JUDGMENT : NISHA M. THAKORE, J. 1. This application is filed by the State invoking section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for quashing and setting aside the order dated 16.01.2021 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 81 of 2021 passed by the learned 15th Additional Sessions Judge, Surat and has further prayed for cancellation of the Anticipatory bail granted to the respondent - original accused no. 1 in respect of FIR bearing I-C.R. No. 240 of 2018 registered with Varachha Police station for the offense punishable under sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 474, 447, 341, 506 read with section 114 of Indian Penal code. 2. The gist of the complaint as it emerges from the FIR bearing IC. R. No. 240 of 2018 is as under: The complainant Sureshchandra Shrikrishan Gupta is aged around 65 years and is living retired life at his native place at Edapur village, post Surtajpur, Thana : Dorighat, Taluka: Madhuban, Uttar Pradesh. He claims to be the owner of land bearing plot no. 1 admeasuring 543.48 sq. mrts. of Final Plot No. 7-B2 paiki, T.P. Scheme No. 4, Choryasi, Surat. The complainant claims to have purchased said plot for consideration of Rs. 60,000/- by registered sale deed dated 30.12.2000 and has declared that the original sale deed copy is lost in floods. It is alleged that the respondent-accused No. 1 Pawan kumar Gupta, had created false and bogus documents of such property which include notarised power of attorney dated 15.02.2010, executed before notary named K.B. Solanki, by forging the signature of the complainant. The said power of attorney was claimed to have been executed in presence of two witnesses namely Vinod G. and Ramesh. The said power of attorney was made in his favour which was used as genuine document by the said accused before the office of Sub- Registrar to execute the sale deed dated 04.11.2015, in favour of one Meharsinh Mangalsinh Sodha and derived consideration Rs. 3,25,000/- resulting in diminishing of valuable right of ownership of the complainant. The complainant realised the aforesaid fact when his son Durgesh was provided the copy of power of attorney draft by present respondent - accused which was already signed by Lalitkumar Mangilal Bhanshali on Rs. 100/- stamp paper. The same was handed over to obtain his signature. 3,25,000/- resulting in diminishing of valuable right of ownership of the complainant. The complainant realised the aforesaid fact when his son Durgesh was provided the copy of power of attorney draft by present respondent - accused which was already signed by Lalitkumar Mangilal Bhanshali on Rs. 100/- stamp paper. The same was handed over to obtain his signature. His son Durgesh therefore approached the plot and noticed that said Pawankumar had made encroachment in said plot. The complainant was therefore constrained to inquire about the status of his plot whereby he learnt about the forged power of attorney as well as the so called sale deed 04.10.2015. The said sale deed was witnessed by one Masarsinh Bhurasinh Rajpur and Tagaram Jivrajbhai Prajapati. It further transpired that one false affidavit was also created by the present respondent - original accused no. 1 declaring that the power of attorney is in force. Such an affidavit was affirmed before notary Dharti B. Patel on 03.11.2015. On obtaining a copy of such an affidavit the complainant realised that the signatures put in each page are forged as he has never executed such a document. It further transpired on comparison of documents that the present respondent - accused had referred to a copy of his election card bearing unique no. UGH1715317 with power of attorney whereas in the false affidavit he had produced a copy of his election card bearing No. UGH1715317 wherein it was noticed that the election card was issued on 15.04.2014. In such circumstances, the son of the complainant had asked the accused No. 1 to vacate the plot which the accused No. 1 refused to and threaten to not to enter in the property. This gave cause of action for the complainant to approach the court of the learned Principal Civil Judge by filing civil suit R.C.S. No. 1557 of 2015. The complaint came to be filed before the Varacha police station which was registered as I-C.R. No. 240 of 2018 dated 01.07.2018 against (1) Pawankumar Devnarayan Gupta, (2) Meharsinh Mangalsinh Sodha, (3) Masarsinh Rajpur, (4) Tagaram Jirrajbhai Prajapati, (5) Witness Vinod and Ramesh, (6) Notary K.B. Solanki and (7) Laltikumar Bhanshali. 3. During the course of investigation except for present respondent, initially the rest of the accused persons were arrested. 3. During the course of investigation except for present respondent, initially the rest of the accused persons were arrested. The IO officer had filed a charge sheet on 30.11.2018 wherein the present respondent accused who has emerged as main accused was shown absconding. The respondent after having remained absconded for almost three and half years, approached the court of learned District and Sessions Judge, Surat by filing Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 81 of 2021 on 04.01.2021 seeking anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. It was contended that the IO has never inquired about him and as soon he became aware about such FIR, he has approached the court for anticipatory bail. The relief was sought for on the ground of parity as other co-accused namely Lalitkumar Bhanshali, Meharsinh Mangalsinh Sodha and Nareshkumar Mangilal Bhansali were released on bail by this court and trial court concerned. It was further contended that the criminal case is at the stage of evidence and investigation being concluded and based on documentary evidence, his custodial interrogation may not be required. 