JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Fahad Allam, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 24.1.2009 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in connection with Employment Exchange Case No.70 of 2009 whereby the learned court has been pleased to take cognizance under section 4(2), 5(2) and 6 of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancy) Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as Act) and also for quashing of the order dated 1.8.2012 by which warrant of arrest against the petitioner was issued, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad. 3. The prosecution case has been filed alleging therein that Assistant Sub Regional Employment Exchange, Dhanbad has authorized by the Director Employment and Training Jharkhand Ranchi to exercise the rights under section 6 of the said Act with Rule 7 of the Rules made there-under. The complainant as the competent Assistant Director Incharge (Employment ) visited the office of the company on 8.3.2007 and found that above named accused persons have violate the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The accused persons failed to notify 6 vacancies of Sales Development Manager and Branch Operation Officer to the prescribed Employment Exchange which occurred and filled above stated establishment from April, 2006 to December, 2006 in contravention of Sub Section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act. The accused persons neglected to furnish quarterly returns in form ERI to the Local Employment Exchange, Dhanbad, despite the office letter with which the specimen copy of the quarterly return was made available to the establishment and inspite of reminders and thus they have violated Sub section (2) of section 5 of the above mentioned Act read with Rule 6 of the Rules there-under. The accused persons did not furnish information and the documents to that office vide letter no. 696 dated 15.3.2007 inspite of the reminders thereupon. It is also stated that the Manager (HR) Corporate has furnished partial information and documents to this office vide letter no.NIL dated 27.6.2007 and others and the rest required information under column (a), (b) and (c) of the letter were furnished knowingly and thus they have violated section 6 of the said Act. It is also stated that the Manager (HR) Corporate has furnished partial information and documents to this office vide letter no.NIL dated 27.6.2007 and others and the rest required information under column (a), (b) and (c) of the letter were furnished knowingly and thus they have violated section 6 of the said Act. The Managing Director, Regional Manager, Manager (HR) Corporate and the then Br.Manager and the Br. Manager of the company were given notice vide this office memo no.1564-68 to show cause within 15 days. The Sr.Manager Human Resource replied to the show cause notice which was not found satisfactory and the Sr.Manager (HR) was informed with the view vide office letter no.1212-13 dt. 14.3.2008. The plea taken by the accused persons that the above named establishment was not covered by the Act as the number of employees on the pay roll were less than 25 during the quarters ended in June, September and December, 2006 is not true. Establishment is private sector- as defined under section 2(g) of the said Act means an establishment which is not an establishment in public sector and where ordinarily 25 or more persons are employed to work for remuneration. Here persons employed to work for remuneration as also explained under column 1(a) of the proforma for quarterly return prescribed by Rule-2(4) and Rule 6 the said rules include all those persons whether they are working proprietors, partners, commission agents, contingent paid and contractual workers. But the named establishment concealed the fact by excluding number of insurance advisors working as commission agents under column 1(a) of the quarterly return of the above mentioned quarters. The accused persons is one Managing Director, one Regional Manager, one Senior Branch Manager (HR) one the then Branch Manager and one Branch Manager of the company and are entrusted with employment, supervision and control of employees of this company and so they are employees within meaning of word „employer? as defined in section 2(c) of the said Act having an establishment in the private sector as defined in section 2(g) of the said Act. The accused persons have committed offence punishable under section 7(1), section 7(2)(a)(i) and 7(2)(b) of the said Act. The complainant applied for the sanction in time and the necessary sanction for filing of complaint has been accorded vide office order no.52 of 2008, Ranchi, dt. 16.12.2008 of Director, Employment and Training Jharkhand, Ranchi. 4. The accused persons have committed offence punishable under section 7(1), section 7(2)(a)(i) and 7(2)(b) of the said Act. The complainant applied for the sanction in time and the necessary sanction for filing of complaint has been accorded vide office order no.52 of 2008, Ranchi, dt. 16.12.2008 of Director, Employment and Training Jharkhand, Ranchi. 4. Mr. Mazumdar, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is not Managing Director of the HDFC Life Insurance and he was only founder Chairman of HDFC Limited. He submits that inspire of that the case has been lodged against the petitioner. He submits that so far section 4(2) of the Act is concerned the punishment is only for the first offence with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees and for every subsequent offence with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees and section 5(2) and section 6 of the Act are concerned the punishment is for the first offence with fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees and for every subsequent offence with fine which extend to five hundred rupees and he submits that under all these sections only the penalty is there and in view of sub section 2 of section 468 Cr.P.C. the case was required to be filed within six months from the date of occurrence whereas it has been alleged in the complaint that the occurrence took place from 8.3.2007 and lastly up to 14.3.2008 and the complaint has been lodged on 20.1.2009. He submits that in view of sub section 2 of section 468 Cr.P.C it is barred by limitation. He further submits that the sanction by the competent authority is not in accordance with law and there is no independent mind applied in passing such sanction order which is against the mandate of law. On the point of delay the learned counsel for the petitioner relied in the case of “Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases through its Director and Others and Other Analogous cases”, (2014) 2 SCC 62 , paragraph no.35 of the said judgment is quoted below: “35. In this connection, our attention is drawn to the judgment of this Court in Sharadchandra Dongre [State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, (1995) 1 SCC 42 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 16]. In this connection, our attention is drawn to the judgment of this Court in Sharadchandra Dongre [State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, (1995) 1 SCC 42 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 16]. It is urged on the basis of this judgment that by condoning the delay, the court takes away a valuable right which accrues to the accused. Hence, the accused has a right to be heard when an application for condonation of delay under Section 473 CrPC is presented before the court. Keeping this argument in mind, let us examine both the viewpoints i.e. whether the date of taking cognizance or the date of filing