ORDER : Ramesh Sinha, J. 1. The petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs in this petition : “10.1 To call for the records of the case for the kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court. 10.2 To issue an appropriate writ or order and declare that the FIR dated 04.07.2021 (Annexure P/1) is illegal, bad in law. 10.3 To issue an appropriate writ or order and quash the FIR dated 04.07.2021 (Annexure P/1). 10.4 Any other relief deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted.” 2. The facts, in brief, as projected by the petitioners are that they are resident of Ambikapur, District Surguja and the petitioner No. 1 is the owner of Chourasia Marriage Garden situated at Ring Road, Ambikapur. Petitioner No. 2 is the father of Harsh Sahu and petitioner No. 3 is the father of Vaishali Sahu. The marriage of Harsh Sahu and Vaishali Sahu was solemnized and the marriage function was to be held at Chourasia Marriage Garden, Ambikapur. Looking to the COVID-19 Pandemic situation in State of Chhattisgarh, the Collector-Cum-District Magistrate were authorized under the Epidemic Disease Act, 1897 (for short, the Act of 1897) and also under the provisions of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (for short, the Act of 2005) to declare any area as containment zone. Pursuant to the aforesaid delegation of power the Respondent No. 2 on 11.04.2021 declared Surguja District as a containment zone. The aforesaid declaration was subsequently extended by various notifications with certain relaxations and obligations. In continuance with the earlier order, on 28.05.2021 Respondent No. 2 issued a notification under the prescriptions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the Cr.P.C.), Act of 2005 read with Act of 1897. As per the said notification, certain regulations were prescribed. One of the said regulation was that the marriage functions would be conducted by following COVID-19 protocol and in terms of notification of Government of India dated 29.04.2021, the limit of maximum persons to attend the function was prescribed as 50 and all the persons has to go through the COVID-19 test. One of the said regulation was that the marriage functions would be conducted by following COVID-19 protocol and in terms of notification of Government of India dated 29.04.2021, the limit of maximum persons to attend the function was prescribed as 50 and all the persons has to go through the COVID-19 test. For ready reference clause 1.4 of notification / order dated 28.05.21 is quoted as under : ^^oSokfgd dk;ZØe fuokl &x`g ,ao gksVy @ eSfjt gkWy esa dksfoM&19 izksVksdkWy dk dM+kbZ ls ikyu djus dh 'krZ ij vk;ksftr djus dh vuqefr gksxhA Hkkjr ljdkj] x`g ea=ky; ds vkns'k Øekad @40&3@2020&Mh-,e-@1, fnukad&20-04-2021 vuqlkj vk;kstu esa 'kkfey gksus okys O;fDr;ksa dh dqy vf/kdre la[;k 50 jgsxhA oSokfgd dk;ZØe esa lfEefyr gksus okys lHkh O;fDr;ksa dks dksjksuk dksfoM&19 VsLV djkuk vfuok;Z gksxkA blh izdkj vaR;sfV"V] n'kxk= e`R;q laca/kh dk;ZØe esa 'kkfey gksus okys O;fDr;ksa dh dqy vf/kdre la[;k 20 jgsxhA** 3. On 04.07.2021 one Komal Prasad Sahu, Naib Tahsildar, Ambikapur lodged a report that on 02.07.2021, a marriage was performed in Chourasia Marriage Garden. It is alleged that in the said marriage, in violation of notification dated 28.05.2021, approximately 1000 persons were gathered. It was further alleged that the marriage was performed between the son and daughter of petitioner No.2 and 3 whereas the marriage garden is owned by petitioner No.1. According to the F.1.R. since petitioners had violated the regulations contained in the notification dated 28.05.2021, therefore they made themselves liable for penal action. On the aforesaid information the Respondent No. 3 registered the present F.I.R. for the offences punishable under Section 269 and 188 of I.P.C. and also under Section 3 of the Act of 1897. 4. Mr. Goutam Khetrapal and Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners submit that a bare perusal of definition clause of ‘complaint’ defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. would show that to qualify the term defined under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C., there must be a complaint to a Magistrate. The definition further prescribes that the complaint does not include a police report. Law is well settled that no F.I.R. can be registered under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. for alleged commission of offence under Section 188 of I.P.C. thus, registration of F.1.R. under Section 188 of I.P.C. and Section 3 of the Act of 1897 is illegal and bad in law. 5. Mr. Law is well settled that no F.I.R. can be registered under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. for alleged commission of offence under Section 188 of I.P.C. thus, registration of F.1.R. under Section 188 of I.P.C. and Section 3 of the Act of 1897 is illegal and bad in law. 5. Mr. Khetrapal further submits that the offence under Section 269 of I.P.C. prescribes that any negligent act made by any person to spread infection of disease, dangerous to life would be punished. To qualify for the aforesaid prescription, the real test is that a person due to his negligent act has spread or likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life. In the F.I.R. dated 04.07.2021, there is not even a whisper that any of the petitioners had spread or they were likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life thus registration of F.I.R. under Section 269 of I.P.C. is also illegal and bad. The respondents have erred in law in not appreciating the matter in its right perspective. The respondents ought to have considered that the object of Section 195(1)(a)(i) is to protect persons from being needlessly harassed by vexatious prosecution. Further, a plain reading of Section 195(1)(a)(i) makes it clear that a public servant who had promulgated any order which has not been obeyed / disobeyed, himself has