JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment & decree dated 1.4.2022, passed by the learned District Judge (Forests), Shimla, H.P., Camp at Rohru, vide which the appeal filed by the present respondent (plaintiff before the learned Trial Court) was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 1, Rohru, District Shimla, was set-aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking vacant possession of the suit land mentioned in para-1 of the plaint by removing apple plants. It was also prayed that the entry in the revenue record regarding ‘Davedar Bai’ be declared null and void. It was asserted that the suit land was allotted to the father of the plaintiff in a family partition. The plaintiff inherited the estate of her father and became the exclusive owner of the suit land. She collected the revenue record to raise a loan from the bank and found that the suit land was recorded in possession of the defendant as ‘daveder bai’. The plaintiff demanded the possession of the suit land from the defendant. The defendant assured to hand over the vacant possession but failed to do so; hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement, taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability and cause of action, the suit being bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, the plaintiff being estopped to file the present suit due to her act, conduct and acquiescence, improper valuation and the defendant having become the owner by way of adverse possession. The contents of the plaint were denied on merits. It was asserted that Mainee (father of the plaintiff) sold the land to the defendant for a consideration of Rs.500/- on 15.6.1977. Rs.420 were paid on the date of sale and Rs.80 were paid on 28.5.1980. Mainee signed a document by putting his thumb impression. He delivered the possession to the defendant on 15.8.1977. The defendant is in possession as owner of the suit land. The plaintiff is residing in the vicinity of the suit land. She never asserted her title. Rs.420 were paid on the date of sale and Rs.80 were paid on 28.5.1980. Mainee signed a document by putting his thumb impression. He delivered the possession to the defendant on 15.8.1977. The defendant is in possession as owner of the suit land. The plaintiff is residing in the vicinity of the suit land. She never asserted her title. The plaintiff visited the house of the defendant in 1994 and requested her to execute the sale deed. However, the defendant’s husband had met with an accident and was under treatment from 1986 to 1998; hence, the sale deed could not be executed. The plaintiff came to the house of the defendant to execute the sale deed in March, 1998 but the defendant requested her to wait till the recovery of her (defendant’s) husband. The plaintiff again visited the house of the defendant in September, 2013 and requested the defendant to execute the sale deed. However, the sale deed could not be executed because the correction was required in the revenue record. The defendant told the plaintiff that she had acquired the title by way of adverse possession in March, 1998. The defendant had planted fruit-bearing apple trees which are more than 33 years old, hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 5. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 23.5.2015:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the possession of the suit land, as claimed? OPP. 2. Whether the revenue entries of the suit land pertaining to the column of possession are null and void, as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable, as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit on account of her acts, conduct and acquiescence etc., as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD. 7. Whether the defendant has become the owner of the suit land on account of adverse possession, as alleged? OPC. 8. Whether the counterclaim is not maintainable, as alleged? OP non-counter claimant. 9. Whether the counter claimant has no cause of action to file the present counterclaim, as alleged? OP non-counter claimant. 10. OPD. 7. Whether the defendant has become the owner of the suit land on account of adverse possession, as alleged? OPC. 8. Whether the counterclaim is not maintainable, as alleged? OP non-counter claimant. 9. Whether the counter claimant has no cause of action to file the present counterclaim, as alleged? OP non-counter claimant. 10. Whether the counterclaim is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OP non-counter claimant. 11. Relief. 6. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence. The plaintiff examined herself (PW-1). The defendant examined Rati Ram (DW-1), Bahadur Singh (DW-2), Panna Lal (DW-3), Jitender Singh (DW-4), and Saran Dass (DW-5). 7. The Learned Trial Court held that the entry in favour of the defendant continued for a long time and showed that she was in possession of the suit land on the basis of the sale. The plaintiff knew the possession of the defendant but she failed to take any action. The possession of the defendant was continuous, open, uninterrupted and peaceful to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The defendant has become the owner by way of adverse possession. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered issues no. 3, 5 and 6 in affirmative, issues no. 1, 2 and 4 in negative, issues no. 7 to 10 as redundant, and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned District Judge, (Forests), Shimla. Learned First Appellate Court held that no order was passed to record the possession of the defendant and the entry was without any basis. The defendant failed to prove the agreement executed by Mainee. There was no evidence to show that any sale consideration was paid to the father of the plaintiff. The counter claim relating to the adverse possession was withdrawn and the learned Trial Court erred in holding that the defendant had become the owner by way of adverse possession. Hence, the appeal was allowed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside and the decree of vacant possession was passed in favour of the plaintiff. 9. Hence, the appeal was allowed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside and the decree of vacant possession was passed in favour of the plaintiff. 9. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the defendant filed the present appeal asserting that the learned First Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. The judgment is based upon conjectures and surmises. Learned Trial Court held that the defendant had become owner by way of adverse possession and this aspect was not considered by the learned First Appellate Court. No decree of possession could have been passed in favour of the plaintiff and defendant in the absence of proof of family partition. The suit was not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction and it should have been valued on the market value of the orchard existing on the suit land. The defendant was in peaceful, open, continuous, uninterrupted and hostile possession and became owner by way of adverse possession. It was wrongly held that the entry of ‘devedar bai’ was wrongly recorded in the revenue record; therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court be set aside. 10. The following issues were proposed with the memorandum of appeal:- 1. Whether decree for possession on the basis of title could be passed in favour of the respondent by the Ld. First Appellate Court below when the respondent has failed to prove her title on the basis of the family partition as claimed in the suit and the findings thus recorded are vitiated? . 2. Whether the findings recorded by Ld. Appellate Court below are vitiated for the reasons that the Appellate Court has passed the decree for possession in favour of the respondent without giving any reasons while reversing the findings of the Ld. Trial Court which held that the pre decessor-in-interest of the appellants and acquired title on suit land by way of adverse possession? 3. Whether the learned Appellate Court below has committed illegality in the exercise of the jurisdiction as vested in it by setting aside the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the Ld. Trial Court which held that the pre decessor-in-interest of the appellants and acquired title on suit land by way of adverse possession? 3. Whether the learned Appellate Court below has committed illegality in the exercise of the jurisdiction as vested in it by setting aside the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the Ld. Trial Court without giving any reason as to on what basis it has come to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the Ld. Trial Court were not sustainable and thus the findings recorded by the Ld. Court below are vitiated? 4. Whether decree for possession could be passed by the Appellate Court below in the absence of correct valuation of the suit for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction as per Section 7(v)(e) when admittedly as per the case of respondent there is Apple orchard on the suit land and the decree as passed is unsustainable in the law? 5. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court below has misread, misconstrued and misinterpreted the oral as well as documentary evidence and the findings thus recorded are vitiated? 11. I have heard Mr. Y.P. Sood, learned Counsel for the appellants (original defendant and Mr Ravinder Singh Chandel with Ms. Pooja Thakur, learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff. 12. Mr. Y.P. Sood, learned Counsel for the appellant (original defendant) submitted that the learned First Appellate Court erred in accepting the appeal. The plaintiff had failed to prove the exclusive title in herself. The suit was bad for non- joinder of the other co-shares. It was admitted by the plaintiff that the defendant was in possession and she had raised an orchard. The suit land should have been valued on the market value of the orchard; however, the plaintiff did not do so. The defendant had become the owner by way of adverse possession and the learned First Appellate Court erred in negating this plea. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed on the proposed substantial questions of law. 13. Mr Ravinder Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff supported the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court. He submitted that the defendant had taken a plea of part performance and adverse performance, which is impermissible. A person under the executory contract of sale cannot claim the adverse possession. 