4. The IO had filed an affidavit opposing grant of anticipatory bail. It was submitted that further investigation under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. is still continuing as the absconding accused are to be arrested and the original documents in the nature of forged power of attorney is yet to be recovered. It was further submitted that in case of co-accused Meharsinh Sodha, Tagaram Prajapati and Masarsinh Bhurasinh Rajput quashing petition being Cr. M.A. No. 18878 of 2018 has been filed wherein the High Court by order dated 12.06.2020 has granted interim relief. The role of the accused was highlighted and it was submitted that the present respondent- accused has emerged as main accused. During course of investigation, it was also found that one more false affidavit in name of complainant dated 04.11.2015 was created before notary Dharti B. Patel declaring about loss of original copy of title deed of complainant, wherein it is confirmed that the signature of complainant is found forged. The use of election card which has been confirmed to be issued in year- 2014 by the collector office has been relied upon in disputed power of attorney of year- 2010, which creates serious doubts about genuineness of the said document. The use of election card which has been confirmed to be issued in year- 2014 by the collector office has been relied upon in disputed power of attorney of year- 2010, which creates serious doubts about genuineness of the said document. It was also submitted that the application seeking non bailable warrant has been accepted by the court and Section 70 application has been allowed by the court declaring the present respondent - accused absconder. Thus, the judicial custody of the accused was prayed for interrogation as well as to recover the document forged power of attorney. 5. The Court after hearing the learned advocates as well as material placed for consideration prima facie found that there was delay of three and half years in lodging the FIR. The challenge to sale deed is subject matter of civil litigation and co-accused have been enlarged on bail. The Court further noticed that there is no apprehension expressed by IO about whether the accused would flee away from the hands of justice. Thus, the court proceeded to grant anticipatory bail to present respondent - accused subject to terms and conditions incorporated. Hence, this application at the instance of the State seeking challenge to the aforesaid order as well as seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail order. 6. Upon hearing the learned Additional Public prosecutor, this Court vide order dated 29.11.2021 had issued notice upon respondent- accused. Ms. Mita Panchal, learned advocate, had entered her appearance on behalf of said respondent- accused. An affidavit in reply has been filed wherein the accused had offered explanation that the original election card was misplaced and had applied to competent authority for re-issue of card. Thus, the issue of date reflected on election card viz. of the year 2014, in no manner can be presumed to be a forged document. The defence was raised that the power of attorney and the rest of the documents are executed by the owner and he has not prepared any forged or false documents as alleged. Subsequently, a detailed additional affidavit in reply has been filed by the respondent- accused wherein he has raised allegations against the officers of CID crime who in spite of court’s order have failed to execute anticipatory bail order. It was submitted that a written complaint has been addressed to the office of Deputy Police Commissioner, CID crime, Surat on 22.01.2021 and 25.01.2021. It was submitted that a written complaint has been addressed to the office of Deputy Police Commissioner, CID crime, Surat on 22.01.2021 and 25.01.2021. It was further submitted that at no stage, any warrant issued under section 70 upon him, was received by him. He had denied custody of power of attorney and had submitted that the said power of attorney was executed by the complainant before the civil court and the original document was retained by him. He had taken stand that in fact when the son of the complainant had forced and threatened him to leave the possession of land, he had filed a written complaint dated 18.01.2017 against the complainant and his son Durgesh. 7. During the course of hearing, learned Advocate Mr. Karan Sanghani had appeared and submitted that he had received instructions to appear on behalf of the complainant. Upon hearing the learned advocates, the Court by order dated 18.01.2023 had permitted the original complainant to be joined as respondent no. 2. 7.1 Learned Advocate Mr. Karan Sanghani has placed reliance upon averments made in the plaint of civil suits filed by complainant against accused and has invited attention of this Court to the prayers sought for. He has submitted that declaration of cancellation of sale deed dated 04.11.2015 has been made contending that the power of attorney used for such transaction was bogus and forged. The prayer for permanent injunction has also been made seeking injunction against accused from entering into suit land as well as not to create any further rights. He submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has failed to appreciate that there was no delay in lodging FIR. He has invited attention of this Court to the copy of plaint of R.C.S. No. 546 of 2016 as well as written statement dated 05.12.2016 filed by the defendant-accused wherein he claimed to be bona fide purchaser. Considering his submissions, this Court by order dated 18.01.2023 had directed learned Advocate Mr. Karan Sanghani to place on record such documents. The same has been placed on record. 