ORDER : Heard. 1) The petitioner has assailed the order dated 31.10.2022 passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh, District- Korea (C.G.) in Criminal Revision No.43/2022, whereby the revision preferred by the petitioner/accused has been dismissed and the order dated 17.06.2022 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Manendragarh, District Korea (C.G.) in Criminal Case No.208/2018 parties being ‘Indrajeet Sen vs. Smt. Rajshreee Sharma’ has been affirmed, whereby an application moved by the petitioner under Section 45 of the Evidence Act was rejected. 2) The facts of the present case are that the respondent/complainant filed a Complaint Case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI Act’) before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Manendragarh inter alia on the ground that in discharge of liability, a cheque of Rs.9,50,000/- was issued by the petitioner in favor of the complainant on 25.04.2018. The complainant presented the cheque on 30.04.2018 and the same was dishonored on the ground of insufficient funds. Thereafter, a mandatory demand notice was issued and when the petitioner did not refund the amount, a complaint case was filed on 18.05.2018. The evidence of the complainant was recorded on 14.01.2020 and thereafter, on 21.03.2022, an application was moved by the petitioner under Section 45 of the Evidence Act seeking the opinion of a handwriting expert to examine the signature on the subject cheque as the petitioner has denied his signature over the disputed cheque. The respondent filed the reply and denied the averments made in the application. 3) Learned Trial Court vide order dated 17.06.2022 rejected the application moved by the petitioner under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on the ground that the Bank has not raised any objection with regard to the signature of the petitioner and therefore, there is no need to take the opinion of the handwriting expert. 4) The petitioner preferred a revision before the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh and vide order dated 31.10.2022, the revision has been dismissed affirming the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. It is also observed that for the first time aforesaid ground has been raised in the application filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and prior to that even at the time of the cross-examination of the complainant, this plea was not taken. It is also observed that for the first time aforesaid ground has been raised in the application filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and prior to that even at the time of the cross-examination of the complainant, this plea was not taken. 5) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the written complaint was made before the Police with regard to the misuse of the cheque. He would further submit that the petitioner is ready to bear the expenses of the examination of the disputed cheque by a handwriting expert and the right of the petitioner cannot be curtailed. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of G. Someshwar Rao Vs. Samineni Nage-Shwar Rao and another, AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2050. 6) On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent would submit that the cheque issued by the petitioner was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds and at the fag end of the trial an application under Section 45 of the Evidence Act has been moved, whereas, this plea was not taken by the petitioner at any point of time. He would submit that earlier an application under Section 243 of the Cr.P.C. was moved for calling a handwriting expert as a defence witness and the same was rejected vide order dated 26.11.2022 by the learned Trial Court. He would further submit that the statement of the petitioner under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has also been recorded but this plea has not been taken. He has placed reliance on the judgments passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matters of Sadhna Pandey Vs. P.C. Jain, 2014 ACD 517 (MP) and Sameer Chaturvedi Vs. Kuldeep Chaturvedi, reported in AIR Online 2018 MP 1533. 7) With regard to the complaint made by the petitioner against the complainant before the Police Authorities, he would submit that the petitioner appeared before the learned Trial Court in the present case on 03.10.2018, whereas, the alleged complaint was made to the Police on 20.11.2022 i.e. after a period of four years. His next submission is that the application was moved by the petitioner just to delay the trial. He would argue that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. 8) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents with utmost circumspection. His next submission is that the application was moved by the petitioner just to delay the trial. He would argue that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. 8) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents with utmost circumspection. 