JUDGMENT : MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI, J. 1. Petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher in a Basic School in erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh, vide order dated 14.02.1997. A charge-sheet dated 07.09.2015 was served upon him with a covering letter dated 24.09.2015, asking petitioner to give reply to the charge that he obtained appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher on the basis of forged marks sheet of Basic Teachers Certificate (B.T.C.) and marks sheets/certificates of High School and Intermediate Examination. 2. The reply given by petitioner to the charge-sheet is on record as Annexure CA-2 to the counter affidavit filed by respondent no. 3. Perusal of reply reveals that petitioner did not deny the charges, and he simply said that he has produced the evidence regarding the charges before Hon’ble High Court, and whatever decision is taken by Hon’ble Court, shall be acceptable to him. 3. It is revealed that petitioner was put under suspension, vide order dated 25.08.2015 and he had challenged the suspension order by filing WPSS No. 2055 of 2015, which was disposed of vide order dated 07.01.2016 with a direction to the Competent Authority to conclude the disciplinary proceeding within three months. 4. The report of inquiry officer is on record as Annexure CA-9 to the counter affidavit. Perusal of the same reveals that the registered envelop, whereby suspension order was sent to petitioner, was returned undelivered with the remark that petitioner does not reside at the given address, thus, it was inferred that petitioner had given wrong address, at the time of his appointment. In paragraph no. 4 of the said report, reference is made to the reply to the charge given by petitioner that he has produced entire evidence regarding charges before the Hon’ble Court. It is further observed that educational certificates produced by petitioner, on verification, were found to be fake. 5. Based on the report of inquiry officer, punishment of removal from service was imposed upon petitioner by Chief Education Officer (Elementary Education), Nainital, vide order dated 26/30.12.2015, which is under challenge in this writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the B.T.C. Certificate produced by petitioner is not fake. He has drawn attention of this Court to paragraph no. 15 of the writ petition, which is reproduced below: “15. That the petitioner did his basic training examination in the year 1990 from Government Diksha Vidhyalaya Ganjdudvara, Etah. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the B.T.C. Certificate produced by petitioner is not fake. He has drawn attention of this Court to paragraph no. 15 of the writ petition, which is reproduced below: “15. That the petitioner did his basic training examination in the year 1990 from Government Diksha Vidhyalaya Ganjdudvara, Etah. The petitioner took his examination with Roll No. 1303 and this certificate is recognized by the education department of U.P. The true copy of the certificate as well as the mark-sheet is being annexed as Annexure No. 3 to the writ petition.” 7. Reply to paragraph no. 15 of the writ petition is given in paragraph no. 12 of the counter affidavit, which is reproduced below: “12. That the contents of Para 15 of the writ petition are wrong and denied. It is submitted that the petitioner initially appointed in the education department in Nainital in 1997 as Assistant Teacher of Government Primary School. At the time of appointment the petitioner has submitted his High school marksheet/certificate for the year 1982 with roll no. 053487 and intermediate marksheet/certificate of the year 1985 bearing roll no. 605341. The Secretary Secondary Education Board, Uttar Pradesh has informed that against the roll numbers mentions by the petitioner the name of some other candidates are registered as per the available records with the Board. At the time of appointment the petitioner has also submitted BTC marksheet for the year 1988 with roll no. 639 issued by the Rajkiya Diksha Vidalaya, Budhanpur, Muradabad (332 marks obtained by the petitioner shown to be 332/650). On verification of the above marksheet by the Secretary Examination regulatory Authority, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad it was revealed that the BTC marksheet is not correct and contrary to the records available with authorities. True and correct copy of the letter dated 27.07.2015 of Secretary, Examination Regulatory Authority U.P. Marksheet of BTC examination filed by the petitioner at the time of appointment and extract of first page of the service book of the petitioner are being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. CA-4, CA-5 and CA-6 to this affidavit. That the marksheet of BTC examination submitted by the petitioner with the present writ petition seems to be forged due to following reasons: (i) The new marksheet annexed by the petitioner along with the petition as page no. That the marksheet of BTC examination submitted by the petitioner with the present writ petition seems to be forged due to following reasons: (i) The new marksheet annexed by the petitioner along with the petition as page no. 28-29 shows the name of the petitioner as Rohitas Kumar whereas in the earlier marksheet it was shown as Rohitas Singh. (ii) The division mentioned in the new marksheet annexed alongwith the writ petition shows to be IInd, Ist, Ist, Ist division whereas in the earlier BTC marksheet it was shown to be IIIrd, IInd, IIIrd, Ist and which is also endorsed as such in the service book of the petitioner. (iii) That the marksheet submitted along with writ petition was printed on 01.01.1994 whereas the petitioner has shown to be issued in the year 1990. (iv) The sum of marks obtained in the first 05 papers is wrongly shown as 170 whereas the correct sum comes to be 160 marks. That after 170 the sum has been shown as 351 whereas it should have been 357. Which itself shown that the said marksheet was procured illegally. That on receiving complaints against the petitioner he was called by the office of answering respondent for personal hearing on 08.10.2013 alongwith all his original educational and training marksheets. In compliance thereof the petitioner was personally present on 08.10.2013 but stated that he could not bring his original educational and training certificates as his original document are in his parental house however he inform by his application dated 08.10.2013 that the petitioner has done BTC in the year 1988 with roll no. 639 from Rajkiya Diksha Vidalaya, Budanpur, Muradabad. True and correct copy of the hand written application of the petitioner dated 08.10.2013 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. CA-7 to this affidavit. From this it is clear that the petitioner has obtained forged marksheet for the year 1998 and when it was verified that the marksheet has forged then, the petitioner again managed to get another forged marksheet bearing roll no. 1303 dated 18.07.1990 of BTC examination of the year 1988.” 