13. Mr Ravinder Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff supported the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court. He submitted that the defendant had taken a plea of part performance and adverse performance, which is impermissible. A person under the executory contract of sale cannot claim the adverse possession. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that the defendant had become the owner by way of adverse possession and the learned First Appellate Court had rightly corrected the error. Hence, he prayed that the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court be upheld and the appeal be dismissed. 14. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 15. Plaintiff Watuli Devi admitted in her cross- examination that an orchard exists over the suit land which has been yielding crops for the last ten years. This orchard was raised by the defendant. It was submitted that the existence of the orchard is not in dispute; therefore, the plaintiff should have valued the suit land on the market value of the orchard. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Niram Dass vs. Hirda Ram ILR 1975 HP 659 that the raising of the orchard is immaterial to determine the court fee and jurisdiction in a suit for possession of the vacant land. It was observed: “8. The real question is whether the value of the land alone is to be considered for determining the value of the suit or regard must also be had to the value of the orchard. There is no dispute that the plaint in the suit refers to the land only and the relief also relates to the land only. The orchard was planted by the petitioner soon after the land was gifted to him. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on Shanti Prasad vs. Mahabir Singh(A.I.R. 1957 All. There is no dispute that the plaint in the suit refers to the land only and the relief also relates to the land only. The orchard was planted by the petitioner soon after the land was gifted to him. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on Shanti Prasad vs. Mahabir Singh(A.I.R. 1957 All. 402.), where a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that although the plaintiff had not claimed any relief in respect of the buildings and the garden in a suit for possession of land, and he is found entitled to the relief he has claimed, the defendant must either remove the buildings and do away with the garden in question or leave them as they are to be taken by the plaintiff along with the land. In the circumstances, it was laid down that the buildings and garden must be held to be affected by the relief sought within the meaning of the term used in Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. It was pointed out that even if the suit was deemed to be a suit for possession of land alone, as it involved a building or garden standing on it the market value of the building and the garden standing on the land was bound to be added to the value of the land in order to determine the value of the land itself. Reliance was placed on Rule 3 of the U.P. Suits Valuation Act, 1942. Now, this provision expressly lays down that in suits for possession of land, the value of the land for purposes of jurisdiction shall be determined by aggregating the value of the land and the market value of buildings or gardens situated thereon. The decision turned on the particular language of Rule 3 (e). Such a provision is absent in the Act before me. My attention has been drawn to Divisional Forest Officer, Sarahan Forest Division of Simla Forest Circle, Himachal Pradesh vs. Daut and Ors (A.I.R. 1968-S.C. 612.), but in that case, the definition of land included orchards standing thereon. 9. In Kewal Kishore vs. Hamad Ahmad Khan (A.I.R. 1959 Pun. Such a provision is absent in the Act before me. My attention has been drawn to Divisional Forest Officer, Sarahan Forest Division of Simla Forest Circle, Himachal Pradesh vs. Daut and Ors (A.I.R. 1968-S.C. 612.), but in that case, the definition of land included orchards standing thereon. 9. In Kewal Kishore vs. Hamad Ahmad Khan (A.I.R. 1959 Pun. 181) a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court held that in a suit for possession of land, on a part of which some buildings had been erected, the court fee payable in such a suit would not depend on the defence which might be raised but would be measured by the value of the land alone. In Durga Das vs. Nihal Chand (A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 852.), Jai Lal, J. held that in a suit for declaration, the market value of the land alone should be taken into consideration for determining the jurisdiction of the court and the amount of the court fee to be paid. It further observed that the plaintiffs claimed possession of the land and not of the building on the land. 10. It is said that differe not considerations arise when it is a case of land with trees thereon. It is urged that the case is entirely different from one of land on which a building has been constructed. It is pointed out, on the terms of Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act that the definition of property means land and all things attached to the land. In my opinion, having regard to the scheme of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act such an inference is not easily possible. Section 7 (v) speaks separately of land houses and gardens. When a garden or orchard is the object of the suit, the suit must be valued accordingly. Where, however, it is a suit for land only, it is the land alone which must be valued. 