 259 in Chapter XXI which deals with trial of warrant cases before Magistrates. Under the former, if summons is issued on a complaint and the complainant on any day remains absent from the court, unless it decides to proceed with the trial, must acquit the accused. This can only happen in the trial of cases, which are punishable with imprisonment of less than one year. This not being the trial of a summons case but a committal inquiry, Section 247 neither applies nor can it furnish any valid analogy. Similarly, Section 259, which occurs in the Chapter on the trial of warrant cases, that is to say, cases triable by a Magistrate and punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year can furnish no analogy. Under Section 259, if the offence being tried as a warrant case is compoundable or is not cognizable the Magistrate may discharge the accused before the charge is framed if the complainant remains absent. Once again this section cannot apply because the Presidency Magistrate was not trying the case under Chapter XXI.” 11. This Court further had occasion to consider Section 495 of Code 1898 (now Section 302 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) and this Court laid down in paragraph 7 as follows: (Ashwin Nanubhai Case, AIR p.985) “7 Mr. Once again this section cannot apply because the Presidency Magistrate was not trying the case under Chapter XXI.” 11. This Court further had occasion to consider Section 495 of Code 1898 (now Section 302 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) and this Court laid down in paragraph 7 as follows: (Ashwin Nanubhai Case, AIR p.985) “7 Mr. Keswani contends that the Presidency Magistrate has made a “substitution” of a new complainant and there is nothing in the Code which warrants the substitution of one complainant for another. It is true that the Presidency Magistrate has used the word “substitute” but that is not the effect of the order. What the Presidency Magistrate has done is to allow the mother to act as the complainant to continue the prosecution. This power was undoubtedly possessed by the Presidency Magistrate because of Section 495 of the Code by which Courts are empowered (with some exceptions) to authorise the conduct of prosecution by any person. The words ‘any person’ would indubitably include the mother of the complainant in a case such as this. Section 198 itself contemplates that a complaint may be made by a person other than the person aggrieved and there seems to us no valid reason why in such a serious case we should hold that the death of the complainant puts an end to the prosecution.” 12. At this stage reference to Section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code is necessary. Section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code is contained in Chapter XXIV with the heading “General provisions as to inquiries and trials.” Section 302 relates to permission to conduct prosecution which is to the following effect: “Section 302. Permission to conduct prosecution: (1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector; but no person, other than the Advocate General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such permission: Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted. (2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader.” 13. (2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader.” 13. This Court had occasion to consider Sections 256 and 302 in Balasaheb K. Thackeray and Another vs. Venkat @ Babru, (2006) 5 SCC 530 . In the above case complaint was filed under Section 500 read with Section 34 IPC. A petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code 1973 against the order of issue of process in the High Court which was dismissed. SLP was filed in this Court in which notice was issued and during the pendency of the appeal it was noted that the complainant had died. It was contended that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that complainant is dead. This Court in the above context referred to Sections 256 and 302. This Court repelled the argument of the appellant that complaint be dismissed on the ground that complainant had died. Following was held in paragraphs 3 to 6: “3. Learned counsel for the appellants with reference to Section 256 of the Code submitted that the complaint was to be dismissed on the ground of the death of the complainant. As noted above learned counsel for Respondent 1’s legal heirs submitted that the legal heirs of the complainant shall file an application for permission to prosecute and, therefore, the complaint still survives consideration. 4. At this juncture it is relevant to take note of what has been stated by this Court earlier on the principles applicable. In Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas vs. State of Maharashtra with reference to Section 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as “the old Code”) it was held that the Magistrate had the power to permit a relative to act as the complainant to continue the prosecution. In Jimmy Jahangir Madan vs. Bolly Cariyappa Hindley after referring to Ashwin case it was held that heir of the complainant can be allowed to file a petition under Section 302 of the Code to continue the prosecution. 5. Section 302 of the Code reads as under: “302. In Jimmy Jahangir Madan vs. Bolly Cariyappa Hindley after referring to Ashwin case it was held that heir of the complainant can be allowed to file a petition under Section 302 of the Code to continue the prosecution. 5. Section 302 of the Code reads as under: “302. Permission to conduct prosecution: (1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector; but no person, other than the Advocate General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such permission: Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted. (2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. 6. To bring in application of Section 302 of the Code, permission to conduct the prosecution has to be obtained from the Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case. The Magistrate is empowered to permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector; but no person other than the Advocate General or the Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor shall be entitled to do so without such permission. 14. Two Judge Bench in Jimmy Jahangir Madan vs. Bolly Caiyappa Hindley (Dead) by LRs. (2004) 12 SCC 509 referring to this Court’s judgment in Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas (supra) had held that heirs of complainant can continue the prosecution. Following was held in paragraph 5: “5. The question as to whether the heirs of the complainant can be allowed to file an application under Section 302 of the Code to continue the prosecution is no longer res integra as the same has been concluded by a decision of this Court in the case of Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas vs. State of Maharashtra in which case the Court was dealing with a case under Section 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which is corresponding to Section 302 of the Code. In that case, it was laid down that upon the death of the complainant, under the provisions of Section 495 of the said Code, mother of the complainant could be allowed to continue the prosecution. It was further laid down that she could make the application either herself or through a pleader. Undisputedly, in the present case, the heirs themselves have not filed the applications to continue the prosecution, rather the same have been filed by their power of attorney holders....” 15. In view of what has been discussed above, we are of the view that High Court did not commit any error in allowing the legal heirs of the complainant to prosecute the criminal miscellaneous petition before the High Court. We do not find any error in the order of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed.” 10. Now coming to the facts of the present case in light of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court it appears that the learned trial Court without applying the provisions of Sections 256 and 302 of Cr.P.C. rejected the application and same has been affirmed by the learned Revisional Court. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that after death of the complainant, his/her legal heirs may be permitted to continue with the prosecution. In view of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the order passed by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the learned Revisional Court are hereby set aside. The application moved by the petitioner seeking permission to continue with the prosecution is hereby allowed. The parties are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 13.9.2023. 12. Accordingly, the petition is disposed of. Record of the Court below be sent back forthwith.