JUDGMENT 1. These two petitions are filed by the unsuccessful petitioners/plaintiffs under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( for short "C.P.C.") assailing the orders dtd. 23/4/2018 passed in I.A.No.498 of 2018 in A.S.No.399 of 2011 and I.A.No.499 of 2013 in A.S.No.400 of 2011 2 by the learned XIV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District. 2. The introductory facts, in brief, are as follows: Originally, the petitioners-plaintiffs filed two appeals in A.S.Nos.399 and 400 of 2011 against the common judgment rendered by learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District in O.S.No.788 of 1999 and O.S.No.1293 of 2001, wherein both the suits were filed by the petitioners-plaintiffs against the respondentsdefendants seeking perpetual Injunction. Both the suits were clubbed, common evidence was recorded by the Court below and disposed of the same by common judgment. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents herein preferred the above said appeals before the IX Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC) Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar. Both the appeals heard ex parte and common judgment was pronounced against the revision petitioners herein by allowing the same on 5/3/2013. The revision petitioners filed application for rehearing of the appeals under Order 41 Rule 21 C.P.C. along with an application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short "the Act") to condone the delay of (208) days and the said applications were dismissed by the appellate Court vide order dtd. 23/4/2013. Challenging the said orders, the present civil revision petitions are filed. 3. Sri C.Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners-plaintiffs submits that in the affidavits filed in support of interlocutory applications for condonation of delay of (208) days, the petitioners have shown sufficient cause for not being able to prosecute the appeal; that the petitioners were not negligent in pursing the matter. There was no representation on behalf of the respondents as counsel failed to appear, the matters were heard ex parte and the judgment was pronounced. Petitioner No.1 could not appear due to ill-health and was unable to contact his counsel for one or two days and so also there was delay for obtaining "No objection Vakalat" for (206) days by earlier counsel and total delay of (208) days occurred in filing the application to set aside the judgment. Petitioner No.1 could not appear due to ill-health and was unable to contact his counsel for one or two days and so also there was delay for obtaining "No objection Vakalat" for (206) days by earlier counsel and total delay of (208) days occurred in filing the application to set aside the judgment. He has submitted that the appellate Court ought to have allowed the application as the petitioners have shown sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the application for rehearing the appeals. The counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of Surat Singh (Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan,(2018) 4 Supreme Court Cases 562. K.N.V.Sri Rama Rao v. Govt. of A.P., 1999 (5) ALT 691 (S.B.). and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst.Katiji,AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353. and N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy,AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3222. 4. Per contra, Sri Vivek Jain, B.Ranganadha Rao, learned counsel for the respondents respectively submits that the appellate Court has passed orders on merits and there were no ex parte proceedings and the petitioners failed to show that there was no proper notice to them and also sufficient cause in filing the application with delay of (208) days. As such, the applications were rightly dismissed under order impugned. The counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of Mohd/Shakeel Ahmed v. M/s.Pioneer Overseas Corporation of India rep.by its authorized signatory Mr.Ramesh Kailasam, Somajiguda, Hyderabad,2014 SCC Online Hyd 615. New India Assurance Company Limited, Hyderabad v. G.Sarada Prasad,2001 SCC Online AP 81. Kommineni Thirupathamma v. Koritala Veeraiah,2004 SCC Online AP 982. Voyages India P.Ltd., v. Indian Hotels Co.Ltd.,2010 SCC Online Del.3781. Mohd.Sahid v. Raziya Khanam (Dead) through Legal representatives,(2019) 11 Supreme Court Cases 384. Harbans Pershad Jaiswal (Dead) by Legal representatives v. Urmila Devi Jaiswal (dead) by legal representatives,(2014) 5 Supreme Court Cases 723. 5. I have perused the material on record and gone through the ratios in the precedents. 6. The point for determination is; "whether the petitioners have made out valid and sufficient grounds and had shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 208 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte common judgment dtd. 5/3/2013 and if so, whether the impugned order is liable to be set aside?" 7. In N.Balakrishnan's case (4 supra), the Apex Court at para Nos.11 and 12 held as under: " 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. 5/3/2013 and if so, whether the impugned order is liable to be set aside?" 7. In N.Balakrishnan's case (4 supra), the Apex Court at para Nos.11 and 12 held as under: " 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [ AIR 1969 SC 575 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006 ] and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality [ (1972) 1 SCC 366 : AIR 1972 SC 749 ] ." 8. In Mohd/Shakeel Ahmed's case ( 5 supra), this Court observed that while considering the applications for condonation of delay, the applicants are required to show sufficient cause for condonation of such delay. Sufficient cause implies satisfactory or reasonable explanation, which is legal and adequate to answer the purpose intended. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. In Mohd/Shakeel Ahmed's case ( 5 supra), this Court observed that while considering the applications for condonation of delay, the applicants are required to show sufficient cause for condonation of such delay. Sufficient cause implies satisfactory or reasonable explanation, which is legal and adequate to answer the purpose intended. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. The words sufficient cause under Sec. 5 of the Act should receive liberal construction so as to achieve substantial justice. However while condoning the delay; the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. A liberal approach is to be adopted in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Sec. 5 of the Act. The concept of such a liberal approach cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. The Court cannot condone the delay in a case where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. The discretion has to be exercised within the reasonable bounds known to the law. Whims or fancies, prejudice or predilections could not form the basis for exercising the discretionary power. When the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of a party, such delay cannot be condoned on mere asking of that party. When an applicant makes an incorrect statement in an application seeking condonation of delay, the Court ought to refuse to condone such delay or inordinate delay. When the explanation offered is found to be a sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, but the delay that deserves to be condoned is a long delay, such delay is generally condoned by imposition of adequate terms/costs to compensate the loss and hardship that may be caused to the opposite party on account of the consequential delay in hearing and disposal of the case. Length of delay is no matter and the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. If there is no acceptable explanation, sometimes a delay of shorter length may also be uncondonable whereas in certain other times, the delay of a very long range can be condoned provided sufficient cause is shown. 9. Keeping in view, the above settled principles, whether the explanation offered and cause shown for condonation of delay is sufficient and whether the delay deserves to be condoned in a case depend upon the facts and circumstances. 9. Keeping in view, the above settled principles, whether the explanation offered and cause shown for condonation of delay is sufficient and whether the delay deserves to be condoned in a case depend upon the facts and circumstances. Coming to the facts of the present case, the petitioners, who are seeking condonation of delay of (208) days are obliged under law to show sufficient cause which implies satisfactory and reasonable explanation, which is legal and adequate to answer the purpose intended to. On a careful consideration of the case pleaded by the petitioners, it is manifest that the petitioners, to explain the long delay, rely upon the following causes namely (1) their counsel could not appear to argue the matter before the appellate Court and as there was no representation, the appellate Court heard the appellants therein ex parte and pronounced judgment on 5/3/2013 (2) petitioner No.1 was suffering from Parkinson's disease, as disease reached extreme stage, he was advised to under medical care and treatment since January, 2013 and he was unable to appear before the appellate Court and there was delay of (102) days occasioned due to ill-health; (3) Petitioner No.1 approached his counsel on 20/7/2013 to know the proceedings and no objection Vakalat was obtained and certified copies of judgment and filed the present application with delay of (208) days. 10. It is also the contention of the petitioners that petitioner No.1 suffered from Parkinson's disease and he was unable to move from the bed from January, 2013. As a result, there was delay of (102) days due to ill-health of petitioner No.1. He filed medical certificate dtd. 29/10/2013 issued by Registered Medical Practitioner. A perusal of the same would show that petitioner No.1 received treatment for Parkinson's disease and he was completely bedridden. Due to his ill-health, he could not contact his counsel and move out of the house and in the mean time, A.S.Nos.399 and 400 of 2011 were allowed by way of common judgment on 5/3/2013. However, in the affidavits, petitioner No.1 stated that he instructed his son to visit the counsel's office on 18/7/2013 to enquire about the status of the appeals and he came to know that the counsel informed that he lost the track of the proceedings in the appeals and the appeals were decreed ex parte. However, in the affidavits, petitioner No.1 stated that he instructed his son to visit the counsel's office on 18/7/2013 to enquire about the status of the appeals and he came to know that the counsel informed that he lost the track of the proceedings in the appeals and the appeals were decreed ex parte. Except the above said document, no other medical record such as prescriptions, diagnosis reports etc., were filed in support of his contention. In fact, the medical certificate is not all convincing to accept the contention of petitioner No.1 that he was not in a position to move from the house and got information through his son. 11. In the accompanying affidavits, petitioner No.1 also stated that there was delay of (102) days occasioned due to his ill-health and the delay of (106) days occasioned in the process of obtaining file as well as no objection Vakalat from his earlier counsel and engaging the present counsel to file the present applications and total delay of (208) days occasioned in filing the present applications to set aside the order and decree dtd. 5/3/2013. But, the explanation offered by petitioner No.1 for the delay of (106) days occasioned in obtaining no objection vakalat from his earlier counsel and engaging the present counsel is not satisfactory. Petitioner No.1 cannot be permitted to shift entire blame on his advocate, as he is having knowledge of legal proceedings and he is capable of taking care of interest in the litigation. On careful consideration of the facts, pleadings and material on record, it appears that the delay occasioned is result of deliberate inaction on the part of the petitioners, as there is no valid explanation and the explanation offered by them is also not acceptable. The facts and circumstances also clearly show that there is no justification for the delay. 12. In P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 . the Apex Court held that " Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained....." 13. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained....." 13. In the light of the above decision, in the instant case, I am not satisfied that the petitioners have acted diligently in pursuing the appeals and the cause shown by him for the delay occasioned as stated above is not sufficient. The petitioners have shifted entire blame on the Advocate for some part of the delay is not acceptable. There is no satisfactory explanation offered explaining the sufficient cause for the delay of (208) days. Therefore, I am of the view that no grounds are made out to condone the said delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree and the appellate Court has rightly dismissed the application under the impugned order. 14. In the result, both the civil revision petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.