to make a complaint and if he refuses to give a complaint, any superior public servant to whom the said public servant is administrately subordinate can file a complaint in respect of disobedience of the order promulgated by the subordinate. The word 'subordinate' means administratively subordinate i.e. an Officer who in his official capacity is superior to him or under whose administrative control he works. In the present case the F.I.R. has been given by a Naib Tahsildar. By no stretch of imagination it can be concluded that a Collector or District Magistrate is subordinate to a Naib Tahsildar. The word 'subordinate' means administratively subordinate i.e. an Officer who in his official capacity is superior to him or under whose administrative control he works. In the present case the F.I.R. has been given by a Naib Tahsildar. By no stretch of imagination it can be concluded that a Collector or District Magistrate is subordinate to a Naib Tahsildar. The respondents have failed to consider that no FI.R. can be registered under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. for alleged commission of offence under Section 188 of I.P.C. Merely because an offence under Section 188 of IPC is cognizable, that by itself does not authorize the police officer to register the FIR for such a offence, the reason being that the registration of FIR would necessarily result in submission of police report under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. which is specifically barred by Section 195(1)(a) read with Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. The respondents failed to consider that the definition of the term ‘complaint’ as contained under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. makes it clear that the complaint does not include a police report. To qualify a complaint as defined under Cr.P.C., it must be made to a Magistrate by the concerned person. Section 3 of the Act of 1897 which deals with the term 'penalty' does not define any penalty except - that if any person disobeys any regulation under the Act of 1897, it would be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 188 of I.P.C. and as such the registration of offence under Section 3 of the Act of 1897 is per se illegal and bad. 6. Mr. Khetrapal further submits that the respondents have further failed to consider that vide notification dated 28.05.2021, Respondent No.2 had declared that the violation of aforesaid notification would be dealt with the under the provisions contained in I.P.C. and Act of 2005. Chapter X, particularly Section 60 of the Act of 2005 prescribes that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act of 2005 without a complaint made by the prescribed officer defined under the Act of 2005. Admittedly, no complaint under the provisions of Act of 2005, Act of 1897 or under the Cr.P.C. was ever made, therefore the registration of offence against the petitioners is per se illegal and bad. 7. In support of his contentions, Mr. Admittedly, no complaint under the provisions of Act of 2005, Act of 1897 or under the Cr.P.C. was ever made, therefore the registration of offence against the petitioners is per se illegal and bad. 7. In support of his contentions, Mr. Khetrapal relies on a decision of this Court in Dr. Santosh Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, {W.P.(Cr.) No. 332/2020, decided on 14.12.2020} and Dr. Apurva Ghiya v. State of Chhattisgarh & others, {W.P.(Cr.) No. 310/2020, decided on 07.10.2020) in which a learned Single Judge of this Court had clearly held that registration of FIR under Section 188 of IPC is clearly impermissible. In the present case, a general allegation has been made against the petitioners without any specification or any enquiry. The FIR itself says that as per the information, approximately 1000 persons had attended the marriage. There is no specific details about the said information or about the persons who attended the marriage. The petitioners have been illegally dragged in the criminal proceedings and are being compelled to face criminal trial which would amount to violation of fundamental rights of the petitioners and initiation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners is sheer abuse of due process of law and the petitioners have been implicated without any fault just because of political reasons. Mr. Khetrapal further relies on a decision of a Single Bench judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Pawan Giri & Others v. State of Haryana CRM-M-51595-2021 (O&M) decided on 07.02.2022, wherein also offence under Section 188 and 269 IPC was registered against the petitioner therein and the learned Single Judge had quashed the FIR. Hence, this petition deserves to be allowed. 8. On the other hand, Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents submits that a bare perusal of the FIR would show that, despite issuance of notification and the order of District Magistrate to follow the COVID-19 Protocol, the petitioners have deliberately conducted the marriage function, wherein, approximately 1000 persons had gathered. Such gatherings could have spread the Corona virus amongst the people, therefore, looking to the seriousness of the situation and violation of COVID-19 Protocol, which amounts to an offence, the complaint was made by the Naib Tahsildar, Ambikapur before the Police Station Ambikapur, District Surguja (CG) against the petitioners. Such gatherings could have spread the Corona virus amongst the people, therefore, looking to the seriousness of the situation and violation of COVID-19 Protocol, which amounts to an offence, the complaint was made by the Naib Tahsildar, Ambikapur before the Police Station Ambikapur, District Surguja (CG) against the petitioners. The petitioners have sought for quashment of FIR in view of the order dated 04.07.2021 (Annexure P/1) passed by this Hon'ble Court in Dr. Santosh Kumar Patel (supra) and Dr. Apurva Ghiya (supra). It has been contended by the petitioner that, in the said matter the Hon'ble High Court has held that no FIR under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. can be registered for offence under Section 188 of IPC, thus, the registration of FIR for offence under Section 188 of IPC is itself illegal. The said contention advanced by the petitioners is without substance and baseless and the above said judgment is not applicable in the present case, because, the aforesaid FIR (Annexure P/1) was lodged against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 188 and 269 of IPC and Section 3 of the Act of 1987. It is pertinent to mention here that the offence under Section 188 of IPC has been lodged alongwith other sections as on the date of incident, i.e. 02.07.2021 as there was effect of notification dated 28.05.2021 issued by the District Magistrate regarding compliance of COVID-19 Protocol, which has been overlooked by the petitioners while conducting marriage wherein approximately 1000 peoples were gathered. Section 154 of Cr.PC. suggests that the information regarding commission of cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station, therefore, upon receiving the information by the concerned Station House Officer of Police Station Ambikapur, the FIR was registered about an incident which constitute a cognizable offence. It hardly gives any discretion to the said police officer. The twofold obligation upon such officer is that: (a) he should receive such information, and (b) record the same as prescribed. The language of Section 154 Cr.P.C imposes such imperative obligation upon the officer. The genesis of this provision in our country in this regard is that the officer-in-charge must register the FIR and proceed with the investigation forthwith. Mr. The twofold obligation upon such officer is that: (a) he should receive such information, and (b) record the same as prescribed. The language of Section 154 Cr.P.C imposes such imperative obligation upon the officer. The genesis of this provision in our country in this regard is that the officer-in-charge must register the FIR and proceed with the investigation forthwith. Mr. Ahluwalia further submits that from the prima-facie narration of allegations in the FIR, there appears that the offences for which crime has been registered, has been committed by the petitioners and at this stage, the defense of the petitioners could not be scrutinized for assessing their guilt or innocence as the same is matter of evidence before the Trial Court. The allegations need to be investigated and the investigation is under process and after due investigation the final report would be submitted by the police, therefore, at this stage, the FIR should not be quashed. The petitioners have not been able to show any exceptional circumstance that the defense or documents could be looked into as the investigation is going on, hence, for the purpose of assessing the guilt or innocent of the petitioners/accused at this stage, only the contents of FIR must be looked into. In view of the investigation made so far, the present does not appear to be a case for quashing of FIR itself. It is settled law that the FIR could be quashed only in a case where, even after reading the entire FIR and the contents thereto, no offence could be made out against the petitioner, which is not a case in the present writ petition, so it could not be said that the present is a fit case of quashing of FIR. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajanlal & Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has held that the proceedings relating to cognizable offences cannot be interfered except on certain grounds enumerated by the Apex Court in the said judgment. It is evident that, none of the grounds mentioned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment are attracted in the present case. It is evident that, none of the grounds mentioned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment are attracted in the present case. Further, in State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani & others, (2017) 2 SCC 779 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR. Also what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses commission of a cognizable offence. The petitioners have failed to make out any ground for interference of this Hon'ble Court in exercise of its extra ordinary writ jurisdiction and the petition, being devoid of any merit, deserves to be dismissed. Since the investigation is going where the prosecution is collecting evidences and records, therefore, at this stage, the instant petition is premature and liable to be dismissed. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto. 10. In the instant case, basically the FIR has been registered against the petitioners for violating the COVID-19 pandemic protocols under Sections 269, 188 of the IPC and Section 3 of the Act of 1897 as it is alleged that the marriage of the son and daughter of petitioner No. 1 and 2 was conducted in the Marriage Hall owned by petitioner No. 1 where more than 1000 people had gathered. It is an admitted position that the FIR was lodged by one Lady Constable Kiran Amlawati of Police Chowki Manipur, on behalf of Komal Prasad Sahu, Nayab Tahsildar, Ambikapur. 11. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant statutory provisions of Section 188, 268 of IPC and Section 3 of the Act of 1896, which reads as under : “188. 11. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant statutory provisions of Section 188, 268 of IPC and Section 3 of the Act of 1896, which reads as under : “188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.—Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or trends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Explanation.—It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm.” “269. Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life.