JUDGMENT : Radhakishan Agrawal, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.06.2015 passed in Sessions Case No. 40/2014 by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur (C.G.), by which the appellant stands convicted & sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence U/s 302 IPC Life imprisonment with fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine amount, additional SI for six months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 16.10.2013 at 10:00 pm at village Kurud, Police Station: Mandir Hasaud, District: Raipur (C.G.), the appellant herein killed his wife by pouring kerosene oil on her. Further case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on the fateful day, the present appellant/accused came home after drinking alcohol and started having fun with his wife Durga Bai, at that time Durga Bai was in menstruation, so she refused to have physical relationship, on account of which, the appellant started reminiscing and poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. Due to which, the Durga Bai came out of her house in a burning condition and thereafter the appellant also came out of his house and with the help of people of the village, she was admitted to Balaji Hospital, Raipur, where Dr.Devendra Nayak examined her and found that she was burnt to the extent of 55% and thereafter, the information of burning case was sent to Police Station Mowa (Pandri). Thereafter, the matter was reported to Police Station: Mandir Hasaud where F.I.R. vide Ex.P.8 was lodged and found Durga Bai to be in a dying state, got her dying declaration recorded by Jageshwar Koushal, Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate (P.W.13) vide Ex.P.16. During treatment, on 02.01.2013 Smt. Durga Bai died. Merg intimation was recorded vide Ex.P.13. Thereafter, inquest proceedings was initiated vide Ex.P.2 and vide Ex.P.10 dead body of deceased was sent for autopsy and Dr. R.K. Singh (P.W.12) conducted post-mortem examination vide Ex.P.15 and opined that cause of death of deceased was due to cardiorespiratory failure as a result of burn injuries and its complications. Vide Ex.P.1 clothes of the deceased Durga Bai was seized and vide Ex.P.12, the appellant was arrested. Seized articles were sent for chemical examination to F.S.L. and F.S.L. report dated 19.05.2014 was brought on record, but not exhibited. According to F.S.L. report, cloths seized from the deceased contains kerosene oil contents. 3. Vide Ex.P.1 clothes of the deceased Durga Bai was seized and vide Ex.P.12, the appellant was arrested. Seized articles were sent for chemical examination to F.S.L. and F.S.L. report dated 19.05.2014 was brought on record, but not exhibited. According to F.S.L. report, cloths seized from the deceased contains kerosene oil contents. 3. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. After due investigation, the appellant was chargesheeted before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which appellant/accused person abjured his guilt and entered into defence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses and brought on record 19 documents whereas the appellant-accused person in support of his defence has not exhibited any document. 5. The trial Court after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under the aforesaid sections, as mentioned in para 1 and sentenced as above against which the present appeal has been preferred. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the judgment under appeal convicting the appellant under the aforesaid Section is apparently contrary to law as the same has been passed without appreciating the evidence in its proper perspective. The dying declaration Ex.P.16, being highly doubtful, is not true and voluntary as the deceased was not certified by any competent doctor to be in a fit mental and physical state of mind to make dying declaration and even the Tahsildar Jageshwar Koushal (P.W.13) did not record his satisfaction properly in dying declaration. The next contention is that the deceased answered the questions in Chhattisgarhi language whereas the it was recorded in Hindi language by Jageshwar Kaushal (P.W.13), which makes the dying declaration suspicious. Further contention on behalf of the appellant is that the prosecution has also failed to prove that kerosene oil smell was coming from cloths seized. It would also contend that conviction of the appellant cannot be based on the evidence of hearsay and interested witnesses, but the learned trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant on the basis of evidence of hearsay and interested witnesses and that some of the material independent witnesses have turned hostile. It would also contend that conviction of the appellant cannot be based on the evidence of hearsay and interested witnesses, but the learned trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant on the basis of evidence of hearsay and interested witnesses and that some of the material independent witnesses have turned hostile. It would also submit that there are major contradictions and omissions between the police statements and evidence deposed before the Court by the prosecution witnesses. Hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted of the charge. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellant placed his reliance on Surender Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 230, P. Mani vs. State of T.N., (2006) 3 SCC 161 and Vijay Mandal vs. State of Jharkhand, 2002 Cr.L.J. 354. 