7.2 The matter was further proceeded for hearing. Learned Advocate Mr. Karan Sanghani had submitted that pursuant to the written statement dated 05.12.2016 filed by the defendant-accused in Special Civil Suit No. 547 of 2016, the copy of sale deed dated 04.11.2015 was applied for and obtained. The same has been placed on record. 7.2 The matter was further proceeded for hearing. Learned Advocate Mr. Karan Sanghani had submitted that pursuant to the written statement dated 05.12.2016 filed by the defendant-accused in Special Civil Suit No. 547 of 2016, the copy of sale deed dated 04.11.2015 was applied for and obtained. On 13.12.2016, application was given by complainant to the office of Police Commissioner, Surat alleging forge power of attorney and bogus sale deed. The office of Police Commissioner had treated such application as local application initially and started preliminary inquiry. Ultimately, at the end of such inquiry, complaint was registered as F.I.R. being I-C.R. No. 240 of 2018, dated 01.07.2018. He therefore, submitted that learned Sessions Judge committed error in considering delay in registration of FIR and passing impugned order of anticipatory bail. He therefore, urged this Court to quash and set aside the order granting anticipatory bail. He has also invited attention of this Court to the fact that summons issued by the trial court is not served as accused is not found at address. 8. The learned advocates appearing for respective parties were heard extensively and were permitted to place written submissions. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Bhatt has placed reliance on the report dated 18.01.2023 placed on record along with relevant documents. She has submitted that the respondent No. 1 was declared absconder warrant was issued under Section 70 of the Code. The role of the respondent no. 1 has emerged as main accused who has created forged power of attorney of complainant and use such document as genuine document for execution of sale deed resulting into destroying valuable security/property of the complainant. By such act of execution of sale deed, the financial gain has been derived by the respondent accused. It is further submitted that alleged power of attorney is claimed to have been executed before notary Mr. K.B. Solanki. During investigation, it is further revealed that there is no notary in the name of Mr. K.B. Solanki who seems to be practising in Surat court. She has therefore urged that recovery of original document of said power of attorney is essential. K.B. Solanki. During investigation, it is further revealed that there is no notary in the name of Mr. K.B. Solanki who seems to be practising in Surat court. She has therefore urged that recovery of original document of said power of attorney is essential. She further submitted that admittedly the power of attorney being used by the accused has not been denied as borne out from his affidavit however, the accused has raised vague defense that the complainant himself had executed such power of attorney before Surat court and the original document is lying with the complainant. Much emphasis is made on the reference of the election card issued in year- 2014 being annexed with power of attorney of year- 2010. Reliance is placed on the statements of witness Mihir Rajan Das, who is the Assistant Manager of Andhra Bank, Nanpura Branch. In his statement dated 23.11.2018, he has examined the bank record as regards the contention of the complainant that no consideration of the alleged sale deed has been received. Upon verification of the bank record, he has produced four cheques each dated 2.11.2015 of an amount of Rs. 1,25,000/-. Each cheque is written in the name of the complainant and at the back it has been signed by co-accused Meharsinh Sodha. He has submitted that the signature of the complainant is found at the back of the cheque which he could not confirm. Also, signature of co-accused Meharsinh Sodha appears twice on the back portion of the cheque, which goes to indicate that the amount has been withdrawn by the said Meharsinh Sodha. Thus, it is confirmed that the consideration amount has not been realized by the complainant. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has relied upon the statement of the Notary Dharitiben Patel which is recorded on 18.11.2018. She has confirmed the fact of execution of the affidavit by the respondent-accused before her which has entered in the Register vide entry No. 9903/2015 dated 4.11.2015. She has also confirmed that he was identified as Pawankumar Gupta by referring to the copy of the election card of having unique identification no. UGH1715317. She has also clarified that there was no signature of the complainant being taken as accused had endorsed as power of attorney of the complainant. She therefore submitted that such a document making a false claim on affidavit falls in the category of “ false document”. UGH1715317. She has also clarified that there was no signature of the complainant being taken as accused had endorsed as power of attorney of the complainant. She therefore submitted that such a document making a false claim on affidavit falls in the category of “ false document”. She further submitted that the culpability aggravated when the accused had produced such an affidavit before the Sub-Registrar office to confirm that the power of attorney is still in force. By making such a claim, the accused has proceeded to execute a sale deed to derive financial gain. Based on aforesaid overwhelming material which has emerged on record of investigation, the learned Additional Public prosecutor submitted that the involvement of accused in commission of offence has clearly transpired. She therefore submitted that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have appreciated the aforesaid material and considering the conduct of the accused having remained absconded, the court ought not to have granted anticipatory bail. She therefore urged to allow the present application. 