JUDGMENT : 1. By way of the present writ petition, it is prayed that the order dated 14.09.2005 passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutional Tribunal, Jaipur in appeal No. 21/2001 whereby, the order of termination of Respondent No. 1 dated 09.11.2000 was quashed and the petitioner was directed to reinstate respondent No.1 with all consequential benefits, be quashed and set aside. 2. The Mayo College, Ajmer is an educational institute which was founded in the year 1875 by Sir Richard Bourke, the 6th Earl of Mayo, who was also the Viceroy of India until 1872. It is one of the oldest educational institutions in the country, which was set up as a public boarding school, offering education to the then elite. While the character of the institute changed post-independence, but one thing that remained constant was the nature of the establishment in being an eminent institute of learning. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that Mayo College is an unaided, non-governmental educational institution receiving no grant from either the State or the Central Government and is affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi. 3. Succinctly stated, the facts of the present case are as follows: (i) That respondent No.1, Smt. Pushpa Sisodiya, was employed as a Class-IV worker in Mayo College Girl’s School, Ajmer. (ii) That in the year 2000, on account of a dispute qua the grant of bonus to the employees of the institute; a Sangharsh Samiti was constituted to start an agitation against the Management of the College, wherein respondent No.1, Smt. Pushpa Sisodiya had an instrumental role in organizing the said agitation. (iii) That on 19.10.2000, a meeting of the employees was held at the Main Gate of the College wherein they informed the Management of their demands qua the grant of bonus and threatened to go on strike from 22.10.2000, if their demands were not positively met. (iv) That in response, the Management informed the employees that the constitution of the said Samiti was illegal. Furthermore, they categorically told the employees that the decision for payment of bonus would be given in accordance with the decision to be taken by the State Government. Accordingly, the Management asked the employees to resume their duties, or else, disciplinary proceedings would be initiated against them. Furthermore, they categorically told the employees that the decision for payment of bonus would be given in accordance with the decision to be taken by the State Government. Accordingly, the Management asked the employees to resume their duties, or else, disciplinary proceedings would be initiated against them. (v) That on 22.10.2000, the Management issued a notice to the said Samiti declaring certain services as essential, including those within the mess and hospital of the petitioner-institute. (vi) That on 23.10.2000, the Annual Prize Giving Function was held in Mayo College Girls School. It was attended by a large number of visitors, including dignitaries, parents and distinguished stake-holders. However, despite the notice by the management declaring certain services as essential, the said function was wholly disturbed by the Samiti, wherein the role of respondent No.1 was instrumental. Furthermore, as a result of the said agitation, the students along with the parents, guardians and visitors were put to severe discomfort. (vii) That as a response, the Management issued a notice to call off the strike and for the non-payment of salary of the employees involved therein. (viii) That on 03.11.2000, a show cause notice was issued to Respondent No. 1 as to why her services should not be terminated. In response, vide letter dated 06.11.2000, respondent No.1 admitted to the fact of her involvement and participation in the strike against the institution. (ix) That as a result, on 09.11.2000, a unanimous decision was taken by the Governing Council of Mayo College, Ajmer that the continuation of the services of Smt. Pushpa Sisodiya was not in the interest of the institution. Accordingly, an order qua the termination of the services of Smt. Pushpa Sisodiya was passed. (x) That aggrieved by the said termination order, Smt. Pushpa Sisodiya preferred an appeal before the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutional Tribunal, wherein vide order dated 14.09.2005, the termination of Smt. Pushpa Sisodiya was set aside and the Management was directed to reinstate the services of respondent No.1. (xi) Therefore, the present writ petition was filed by the petitioner-institute challenging the order of reinstatement passed by the learned Tribunal. 4. Vide interim order dated 28.09.2005, operation of the impugned order dated 14.09.2005 passed by the learned Tribunal was stayed. Thereafter, the matter came up before this Court on an application filed by respondent No.1 to bring certain documents on record. 4. Vide interim order dated 28.09.2005, operation of the impugned order dated 14.09.2005 passed by the learned Tribunal was stayed. Thereafter, the matter came up before this Court on an application filed by respondent No.1 to bring certain documents on record. With the said application, the respondent brought on record the judgment passed by the Apex Court in (2018) 18 SCC 2016 titled as Kailash Singh vs. Managing Committee, Mayo College and prayed that as per the dictum of the Apex Court in the said judgment, she should be granted benefits on parity with the former employees of the petitioner-institute, namely Mr. Kailash Singh and Mr. Jeffry Jobard. Accordingly, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the matter and after having obtained the consent of both the parties, the matter was taken up for final disposal. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the case of the respondent is identical in all respects with that of Kailash Singh and Jeffry Jobard except of the fact that she held a relatively lower post in the petitioner-institute i.e. Class IV Employee and her salary was much lower than that of Kailash Singh and Jeffry Jobard, who held the posts of LDCs. It was further submitted that Kailash Singh and Jeffry Jobard joined Mayo College in the year 1984 and 1985 respectively. Whereas, the year of joining of the respondent in the present case is 1993. Therefore, it is apparent from the face of the record that the respondent in the present case had joined the services of Mayo College significantly after Kailash Singh and Jeffry Jobard. Moreover, she was a Class-IV employee, while the other two employees held the posts of LDCs at the time of their termination from the institute. Hence, the respondent cannot claim the same compensation that was given to the said employees by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that while terminating the services of the respondent, the petitioner-institute had duly complied with the provisions of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Non-Governmental Educational Institutions Act, 1989. In this regard, learned counsel apprised the Court of the fact that the Managing Committee of the petitioner-institute was of a unanimous opinion that the services of the respondent could not be continued without prejudice to the interests of the institution. In this regard, learned counsel apprised the Court of the fact that the Managing Committee of the petitioner-institute was of a unanimous opinion that the services of the respondent could not be continued without prejudice to the interests of the institution. Moreover, before terminating the services of the respondent, the petitioner-institute had also applied for the prior consent of the Director of Education, although the same could not be received on time. Lastly, it was submitted that in order to fulfill the compliance of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, the petitioner-institute also paid salary in lieu of the notice period to the respondent; wherein initially the salary for a period of three months was given and subsequently, the remaining half was deposited in the bank account of the respondent as well. Therefore, the order passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutional Tribunal is against the settled position of the law and hence, is liable to be set aside. 6. In addition to the arguments raised herein-above, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the judgment of Kailash Singh (Supra), the Apex Court had enunciated the formula for the calculation of compensation to be awarded to the employees, wherein it was stated that the employee would be entitled to salary and other allowances for the period of eight years from the date of their termination. However, in this regard, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent had gainfully joined the services of Gheesibai Memorial Mittal Hospital and Research Centre, Ajmer on 29.10.2005. Therefore, the respondent in the present case would only be entitled for the benefit of backwages from 09.11.2000 i.e. date of termination from the petitioner-institute to 29.10.2005 i.e. date of joining the gainful employment elsewhere. In support of the said contention, it was submitted that the Apex Court in (2009) 2 SCC 288 titled as Managing Director, Balasaheb Desai Sahakari S.K. Limited vs. Kashinath Ganapati Kambale has held that the burden of proof to show that the workman was not gainfully employed elsewhere is not on the employer; rather, the same is placed upon the employee himself. Accordingly, it was argued that the respondent shall not be eligible for the salary allegedly accruing to her, for the period where she was gainfully employed elsewhere. Accordingly, it was argued that the respondent shall not be eligible for the salary allegedly accruing to her, for the period where she was gainfully employed elsewhere. Learned counsel further submitted that the actions of the respondent were prejudicial to the interests of the petitionerinstitute, wherein she exhibited behaviour which was not reflective of the values of Mayo College, including the act of adopting abusive language and displaying unworthy conduct on the premises of the institute, while hindering with the functioning of the essential services, such as the operation of the mess for the students, college dispensary etc. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Tribunal failed to take into consideration the factual aspects of the case and hence, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is not tenable to the settled position of law. Therefore, by placing reliance upon the dictum of the Apex Court in Kailash Singh (Supra) and Managing Director, Balasaheb Desai Sahakari S.K. Limited (Supra), it was submitted that having taken into consideration the fact that the respondent was unable to categorically deny her gainful employment elsewhere since the year 2005, she would only be entitled to back wages on the basis of salary and other allowances for the period of November 2000 to November 2005 and not thereafter. The amount for the said period, as calculated by the petitioner-institute stands at Rs. 3,95,017/-. Furthermore, learned counsel while acknowledging yet not admitting to the said position, submitted that even if the back wages of the respondent are allowed for a period of the last eight years i.e. from November 2000 to November 2008, the amount accruable to the respondent comes to Rs. 4,28,217/- only. 7. In light of the submissions made herein-above, learned counsel for the petitioner conclusively argued that the calculations submitted by the respondent cannot be relied upon, as they are misleading and are in complete contravention to the judgment of the Apex Court in Kailash Singh (Supra). Therefore, it was urged that the present writ petition be allowed and the order of re-instatement passed by the learned Tribunal be quashed and set-aside; while the maximum amount accruable qua compensation to the respondent be Rs. 4,28,217/- only. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the learned Tribunal has passed a well-reasoned order and after a due consideration of the material aspects, has arrived at a logical conclusion. 4,28,217/- only. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the learned Tribunal has passed a well-reasoned order and after a due consideration of the material aspects, has arrived at a logical conclusion. In support of his contention, learned counsel submitted that despite being innocent, the respondent was subjected to arbitrary punishment, contrary to the mandatory requirements as stipulated under Section 18(3) of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989. Learned counsel further submitted that while passing the order of termination dated 09.11.2000, the principles of natural justice were not observed as no enquiry was conducted to prove the alleged misconduct on part of the respondent. Moreover, in further contravention of the provisions of the Act of 1989, no unanimous decision on part of the Managing Committee was placed on record before the learned Tribunal in time. Furthermore, the salary paid in lieu of the notice period was initially given only for a period of three months. Learned counsel also submitted that in categoric violation of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, no prior consent of the Director of Education was obtained before terminating the services of the respondent. Therefore, the learned Tribunal, while passing the judgment dated 14.09.2005, rightly observed that the prior approval of the competent authority was neither taken by the Management and nor was any document placed on record showcasing the unanimous decision of the Managing Committee regarding the termination of the respondent. Hence, the order of termination dated 09.11.2000 was rightly set aside by the learned Tribunal, as the same was not in consonance with the mandatory requirements stipulated under Section 18 of the Act of 1989. 9. Furthermore, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the stand taken by the petitioner-institute in the garb of exclusion of the period for the duration of the alleged gainful employment of the respondent is wholly misconceived and against the facts and circumstances of the case. In this regard, learned counsel submitted that the respondent has categorically denied her gainful employment during the said period. Therefore, the burden of proof to show that the workman was not gainfully employed elsewhere is upon the employer and not the employee. In this regard, learned counsel submitted that the respondent has categorically denied her gainful employment during the said period. Therefore, the burden of proof to show that the workman was not gainfully employed elsewhere is upon the employer and not the employee. Moreover, it was further submitted that by no stretch of imagination, the said period may be excluded for determining the amount of compensation accruable to the respondent as the same would constitute a reward for the employer and a punishment for the employee; notwithstanding the fact that the termination order of the respondent was passed contravening the mandatory requirements of Section 18 of the Act of 1989. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent is facing financial hardships in carrying out her day to day expenses, specially considering the fact that her husband is paralyzed and therefore, in unable to earn a livelihood. In support of the said contentions, learned counsel relied upon the dictum of the Apex Court judgments in Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. ED.) & Ors. reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 ; State of Assam vs. J.N. Roy Biswas reported in (1976) 1 SCC 234 and Kailash Singh vs. Managing Committee, Mayo College reported in (2018) 18 SCC 2016. Accordingly, learned counsel urged that the respondent is entitled not only for compensation at par with the similarly situated persons in the case of Kailash Singh (Supra), but also for reinstatement in service at the petitioner-institute. 10. Considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the sides, scanned the record of the case and perused the judgments cited at Bar. 11. Upon a perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal, it is observed that the respondent was employed as a Class-IV worker in Mayo College Girl’s School, Ajmer. Thereafter, on account of a dispute between the parties regarding the grant of bonus to the employees, the respondent’s services were terminated by the petitioner-institute without following the principles of natural justice i.e. the respondent was given a show cause notice on 03.11.2000 and thereafter, her services were terminated on 09.11.2000, without conducting any due inquiry into the alleged misconduct. Thereafter, on account of a dispute between the parties regarding the grant of bonus to the employees, the respondent’s services were terminated by the petitioner-institute without following the principles of natural justice i.e. the respondent was given a show cause notice on 03.11.2000 and thereafter, her services were terminated on 09.11.2000, without conducting any due inquiry into the alleged misconduct. Secondly, it is observed that the learned Tribunal had given a categorical finding that the provisions of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Non-Governmental Educational Institutions Act, 1989 were not complied with; as no prior permission was obtained from the Director of Education before terminating the respondent’s services. Moreover, even the salary given in lieu of the notice period was for a period of three months only, instead of the statutorily prescribed period of six months. Furthermore, it was observed that in contravention of the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act of 1989, no unanimous decision of the Managing Committee was brought on record timely either. Rather, the same was done subsequently, merely as an afterthought. Therefore, after having taken into consideration the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the matter, the learned Tribunal had directed the petitioner-institute to reinstate the services of the respondent. 12. We may now turn to the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of Kailash Singh (Supra). In the said case, while dealing with the issue of awarding compensation to similarly situated employees, who unlike the present respondent, were working on the higher post of LDCs and occupied residential premises provided by the petitioner-institute, were granted a net compensation of Rs. 25 lakhs in the case of Kailash Singh and Rs. 18 lakhs in the case Jeffry Jobard. 13. However, before we delve into determining the issue of reinstatement of the respondent and the compensation to be provided therewith; it would be prudent for us to enunciate upon the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Kailash Singh (Supra). In the said judgment, while dealing with the issue of non-compliance of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, it was observed that the management had admittedly erred in not obtaining the consent of the Director of Education in writing. In the said judgment, while dealing with the issue of non-compliance of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, it was observed that the management had admittedly erred in not obtaining the consent of the Director of Education in writing. However, at the same time, considering the fact that the petitioner-institute is a financially unaided private institution; then in such facts and circumstances, it was held that there could be no question of reinstatement of an employee. Rather, the only remedy available to the aggrieved employee would be by way of compensation to be paid to them, in view of the Management’s failure in not complying with the legal requirement of obtaining the consent of the Director of Education in writing. In this regard, it was further held by the Apex Court that where the nature of employment between the parties is covered by a master-servant relationship, which is governed purely by way of a contract of employment; then any breach in the said contract could only be enforced by a suit for wrongful dismissal and damages. Accordingly, just as a contract of employment is not capable of specific performance, similarly, a breach of contract of employment is not capable of finding a declaratory judgment of subsistence of employment. Therefore, a declaration of unlawful termination and restoration to service in such a case of contract of employment would be indirectly an instance of specific performance of contract for personal services, which is not permissible under the settled position of the law. Hence, it was held that the mode of making demands by employees, in such financially unaided institutions, where their employment is covered by a contract of employment, cannot be at par with workmen in industrial establishments, where the latter agitate for their rights. Therefore, under such contracts of employment, there could be no adjudication by invocation of a reference to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, the only remedy available to the respondent would only be in the form of damages. 14. Accordingly, whilst dealing with the limited question of the quantification of damages, the Apex Court in Kailash Singh (Supra) had held that the methodology of calculation of compensation would be based upon the principle of wrongful termination of an employee, under the master-servant relationship. 