11. I am of the opinion that in a case such as this, the value of the land for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction should be taken to be in stricto sensu and cannot include the value of an orchard planted thereon.” 16. This position was reiterated in Krishna Devi vs. Subhadra 2004 Latest HLJ 655 wherein it was observed: "14. This position was reiterated in Krishna Devi vs. Subhadra 2004 Latest HLJ 655 wherein it was observed: "14. For the purpose of court fee, the plaintiff has valued the suit under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the H.P. Court Fee Act, 1968 (For Short 'Court Fee Act). Both the Courts below on scrutiny of the evidence on record have found that at the time of the institution of the suit, there was no orchard on the land in dispute. Defendant, No.1 while appearing as DW-1 has admitted and stated that the apple trees were planted by him over the land in dispute during the pendency of the suit. The oral testimony of DW-1 stands corroborated by the copy of the application (Ext. PW-4/A), copy of the reply filed to the application (Ext PW-4/B) and copy of the order of the revenue officer dated 25.2.1987 to prove that the apple trees were planted on the land in dispute in the year 1988 and not prior thereto. Seeking decree for possession of the agricultural land, the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and Court fee is required to be assessed on the basis of the land revenue payable of the land. The plaintiff, therefore, had valued the suit for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction on the basis of the land revenue payable of the and in dispute. Therefore, both the courts below have rightly held that the suit of the plaintiff is covered by Section 7(iv) (c) of the Court Fee Act The suit of the plaintiff in the alternative for possession of the land in Cdispute was not for an orchard land at the time of filing of the suit and, therefore the suit was not to be valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at the time of market value of the orchard land." 17. Therefore, the plea that the plaintiff was required to value the suit land on the market value of the orchard is not acceptable. 18. It was submitted that the suit is bad for non-joinder of other co-owners. This plea is not acceptable. The defendant claimed that the father of the plaintiff had entered into an agreement with her and put her in possession. She is even claiming the adverse possession. 18. It was submitted that the suit is bad for non-joinder of other co-owners. This plea is not acceptable. The defendant claimed that the father of the plaintiff had entered into an agreement with her and put her in possession. She is even claiming the adverse possession. It was laid down by this Court in Basant Singh Versus Kishan Dayal, RSA No. 187 of 2007, decided on 13.09.2019 that the plea of the adverse possession means that the title of the plaintiff is not in dispute. It was observed: “21. Once a plea of adverse possession has been raised, it not only pre-supposes the title over the suit land of the plaintiff, but it even admits the identification of the property or else this plea would be in the air. After all, if the defendant is in adveorse possession, then obviously, the same is over the property in dispute or else he would not have raised such a plea. A plea of adverse possession implies an admisstion of title, which is supposedly extinguished.” 19. Thus, the plea that the plaintiff is not the exclusive owner of the suit land and the suit was bad for the non-joinder of other co-owners is not acceptable. 20. The plaintiff was recorded to be the co-owner of the suit land. It was laid down by this Court in Dharam Singh Vs. Jagdish AIR 2005 Himachal Pradesh 10 = 2005(1) Civil Court Cases 823 (HP) that a co-owner can always file a suit for recovery of the possession and such a suit is not bad for non-joinder of other co-owners. It was observed:- “5. The question whether a co-sharer can institute and maintain a suit for possession against a trespasser in respect of the entire property irrespective of his share therein without impleading the other co-sharers is maintainable or not, came up before a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Ram Niranjan Das v. Loknath Mandal, AIR 1970 Patna 1 and it was held that such a suit by a co- sharer without impleading the other co-sharers was maintainable and that a co-sharer can recover the possession of the entire land from a trespasser irrespective of his share therein. 6. A similar question also arose before the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ajmer Singh (deceased by L.R.'s) v. Shamsher Singh, AIR 1984 Punj and Har 58. 