—Whoever unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.” “3. Penalty. - (1) Any person disobeying any regulation or order made under this Act shall be deemed to have committed an offence punishable under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). Penalty. - (1) Any person disobeying any regulation or order made under this Act shall be deemed to have committed an offence punishable under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). (2) Whoever, - (i) commits or abets the commission of an act of violence against a health care service personnel; or (ii) abets or cause damage or loss to any property, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months, but which may extend to five years, and with fine, which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees, but which may extend to two lakh rupees. (3) Whoever, while committing an act of violence against a health care service personnel, cause grievous hurt as defined in section 320 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) to such person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to seven years and with fine, which shall not be less than one lakh rupees, but which may extend to five lakh rupees.” 12. The question that would arise for consideration in the present case is, whether FIR can be registered under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C for offence under Section 188 of the IPC and whether such an offence can be investigated by the police in view of the provision contained in Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C.? 13. In order to decide the dispute, it would be appropriate to notice the definition of “cognizable offence” contained in Section 2(c) of the Cr.P.C. which states as under : “(c) "cognizable offence" means an offence for which, and "cognizable case" means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant;” Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. defines “complaint”. It states as under: “(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. It states as under: “(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Explanation.—A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant;” Section 2(h) of the Cr.P.C. defines “investigation” which is as follows: “(h) "investigation" includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf;” “Police report” is defined in Section 2(r) of the Code which is as under: “(r) "police report" means a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) of section 173;” 14. Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. states about information to the police and their powers to investigate. Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. speaks about information in cognizable cases. Sub-section (1) of Section 154 provides that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. Section 155 deals with information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases. Section 156 enumerates police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case. Section 173 provides for report of police officer given on completion of investigation. Section 190 provides for cognizance of offences by Magistrates. Section 195 prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of the offences mentioned therein except on the complaint in writing by the persons named therein. 15. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. which states as under: - “195. Section 190 provides for cognizance of offences by Magistrates. Section 195 prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of the offences mentioned therein except on the complaint in writing by the persons named therein. 15. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. which states as under: - “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.— (1) No Court shall take cognizance— (a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or (ii) xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate;” 16. The object of the above-stated provision is to protect persons from being needlessly harassed by vexatious prosecutions in retaliation. It is a check to protect innocent persons from criminal prosecution which may be activated by malice or ill will. 17. A careful perusal of Section 195(1) of the CrPC would show that the general rule is that any person having knowledge may set the law in motion by making a complaint, even though he is not the person interested in or assisted by the offence to the general rule. Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. provides an exception and forbids cognizance having been taken of the offence referred to therein except on the complaint in writing by the court or by some other court to which such court is subordinate. (See Lalji Haridas v. The State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1964 SC 1154 .) 18. In the matter of Basir-ul-Huq and others v. The State of West Bengal on the complaint of Dhirendra Nath Bera, AIR 1953 SC 293 , the Supreme Court qua Sections 182 and 188 of the IPC, held as under : “(9) Section 195, Criminal P.C., on which the question raised is grounded, provides inter alia, that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Ss. 172 to 188, Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. 172 to 188, Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned no prosecution for an offence under S. 182 can be taken cognizance of. ...” 19. In the matter of Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1206 , the Supreme Court has held that there is an absolute bar against the court taking seisin of the case under Section 182 of the IPC except in the manner provided by Section 195 of the CrPC. It was further held that the complaint must be in writing by the public servant concerned and trial under Section 182 of the IPC without complaint in writing is therefore without jurisdiction ab initio. 