9) From the perusal of the documents, it appears that earlier an application was moved by the petitioner under Section 243 of the Cr.P.C. read with Section 45 of the Evidence Act and the same was rejected on 17.06.2022 and against that order, Criminal Revision No.43/2022 was also preferred which was dismissed vide order dated 31.10.2022 and these facts are evident from the copies of orders placed by the respondent/complainant vide Annexure R/1. The statement of the petitioner under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has been recorded where she has denied all the questions and at last, she has stated that her letter-pad, cheques etc. were misused by the complainant. Further, the complainant was examined as Complainant Witness No.1 on 14.01.2020 but no suggestion was given to the effect that the cheque was not signed by the petitioner. 10) Learned Trial Court rejected the application moved by the petitioner on the ground that earlier similar application was rejected vide order dated 17.06.2022 and the Bank has not returned the cheque on the ground that there is a mismatch of signature. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court have been affirmed by the Revisional Court. 11) In the matter of G. Someshwar Rao (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an accused is entitled to a fair trial which is a part of the fundamental right as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. A Court of law will have to consider each application filed by an accused praying for a comparison of his signature on a disputed document with his admitted signature on its own merits. The relevant para 9 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : “9. Indisputably, an accused is entitled to a fair trial which is a part of his fundamental right as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The concept, however, cannot be put to a straight jacket formula. A court of law will have to consider each application filed by an accused praying for comparison of his signature on a disputed document with his admitted signature on its own merits. The concept, however, cannot be put to a straight jacket formula. A court of law will have to consider each application filed by an accused praying for comparison of his signature on a disputed document with his admitted signature on its own merits. No hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor.” 12) In the matter of Sadhna Pandey (supra), it is held that when the cheque has not been dishonoured on account of a mismatch of signature of the complainant and it was returned with the note of insufficient funds, the permission to examine the handwriting expert should not be granted in such circumstances. Paras 5 & 6 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced herein below : “5. Having heard the counsel at length, keeping in view their arguments in order to decide the controversy, I have carefully gone through the revision memo as well as the impugned order of the revisional Court. On perusing such order, I have gathered the information that the impugned cheque given by the applicant to the respondent to pay the due consideration was dishonored by the banker of the applicant on the ground of insufficiency of fund and not on any other ground. I have not found any reply of the applicant, given by him to the respondent, in response of his demand notice given to her before filing the complaint, to show that such defence regarding difference of signature on the cheque was taken by her at the initial stage. Even in the cross-examination of the respondent's witnesses before the trial Court no such specific defence was put forth on behalf of the applicant. The impugned complaint was filed by the respondent only on the ground of dishonoring the cheque on account of insufficiency of fund and not on the ground of difference of signature of the applicant. As such the grounds which are not the subject matter of the case could not be permitted to raise in the defence. In the case at hand when the banker of the applicant itself has not dishonored the cheque on the ground of difference of the signature then the applicant/ accused could not take such defence. The applicant has only right to defend the case on the ground of insufficiency of fund and rebut the evidence of the respondent adduced on such count. The applicant has only right to defend the case on the ground of insufficiency of fund and rebut the evidence of the respondent adduced on such count. In such premises the applicant could not be permitted to get examine her signature on the cheque from hand writing expert. So, in such premises the trial court had committed grave error in allowing the impugned application of the applicant but on consideration the revisional Court has rightly rectified such error by setting aside the order of the trial Court and dismissing such application by allowing the revision of the respondent. My aforesaid approach is fully fortified by the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of L. C. Goyal ( AIR 1999 SC 2222 ) (Supra), in which it was held as under : (2) Dishonoring of the cheque issued by the appellant Ex.C/4 by the bank on account of insufficient fund in the account of the appellant. The complainant alleged that when the appellant realized that the complainant has come to know that he has misappropriated a sum of Rs. 25,491/-, he gave a cheque for a sum of Rs. 38,000/- which is Ext.C-4. The said cheque was drawn on UCO Bank and the same was deposited in the Central Bank of India in the account