9. The respondent No. 1 accused had tendered written submissions dated 30.01.2023. The respondent No. 2 complainant had placed a list of documents which include a copy of the special Civil Suit No. 547 of 2016 filed against accused Lalitkumar Bhanshali, copy of written statement of accused Lalitkumar Bhanshali and copy of plaint of Special Civil Suit No. 332 of 2018 filed against the present respondent accused. The arguments were concluded and matter was reserved for orders. 10. Ms. Mita Panchal has vehemently objected to the submissions of the learned Additional Public prosecutor as well as Mr. Sanghani for the complainant. The written arguments are reproduced as under: 1. At the outset applicant challenged the order passed by the learned session judge surat in CRMA NO. 81/2021 Dt.16/01/2021 after hearing all the parties including the complainant after imposing condition to mark his presence before the concerned police station to procure the presence of the accused/respondent (condition no. 4). 2. That undisputedly though respondent no. 1 went to /I.O after Anticipatory bail order to remain present on the two different Dt. As mention in the Additional affidavit in reply the investigating officer did not permitted to execute the Learned session court’s order passed in favour of respondent no. 4). 2. That undisputedly though respondent no. 1 went to /I.O after Anticipatory bail order to remain present on the two different Dt. As mention in the Additional affidavit in reply the investigating officer did not permitted to execute the Learned session court’s order passed in favour of respondent no. 1 without any stay order granted by this Hon’ble court and thereby acted illegally and mala-fide in connivance with the complainant therefore JUDICIAL notice of the such conduct of I.O. is required to be taken against the investigating officer by passing order against his conduct. The observation made in Para 87 the case of SIDDHARAM MHERTE may be taken into consideration. 3. It is submitted that after the order has been passed by the learned session judge in favour of respondent no. 1 it is not reported that till today he has misused the liberty or tried to tempered with the witness, not only that he has no criminal history and to secure his presence at the time or trail the condition has been already imposed in the bail order. Thus discretion exercised by the learned judge is may kindly be upheld in the facts of the case. 4. It is submitted that even after released on Anticipatory bail police officer can certainly ask for remand, so merely to recovered the alleged power of Attorney anticipatory bail cannot be cancelled as it amount to infringement of RIGHT OF PERSONAL liberty available to accused under Article 21, 22 and 19 of Constitution of India. (Para-111 & 116 of the Case of Siddharam Mhatre 2011 (1) SCC 694 ) 5. That there is delay of 3 ½ years in registration of FIR. And of civil suit is also filed by the complainant. That neither in the FIR nore in the civil suits explanation is given by the complainant about when he derived knowledge of execution of so called alleged forged of POWER OF ATTORNEY issued in the year 2010. Not only that very suprisingly even the contents of P.O.A. issued in favour of respondent no. 1 in the year 2010 and the P.O.A. issued in favour of Durgesh/Son of complainant in the year 2015 are all most identical. 6. That statement of Notary Dartiben recorded by the .I.O. Dt. Not only that very suprisingly even the contents of P.O.A. issued in favour of respondent no. 1 in the year 2010 and the P.O.A. issued in favour of Durgesh/Son of complainant in the year 2015 are all most identical. 6. That statement of Notary Dartiben recorded by the .I.O. Dt. 18.11.2018 is in respect to the continuance of P.O.A. in the year executed in the year 2010 by the complainant as well as affidavit made before her for none existence/misplaced of original copy sale of deed are signed by the respondent no. 1 as a P.O.A. of the complainant. It stated that at that relevant time he made signature as P.O.A. of complainant Therefore in the register of notary sign of complainant is blank. 7. That even with regards to nonexistence of ELECTION CARD in the first power of attorney is concerned the election Mattdar yadi which was prepared in the year 2010 reflected the same election card no. which is mention in the FIR indicating the dated of 2014 however it is dated of its reissuance and not the date issued for the first time. Therefore prima facie the said allegation is bogus and not well founded. 8. That regarding the requirement of original P.O.A. is concerned while making compliant before the commissioner of police surat on 19/01/2017 i.e. prior to registration of F.I.R. in question he has disclosed that original P.O.A. is not lying with him but it was the complainant. Therefore in the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent all the documents are attached. 