6. A similar question also arose before the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ajmer Singh (deceased by L.R.'s) v. Shamsher Singh, AIR 1984 Punj and Har 58. Following the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court, it was held that a suit by a co- sharer for possession against a trespasser without impleading the other co-sharers is maintainable and a decree for possession can be passed. I am in full agreement with the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court as well as the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court. In view of the said ratio, learned Additional District Judge rightly held the suit to be maintainable and granted a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff.” 21. Therefore, the plea that the suit was bad for non-joinder of other co-owners is not acceptable. 22. The learned Trial Court held that the defendant had succeeded in establishing her adverse possession. The defendant asserted in para-2 of the written statement that the plaintiff came to the house of the defendant and requested her to get the sale deed executed; however, the defendant’s husband had met with an accident, due to which the sale deed could not be executed. The plaintiff again came to the house of the plaintiff to execute the sale deed but the defendant requested her to wait till the recovery of her (defendant’s) husband and grant of the permission to purchase the land. It was further stated that the plaintiff came to the house of the defendant in September 2013 and she requested the defendant to execute the sale deed but the defendant replied that the sale deed could not be executed without the correction in the column of ownership. She asked the plaintiff to get the correction carried out so that the sale deed could be executed. Thus, it is apparent that the defendant is asserting that shoe is in possession of an agreement to sell and that the sale deed was to be executed but could not be executed due to one reason or the other. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Achal Reddy v. Ramakrishna Reddiar, (1990) 4 SCC 706 that where a person was put in possession pursuant to the agreement to sell, he cannot claim adverse possession. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Achal Reddy v. Ramakrishna Reddiar, (1990) 4 SCC 706 that where a person was put in possession pursuant to the agreement to sell, he cannot claim adverse possession. It was observed at page 710:- “10. In the case of an executory contract of sale where the transferee is put in possession of the property in pursuance of the agreement of sale and where the parties contemplate the execution of a regular registered sale deed the animus of the purchaser throughout is that he is in possession of the property belonging to the vendor and that the former's title has to be perfected by a duly executed registered deed of sale under which the vendor has to pass on and convey his title. The purchaser's possession in such cases is of a derivative character and in clear recognition of and in acknowledgement of the title of the vendor. The position is different in the case where in pursuance of an oral transfer or a deed of transfer not registered the owner of a property transfers the property and puts the transferee in possession with the clear animus and on the distinct understanding that from that time onwards he shall have no right of title to the property. In such a case the owner of the property does not retain any vestige of right in regard to the property and his mental attitude towards the property is that it has ceased to belong to him altogether. The transferee after getting into possession retains the same with the clean animus that he has become the absolute owner of the property and in complete negation of any right or title of the transferor, his enjoyment is solely as owner in his right and not derivatively or in recognition of the title of any person. So far as the vendor is concerned both in mind and actual conduct, there is a total divestiture of all his right, title and interest in the property. This applies only in a case where there is a clear manifestation of the intention of the owner to divest himself of the right over the property. So far as the vendor is concerned both in mind and actual conduct, there is a total divestiture of all his right, title and interest in the property. This applies only in a case where there is a clear manifestation of the intention of the owner to divest himself of the right over the property. On the other hand in the case of an executory contract the possession of the transferee until the date of registration of the conveyance is permissive or derivative and in law is deemed to be on behalf of the owner himself. The correctness of the decision in Annamalai v. Muthiah [ILR (1965) 1 Mad 254: 78 Mad LW 172] cannot, therefore, be doubted. 