of Union, viz., Siemens Employees Union, New Delhi. But the said cheque was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The appellant denied his signature on Ext. C-4 and contended that his signature was forged by the complainant. It is in this context that it was urged before the Bar Council of India that some handwriting expert be examined in order to find out the genuineness of the signature on Ext. C-4. As stated above, the cheque bounced not on account of the fact that the signature on Ext. C-4 was not tallying with the specimen signature of the appellant kept with the Bank, but on account of insufficient funds. Had the signature on Ext. C-4 been different, the bank would have returned the same with the remark that the signature on Ext. C- 4 was not tallying with the appellants specimen signature kept with the bank. The memos Ext. C-6 and Ext. C-8 issued by the bank clearly show that signature of the appellant on Ext. C-4 was not objected to by the bank, but the same was returned with the remark insufficient fund. C- 4 was not tallying with the appellants specimen signature kept with the bank. The memos Ext. C-6 and Ext. C-8 issued by the bank clearly show that signature of the appellant on Ext. C-4 was not objected to by the bank, but the same was returned with the remark insufficient fund. This circumstance shows that the signature on Ext. C-4 was that of the appellant. (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4) No reply to the notices (Exts.C-12 and C-13) dated 9.6.93 and 11.1.93, respectively. The complainant sent two notices on behalf of M/s Siemens Union to the appellant wherein she inter alia alleged, that a sum of Rs. 25,102/- was misappropriated by the appellant under the pretext of payment of the court fee for the suit filed by the plaintiffs, that the appellant did not press the application for injunction, and that the appellant misled the complainant as regards the progress of the case. These notices were not replied to by the appellant which is a material circumstance against the appellant when, receipt of the notices sent to him have been admitted. 5) No FIR lodged with regard to theft of the cheque book. The case set up by the appellant before the Bar Council was that, in fact, the complainant somehow managed to get his cheque book and she after forging his signature on one of the leaf presented the same to the bank for payment. If it was true, why did the appellant not lodge any FIR with the Tilak Marg Police Station regarding theft of the cheque book. However, it was subsequently explained by the appellant that he did send a letter to the SHO of the said Police Station. But, in normal course, FIR is not lodged by letter at the first instance. Moreover, SHO, Tilak Marg Police Station gave a certificate Ext. C-14, to the effect that he did not receive any registered letter or report from the appellant regarding theft of his cheque book. 5. These established circumstances stated above, clearly show that the signature on Exts. C-1, C-2 and C-4 were that of the appellant himself. Moreover, during the course of hearing of the case, we ourselves examined and compared the admitted signature of the appellant with that of Ext. 5. These established circumstances stated above, clearly show that the signature on Exts. C-1, C-2 and C-4 were that of the appellant himself. Moreover, during the course of hearing of the case, we ourselves examined and compared the admitted signature of the appellant with that of Ext. C-4 leaving nothing to chance lest any injustice is caused to the appellant. On comparison, we found striking similarity between the admitted signature and that of the disputed one and there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the signature on Ext. C-4. The circumstances established in the present case speak for themselves and candidly point out towards the misconduct committed by the appellant. When the established circumstantial evidence is so patent that it leads to only one conclusion that the signature on Ext. C-4 was not forged; there was no need for an opinion of a hand writing expert. We are, therefore, satisfied that the established circumstantial evidence as well as the documentary evidence in the present case show that the allegations of the complainant were well substantiated and in such circumstances of the case, the Bar Council of India was justified in declining to summon a hand-writing expert for finding out the genuineness of the signature on Ext. C- 4.’ 6. Subsequently such case law was followed by the Karnataka High Court in the matter of H. M. Satish (2007 Cri LJ 2312 (Kar) (Supra), in which it was held as under: 7. In the case of denial of signature of drawer of a cheque, the best witness would be the concerned Bank Manager and not a hand writing expert The learned Magistrate has allowed the application solely on the ground that the accused would be put to greater hardship if the application were rejected. The learned magistrate has not appreciated the facts on record while allowing the application. It is useful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex court rendered in L.C. Goyal v. Mrs. Suresh Joshi and Ors. Has observed in para 8 of its judgment as under that …......the cheque bounced not on account of the fact that the appellant