JUDGMENT : P.N. DESAI, J. 1. This appeal arises out of judgment passed in C.C. No. 1740/2009 dated 14.06.2012 by the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Shimogga wherein learned JMFC acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (for short hereinafter referred to as ‘N.I. Act’). 2. In brief the case of the complainant is that the accused had borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- from the complainant and agreed to pay the same with interest @ 23% p.a. within five months from the date of borrowing the loan. In that connection, the accused had issued three cheques bearing Nos. 957442, 957443, 957444 dated 04.02.1998, 15.3.1998 and 31.3.1998 respectively. When the complainant presented those cheques for encashment on 22.06.1998, the said three cheques came to be dishonoured for want of sufficient funds. Therefore, the complainant issued demand notice dated 26.06.1998. The same was served on the accused and the accused gave a reply on 01.07.1998. But as the accused did not pay the amount, the complainant filed the complaint on 24.08.1998. 3. In order to prove his case, the complainant got examined himself as PW-1 and got marked eleven documents as Exs.P1 to P11. The respondent got examined himself as RW-1. But no documents are marked on behalf of respondent. After hearing the arguments, learned JMFC acquitted the accused on the ground that the complaint itself was time barred. Aggrieved by the same, the complainant has filed this appeal. 4. Heard Sri. Yogesh V. Kotemath for Sri. P.H. Virupakshaiah, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri. Jagadeeshachari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that in view of Section 142(b) of N.I. Act, the appeal may be allowed and the matter may be remanded and an opportunity may be provided to the appellant to file an application seeking condonation of delay. Learned counsel in support of his arguments relied on the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of R.K. Chawla and Another vs. Goa Antibiotics, 2006 (1) ALD Cri. 62 and at paragraph No. 19, the Bombay High Court referred to Section 142(b) of N.I Act and held that it was open to the complainant in a pending case to take recourse to the proviso to Section 142(b) of N.I. Act. 62 and at paragraph No. 19, the Bombay High Court referred to Section 142(b) of N.I Act and held that it was open to the complainant in a pending case to take recourse to the proviso to Section 142(b) of N.I. Act. Further he relied on the judgment of coordinate bench of this Court in Crl. R.P. No. 1242/2021 dated 08.04.2022 in the case of M/s. A. Seating vs. M/s. Nandini Modulars, wherein the coordinate bench of this Court has dismissed the revision petition holding that the Court has to take note of the very proviso to Section 142(b) of N.I.Act, which confers jurisdiction upon the Court to condone the delay i.e. original Court or otherwise the very purpose and wisdom of the parliament would be defeated. With these arguments, learned counsel prayed to set aside the judgment of acquittal and remand back the matter to the Trial Court. 6. Against this, learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment of acquittal and stated that the Trial Court has passed the well reasoned judgment and there is no need to interfere with the same. 7. I have perused the impugned judgment of acquittal and also other materials on record. 8. Admittedly, in this case, according to the complainant, the cheques were presented on 22.06.1998 and they were returned dishonoured on the same day for want of sufficient funds. Then the complainant issued demand notice on 26.06.1998 i.e. after four days of the dishonor of cheques. The postal acknowledgment is also produced and the same is marked as Ex.P8, but it does not bear any seal of the postal authority or any date or initial by the respondent. But Ex.P10 is the reply notice which bears date as 01.07.1998. Therefore, it is evident that the said notice was served on or before 01.07.1998 or on 01.07.1998 itself. 9. Section 138 of N.I. Act reads as under: “138 Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. But Ex.P10 is the reply notice which bears date as 01.07.1998. Therefore, it is evident that the said notice was served on or before 01.07.1998 or on 01.07.1998 itself. 9. Section 138 of N.I. Act reads as under: “138 Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless: (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation: For the purposes of this section “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” 10. Explanation: For the purposes of this section “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” 10. Therefore, in view of Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act, when once the cheque came to be dishonoured, a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque will be issued within 30 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. Prior to 06.02.2003, the time was fixed at 15 days and further if the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheuqe, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice i.e. intimation regarding service of notice as provided under Section 142 of N.I. Act within 30 days, he has to file complaint. 11. Section 142 of N.I. Act reads as under: 142. Cognizance of offences - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974): (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque. (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138: Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138. 