ORDER : Ramesh Sinha, J. 1. Heard Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State. 2. Appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 21(1) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 against the 5-8-2021 passed by the learned Special Court (NIA Act), Distt. Kanker whereby charges have been framed against the appellant praying that he be discharged from offence under Section 10(a), 13, 17, 38(1)(a)(2), 40 read with Section 22(a), 22(c) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 8(2)(3)(5) of the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Surkasha Adhiniyam and Section 120B, 201, 149, 34 of the Indian Pena Code in relation to FIR No. 09/2020 registered at PS Siksod, Distt. Uttar Bastar, Kanker 3. Case of the prosecution is that on 24-03-2020, a secret information was received by the respondent authority that a vehicle bearing registration No. CG 07AH 6555 which was being driven by Tapas Kumar Palit, transported the alleged shoes, cloths of uniform, and others articles which relates to naxlites activities. In the vehicle, 95 pairs of shoes, cloths of uniform, 2 bundles of electric wires each of 100 meters, 2 sets of walki-talki alongwith charger, LED lens and other articles were found from possession of Tapas Kumar Palit and accordingly same were seized from him. The alleged articles were to be supplied by Tapas Kumar Palit to the Naxalites in order to support their illegal and disruptive activities. During the course of investigation, the said accused person was arrested and his statement was recorded. During the course of investigation, the statements of eye witnesses of the incident were also recorded. It is alleged that the eye witness has clearly named the present appellant as being part of the group who involved in supplying the aforesaid articles to nexalites and he was providing funds as well to the naxalites. The present appellant was subsequently arrested by the police on 13-05-2020. It is alleged that the eye witness has clearly named the present appellant as being part of the group who involved in supplying the aforesaid articles to nexalites and he was providing funds as well to the naxalites. The present appellant was subsequently arrested by the police on 13-05-2020. After completing the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed on 08-09-2020 before the NIA Court for offence punishable U/s 10, 13, 17, 22A, 22C, 38(1) (2) & 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 and Section 8(2)(3)(5) of the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005 and Section 120-B, 201, 148, 149, of I.P.C. After appreciating the evidence available in the charge-sheet, the learned Special Judge (NIA Act), Uttar Bastar Kanker framed the charges against the present appellant U/s 10(a), 13, 17, 22A, 22C, 38(1)(2) & 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 8(2)(3)(5) of the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam and Section 120-B, 201, 148, 149 of the I.P.C. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no prima facie case and incriminating evidence against the appellant to implicate him in this case. It is further submitted that learned Special Judge had failed to consider the record of the case and documents submitted therewith, since neither there exists the facts nor ingredients of the offences for presumption of the Court that there is ground to proceed against the appellant and for framing of charge. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction under Section 228 of Cr.P.C. It is also submitted that Respondent and Public Prosecutor had failed to adduce evidence against the appellant in relation to Section Section 13, Section 17, Section 38, Section 40 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 8(2)(3)(5) of Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Surkasha Adhiniyam so as to substantiate that the appellant is and continues to be a member of banned association, takes part in meetings of such association; and contributes to, or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of, such association; and in any way, assists the operations of such association or advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity. It is next submitted that appellant has been implicated in the case merely on the basis of memorandum statement of co-accuseds recorded during the investigation by the Respondent which is inadmissible in the eyes of law in lieu of Section 25 and Section 26 of Indian Evidence Act. It is also submitted that entire search and seizure undertaken by the Respondent during the course of investigation is illegal being in violation of Section 25 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 whereby prior approval of DGP and post approval of Designated Authority is absent in the matter. It is submitted that appellant is the Proprietor of M/s Landmark Engineers and was undertaking road construction in Bastar Region on behalf of the government departments which cannot by itself be attributed against the Appellant. It is submitted that learned Special Judge, NIA Court had erred to consider that at the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. What the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible whereas in the present matter, there is no evidence adduced by the Respondent for creating such a strong suspicion as well. It is also submitted that appellant's firm had sub-let the road construction work to Rudransh Earthmovers Road Construction Company for working. It is next submitted that the call details attached with the final report by respondent does not divulges any implicating evidence against appellant for framing of charges and does not supports the case of respondent. 5. On the other hand, Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State submits that the present appellant has clearly been named in the statement of witnesses. Thus, there is clear evidence regarding the involvement of the present appellant in the alleged offences. It is further submitted that as far as the appreciation of the evidence is concerned, the same is matter of trial and the learned Court below was not required to appreciate the evidence at the stage of framing of charge. At this stage, mere prima-faice evidence is required to be seen which is clearly present in respect of the appellant. It is further submitted that as far as the appreciation of the evidence is concerned, the same is matter of trial and the learned Court below was not required to appreciate the evidence at the stage of framing of charge. At this stage, mere prima-faice evidence is required to be seen which is clearly present in respect of the appellant. Therefore, in view of the material present on the record and looking to the gravity of the offence, the learned Special Judge has rightly framed the charges against the present appellant. Therefore, there being sufficient prima-facie material available on record against the appellant, he does not deserve to be discharged and therefore, there is no infirmity in the order dated 05-08-2021 passed by the learned Court below and the instant appeal is without any merit and the same may kindly be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. Basic law as to whether charge is to be framed or not has been provided in Section 227 of the Code that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. But if charge is framed as per provisions contained in Section 228 of the Code, then recording of reasons for so doing is not required. 9. In the matter of State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi [ (2000) 8 SCC 239 ], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 7 that legal position is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the trial Court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor it is for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. At this stage of charge the court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused persons. 10. At this stage of charge the court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused persons. 10. In the case of M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Bengaluru [ (2020) 2 SCC 768 ], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that while deciding a discharge petition, only materials brought on record by prosecution (both in form of oral statements and documents) have to be considered. Accused is entitled to discharge if evidence (i.e. statements recorded by police or documents concerned), which prosecution proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of accused, even if fully accepted, before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence, cannot show that accused committed the offence. It is also held that though it is open to accused to explain away the materials giving rise to grave suspicion, but his submissions must be confined only to materials produced by the prosecution. Defence of accused cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. It is also held that Court must, without making a roving inquiry into the pros and cons, consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the materials before it, any basic infirmities appearing in the case, etc. Probative value of material on record cannot be gone into. Materials brought on record by prosecution has to be accepted as true, existence of some material to entertain strong suspicion is essential to draw up a charge and refuse to discharge accused. 11. The afore-stated principles of law have been reiterated and followed by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the matter of Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another [ (2013) 11 SCC 476 & Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central bureau of Investigation [(2010) 9 368]. 12. In case of Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and another [(2012) 2 SCC 460], their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution and where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. Therefore, alleged contradictions, irregularities or improbabilities with regard to proceedings made by investigating agency cannot be taken into consideration at this stage. 13. Reverting to the instant case, although there is no direct evidence against the appellant but the facts involved in the instant case show his involvement. In view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, at this state, while deciding a discharge petition, only materials brought on record by prosecution have to be considered. Defence of accused cannot be looked into at this stage and probative value of material on record cannot be gone into. Materials brought on record by prosecution has to be accepted as true, existence of some material to entertain strong suspicion is essential to draw up a charge and refuse to discharge accused, and further that quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution, and the Court is not expected to marshal the records at this stage, we are not inclined to allow the appeal preferred by the appellant for setting aside the order dated 5-9-2021 whereby charge has been framed against the appellant in relation to FIR No. 9/2020. 14. The appeal being devoid of substance, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.