ORDER : 1. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 04.06.2016 by which the respondents have terminated the service of the petitioner on the count that the caste certificate of the petitioner has been cancelled by the High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee Raipur on 26.11.2007. 2. Brief facts reflected from the record are that, the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Lecturer (Electronics) in the Higher Education Department on 08.04.1996 thereafter he was posted in the Govt. Engineering College, Raipur. The petitioner was appointed on the said post which was reserved for Scheduled TrCandidate claiming himself to be Halba caste. The petitioner was granted senior pay scale of Rs. 10,000-325-15200 vide order dated 22.01.2004 issued by respondent No.1. 3. The Assistant Commissioner (Tribal Welfare) Balaghat had issued notice on 02.04.2002 directing him to appear before the Caste Scrutiny Committee on 16.04.2002. Since the petitioner was allocated to the State of Chhattisgarh therefore, the High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee, Raipur has conducted the enquiry and vide its order dated 26.11.2007 has cancelled the caste certificate issued in favour of the petitioner. The Committee while cancelling the caste certificate has recorded its finding that the petitioner has not submitted any document to demonstrate that petitioner’s father/forefather belongs to Halba caste. The committee has also recorded its finding that in the Dakhilkharig register petitioner’s father and mother, the date of birth petitioner’s mother have been recorded 01.05.1958 and caste has been recorded as “Kosti” which is OBC. 4. In pursuance of the cancellation of caste certificate by the High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee, the petitioner service was terminated on 04.10.2008 by the respondent No.1. The petitioner has never challenged his cancellation of caste certificate and moved a representation before the respondent No.1 who has considered the case of the petitioner and in the light of circular dated 01.10.0211 issued by the State of Chhattisgarh which provides that candidates who have been appointed prior to 28.11.2000 and they have been appointed against the post which are reserved for Scheduled Caste their services will not be terminated but in future they will not be granted the benefits of reservation. Accordingly, the petitioner was reinstated in service without any monetary benefits. 5. Accordingly, the petitioner was reinstated in service without any monetary benefits. 5. Thereafter respondent No.1 again examined the case of the petitioner and also considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Dattatray S/o. Namdeo Mendhekar and Others, AIR 2008 SC 1678 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the law and in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court earlier circular issued by the State Government on 01.10.2011 was cancelled on 11.01.2016. In the subsequent circular dated 11.01.2016 it has also been directed that the government servants who are protected in view of the circular dated 01.10.2011 their protection will be withdrawn and accordingly the services of the petitioner were again terminated on 04.06.2016 when the petitioner was posted at Jagdalpur Engineering College, this order is being assailed in this writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in view of above factual matrix would submit that judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the Chief Executive Officer, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai vs. Mahesh Kumar Gonnade and others reported decided in Civil Appeal No. 4990 of 2021 on 11 July, 2022 will not be applicable to the present facts of the case because the petitioner’s case has already been decided in the year 2005 and in the present case, judicial order was passed on 08.05.2005 and the same order was not challenged before the higher forum, therefore, the judgment in case of Bhilai Steel Plant (supra) will not be applicable to the facts of the case. He would further submit that this Court in WP No. 2415 of 2002 has already been considered the issues raised in the case of Gulabchand Nandanwar vs. State of MP by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Madhya Pradesh High Court recorded its finding that when no fraud was practised by the petitioner and there has not been cancellation of caste certificate the present case would be covered by the aforesaid view of their Lordship of Supreme Court and accordingly it is directed that no action should be taken against the petitioner but the petitioner shall hereinafter not be entitled to get any benefits on the basis of caste certificate. He would further submit that this Court has granted interim protection to the petitioner on 21.06.2016 and it is continued for more than 7 years, therefore, he would submit that the petitioner may be allowed and the order dated 04.06.2016 may be quashed and the petitioner may be reinstated with full back wages. To substantiate his submission, the petitioner has referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of NCT of Delhi through the Secretary, Land and Building Department and Ors. vs. K.L. Rathi Steel Limited and Ors. decided on 17.03.2023. He would submit that since the order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court has not been challenged, therefore, in view of subsequent judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court the matter cannot be reopened and would refer to the judgment in the case