20. Similarly, in the matter of Govind Mehta v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1708 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that Section 195 of the CrPC is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). It was further held that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein. 21. Likewise, in the matter of C. Muniappan and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 195 of the CrPC are mandatory and non-compliance of the same would vitiate the prosecution. It was observed as under : “33. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that there must be a complaint by the pubic servant whose lawful order has not been complied with. The complaint must be in writing. The provisions of Section 195 CrPC are mandatory. Non-compliance of it would vitiate the prosecution and all other consequential orders. The court cannot assume the cognizance of the case without such complaint. The complaint must be in writing. The provisions of Section 195 CrPC are mandatory. Non-compliance of it would vitiate the prosecution and all other consequential orders. The court cannot assume the cognizance of the case without such complaint. In the absence of such a complaint, the trial and conviction will be void ab initio being without jurisdiction.” 22. The principle of law laid down in C. Muniappan (supra) has been followed with approval by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Babita Lila and another v. Union of India, (2016) 9 SCC 647 in which it has been held as under : “46. That the provisions of Section 195 of the Code are mandatory so much so that non-compliance thereof would vitiate the prosecution and all consequential orders, has been ruled by this Court, amongst others in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N. (supra) wherein the following observations in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 were recorded with approval: (SCC pp. 497-98, para 7) “7. … Section 190 of the Code empowers “any Magistrate of the first class” to take cognizance of “any offence” upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the Magistrate, and the general right of a person to move the court with a complaint is to that extent curtained. It is a well-recognised canon of interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise. ... (emphasis supplied)” 23. In the matter of State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh and others, (1994) 4 SCC 95 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, with respect to Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C., held as under : “6. The object of this section is to protect persons from being vexatiously prosecuted upon inadequate materials or insufficient grounds by person actuated by malice or ill-will or frivolity of disposition at the instance of private individuals for the offences specified therein. The object of this section is to protect persons from being vexatiously prosecuted upon inadequate materials or insufficient grounds by person actuated by malice or ill-will or frivolity of disposition at the instance of private individuals for the offences specified therein. The provisions of this section, no doubt, are mandatory and the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing of 'the public servant concerned' as required by the section without which the trial under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code becomes void ab initio. See Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab (supra). To say in other words a written complaint by a public servant concerned is sine qua non to initiate a criminal proceeding under Section 188 of the IPC against those who, with the knowledge that an order has been promulgated by a public servant directing either 'to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order, with certain property in his possession or under his management' disobey that order. Nonetheless, when the court in its discretion is disinclined to prosecute the wrongdoers, no private complainant can be allowed to initiate any criminal proceeding in his individual capacity as it would be clear from the reading of the section itself which is to the effect that no court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the IPC except on the written complaint of 'the public servant concerned' or of some other public servant to whom he (the public servant who promulgated that order) is administratively subordinate.” 24. Similarly, in Sachida Nand Singh8 (supra), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the issue held as under : “7. Even if the clause is capable of two interpretations we are inclined to choose the narrower interpretation for obvious reasons. Section 190 of the Code empowers "any magistrate of the first class" to take cognizance of "any offence" upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the magistrate, and the general right of a person to move the court with a complaint is to that extent curtailed. Section 190 of the Code empowers "any magistrate of the first class" to take cognizance of "any offence" upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the magistrate, and the general right of a person to move the court with a complaint is to that extent curtailed. It is a well-recognised canon of interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise (Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 ).” 25. In the matter of M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana and another, AIR 2000 SC 168 , the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. are mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing as required under that section. 