12. In view of section 142(b) of N.I. Act, the complaint has to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of N.I. Act. Under section 138(c) of N.I. Act, cause of action arises when once the complainant firstly receives intimation from the bank about the dishonour of cheque. Under section 138(c) of N.I. Act, cause of action arises when once the complainant firstly receives intimation from the bank about the dishonour of cheque. Then he has to issue notice giving 15 days time to the accused to repay the amount and while calculating the limitation, 15 days time as to when the information of dishonour of cheque is received by the accused is to be excluded and thereafter within 30 days, a complaint has to be lodged. 13. I have perused the case papers and the records of the trial court. It is evident that the complaint was lodged on 24.08.1998 in the open court itself. Thereafter, the magistrate took cognizance and sworn statement was recorded. I have also perused the order sheet dated 05.02.2000, wherein learned JMFC has in detail discussed as to how a prima-facie case exists to proceed against the accused and thereafter the evidence was led. It appears, the complainant has not produced the legal notice, reply given by the accused at the time of filing the complaint, because, in the written complaint which is filed before the court, the complainant has not at all shown as to actually when the registered RPAD notice was served and when the accused sent a letter. There is no material at this stage before the court to show as to whether it is time barred or not. Subsequently, Ex-P10 letter written by the accused was produced through the evidence of PW-1. In the cross examination, PW-1 has admitted that his Advocate has received the reply sent by the accused-Ex-P10 on 01.07.1998. He has also admitted that the date of receipt of letter was subsequently altered. The accused has taken defence in his evidence that there is delay in filing the complaint and also giving evidence. He has denied the suggestion that within one month of receipt of said notice, the complaint was filed. 14. Admittedly, the complaint was filed after the prescribed period of limitation. Therefore, learned JMFC has dismissed the complaint. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision of the coordinate bench of this Court in Crl. R.P. No. 1242/2021 dated 08.04.2022 in the case of M/s. A. Seating and Others vs. M/s. Nandini Modulars wherein the Bench has referred to the decision of G. Thimmappa vs. Shivaraj, ILR 2015 Kar. 5064. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision of the coordinate bench of this Court in Crl. R.P. No. 1242/2021 dated 08.04.2022 in the case of M/s. A. Seating and Others vs. M/s. Nandini Modulars wherein the Bench has referred to the decision of G. Thimmappa vs. Shivaraj, ILR 2015 Kar. 5064. In that case, no contention was taken before the trial court that the complaint was time barred. Then before the appellate court, an application for condonation of delay was filed. Same was allowed by the Sessions Court which is confirmed by this Court by referring to section 142(b) of N.I. Act which confers jurisdiction upon the court to condone the delay. In my view, said decision is not applicable because here the question of limitation was raised before the trial court itself by cross examining PW-1 and accused giving his evidence regarding complaint being time barred. No such application was filed before the trial court. Even in the appeal also, no such application for condonation of delay is filed. On the other hand, no such ground was also taken in the appeal memo filed in this case. 16. On perusal of the appeal memo and the grounds taken therein, it is evident that the contention of the appellant all alone is that the complaint filed before the trial court was well within the date of period of limitation. The appellant’s contention is that notice is served. Even though reply notice is dated 01.07.1998 as there are no documents to show the said date, it has to be presumed as 11.07.1998, within 15 days thereafter is 26.07.1998. This complaint is filed on 24.08.1998 is well within time, which contention of the appellant is not at all tenable, because, Ex-P10 is relied by the appellant himself. In his evidence also, he has admitted that notice is received by his counsel on 01.07.1998 and the date 11.07.1998 is an altered one. Therefore, no such ground regarding condonation of delay is taken in the trial court, even though it is specifically raised no such ground is taken in the appeal. 17. I have perused the coordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the case of G. Thimmappa vs. Shivaraj, ILR 2005 Kar. 5064, wherein, there was five days delay in filing the complaint. The complainant had infact filed an application for condonation of delay alongwith the complaint. 17. I have perused the coordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the case of G. Thimmappa vs. Shivaraj, ILR 2005 Kar. 5064, wherein, there was five days delay in filing the complaint. The complainant had infact filed an application for condonation of delay alongwith the complaint. The trial court without considering the said application has dismissed the complaint. Therefore, the court held that such a proceedings is not a proceeding in the eye of law. The magistrate has to deal with the application for condonation of delay in accordance with Section 142(b) of N.I. Act. Therefore, said decision is also not applicable as no such application was filed before the trial court, even though limitation ground was taken by the respondent/accused. In appeal also, no such ground is urged. Moreover, in Crl. R.P. No. 1242/2021 in the case of M/s. A. Seating and Others vs. M/s. Nandini Modulars case, the application was filed in the year 2017 before the Magistrate Court, at that time already amended proviso to section 142(b) of N.I. Act came into force, wherein there is provision for condonation of delay, if sufficient cause is shown. 