of Neelima Srivastava vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in AIR 2021 SC 3884 and would the refer to paragraph 26 to 35 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 26. Writ Petition No. 3316 (SS) of 1986 filed by the appellant before the High Court challenging the modification in the terms of her appointment was stayed vide order dated 20.05.1986 during the pendency of this Writ Petition before the High Court. She again approached the High Court by filing Writ Petition No. 7890 of 2003 challenging the order passed by the Joint Director of Education rejecting her claim of regularization. The two pending Writ Petitions were clubbed by the High Court and disposed of vide common judgment and order dated 23.01.2006 with the finding that the appellant is having all the requisite qualification and has worked for 21 years and she might have been appointed in a leave arrangement but by virtue of her satisfactory services, she has now acquired a Right to hold the post and continued in the institution and at this stage, it would not be appropriate to treat her as an appointee in a stop-gap arrangement and accordingly directed the State-respondent to consider for regularization under the relevant Regularization Rules. 27. This Judgment attained finality inter-se between the parties as admittedly the State-respondent did not put the same to challenge before any higher forum. The aforesaid judgment which attained finality crystallized the right of the appellant for regularization. 27. This Judgment attained finality inter-se between the parties as admittedly the State-respondent did not put the same to challenge before any higher forum. The aforesaid judgment which attained finality crystallized the right of the appellant for regularization. When the same was refused by the Joint Director of Education, it was again challenged by filing Writ Petition No. 8597 of 2010. A learned Single Judge vide order dated 15.05.2014 allowed the Writ Petition with the finding that in the earlier round of litigation, the High Court had held that she was entitled to hold the post and since the said judgment become final and unchallenged, the Regularization Rules, 2001 were applicable and refusal to apply the said Rules was unlawful. 28. Admittedly, when the judgment dated 23.01.2006 was passed by the High Court in the earlier two Writ Petitions filed by the appellant, the dictum of Umadevi (3) was not even in existence as the said judgment was rendered subsequently on 10.04.2006. 29. The Division Bench of the High Court has erroneously understood the dictum of this Court in Umadevi (3). The Constitution Bench has nowhere directed that service matters that stand concluded inter partes, ought to be re-opened. On the contrary, in paragraph 54 of the said decision, the Constitution Bench clarified as under:- “It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents.” 30. It becomes absolutely clear from the above clarification that earlier decisions running counter to the principles settled in the decision of Umadevi (3) will not be treated as precedents. It cannot mean that the judgment of a competent Court delivered prior to the decision in Umadevi (3) and which has attained finality and is binding inter se between the parties need not be implemented. Mere over-ruling of the principles, on which the earlier judgment was passed, by a subsequent judgment of higher forum will not have the effect of uprooting the final adjudication between the parties and set it at naught. There is a distinction between over-ruling a principle and reversal of the judgment. The judgment in question itself has to be assailed and got rid of in a manner known to or recognized by law. There is a distinction between over-ruling a principle and reversal of the judgment. The judgment in question itself has to be assailed and got rid of in a manner known to or recognized by law. Mere over-ruling of the principles by a subsequent judgment will not dilute the binding effect of the decision on inter-parties. 31. In an identical situation, this Court in Civil Appeal No. 4443 of 2021 with Civil Appeal Nos. 4444 & 4445 of 2021 decided on 26.07.2021 (Vice Chancellor Anand Agriculture University Vs. Kanubhai Nanubhai Vaghela and Anr.) has rejected the argument advanced by the appellant in the said case that the judgment of this Court dated 18.01.2001 in Gujarat Agricultural University Vs. Rathod Labhu Bechar & Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 574 does not survive after the judgment of this Court in Umadevi(3). It was held in paragraph 11 as under:- “11. We have heard Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel for the university and Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel for the respondents. The main contention of the university is that after the judgment of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. Vs. Umadevi and Ors. the respondents are not entitled for regularization as there are no sanctioned posts available. Another submission made on behalf of the appellant is that the judgment of this Court dated 18.01.2001 in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) does not survive after the judgment of this Court in Umadevi. It is no doubt true that in Umadevi’s case, it has been held that regularization as a one-time measure can only be in respect of those who were irregularly appointed and have worked for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned posts. However, in the instant case the respondents are covered by the judgment of this Court