14. Accordingly, whilst dealing with the limited question of the quantification of damages, the Apex Court in Kailash Singh (Supra) had held that the methodology of calculation of compensation would be based upon the principle of wrongful termination of an employee, under the master-servant relationship. Therefore, while awarding compensation in the form of backwages, the Court must observe the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the factual matrix of the case. The amount so awarded could not be ‘measly’, nor could it be a ‘bonanza’. Hence, after analyzing the facts and circumstances of the matter, the Hon’ble Apex Court had granted damages in the form of salary and allowances payable for a period of eight (8) years, of the actual amounts, after adding the respective provident fund amounts and other retiral dues while simultaneously deducing electricity, water and occupation charges etc, which are not a part of the present dispute, as the respondent was not allotted residential quarters by the petitioner-institute. As a result, the court quantified and fixed the amounts qua compensation to the tune of Rs. 25 lakhs, in the case of Kailash Singh and Rs. 18 lakhs, in the case of Jeffry Jobard. 15. In the conspectus of the aforesaid discussion, we now turn to the crucial issue of determining the adequacy of compensation to be awarded to the respondent in the present dispute. The Management of the petitioner-institute has provided an amount to the tune of Rs. 4,28,217/-, based upon the calculation of backwages for a period of eight years as per the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kailash Singh (Supra). In this regard, it is noted that the submission of the petitioner-institute that the respondent was gainfully employed at Gheesibai Memorial Mittal Hospital & Research Centre, Ajmer since 29.10.2005; therefore, the respondent in the present case would only be entitled for the benefit of back wages from 09.11.2000 i.e. date of termination to 29.10.2005 only, was not substantiated by placing on record any cogent evidence to prove the said gainful employment of the respondent. Moreover, the said argument qua the gainful employment was never made by the petitioner-institute before the learned Tribunal as well. Hence, the same is not sustainable before this Court. Moreover, the said argument qua the gainful employment was never made by the petitioner-institute before the learned Tribunal as well. Hence, the same is not sustainable before this Court. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent correctly placed reliance upon the Apex Court judgment in Deepali Gundu Surwase (Supra) wherein it was held that in circumstances where the employer wants to deny backwages to the employee or contest the employee’s entitlement to get consequential benefits, it is upon the employer to plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed during the intervening period. Moreover, in circumstances where backwages are to be awarded for illegal and wrongful termination, the conduct of the employer and the suffering of the employee have to be taken into consideration as well. Furthermore, the corresponding denial of back wages would amount to indirectly rewarding the employer and punishing the employee. Hence, the onus to establish gainful employment of the employee was upon the petitioner-institute and not the respondent. 16. Therefore, keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the present case and considering the dictum of the Apex Court in Kailash Singh (Supra) wherein similarly situated employees, who were working on the post of LDCs, were awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 25 lakhs and Rs. 18 lakhs after the deduction of electricity, water and occupation charges; considering the fact that the mandatory provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 were not duly complied with; considering the fact that the respondent was employed as a Class IV worker and that she is presently facing financial hardship in carrying out her to day to day expenses; considering the fact that the husband of the respondent is paralysed; considering the fact that the respondent was not in occupation of any premises on the campus and had to bear additional expenses towards her housing and other amenities, including electricity and water charges, unlike the similarly situated persons in Kailash Singh (Supra) and taking a practical view of the situation to put a quietus to this long drawn dispute, this Court is inclined to direct the petitioner-institute to make a lump sum payment of Rs. 15 lakh to the respondent, without any interest. 17. The said compensation be paid to the respondent within a period of 60 days from the receipt of certified copy of this order. 18. 15 lakh to the respondent, without any interest. 17. The said compensation be paid to the respondent within a period of 60 days from the receipt of certified copy of this order. 18. In light of the said observations, the order of the Tribunal is modified in above terms and compensation is awarded to the respondent to the tune of Rs. 15 lakh. Furthermore, the order directing the reinstatement of the respondent in the petitioner-institute is set aside. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, in above terms.