7. Per contra, learned State counsel would support the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submit that learned trial Court, in view of categorical statement made by the deceased in dying declaration (Ex.P.16) duly proved by the Jageshwar Koushal (P.W.13) coupled with the statement of Munnalal Yadav (P.W.7), Krishni Yadav (P.W.6) before whom oral dying declaration was also made by the deceased, S.R.Netam (P.W.10) and Jageshwar Koushal, Tahsildar, (P.W.13), was absolutely justified in bringing home the guilt of the appellant for the aforesaid offence as the prosecution has proved the offence committed by the appellant beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent and clinching evidence, therefore, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records carefully. 9. The first and foremost question that falls for our consideration is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, to which, the learned trial Court has recorded a finding in affirmative by taking into consideration the post-mortem report (Ex.P.15), which is duly proved by Dr. R.K.Singh (P.W.12), who has conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of deceased. Accordingly, taking into account the post-mortem report (Ex.P.15) and the statement of Dr. R.K.Singh (P.W.12), who has conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of deceased. Accordingly, taking into account the post-mortem report (Ex.P.15) and the statement of Dr. R.K.Singh (P.W.12), we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in holding that the death of deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and the same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Accordingly, we hereby upheld the said finding. 10. Now the next question would be whether the learned trial Court is fully justified in holding the appellant author of the crime in question? 11. The entire issue in the present case hinges on the admissibility and evidentiary value of the dying declaration (Ex.P.16) made by the deceased, which was reduced in writing and recorded by P.W.13 Jageshwar Koushal, Tahsildar & Executive Magistrate in the Hospital after certifying by the Doctor that the deceased was mentally and physically fit to give such dying declaration, which is specifically mentioned in dying declaration (Ex.P.16) after permission was given by the Doctor in Balaji Hospital, Raipur where he (P.W.13) has recorded the same as per statement of deceased Durga Bai in question and answer form. In addition to above, deceased Durga Bai also made an oral dying declaration before her mother P.W.6 Krishni Yadav. 12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (Constitution Bench), (2002) 6 SCC 710 has clearly held that a certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise and observed as under: “3. … Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” 13. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” 13. Following the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Laxman (supra), recently in the matter of Jagbir Singh v. State of NCT, (2019) 8 SCC 779 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that even absence of the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration. However, the requirement remains that the person who records the dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration. 14. In the matter of Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 9 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court held that while recording dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of maker, alertness of his/her mind and memory, evidentiary value, etc. have to be taken into account, laid down principles. Paras 14 to 22 are relevant for the purpose, which read as under :- “(A) Dying declaration 14. It is true that in the case on hand, conviction under Section 302 was based solely on the dying declaration made by Sonu @ Savita and recorded by Investigating Officer in the presence of a Doctor. Since we have already narrated the case of prosecution which led to three deaths, eliminating the second wife and the children of one Jaswant Singh, there is no need to traverse the same once again. This Court in a series of decisions enumerated and analyzed that while recording the dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of the maker, alertness of mind and memory, evidentiary value etc. have to be taken into account. 15. In Munnu Raja and Another vs. The State of M. P, (1976) 3 SCC 104 , this Court held: (SCC pp. This Court in a series of decisions enumerated and analyzed that while recording the dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of the maker, alertness of mind and memory, evidentiary value etc. have to be taken into account. 15. In Munnu Raja and Another vs. The State of M. P, (1976) 3 SCC 104 , this Court held: (SCC pp. 106-07 para 6)" “6....It is well settled that though a dying declaration must be approached with caution for the reason that the maker of the statement cannot be subject to cross-examination, there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated...." It is true that in the same decision, it was held, since the Investigating Officers are naturally interested in the success of the investigation and the practice of the Investigating Officer himself recording a dying declaration during the course of an investigation ought not to have been encouraged. 16. In Paras Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126 , this Court held that lapse on the part of the Investigation Officer in not bringing the Magistrate to record the statement of the deceased should not be taken in favour of the accused. This Court further held that a statement of the deceased recorded by a police officer in a routine manner as a complaint and not as a dying declaration can also be treated as dying declaration after the death of the injured and relied upon if the evidence of the prosecution witnesses clearly establishes that the deceased was conscious and was in a fit state of health to make the statement. 