8. Thus, the stand taken by respondents is that the B.T.C. Certificate produced by petitioner for securing appointment, is a fabricated document, which fact is established upon verification from the competent authority. Other educational certificates furnished by petitioner at the time of appointment are also fake. 9. 1303 dated 18.07.1990 of BTC examination of the year 1988.” 8. Thus, the stand taken by respondents is that the B.T.C. Certificate produced by petitioner for securing appointment, is a fabricated document, which fact is established upon verification from the competent authority. Other educational certificates furnished by petitioner at the time of appointment are also fake. 9. This writ petition was allowed by coordinate Bench vide judgment dated 28.03.2017 by following the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259 . However, the judgment of co-ordinate Bench was set-aside in Appeal filed by the Director, Primary Education, Uttarakhand and others. Operative portion of the judgment rendered by Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 384 of 2017 and other connected Appeal is reproduced below: “8. A copy of the inquiry report was filed, alongwith the counter affidavit, in the Writ Petition. The only question which necessitates examination is whether, failure on the part of the appellants to provide an opportunity to the respondents-writ petitioners to submit their objections to the inquiry report, would automatically result in the impugned order of punishment being set-aside. 9. This question is no longer res integra. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 considered this question, and observed: “........Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, The Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment the Courts/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Court/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate of revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law......” (Emphasis supplied) 10. That will also be the correct position in law......” (Emphasis supplied) 10. In terms of the law declared by the Supreme Court, in B. Karunakar, this Court is required to permit the petitioners to show how they were prejudiced because of non-supply of the report; it is only if the Court comes to the conclusion that non-supply of the report has caused prejudice to the delinquent employee, would interfere be justified; if, on the other hand, the Court is satisfied that non-supply of the inquiry report would not have made any difference to the ultimate findings, and the punishment order given, the Court should not interfere with the order of punishment. 11. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge has not examined this aspect nor has he recorded any finding that failure on the part of the appellants to furnish the inquiry report to the respondents-writ petitioners has caused them substantial prejudice; or, if the copy of the inquiry report had been furnished, it would have resulted in the ultimate finding, and the order of punishment, being set-aside. 12. We consider it appropriate, in such circumstances, to set-aside the order under appeal, and to restore the writ petitions to file. The learned Single Judge shall examine whether failure, to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent employee, has caused them prejudice, and whether it would result in the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, and the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee, being set-aside. 13. The special appeals stand disposed of accordingly. No costs.” 10. On the question of prejudice, learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner had enclosed the documents to prove his innocence, in his writ petition, challenging the suspension order, therefore, petitioner did not file those documents with his reply to the charge-sheet. He further submits that it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to consider the documents, which were filed by petitioner with his earlier writ petition, however, those documents were not considered. 11. Per contra, learned State Counsel contends that petitioner had not denied the allegations made against him, therefore, the charges are admitted by him. He further submits that no document was enclosed by him with his reply; therefore, inquiry officer had no occasion to consider these documents. 11. Per contra, learned State Counsel contends that petitioner had not denied the allegations made against him, therefore, the charges are admitted by him. He further submits that no document was enclosed by him with his reply; therefore, inquiry officer had no occasion to consider these documents. He further submits that in this writ petition also, no document is enclosed, which may establish that petitioner secured appointment based on valid documents. He further submits that as per the educational certificates produced by petitioner at the time of his appointment, his name is Rohitas Singh while, in the B.T.C. Certificate, enclosed with this writ petition, name of Rohitas Kumar is mentioned. He further submits that the sum total of marks as mentioned in his B.T.C. marksheet is also incorrect, which proves that it is a manufactured document. He further submits that seal of the issuing authority is also not there in B.T.C. marksheet. He further points out that upon verification of High School and Intermediate marksheet/certificate from Secretary, Secondary Education Board, U.P. it was revealed that against the roll number mentioned in the High School Certificate and marksheet produced by petitioner, name of some other person is mentioned. Thus, he submits that all the educational certificates of petitioner are forged, which indicates that he is not qualified to be a teacher, and he wrongly secured appointment, based on forged certificates. He further submits that plea of prejudice could have been taken by petitioner only when he had denied the charges and participated in the inquiry proceedings; since petitioner did not deny the charges; therefore, he cannot now turn around to say that non-supply of charge-sheet had caused prejudice to him. He also placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank vs. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC 321 , in which the ‘theory of useless formality’ is considered and discussed. 12. Since petitioner had no courage to deny the charges levelled against him, therefore, in the humble opinion of this Court, he cannot now raise issue of prejudice due to non-supply of inquiry report. Inquiry report, even if supplied, would not have made much of a difference as petitioner could not have established that his educational certificates are genuine. 13. Thus, there is no scope for interference with the impugned punishment order. 14. The writ petition fails, and is accordingly, dismissed.