9. That so far as issuance of warrant under section 70 of CRPC is concerned as per his knowledge some facts were asked to his wife by the I.O. but her signature was never obtained so respondent no. 1 could not explained in his affidavit placed on record of the present cancellation of bail application. 10. Thus when the narration of relationships between the complainant and the respondent no. 1 in the FIR on page 3 are contrary to each other so the say of complainant does not inspire any confidence under the circumstances considering the affidavit and Additional affidavit in reply placed on record by the respondent no. 1 and the considering the written submission the cancellation of Anticipatory bail application may kindly be dismissed in the interest of justice. 11. 1 and the considering the written submission the cancellation of Anticipatory bail application may kindly be dismissed in the interest of justice. 11. I have considered rival submissions of the learned advocates on record as well as have perused the record carefully. I am of the view that the learned Judge failed to take judicial notice of the material being collected by the IO which prima facie goes to point fingers against the respondent accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Sadhna Chaudhary vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, 2022 (9) SCALE 931 had occasion to revisit the parameters defined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court right from the case of Siddhram Satlingappa Mhetre vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 , while considering the scope and ambit of powers of the Sessions court as well as High Courts to grant anticipatory bail under section 438 of CRPC has directed courts to evaluate the entire material against the accused carefully. The relevant observations reads as under: “14. Law on the applicability or grant of anticipatory bail under section 438 Cr.P.C. may be briefly summarised as under: 14.1. In Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others vs. State of Punjab, a Constitution Bench of this Court, Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, speaking for the Court dealt with in detail on the considerations for grant of anticipatory bail. 14.2. In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre vs. State of Maharashtra and Others; this Court relying upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia laid down in paragraph 112 of the report the following factors and parameters to be considered while dealing with an application for anticipatory bail: “(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made. (ii) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable offence. (iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice. (iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offences. (v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her. (vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people. (iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offences. (v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her. (vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people. (vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the accused very carefully. The court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 the court should consider with even greater care and caution because over-implication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge and concern. (viii) While considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to the free, fair and full investigation and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused. (ix) The court to consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (x) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.” 14.3. In yet another recent Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Sushila Aggarwal and Others vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, in paragraph 85 of the report Justice Ravindra Bhatt laid down the guiding principles in dealing with applications under Section 438. Justice M.R. Shah had authored a separate opinion. Justice Arun Misra, Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice Vineet Saran agreed with both the opinions. The concluding guiding factors stated in paragraphs 92, 92.1 to 92.9 are reproduced hereunder: “92. This Court, in the light of the above discussion in the two judgments, and in the light of the answers to the reference, hereby clarifies that the following need to be kept in mind by courts, dealing with applications under Section 438 CrPC. 92.1. The concluding guiding factors stated in paragraphs 92, 92.1 to 92.9 are reproduced hereunder: “92. This Court, in the light of the above discussion in the two judgments, and in the light of the answers to the reference, hereby clarifies that the following need to be kept in mind by courts, dealing with applications under Section 438 CrPC. 92.1. Consistent with the judgment in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others vs. State of Punjab, when a person complains of apprehension of arrest and approaches for order, the application should be based on concrete facts (and not vague or general allegations) relatable to one or other specific offence. The application seeking anticipatory bail should contain bare essential facts relating to the offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends arrest, as well as his side of the story. These are essential for the court which should consider his application, to evaluate the threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed. It is not essential that an application should be moved only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier, so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest. 