24. This position was reiterated in Roop Singh vs. Ram Singh 2000 (3) SCC 708 wherein it was observed:- “9. Further, even with regard to appreciation of evidence the High Court materially erred in considering the evidence of Anoop Singh for holding that the defendant has been in possession for 15-16 years from the date of the suit and that possession being not permissive and adverse to the title of the plaintiff, would ripen into perfect title. This finding is quite contrary to the evidence of Anoop Singh and the finding given by both the Courts below who after appreciating the evidence of witnesses have specifically arrived at the conclusion that the witnesses have nowhere stated that the defendant asserted his hostile title. From the deposition of the said witnesses and the revenue records, the Courts arrived at the conclusion that since 1956-57 the defendant was in possession but that possession was as a bataidar. As the suit was filed on 4-2-1969, it cannot be said that the defendant has perfected his title by adverse possession. In the written statement, the defendant has only asserted that about 14 years ago plaintiff gave this land by executing the sale agreement for Rs. 611/-; the sale deed was written in the presence of two persons of the same village and hence since 1955 defendant is in possession of the land as an owner/purchaser. Therefore, he has become the owner of the suit property by adverse possession. Except this bare evidence, there is no other evidence on record to establish that the defendant got possession of the property by purchasing the same. Therefore, he has become the owner of the suit property by adverse possession. Except this bare evidence, there is no other evidence on record to establish that the defendant got possession of the property by purchasing the same. As against this, the revenue record clearly establishes that the plaintiff was the owner of the property and that he had handed over the possession of the suit land to the defendant for cultivation as bataidar. It appears that the High Court materially erred in not referring to the evidence of the plaintiff who has specifically deposed that in the year 1956-57, he had given the suit land to the defendant for two years on batai. It is also to be stated that the plea of adverse possession and retaining the possession by operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act are inconsistent with each other. Once it is admitted by implication that the plaintiff came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till the date of the suit, the plea of adverse possession would not be available to the defendant unless it has been asserted and pointed out a hostile animus of retaining possession as an owner after getting in possession of the land. (Re: Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639 : (1996 AIR SCW 306: AIR 1996 SC 910 )” (Emphasis supplied) 25. A similar view was taken by this court in Sarvi Devi v. Ran Singh, 2012 SCC OnLine HP 8003 : (2012 ) 114 AIC 460 wherein it was held at page 463:- “13. In the present case, the respondent came in possession of suit land on the basis of agreement Ex. PA which was executory in nature. On the basis of Ex. PA no suit for specific performance or independent sale-deed was executed in favour of the respondent. The possession of respondent remained permissive since his entry over the suit land was under agreement Ex. PA. The two Courts below have not appreciated this vital question of law which has a bearing on the ultimate result of the case. The respondent in his statement has not stated even a word that he is in adverse possession of the suit land. This clinches point on adverse possession against the respondent. PA. The two Courts below have not appreciated this vital question of law which has a bearing on the ultimate result of the case. The respondent in his statement has not stated even a word that he is in adverse possession of the suit land. This clinches point on adverse possession against the respondent. The learned District Judge has noticed Achal Reddy (supra) in the impugned judgment from another Journal, but he has not applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Achal Reddy properly. The impugned judgment and decree are not sustainable. The substantial question of law No. 1 is decided in favour of the appellants.” 26. Therefore, the plea of adverse possession will not be available to the defendant in the absence of the pleadings and proof regarding the denial of the title of the real owner. 27. The defendant stated in para 2 of the written statement that she told the plaintiff that she had acquired the title by way of adverse possession, particularly from March, 1998. This means that as per the version of the defendant, the adverse possession was asserted for the first time in September, 2013. The suit was filed on 24.5.2014; therefore, the statutory period for the acquisition of title on adverse possession had not been completed, and the learned First Appellate Court had rightly rejected the plea of adverse possession taken by the defendant. u 28. The title of the plaintiff was not in dispute. The defendant claimed to be in possession by way of an agreement to sell. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that an agreement to sell was not proved. Even the agreement does not show that the possession was delivered pursuant to this agreement and the benefit of Section 53(a) will not be available to the defendant. The defendant had no right to retain the possession and the learned First Appellate Court had rightly passed the decree for possession. 29. There is no misreading of the evidence by the learned First Appellate Court; hence the proposed Substantial Questions of Law do not arise in the present case. Final order 30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.