17. The effect of dying declaration not recorded by the Magistrate was considered and reiterated in Balbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 283 . Para 23 of the said judgment is relevant which reads as under: "23. However, in State of Karnataka v. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 , this Court categorically held that there was no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made before a Magistrate. Vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 283 . Para 23 of the said judgment is relevant which reads as under: "23. However, in State of Karnataka v. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 , this Court categorically held that there was no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made before a Magistrate. This Court therein noted its earlier decision in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517 , wherein it was also held that the dying declaration need not be in the form of questions and answers. (See also Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 )." It is clear that merely because the dying declaration was not recorded by the Magistrate, by itself cannot be a ground to reject the whole prosecution case. It also clarified that where the declaration is wholly inconsistent or contradictory statements are made or if it appears from the records that the dying declaration is not reliable, a question may arise as to why the Magistrate was not called for, but ordinarily the same may not be insisted upon. This Court further held that the statement of the injured, in event of her death may also be treated as FIR. 18. In State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC 550 , the view in Balbir Singh case has been reiterated. The following conclusions are relevant which read as under: (Wakteng case, SCC p. 554, paras 14-15) "14. Though conviction can be based solely on the dying declaration, without any corroboration the same should not be suffering from any infirmity. 15. While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lie or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person but the court has to be careful to ensure that the statement was not the result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of the imagination. It is, therefore, essential that the court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement, had clear capacity to observe and identify the assailant and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it is sufficient for the purpose of conviction." 19. Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it is sufficient for the purpose of conviction." 19. In Bijoy Das vs. State of West Bengal, (2008) 4 SCC 511 , this Court after quoting various earlier decisions, reiterated the same position. 20. In Muthu Kutty & Anr. Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113 , the following discussion and the ultimate conclusion are relevant which read as under: (SCC p. 120, paras 14-15) "14. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and crossexamination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence. 15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 21. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 21. The same view has been reiterated by a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Panneerselvam vs. State of T.N., (2008) 17 SCC 190 and also the principles governing the dying declaration as summed up in Paniben vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 . 22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that, (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” 15. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” 15. In the matter of Uttam vs. The State of Maharashtra, (2022) 8 SCC 576 the Supreme Court has observed in paras 22 and 29 as under :- 22. However, if a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused. In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration. In this context, it would be profitable to refer to Nallapati Sivaiah (supra), wherein this Court held as under : “46. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused. It is true that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind. The evidence of the Professor of Forensic Medicine casts considerable doubt as regards the condition of the deceased to make a voluntary and truthful statement. It is for that reason non-examination of Dr. T. Narasimharao, Casualty Medical Officer, who was said to have been present at the time of recording of both the dying declarations attains some significance. It is not because it is the requirement in law that the doctor who certified about the condition of the victim to make a dying declaration is required to be examined in every case. But it was the obligation of the prosecution to lead corroborative evidence available in the peculiar circumstances of the case. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 52. The dying declaration must inspire confidence so as to make it safe to act upon. Whether it is safe to act upon a dying declaration depends upon not only the testimony of the person recording the dying declaration—be it even a Magistrate but also all the material available on record and the circumstances including the medical evidence. The dying declaration must inspire confidence so as to make it safe to act upon. Whether it is safe to act upon a dying declaration depends upon not only the testimony of the person recording the dying declaration—be it even a Magistrate but also all the material available on record and the circumstances including the medical evidence. The evidence and the material available on record must be properly weighed in each case to arrive at a proper conclusion. The court must satisfy itself that the person making the dying declaration was conscious and fit to make statement for which purposes not only the evidence of persons recording the dying declaration but also cumulative effect of the other evidence including the medical evidence and the circumstances must be taken into consideration.” xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 29. Following were the reasons that collectively weighed with the High Court for disregarding the second written dying declaration recorded by the SEM (PW-9): (a) the attending doctor did not examine the deceased in the presence of PW-9 before her statement was recorded; (b) the statement of the deceased was recorded by PW-9 in the absence of the doctor; (c) the doctor did not make any endorsement on the requisition letter in the presence of PW-9; (d) PW-9 did not record the statement of the deceased himself. Instead, he delegated the task to the police constable who reduced the statement of the deceased into writing; (e) after reducing the statement into writing, the same was not read over to the deceased before her signatures were obtained; (f) the statement of the deceased was not recorded in a question-answer format. 16. Dying declaration is the last statement that is made by a person as to the cause of his imminent death or the circumstances that had resulted in that situation, at a stage when the declarant is conscious of the fact that there are virtually nil chances of his survival. On an assumption that at such a critical stage, a person would be expected to speak the truth, courts have attached great value to the veracity of such a statement. On an assumption that at such a critical stage, a person would be expected to speak the truth, courts have attached great value to the veracity of such a statement. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of death, or as to any of the circumstances which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing made by the deceased victim to the witness, is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. It is noteworthy that the said provision is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act that ‘hearsay evidence is inadmissible’ and only when such an evidence is direct and is validated through cross-examination, is it considered to be trustworthy. 17. P.W.6 Krishni Yadav is the mother of the deceased and the appellant is her son-in-law. In her testimony, she has testified that the deceased made oral dying declaration before her to the effect that when she saw Durga Bai in burnt condition and on being asked, then deceased (Durga Bai) told her that appellant Ghanshyam, after consuming liquor, came to the house and asked her to undress, which was refused by her, enraged this, the appellant poured kerosene oil and set her on fire. In crossexamination, she remained firm. P.W.7 Munnalal Yadav is the father of the deceased, who has stated that the appellant poured kerosene and set her ablaze. P.W.10 S.R.Netam, A.S.I. posted at Mandir Hasaud Police Station, has stated that on receipt of information with respect to burning case, he immediately rushed to Balaji Hospital, Raipur and saw Durga Bai was admitted. He has further deposed that on being asked with respect to incident, she told him that it was her husband, who set her on fire after pouring kerosene. It has also come in his evidence that after seeing her condition, he has sent an application to Kharora Tahsildar & Executive Magistrate to record dying declaration. He has further deposed that on being asked with respect to incident, she told him that it was her husband, who set her on fire after pouring kerosene. It has also come in his evidence that after seeing her condition, he has sent an application to Kharora Tahsildar & Executive Magistrate to record dying declaration. P.W.13 Jageshwar Koushal is Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate of Kharora, who has deposed in his examination-in-chief that he has recorded the dying declaration of Durga Bai after getting permission from Doctor about the injured being in fit condition to give her statement on 21.10.2013, which is mentioned in Ex.P.16 and with the consent of doctor, in form of question and answers, which is exhibited as Ex.P.16, which reads as under :- ej.kklUu dFku fnuakd 21@ x @13 ckykth gkLirky eksok jk;iqj iz'u & vkidk uke nqxkZ ckbZ gS D;k \ m0 & gka iz'u & fdls tyh \ D;k dksbZ tyk;k x;k Fkk A vius vki ?kVuk ?kVh \ m0 & esjs ifr cq/kokj jkr dks 'kjkc ihdj ?kj vk;s A esjs lkFk eLrh dj jgs Fks A lsDlh fQYe ugha ns[krs gks dgus yxs A esjk ml le; M.C py jgk Fkk A eSa laca/k cukus ugha Fkh rc og u'ksa esa eq>s fpeuh ls tyk fn;k A esjk ifr dk uke ?ku';ke ;kno fuoklh pjkSnk gS mls ugha NksM+ukA ?kVuk dk esjs ifr ftEesnkj gS A Ckk;s gkFk dk vaxwBk tys gksus ij nk;sa gkFk ds vaxwBk dk fu'kku fy;k x;k A lgh vfr0 rg0 21@x@13 vfu- nwxkZ lgh@& 18. In his (P.W.13) cross-examination, he has stated that while recording dying declaration, deceased Durga Bai was speaking in Chhattisgarhi language, which has been translated by him in Hindi language. In his cross-examination, he denied that Durga Bai did not understand Hindi language. It is also admitted by him that Durga Bai answered the questions in Chhattisgarhi language, which has written in Hindi language. He again reiterated by admitting in his cross-examination para 7 that Durga Bai was answering the questions asked by this witness in Chhattisgarhi language considering it to be Hindi and that he has knowledge of Chhattisgarhi language. Therefore, it stands proved that both this witness (P.W.13) and Durga Bai (deceased) have had the knowledge of both in Hindi and Chhattisgarhi languages. 