92.2. It may be advisable for the court, which is approached with an application under Section 438, depending on the seriousness of the threat (of arrest) to issue notice to the public prosecutor and obtain facts, even while granting limited interim anticipatory bail. 92.3. Nothing in Section 438 Cr. PC, compels or obliges courts to impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time, or upon filing of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police, during investigation or inquiry, etc. While considering an application (for grant of anticipatory bail) the court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation, or tampering with evidence (including intimidating witnesses), likelihood of fleeing justice (such as leaving the country), etc. The courts would be justified - and ought to impose conditions spelt out in Section 437 (3), Cr.P.C. [by virtue of Section 438 (2)]. The need to impose other restrictive conditions, would have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, and depending upon the materials produced by the state or the investigating agency. The courts would be justified - and ought to impose conditions spelt out in Section 437 (3), Cr.P.C. [by virtue of Section 438 (2)]. The need to impose other restrictive conditions, would have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, and depending upon the materials produced by the state or the investigating agency. Such special or other restrictive conditions may be imposed if the case or cases warrant, but should not be imposed in a routine manner, in all cases. Likewise, conditions which limit the grant of anticipatory bail may be granted, if they are required in the facts of any case or cases; however, such limiting conditions may not be invariably imposed. 92.4. Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case, while considering whether to grant anticipatory bail, or refuse it. Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion; equally whether and if so, what kind of special conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed) are dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the discretion of the court. 92.5. Anticipatory bail granted can, depending on the conduct and behaviour of the accused, continue after filing of the charge-sheet till end of trial. 92.6. An order of anticipatory bail should not be “blanket” in the sense that it should not enable the accused to commit further offences and claim relief of indefinite protection from arrest. It should be confined to the offence or incident, for which apprehension of arrest is sought, in relation to a specific incident. It cannot operate in respect of a future incident that involves commission of an offence. 92.7. An order of anticipatory bail does not in any manner limit or restrict the rights or duties of the police or investigating agency, to investigate into the charges against the person who seeks and is granted pre-arrest bail. 92.8. The observations in Sibbia regarding “limited custody” or “deemed custody” to facilitate the requirements of the investigative authority, would be sufficient for the purpose of fulfilling the provisions of Section 27, in the event of recovery of an article, or discovery of a fact, which is relatable to a statement made during such event (i.e. deemed custody). 92.8. The observations in Sibbia regarding “limited custody” or “deemed custody” to facilitate the requirements of the investigative authority, would be sufficient for the purpose of fulfilling the provisions of Section 27, in the event of recovery of an article, or discovery of a fact, which is relatable to a statement made during such event (i.e. deemed custody). In such event, there is no question (or necessity) of asking the accused to separately surrender and seek regular bail. Sibbia (supra) had observed that “if and when the occasion arises, it may be possible for the prosecution to claim the benefit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in regard to a discovery of facts made in pursuance of information supplied by a person released on bail by invoking the principle stated by this Court in State of U.P. vs. Deoman Upadhyaya.” 92.9. It is open to the police or the investigating agency to move the court concerned, which grants anticipatory bail, for a direction under Section 439 (2) to arrest the accused, in the event of violation of any term, such as absconding, non cooperating during investigation, evasion, intimidation or inducement to witnesses with a view to influence outcome of the investigation or trial, etc.” Thus, in light of the aforesaid guidelines of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is evident that the courts have been directed to comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The Courts are also directed to strike a balance between no prejudice to investigation and unjustified detention. The courts are also directed to look into reasonable apprehension of tampering of witnesses. 12. In the instant case, in my opinion, the learned Sessions Judge failed to examine the bail application in light of the overall parameters as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. On the other hand the learned Sessions Judge erroneously applied parity without appreciating the role of the present respondent accused with the co-accused. Additionally, the aspect of delay in lodging FIR has been wrongly considered in exercise of discretion in granting anticipatory bail. The learned Sessions Judge has totally ignored the conduct of the present accused of issuance of warrant under Section 70 and his failure to participate in investigation at earlier stage. 