of Ext.C-4 was not talking with the specimen signature of the appellant kept with the bank, but on account of insufficient funds. Suresh Joshi and Ors. Has observed in para 8 of its judgment as under that …......the cheque bounced not on account of the fact that the appellant of Ext.C-4 was not talking with the specimen signature of the appellant kept with the bank, but on account of insufficient funds. Had the signature on Ext C-4 been different, the bank would have returned the same with the remark that the signature on Ext C-4 was not tallying with the appellant's specimen signature kept with the bank. The memos Ext. C-6 and Ext.C-8 issued by the bank clearly show that the signature of the appellant on Ext.C-4 was not objected to by the bank, but the same was returned with the remark "insufficient funds". This circumstances shows that the signature of Ext.C-4 was that of the appellant. 8. The above said decision is applicable on all the fours to the case on hand and the impugned order is not sustainable in law and the same calls for interference by this Court. 9. In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 21.7.2006 made in CC No. 937/2005 on the file of JMFC at Mudigere, is set aside, and the application filed by the accused under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act is dismissed. The learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of the criminal case, in accordance with law, within 3 months from the date of receipt of this order.” 13) In the matter of Sameer Chaturvedi (supra), it is held that the accused has not disputed his signature on the cheque in question therefore in light of the provisions given in Section 20 of the NI Act and further where such an accused has not denied his signature the application for expert opinion cannot be allowed. The relevant para 6 & 11 are reproduced herein below : “6.Thus, in the light of Section 20 of Negotiable Instrument Act, it is clear that where a person has not denied his signatures on the disputed cheque then, it is not necessary to send the cheque to the handwriting expert to verify that whether the remaining entries in the cheque are in the handwriting of the signatory of the cheque or not. 11. In the case of Sunita Dubey Vs. 11. In the case of Sunita Dubey Vs. Hukum Singh Ahirwar reported in 2015 Cr.L.R.(M.P.) 62 , it has been held as under :- "(10) A bare perusal of the provisions shows that there is a clear mandate under section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the effect that such an instrument can be negotiated by the maker thereof by simply signing and delivering the same to the holder in due course giving thereby ample authority to the latter to fill up the content of the instrument as intended by the maker thereof. Once the execution is admitted, it shall be taken that the cheque was issued by the accused in favour of the complainant towards the discharge of the liability. 11. In the present case, it is admitted position that the cheques were signed by the accused persons. The provisions given in section 20 of the NI Act extracted above makes it clear that the instrument may be wholly blank or incomplete in any particular; in either case, the holder has the authority to make or complete the instrument as a negotiable one. The authority implied by a signature to a blank instrument is so wide that the party so signing is bound to a holder in due course even though the holder was authorised to fill for a certain amount. Section 20 of the Act declares that inchoate instruments are also valid and legally enforceable. In the case of a signed blank cheque, the drawer gives authority to the drawee to fill up the agreed liability." 14) In light of the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, it is quite clear that though the application for examination of the cheque in question by the handwriting expert should be allowed in normal course when the accused has denied his signatures on the cheque and has moved an application at a proper stage. The right to fair trial of the accused is a fundamental right but in the instant case, earlier similar application was moved by the petitioner and the same was dismissed vide order dated 17.06.2022 by the learned trial Court and the same was affirmed by the learned Revisional Court vide order dated 31.10.2022. Both the orders attained finality and thereafter, the repeat application was moved. Both the orders attained finality and thereafter, the repeat application was moved. The petitioner has not put any question to the complainant during his cross-examination with regard to the forged signature on the cheque and in the statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., no such defence is taken. There must be a concrete foundation to move an application for expert opinion and in a routine manner such an application cannot be allowed, therefore, the learned Trial Court has rightly rejected the application moved by the petitioner under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and the learned Revisional Court while affirming such order has not committed any irregularity or infirmity. 15) In the opinion of this Court, there is no infirmity or error of law in the orders passed by the Courts below. Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.