in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra). This Court approved the proposed scheme of the State of Gujarat and directed regularization of all those daily wagers who were eligible in accordance with the scheme phase-wise. The right to be regularized in accordance with the scheme continues till all the eligible daily-wagers are absorbed. Creation of additional posts for absorption was staggered by this Court permitting the appellant and the State of Gujarat to implement the scheme phase-wise. The right to be regularized in accordance with the scheme continues till all the eligible daily-wagers are absorbed. Creation of additional posts for absorption was staggered by this Court permitting the appellant and the State of Gujarat to implement the scheme phase-wise. We are not impressed with the submissions made on behalf of the university that the judgment of this Court in Umadevi’s case overruled the judgment in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra). The judgment of this Court in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) inter partes has become final and is binding on the university. Even according to Para 54 of Umadevi’s case, any judgment which is contrary to the principles settled in Umadevi shall be denuded of status as precedent. This observation at Para 54 in Uma Devi’s case does not absolve the university of its duty to comply with the directions of this Court in Gujarat Agricultural University (Supra).” 32. The Division Bench of the High Court proceeded as if it was hearing an appeal against the judgment dated 23.01.2006 of the learned Single Judge which had already attained finality. Appeal filed under the Rules of the Court was filed against the judgment dated 15.05.2014 rendered in Writ Petition No. 8597 of 2010. It is a well settled principle of law that a Letters Patent Appeal which is in continuation of a Writ Petition cannot be filed collaterally to set aside the judgment of the same High Court rendered in an earlier round of litigation ignoring the principles of res-judicata and doctrine of finality. 33. By a majority decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. has laid down the law in this regard as under:- “When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first decides questions, of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate Court.” 34. In Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra & Anr., while dealing with an identical issue this Court held that reconsideration of the judgment of this Court which has attained finality is not normally permissible. In Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra & Anr., while dealing with an identical issue this Court held that reconsideration of the judgment of this Court which has attained finality is not normally permissible. The decision upon a question of law rendered by this Court was conclusive and would bind the Court in subsequent cases. The Court cannot sit in appeal against its own judgment. 35. In Union of India & Ors. Vs. Major S.P. Sharma & Ors., a three-judge bench of this Court has held as under:- “A decision rendered by a competent court cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings for the reason that if it is permitted to do so there would be "confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning." 7. He would further submit that the said judgment was followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of NCT of Delhi (supra) and would pray for allowing the petition. 8. On the other hand learned counsel for the State would submit that the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Executive Officer, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai vs. Mahesh Kumar Gonnade, in Civil Appeal No. 4990 of 2021 dated 11 July 2022 reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 572 which has arisen from order passed by this Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has extensively examined the issues in paragraph 11,12, 13 and 14. Relevant paragraph of the judgment is extracted below:- 11. While applying the ratio of Milind as above, the High Court, however, failed to take note of the following clarification given in Dattatray (supra), regarding the ratio in Milind:- “5. ….........But the said decision has no application to a case which does not relate to an admission to an educational institution, but relates to securing employment by wrongly claiming the benefit of reservation meant for Scheduled Tribes. When a person secures employment by making a false claim regarding caste/tribe, he deprives a legitimate candidate belonging to Scheduled Caste/Tribe, of employment. In such a situation, the proper course is to cancel the employment obtained on the basis of the false certificate so that the post may be filled up by a candidate who is entitled to the benefit of reservation.” 12. The pronouncement in Dattatray clearly suggests that the High Court misapplied the ratio in Milind, since the appointment of the respondent no. The pronouncement in Dattatray clearly suggests that the High Court misapplied the ratio in Milind, since the appointment of the respondent no. 1 as Management Trainee (Technical), cannot be compared to the education and appointment of a medical doctor. 