26. In the matter of Jeewan Kumar Raut and another v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526 , which is the case under the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (TOHO Act) of which Section 22 stipulates that no court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except on a complaint made by the Appropriate Authority concerned, or any officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Government or, as the case may be, the Appropriate Authority; Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the question whether the authorised officer has power to investigate as per the provisions of the Cr.P.C., expressing doubt, it was held as under : “25. Section 22 of TOHO prohibits taking of cognizance except on a complaint made by an appropriate authority or the person who had made a complaint earlier to it as laid down therein. The respondent, although, has all the powers of an investigating agency, it expressly has been statutorily prohibited from filing a police report. It could file a complaint petition only as an appropriate authority so as to comply with the requirements contained in Section 22 of TOHO. If by reason of the provisions of TOHO, filing of a police report by necessary implication is necessarily forbidden, the question of its submitting a report in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code did not and could not arise. If by reason of the provisions of TOHO, filing of a police report by necessary implication is necessarily forbidden, the question of its submitting a report in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code did not and could not arise. In other words, if no police report could be filed, sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code was not attracted. xxx xxx xxx 28. To put it differently, upon completion of the investigation, an authorised officer could only file a complaint and not a police report, as a specific bar has been created by Parliament. In that view of the matter, the police report being not a complaint and vice versa, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent to choose the said method invoking the jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned for taking cognizance of the offence only in the manner laid down therein and not by any other mode. The procedure laid down in TOHO, thus, would permit the respondent to file a complaint and not a report which course of action could have been taken recourse to but for the special provisions contained in Section 22 of TOHO. xxx xxx xxx 36. We are, however, not oblivious of some decisions of this Court where some special statutory authorities like authorities under the Customs Act have been granted all the powers of the investigating officer under a special statute like the NDPS Act, but, this Court has held that they cannot file charge-sheet and to that extent they would not be police officers. (See Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of W.B., AIR 1970 SC 940 and Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409 .) 37. In the present case, however, the respondent having specially been empowered both under the 1946 Act as also under the Code to carry out investigation and file a charge-sheet is precluded from doing so only by reason of Section 22 of TOHO. It is doubtful as to whether in the event of authorisation of an officer of the Department to carry out investigation on a complaint made by a third party, he would be entitled to arrest the accused and carry on investigation as if he is a police officer. We hope that Parliament would take appropriate measures to suitably amend the law in the near future.” 27. We hope that Parliament would take appropriate measures to suitably amend the law in the near future.” 27. In the matter of Saloni Arora v. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2017 SC 391 wherein, in violation of the provisions contained in Section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C., the accused was prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 182 of the IPC, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court quashed the complaint following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Daulat Ram (supra) and held as under : “12. It is not in dispute that in this case, the prosecution while initiating the action against the appellant did not take recourse to the procedure prescribed under Section 195 of the Code. It is for this reason, in our considered opinion, the action taken by the prosecution against the appellant insofar as it relates to the offence under Section 182 IPC is concerned, is rendered void ab initio being against the law laid down in the case of Daulat Ram (supra) quoted above.” 28. The Madras High Court in the matter of Jeevanandham and others v. State and another, 2019 (1) MLJ (Cri) 36 clearly held that a Police Officer cannot register an FIR for any of the offences falling under Section 172 to 188 of the IPC and observed as under:- “25. In view of the discussions, the following guidelines are issued insofar as an offence under Section 188 of IPC, is concerned: (a) A Police Officer cannot register an FIR for any of the offences falling under Section 172 to 188 of IPC. (b) A Police Officer by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 41 of Cr.P.C. will have the authority to take action under Section 41 of Cr.P.C., when a cognizable offence under Section 188 IPC is committed in his presence or where such action is required, to prevent such person from committing an offence under Section 188 of IPC. (c) The role of the Police Officer will be confined only to the preventive action as stipulated under Section 41 of Cr.P.C. and immediately thereafter, he has to inform about the same to the public servant concerned/authorised, to enable such public servant to give a complaint in writing before the jurisdictional Magistrate, who shall take cognizance of such complaint on being prima facie satisfied with the requirements of Section 188 of IPC. (d) In order to attract the provisions of Section 188 of IPC, the written complaint of the public servant concerned should reflect the following ingredients namely; (i) that there must be an order promulgated by the public servant; (ii) that such public servant