complaint is material for computing limitation. If the date on which complaint is filed is taken to be material, then if the complaint is filed within the period of limitation, there is no question of it being time-barred. If it is filed after the period of limitation, the complainant can make an application for condonation of delay under Section 473 CrPC. The court will have to issue notice to the accused and after hearing the accused and the complainant decide whether to condone the delay or not. If the date of taking cognizance is considered to be relevant then, if the court takes cognizance within the period of limitation, there is no question of the complaint being time-barred. If the court takes cognizance after the period of limitation then, the question is how will Section 473 CrPC work. The complainant will be interested in having the delay condoned. If the delay is caused by the Magistrate by not taking cognizance in time, it is absurd to expect the complainant to make an application for condonation of delay. The complainant surely cannot explain that delay. Then in such a situation, the question is whether the Magistrate has to issue notice to the accused, explain to the accused the reason why delay was caused and then hear the accused and decide whether to condone the delay or not. This would also mean that the Magistrate can decide whether to condone delay or not, caused by him. Such a situation will be anomalous and such a procedure is not known to law. This would also mean that the Magistrate can decide whether to condone delay or not, caused by him. Such a situation will be anomalous and such a procedure is not known to law. Mr Luthra, learned ASG submitted that use of disjunctive “or” in Section 473 CrPC suggests that for the first part i.e. to find out whether the delay has been explained or not, notice will have to be issued to the accused and for the latter part i.e. to decide whether it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice, no notice will have to be issued. This question has not directly arisen before us. Therefore, we do not want to express any opinion whether for the purpose of notice, Section 473 CrPC has to be bifurcated or not. But, we do find this situation absurd. It is absurd to hold that the court should issue notice to the accused for condonation of delay, explain the delay caused at its end and then pass an order condoning or not condoning the delay. The law cannot be reduced to such absurdity. Therefore, the only harmonious construction which can be placed on Sections 468, 469 and 470 CrPC is that the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the complaint in respect of it is filed within the prescribed limitation period. He would, however, be entitled to exclude such time as is legally excludable.” 5. On the same line, he further relied in the case of “Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, ” reported in (1993) 3 SCC 4 , and on the point of sanction, he relied in the case of “Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chouhan v. State of Gujarat” reported in (1997) 7 SCC 622 , paragraph no.19 of the said judgment is quoted below: “19. Since the validity of “sanction” depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority “not to sanction” was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution.” 6. On these grounds, he submits that so far the petitioner is concerned, the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance is bad in law and this petition my kindly be allowed. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Fahad Allam, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State submits that in view of non compliance of the said provision, the case has been filed by the competent authority and the learned court has taken the cognizance and he submits that the sanction is also in accordance with law. He further submits that a show cause has been issued to the company however unsatisfactory reply has been filed and that is why the case has been filed. On the point of limitation, the learned counsel for the respondent State has not been able to demolish the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. In view of the above submission of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the contents of the complaint petition as well as the order taking cognizance. Admittedly, the case has been filed under section 4(2), 5(2) and 6 of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancy) Act, 1959 and so far section 4(2), section 5(2) and section 6 of the Act is concerned the punishment is as aforesaid. In view of sub section 2(a) of section 468 Cr.P.C, the limitation is prescribed therein for six months. Admittedly the last occurrence is said to be made on 14.3.2008 whereas the complaint case has been filed on 20.01.2009 that is beyond six months period as disclosed in the said section. In view of sub section 2(a) of section 468 Cr.P.C, the limitation is prescribed therein for six months. Admittedly the last occurrence is said to be made on 14.3.2008 whereas the complaint case has been filed on 20.01.2009 that is beyond six months period as disclosed in the said section. Further the learned court without condoning the limitation has taken cognizance which is bad in law and in that view of the matter the case of the petitioner is fully covered in view of the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner rendered in the case of “Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases through its Director and Others and Other Analogous cases”, as well as “Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, ” (supra). The Court has perused the sanction order contained at page 50 of the complaint petition and finds that the learned sanctioning authority has not stated that what are the materials against this petitioner and he has passed that order in a mechanical way which is against the mandate of law and for providing sanction there must be application of mind which is absent in the case in hand and in that view of the matter the case of the petitioner is fully covered in view of the judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner rendered in the case of “Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases through its Director and Others and Other Analogous cases”, as well as “Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, ”(supra). The Court further finds that it has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent State that the show cause has been issued to the petitioner and looking into the show cause annexed with the complaint petition it transpires that that said show cause has been issued to the Branch Manager of the HDFC Life Insurance at Dhanbad and the petitioner is said to be stationed at Mumbai. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent State is not accepted by the Court. 9. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent State is not accepted by the Court. 9. In view of the above facts, reasons and the analysis and considering that the case is fully covered in light of sub section 2(a) of section 468 Cr.P.C and the sanction order is not in accordance with law, the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 24.1.2009 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in connection with Employment Exchange Case No.70 of 2009, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad so far as this petitioner is concerned, is quashed. 10. Cr.M.P. No.1669 of 2012 is allowed in the above terms and disposed of. 11. It is made clear, that this Court has not interfered with the complaint with regard to other accused persons including the order taking cognizance.