Research › Search › Judgment

Telangana High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 413 (TS)

Bommakanti Yadagiri v. State of Telangana

2023-06-06

G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY

body2023
JUDGMENT 1. This revision is filed against the order dtd. 2/1/2023 in Crl.MP.No.1295 of 2019 in C.C.No.4812 of 2018 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court-cum-IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-IV Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar. 2. Heard Sri Jalli Kanakaiah, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri S. Ganesh, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1. 3. The petitioner was arrayed as accused in C.C.No.4812 of 2018 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Ranga Reddy at L.B.Nagar, for the offences punishable under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC. He filed Crl.MP.No.1295 of 2019 seeking for his discharge from the said case, which is dismissed by way of impugned order dtd. 2/1/2023. 4. The facts of the case in brief, are that one B. Satyanarayana, Sub-Inspector of Police, Chaitanyapuri Police Station has filed a complaint against the petitioner on 8/8/2015 alleging that on the said date, the petitioner has obstructed him from discharging his official duties and also threatened him. Therefore, a case was registered for the offences punishable under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC. 5. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for petitioner that the ingredients of Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC are not made out from the complaint and even the 161 Cr.P.C. statement of the de facto complainant does not disclose the elements of assault or criminal force, and therefore, prayed to discharge the petitioner from the alleged offences under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on the following judgments : 1. In Manik Taneja and another v. State of Karnataka and another,2015 LawSuit (SC) 52. wherein, it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under : "The essential ingredients of the offence under Sec. 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under Sec. 353 IPC are not made out. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this Sec. . But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty." 2. In Manoj v. State of Kerala,Crl.MC.No.4290 of 2019, dt.23/11/2021. wherein, it is held by the Kerala High Court as under: The Explanation to Sec. 351 itself will be an answer to it because it would say specifically that "Mere words do not amount to an assault." But if at all the words gave any gestures or preparation, it may make those gestures or preparation amount to an assault. But words alleged in the FIS does not speak about any gestures or any preparation to make those gestures amounting to assault. So the alleged assault are quite short of attracting the offence under Sec. 353 so as to amount to assault or use of criminal force......However, the question remains is only whether the alleged acts of the petitioner amount to an assault or use of criminal force in carrying out the enquiry proceedings of the de facto complainant or not ? So the alleged assault are quite short of attracting the offence under Sec. 353 so as to amount to assault or use of criminal force......However, the question remains is only whether the alleged acts of the petitioner amount to an assault or use of criminal force in carrying out the enquiry proceedings of the de facto complainant or not ? On going through the entire allegations in the FIS as rightly contended by the learned counsel, the words uttered would not amount to an assault as contemplated under Sec. 351 or use of criminal force so as to deter the de facto complainant from carrying out the enquiry proceedings...... There is no allegation at all to the de facto complainant about the use of any criminal force apart from the statement towards the end of FIS that only because of the fact that her co-workers were also there, accused Nos.1 and 2 did not attack her. But can be taken only as an assumption of the de facto complainant without any basis because she has no whisper in the FIS that the petitioner herein made any preparation or gestures so as to attack her. So evaluating the facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that even if the entire allegations in the FIS is admitted in toto, there are no materials to attract the ingredients of the offence under Sec. 353 IPC....." ".....So, in order to attract the offence under Sec. 506, the accused should have threatened another with any injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested with intention to cause alarm to that person or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omitted to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of the threats. Here, the words alleged is that "I will show you. You will have to face the consequences". There is nothing in the above words to indicate that the threatening was to cause injury either to the person or reputation of the de facto complainant or of causing alarm to her or with the intention of herself omitting to do any act which she is legally entitled to do. You will have to face the consequences". There is nothing in the above words to indicate that the threatening was to cause injury either to the person or reputation of the de facto complainant or of causing alarm to her or with the intention of herself omitting to do any act which she is legally entitled to do. Here the words uttered itself will not cause any injury to the reputation of the de facto complainant or it appears to have made with the intention CRL.M.C.4290/2019 to cause alarm to the de facto complainant. So the words uttered are far short of attracting any criminal intimidation as contemplated under Sec. 503 of the Code." 3. In Mr. Satish v. State of Karnataka,WP.No.6880 of 2020, dt. 8/4/2022. wherein, it is held by the Karnataka High Court as under; "The word 'assault' as defined in Sec. 351 means making of a gesture or preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that the gesture or the preparation will cause apprehension in the mind of another person that criminal force will be used against him. The illustrations to Secs. 350 and 351 IPC make the meaning of words 'criminal force' and 'assault' very clear. In common parlance, the word 'assault' is understood as 'one person beating another person with or without weapon'. But this common parlance meaning cannot be employed while examining the FIR to find out whether an offence under Sec. 353 IPC is made out or not, in the given set of circumstances. In the case on hand, the third respondent has made three allegations as extracted above. First allegation is that the petitioner posted certain messages in awkward language. The second one pertains to putting threat to him in case he did not agree for his demands and that the third one is again putting threat to getting him transferred to another place in case he attended to the work of anybody whom the petitioner did not like. These allegations do not disclose either using criminal force or making assault." 6. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor that there is ample evidence on record and it is a matter of trial to decide whether any case is made out against the petitioner for the alleged offences under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 7. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor that there is ample evidence on record and it is a matter of trial to decide whether any case is made out against the petitioner for the alleged offences under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 7. The point, which arise for determination in this case is: "Whether the trial Court is right in dismissing the discharge petition and whether the ingredients of Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC are made out against the petitioner/accused, from the material available on record ?" 8. In the judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for petitioner in Manik Taneja's case (1 supra), since no force was applied for causing obstruction in discharging the official duties of 2nd respondent therein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the ingredients of Sec. 353 of IPC are not made out. But, the facts of the present case stand on different footing, as the contents of the complaint and the statements of witnesses recorded under Sec. 161 Cr.P.C. show that on 8/8/2015, the petitioner/accused went to Chaitanyapuri Police Station along with one lady by name Indira, discussed about the old case of said Indira and stated to the Police that he is having influence at high level political leaders. He threatened that he is a crime reporter and that he will show live report about Police and also abused the Police in filthy language and thus obstructed the duties of the de facto complainant, who was on duty at that time. 9. The above contents attract the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC. Though it is contended by the petitioner that he did not threaten or obstruct the de facto complainant from discharging his official duties, whether the petitioner has actually committed such offences or not, can only be decided after a full-fledged trial. Therefore, it is not a fit case for discharging the petitioner at this stage. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, this revision case is devoid of merits and it is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.