18. The decision of Bombay High court relied on by learned counsel for the appellant in the case of R.P. Chawla and Another vs. Goa Antibiotics and Another dated 06.07.2005 referred above is also not applicable as the finding at para 19 that the proviso to clause(b) of section 142 of N.I. Act is retrospective, is not all tenable in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Subodh S. Salaskar vs. Jayprakash M. Shah and Another, AIR 2008 SC 3086 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court at Paras 24 and 26 discussed in detail and held that the said proviso to section 142(b) conferring such power is substantive provision and it is not a procedural aspect. Therefore, it could not be given a retrospective effect. Paras 24 and 26 reads as under: 24. Ex facie, it was barred by limitation. No application for condonation of delay was filed. No application for condonation of delay was otherwise maintainable. The provisions of the Act being special in nature, in terms thereof the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Act was limited to the period of thirty days in terms of the proviso appended thereto. No application for condonation of delay was otherwise maintainable. The provisions of the Act being special in nature, in terms thereof the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Act was limited to the period of thirty days in terms of the proviso appended thereto. The Parliament only with a view to obviate the aforementioned difficulties on the part of the complainant inserted proviso to Clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act in 2002. It confers a jurisdiction upon the court to condone the delay. It is, therefore, a substantive provision and not a procedural one. The matter might have been different if the Magistrate could have exercised its jurisdiction either under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1976. The provisions of the said Acts are not applicable. In any event, no such application for condonation of delay was filed. If the proviso appended to Clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act contained a substantive provision and not a procedural one, it could not have been given a retrospective effect. A substantive law, as it is well-settled, in absence of an express provision, cannot be given a retrospective effect or retroactive operation. 26. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the courts below committed a manifest error in applying the proviso to the fact of the instant case. If the complaint petition was barred by limitation, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 138 of the Act. The direction to issue summons on the appellant, therefore, being illegal and without jurisdiction was a nullity. 19. Therefore, in view of this decision also, the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of R.P. Chawla’s case will not help the appellant. Apart from that, in that case, the trial court has taken cognizance and the accused preferred revision before the Sessions court. The Sessions Court held that the trial court had not taken into consideration the question of delay and not called upon the complainant to explain the delay. Hence, remanded the matter back to the trial court. Therefore, said order was confirmed. 20. But here, the facts of this case are totally different. It is to be noted that the complaint was filed in the year 1998. Hence, remanded the matter back to the trial court. Therefore, said order was confirmed. 20. But here, the facts of this case are totally different. It is to be noted that the complaint was filed in the year 1998. Infact, under section 138(b), the demand has to be made within 15 days. Subsequently, it was amended to 30 days. The complainant has not brought to the notice of the court regarding receipt of notice by the respondent by stating any date. So there was no occasion for the Magistrate at the time of taking cognizance to consider the question of limitation. But when Ex-P10-reply by the accused-document was produced, subsequently, the question of limitation was raised. Evidence was led. At that time, no application for condonation of delay was filed by the complainant. When the Magistrate has rightly dismissed the complaint, now the appeal is filed again taking the ground that the complaint was within time. No such application for condonation of delay was filed nor any such contention is taken at subsequent stages before appellate court. Therefore, in view of the facts of this case and the dates and events that have taken place, the complaint filed by the complainant is time barred. Learned JMFC after considering the rival contentions has rightly come to the conclusion that it is time barred one which judgment needs no interference. 21. It is settled principles of law that this court being the appellate court will not interfere in the judgment of acquittal, unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal is on erroneous ground or it has resulted in miscarriage of justice or it is a perverse. 22. In the light of these principles, if the present judgment of acquittal is considered, then in my considered view, the impugned judgment is correct and learned JMFC has rightly answered the points for consideration and dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused. Therefore, the appeal being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed. 23. Accordingly, I pass the following: ORDER: 1. The appeal filed by the appellant-complainant under section 378(4) Cr.P.C. stands dismissed. 2. The judgment of acquittal dated 14.06.2009 passed by learned II Addl. Civil Judge and JMFC, Shimoggaa in C.C. No. 1740/2009 is hereby confirmed. 3. Office is directed to send back the records to the trial court. 4. No order as to costs.