is lawfully empowered to promulgate it; (iii) that the person with knowledge of such order and being directed by such order to abstain from doing certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession and under his management, has disobeyed; and (iv) that such disobedience causes or tends to cause; (a) obstruction, annoyance or risk of it to any person lawfully employed; or (b) danger to human life, health or safety; or (c) a riot or affray. (e) The promulgation issued under Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861, must satisfy the test of reasonableness and can only be in the nature of a regulatory power and not a blanket power to trifle any democratic dissent of the citizens by the Police. (f) The promulgation through which, the order is made known must be by something done openly and in public and private information will not be a promulgation. The order must be notified or published by beat of drum or in a Gazette or published in a newspaper with a wide circulation. (g) No Judicial Magistrate should take cognizance of a Final Report when it reflects an offence under Section 172 to 188 of IPC. An FIR or a Final Report will not become void ab initio insofar as offences other than Section 172 to 188 of IPC and a Final Report can be taken cognizance by the Magistrate insofar as offences not covered under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. (h) The Director General of Police, Chennai and Inspector General of the various Zones are directed to immediately formulate a process by specifically empowering public servants dealing with for an offence under Section 188 of IPC to ensure that there is no delay in filing a written complaint by the public servants concerned under Section 195(1)(a) (i) of Cr.P.C.” 29. In a recent judgment, in the matter of Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma and others, Criminal Appeal No.200 of 2020, decided on 28-8-2020, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering registration of FIR by the police in the light of the provisions contained in Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, held as under : “150. Thus, we may cull out our conclusions/ directions as follows: I. In regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, in view of Section 32 of the Act and also the scheme of the CrPC, the Police Officer cannot prosecute offenders in regard to such offences. Only the persons mentioned in Section 32 are entitled to do the same. II. There is no bar to the Police Officer, however, to investigate and prosecute the person where he has committed an offence, as stated under Section 32(3) of the Act, i.e., if he has committed any cognizable offence under any other law. III. Having regard to the scheme of the CrPC and also the mandate of Section 32 of the Act and on a conspectus of powers which are available with the Drugs Inspector under the Act and also his duties, a Police Officer cannot register a FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC, in regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act and he cannot investigate such offences under the provisions of the CrPC. IV. Having regard to the provisions of Section 22(1)(d) of the Act, we hold that an arrest can be made by the Drugs Inspector in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act without any warrant and otherwise treating it as a cognizable offence. He is, however, bound by the law as laid down in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 and to follow the provisions of CrPC. V. It would appear that on the understanding that the Police Officer can register a FIR, there are many cases where FIRs have been registered in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act. We find substance in the stand taken by learned Amicus Curiae and direct that they should be made over to the Drugs Inspectors, if not already made over, and it is for the Drugs Inspector to take action on the same in accordance with the law. We find substance in the stand taken by learned Amicus Curiae and direct that they should be made over to the Drugs Inspectors, if not already made over, and it is for the Drugs Inspector to take action on the same in accordance with the law. We must record that we are resorting to our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in this regard. VI. Further, we would be inclined to believe that in a number of cases on the understanding of the law relating to the power of arrest as, in fact, evidenced by the facts of the present case, police officers would have made arrests in regard to offences under Chapter IV of the Act. Therefore, in regard to the power of arrest, we make it clear that our decision that Police Officers do not have power to arrest in respect of cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, will operate with effect from the date of this Judgment. VII. We further direct that the Drugs Inspectors, who carry out the arrest, must not only report the arrests, as provided in Section 58 of the CrPC, but also immediately report the arrests to their superior Officers.” 30. The Supreme Court in the matter of Ushaben v. Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada and others, (2012) 6 SCC 353 referring to the Explanation appended to Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., clearly held that a report made by a police officer after investigation of a non-cognizable offence is to be treated as a complaint and the officer by whom such a report is made is to be deemed to be the complainant. 31. In the matter of Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal and others, AIR 1963 Cal 191 , the Calcutta High Court has held that the words “it does not include a police report” in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. refers to report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. after completion of investigation, not any other report by police officer. 