19. Therefore, it stands proved that both this witness (P.W.13) and Durga Bai (deceased) have had the knowledge of both in Hindi and Chhattisgarhi languages. 19. When we examine the evidence above prosecution witnesses coupled with the evidence of Ishwar Sahu (P.W.8), it is apparent that the incident took place at around 10:00 pm inside the house and at that time no eye-witness was present to witness the incident. According to P.W.8 Ishwar Sahu, incident took place at around 10:30 pm and he came to his house after his duty at Monnet Plant is over, at the same time, he heard the voice of the accused-appellant and Durga Bai and upon hearing such voice, he and other members of his had come out and saw that Durga Bai also came out and her both hands were burnt. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid statement that only the accused and his wife were present at the time of occurrence. Dr. Devendra Nayak (P.W.14 has also stated that the deceased brought to the Hospital by her husband/accused. This apart, there is no specific defence on behalf of the appellant. The burning of the deceased by pouring kerosene by the accused/appellant shows that he intended to cause or to cause such injury as was sufficient to cause death to the deceased in the ordinary course of nature. Therefore, from the statements of aforesaid prosecution witnesses coupled with the dying declaration (Ex.P.16) and oral dying declaration made by the deceased before her mother P.W.6 Krishni Yadav and also medical evidence showing the death of deceased homicidal in nature, it would be proved beyond doubt that it was the appellant, who had intentionally caused the death of his wife by pouring kerosene on her and thereby committed the offence. 20. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of decisions rendered by their Lordships in the above referred matters, it is quite clear that on the fateful day of 16.10.2013 Durga Bai and the appellant were present in the same house; the appellant came to the house after consuming liquor; thereafter at 10.00 pm Durga Bai was set on fire by the appellant by pouring kerosene on her. The presence of appellant and his wife in their house was corroborated by the evidence of P.W.8 Ishwar Sahu, who, after coming from duty, heard the voice of the accused-appellant and Durga Bai and upon hearing such voice, he and other members of his family had come out and saw that Durga Bai also came out and her both hands were burnt. Dr. Devendra Nayak (P.W.14) has also stated that the deceased brought to the Hospital by her husband/accused. This apart, there is no specific defence on behalf of the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Of the witnesses produced by the prosecution, P.W.6 Krishni Yadav is crucial witness, before whom the deceased made oral dying declaration, which is corroborated by the evidence of P.W.13 Jageshwar Koushal, Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate, who had recorded the dying declaration, after certifying the deceased to be mentally and physically fit by the Doctor. Therefore, the dying declaration (Ex.P.16) given by the deceased before Executive Magistrate was neither suspicious piece of evidence nor can be discarded. This apart, before recording dying declaration (Ex.P.16), the deceased Durga Bai was found mentally and physically fit to give her statement, then there is no serious doubt about her being mentally and physically fit to give her statement. It also shows that the Police have made effort to get dying declaration (Ex.P.16) recorded by the Executive Magistrate. In such a situation, the dying declaration (Ex.P.16) recorded by Executive Magistrate Jageshwar Koushal (P.W.13) as per direction of Doctor inspires confidence and found reliable as the same has been recorded by Executive Magistrate. Thus the dying declaration do not suffer from infirmity and in our considered opinion, it can be the sole basis for convicting the accused appellant. The prosecution has also been able to prove the circumstances of the case in the light of five golden principles to constitute the 'panchsheel' of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, 1984 AIR SC 1624. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is not entitled to be acquitted of the charge. The case law cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is clearly distinguishable on facts and circumstances of the present the case. 21. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is not entitled to be acquitted of the charge. The case law cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is clearly distinguishable on facts and circumstances of the present the case. 21. In the light of aforesaid discussion, we are inclined to endorse the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court convicting the appellant on the basis of evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses and dying declaration (Ex.P.16) and oral dying declaration made by the deceased before her mother P.W.6 Krishni Yadav. Therefore, conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of IPC as well as the sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court is well merited and does not call for any interference by this Court. 22. In the result, the criminal appeal is dismissed to the extent indicated herein-above.