13. It must also be borne in mind that the Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court in the common judgment in Writ Appeal No.531 of 2016 (State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. vs. Dinesh Kumar Sonkusre) had made the following observations: “40. It would be pertinent to mention that the State of Chhattisgarh was formed w.e.f. 01.11.2000 and the judgment in Milind (supra) was rendered on 28.11.2000 and the protection can only be given to those who were actually “Halba-Koshti” or “Koshti” for the State of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh prior to 28.11.2000 and were therefore treated as “Halbas”. 41. Having held so, we want to clarify that the notification dated 11.1.2016 is not bad in law. It will however have to be read in the context of the law laid down by the Apex Court in various judgements as explained by us above. This notification may not apply to those petitioners who have obtained jobs prior to 28.11.2000 provided they have obtained Scheduled Tribe certificate “bona fide” and without suppression or misrepresentation of any facts. In case, a person is not a “Halba Koshti” in relation to State of Madhya Pradesh, then that person is not entitled to any protection of law. If a person has obtained a false certificate by misrepresentation of facts or providing wrong information, then that the person is also not entitled to any protection. It is only those who were actually “Halba Koshti” or “Koshti” believed that they were members of “Halba”, a Scheduled Tribe and who got jobs prior to 28.11.2000, are entitled to such protection. This protection cannot be extended to all and sundry. To give an example if “Halba Koshti” from the State of Maharashtra had shifted to State of Madhya Pradesh, then he would not be “Halba Koshti” belonging to Madhya Pradesh and as such, his certificate would be totally false and such a person would not be entitled to any protection. 14. This protection cannot be extended to all and sundry. To give an example if “Halba Koshti” from the State of Maharashtra had shifted to State of Madhya Pradesh, then he would not be “Halba Koshti” belonging to Madhya Pradesh and as such, his certificate would be totally false and such a person would not be entitled to any protection. 14. As we notice, the High Court disregarded the Government’s circular dated 11.01.2016 whereby the previous circular (01.10.2011) was cancelled with the specific observation that Milind’s judgment was clarified subsequently in Dattatray, by declaring that when a person secures appointment on the basis of a false certificate, he cannot be permitted to retain the benefit of wrongful appointment. In fact, necessary actions were expected to be taken against those who secured unmerited appointment on the basis of false caste certificate. Pertinently, the respondent no.1 could have (but never did) challenge, the circular dated 11.01.2016 which required the Government to cancel such unmerited appointment. 9. She would submit that the petitioner of Bhilai Steeel Plant (supra) has never challenged the decision taken by the High Power Scrutiny Committee, who has cancelled the caste certificate of the petitioner and in the present writ petition also the petitioner has also not challenged the decision taken by the High Power Scrutiny Committee on 26.11.2007 by which the caste certificate has been cancelled. She would further submit that the petitioner has only challenged the impugned order by which the service of the petitioner has been terminated on the count the circular 2011 has already been withdrawn by the State Government. The termination of service by respondent No.1 is execution of order and original order cancelling the caste certificate by the High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee has not been challenged thus she would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 11. From the record, it is quite vivid, that the petitioner has nowhere challenged cancellation of his caste certificate vide order dated 26.311.2007 passed by the High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee. The impugned order dated 04.06.2016 by which his service was terminated is consequence of withdrawal of earlier circular dated 01.10.2011 by subsequent circular dated 06.02.2016. 11. From the record, it is quite vivid, that the petitioner has nowhere challenged cancellation of his caste certificate vide order dated 26.311.2007 passed by the High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee. The impugned order dated 04.06.2016 by which his service was terminated is consequence of withdrawal of earlier circular dated 01.10.2011 by subsequent circular dated 06.02.2016. Thus, the issue raised in this petition is squarely covered by the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Executive Officer, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai (supra), therefore, it cannot be said that there is any illegality in passing the order dated 04.06.2016 passed by respondent No.1 under Secretary Technical Education Department terminating the service of the petitioner as his caste certificate is already cancelled. 12. The judgment cited by the petitioner in the case of Neelima Srivastava (supra) is distinguishable on its facts alone as the petitioner is claiming relief on the basis of circular dated 01.10.2011 which has subsequently been withdrawn vide circular dated 06.02.2016. Even withdrawal of the circular and cancellation of the caste certificate was never subject matter of challenge before any forum. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court does not find any strong case made out by the petitioner calling for an interference in the impugned order dated 04.06.2016. 13. Accordingly the writ petition thus sans merit and deserves to be dismissed. 14. The interim protection granted by this Court on 21.06.2016 stands vacated.