32. Similarly, the Karnataka High Court in the matter of Chandrasha & others v. The State, 1989 Cri. L.J. NOC 97 (Kant.) has also held that charge-sheet on a cognizable offence is not complaint, it is police report. 33. 32. Similarly, the Karnataka High Court in the matter of Chandrasha & others v. The State, 1989 Cri. L.J. NOC 97 (Kant.) has also held that charge-sheet on a cognizable offence is not complaint, it is police report. 33. From a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments rendered by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court (supra) and the Madras High Court (supra), it is quite vivid that in order to prosecute an accused for the offence punishable under Section 188 of the IPC, it is imperative to undergo the procedure envisaged under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. i.e. complaint in writing of public servant concerned or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate, otherwise cognizance of offence under Section 188 of the IPC cannot be taken and if this imperative procedure is not complied with, the entire prosecution for offence under Section 188 of the IPC would be rendered void ab initio, as Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. wherein any person can set the law in motion by making complaint. The provisions of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. are mandatory and non-compliance with it will make the entire process void ab initio and without jurisdiction as well. As such, since cognizance of offence under Section 188 of the IPC can be taken on the basis of complaint in writing filed by the public servant concerned within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., offence under Section 188 of the IPC being cognizable offence is not also saved by Explanation appended to Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., as by Explanation to Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., report made by police officer after investigation of non-cognizable offence is only to be treated as complaint and person making the complaint is to be treated as complainant and police report or FIR is not a complaint and further, charge-sheet is a report of police officer. Therefore, the first information report also cannot be registered under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. for offence under Section 188 of the IPC, as registration of FIR after investigation would culminate into police report under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. which cannot be taken cognizance of by the Magistrate under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C., as such registration of FIR for offence under Section 188 IPC is barred. 34. 34. The submission of learned State counsel that since the offence punishable under Section 188 of the IPC is a cognizable offence, therefore, police is duty bound to register FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. immediately on information as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2014) 2 SCC 1 and to proceed to investigate as provided under Sections 156(3) & 157 of the Cr.P.C. is noticed to be rejected. Such a submission is not acceptable, because, merely because the offence under Section 188 of the IPC is cognizable offence, that by itself does not authorise the police officer to register FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. for such offence, the reason being that the registration of FIR would necessarily result in submission of police report under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. which is specifically barred by Section 195(1)(a) read with Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C.. The definition of “complaint” contained in Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. makes it clear that complaint does not include a police report. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma’s case (supra), in the light of Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, held that the principles laid down in Lalita Kumari (supra) could not be applicable to registration of FIR for offence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and observed as under : “66. We would think that this Court was not, in the said case, considering a case under the Act or cases similar to those under the Act, and we would think that having regard to the discussion which we have made and on a conspectus of the provisions of the CrPC and Section 32 of the Act, the principle laid down in Lalita Kumari (supra) is not attracted when an information is made before a Police Officer making out the commission of an offence under Chapter IV of the Act mandating a registration of a FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC.” As such, the argument raised in this behalf by the learned State Counsel deserves to be rejected following the principle of law laid down in this behalf by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma’s case (supra). 35. 35. In Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), the Supreme Court laid down the parameters in paragraph 102 of its report for quashing criminal proceeding / FIR exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. relevant portion of which states as under : “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) to (5) xxx xxx xxx (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) xxx xxx xxx” 36. In the case in hand, FIR has been registered under Section 154 Cr.P.C. against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 269 and 188 of IPC as well as Section 3 of the Act of 1897 at the instance of the Nayab Tahsildar and applying the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, the FIR dated 04.07.2021, bearing Crime No. 587 of 2021 registered at Police Station, Ambikapur, District Surguja, is quashed following the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra). 37. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to cost(s).