13. On appreciation of the material which has emerged on record, I am of the view that the role of the accused has emerged as the main accused. The learned Sessions Judge has totally ignored the conduct of the present accused of issuance of warrant under Section 70 and his failure to participate in investigation at earlier stage. 13. On appreciation of the material which has emerged on record, I am of the view that the role of the accused has emerged as the main accused. The court had accepted the application of the IO seeking issuance of warrants under Section 70 of the Code. The accused failed to join the investigation by remaining absconding. In such circumstances, the learned Judge ought not to have applied parity. Even otherwise looking at his role as principal accused, he could not have been treated at par with other co-accused. The court also takes notice of the fact that by not joining the investigation at an early stage, the recovery of the forged document has been delayed. The accused has been successful in avoiding recovery of original power of attorney. On the other hand, the accused is coming up with a defense that the original power of attorney was executed by the complainant himself and was retained by him. On circumspection of the events, one is unable to accept such defense as it was the present respondent accused who has appeared before the Sub-Registrar to execute the sale deed under the authority of power of attorney of the complainant. The statement of notary Dharitriben Patel confirms that the affidavit dated 4.11.2015, about power of attorney of the complainant being in force has been executed by the present respondent accused. Thus, the original power of attorney one can presume to be in custody of the respondent accused. With such conduct of the accused striking a balance between not causing prejudice to the investigation and protection of individual liberty, the situation demands that one who has failed to abide by law, cannot be extended an umbrella of protection when he has not cooperated in investigation. There cannot be dispute to the legal position that personal liberty is recognised as a precious fundamental right, however, the same can be curtailed when it becomes imperative in the facts and circumstances of the case. There cannot be dispute to the legal position that personal liberty is recognised as a precious fundamental right, however, the same can be curtailed when it becomes imperative in the facts and circumstances of the case. I am of the view that the further investigation as reported by the IO is still continued, this was not a case for grant of anticipatory bail, when the recovery of the document is yet to be made and the respondent accused who has not cooperated in the investigation. 14. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyentdra Kumar Anvil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation “the power of Court is quite enormous while exercising the power under Section 437 of Cr.P.C. there can not be denial of the principle “bail is rule and jail is exception”, which has been well recognized through various judicial pronouncements. However, at the same time, when Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds that custodial interrogation of accused is required as prima facie, the involvement of accused in commission of offence is made out, then the Court may refuse to entertain anticipatory bail. This Court is of the view that learned Sessions Judge failed to take judicial notice of the circumstances discussed above and on the other hand on erroneous ground of parity of co-accused and delay in registration of the FIR, proceeded to exercise the discretion in granting anticipatory bail. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prashant Kumar vs. Ashish Chatarjee, 2010 (14) SCC 496 , has laid down factors to be borne in mind while considering bail applications. In my opinion, the learned Sessions Judge failed to advert to the aforesaid factors relevant for consideration and only on irrelevant/incorrect ground has enlarged the applicant on anticipatory bail. 16. In such circumstances, the said orders suffers from non application of mind rendering it to be illegal order. Hence, present application seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail granted in favour of the respondent herein is allowed. The anticipatory bail granted to the respondent-accused is hereby cancelled. 17. The respondent-accused is hereby directed to surrender forthwith before the concerned court, to be taken by the concerned police station. In case of failure to surrender, the Investigating Agency is at liberty to seek arrest of the accused. The anticipatory bail granted to the respondent-accused is hereby cancelled. 17. The respondent-accused is hereby directed to surrender forthwith before the concerned court, to be taken by the concerned police station. In case of failure to surrender, the Investigating Agency is at liberty to seek arrest of the accused. The observations made hereunder are limited for the present proceedings of cancellation of anticipatory bail and the same may not in any manner be construed as an expression of any opinion on merits of the case. FURTHER ORDER After order was passed, a request was made on behalf of Ms. Mita Panchal, learned advocate for the respondent to grant reasonable time to surrender before the police authority. Considering the request, the respondent-accused is granted time for a period of four weeks to surrender before the concerned police authority from the date of receipt of this order.