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2023 DIGILAW 428 (ALL)

Sher Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P.

2023-02-13

SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY

body2023
JUDGMENT : SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J. 1. Heard Sri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned counsel for petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. 2. Petitioner, a village Pradhan of Gram Sabha Sitwanpur Pithu, Block Mohammabadad, district-Farrukhabad has approached this Court by way of filing this writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India challenging the communication dated 28.12.2022 of Chief Development Officer, Farrukhabad addressed to District Magistrate, Farrukhabad recommending to initiate proceedings against petitioner under Section 95 (1) (g) of Uttar Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the ‘Act, 1947’) as he failed to perform his duties imposed by State for maintaining a ‘Gaushala’ properly and has committed financial irregularities also. Petitioner has failed to disclose the source of document impugned as it is a communication between one authority to other except that this document was in public domain. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner in support of his submission to challenge aforesaid communication, has submitted that Chief Development Officer is not an appropriate authority i.e. not a District Level Officer nor a Officer nominated by District Magistrate to fall under the definition of ‘Inquiry Officer’ of Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules, 1997’), therefore, impugned communication cannot be treated to be a ‘preliminary enquiry’ as defined under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1997, therefore, recommendation made in the impugned communication to initiate proceedings against petitioner under Section 95 (1) (g) of the Act, 1947 was beyond his jurisdiction and District Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the same. 4. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel has submitted that by way of impugned communication only a recommendation was made by the Chief Development Officer, Farrukahbad to District Magistrate, Farrukhabad to initiate enquiry against petitioner under Section 95 (1) (g) of the Act 1947, and nothing has been brought on record that till date the District Magistrate has taken cognizance of impugned communication, therefore, this writ petition may be dismissed being premature. He further submits that Chief Development Officer is a District Level Officer, therefore, he has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary inquiry, therefore, he is an ‘Enquiry Officer’ and the impugned communication can be treated to be a preliminary inquiry as described under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1997. 5. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 6. He further submits that Chief Development Officer is a District Level Officer, therefore, he has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary inquiry, therefore, he is an ‘Enquiry Officer’ and the impugned communication can be treated to be a preliminary inquiry as described under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1997. 5. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 6. The document impugned is undisputedly an inter-se communication of Chief Development Officer, Farrukhabad addressed to District Magistrate, Farrukhabad and it was not communicated to petitioner as he has no lis to preliminary inquiry under the provisions of Rules, 1997. [See Vivekanand Yadav vs. State of U.P. and Another, 2010 (10) ADJ 1 ] 7. Petitioner has not disclosed source of impugned communication. However, since argument has been raised that impugned communication was beyond jurisdiction of Chief Development Officer, Farrukhabad and that it cannot be treated to be a preliminary inquiry under the Rules, 1997, the Court proceeds to consider the rival submissions. 8. First contention of learned counsel for petitioner is that Chief Development Officer is not a District Level Officer which has been denied by learned Standing Counsel. 9. Chief Development Officer and District Development Officer are in-charge of development activities in a district. 10. District administration is normally headed by District Magistrate who is assisted by Chief Development Officer, Additional District Magistrate etc. therefore, Chief Development Officer, as well as District Development Officer are definitely District Level Officers. 11. Learned counsel for petitioner has not brought on record any document or circular that Chief Development Officer is not a District Level Officer, whereas in the hierarchy of administration, development works under district are supervised by Chief Development Officer who assists the District Magistrate, therefore, contention that Chief Development Officer is not a District Level Officer is liable to be rejected and therefore it is rejected. 12. Other submission on behalf of learned counsel for petitioner is that the impugned communication cannot be considered to be a preliminary inquiry as defined under the Rules, 1997. 13. Since in the preceding paragraph, Court has held that Chief Development Officer is a District Level Officer, therefore, he falls under the definition of ‘Enquiry Officer’ as defined under Rule 2 (c) of the Rules, 1997. 14. At this stage, conclusions of Vivekanand Yadav (supra)are apposite to mention which are as follows: “107. 13. Since in the preceding paragraph, Court has held that Chief Development Officer is a District Level Officer, therefore, he falls under the definition of ‘Enquiry Officer’ as defined under Rule 2 (c) of the Rules, 1997. 14. At this stage, conclusions of Vivekanand Yadav (supra)are apposite to mention which are as follows: “107. Our conclusions are as follows: (a) The DM may ask the preliminary enquiry to be conducted by any officer defined under rule 2(c) of the Enquiry Rules on a complaint or a report under rule 3 or any other material or information. He has suo motu powers as well to order a preliminary enquiry. (b) A pradhan has no right to object that complaint or report is not in accordance with rule 3 of the Enquiry Rules. (c) A pradhan is neither entitled to be associated in the preliminary enquiry nor is entitled to the copy of the preliminary report. However, before an order ceasing the financial and administrative power is passed, his explanation or point of view or the version to the charges should be obtained and considered. (d) In the first and the third WPs, the impugned orders have been passed on the basis of preliminary report after obtaining and considering the explanation of the pradhan. The impugned orders in these WPs cannot be faulted on this ground. (e) In our opinion the word 'otherwise' in rule 5 includes and the DM can rely upon the following reports only to cease financial and administrative power and direct the final enquiry: A report of a person who is also defined as an enquiry officer under rule 2(c) of the Enquiry Rules - irrespective of whether he was directed by the DM to conduct the preliminary inquiry or not. A preliminary enquiry report conducted by the DM himself. (f) In the third writ petition, the report was submitted by the DPRO, who is defined as an enquiry officer under rule 2(c) of the Enquiry Rules. The impugned order cannot be faulted on the ground that the DPRO was not asked by the DM to conduct the preliminary enquiry; However, it is open to the petitioners in the first and third WPs to raise other points before the appropriate bench.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. The impugned order cannot be faulted on the ground that the DPRO was not asked by the DM to conduct the preliminary enquiry; However, it is open to the petitioners in the first and third WPs to raise other points before the appropriate bench.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. From the above observations made in Vivekanand Yadav (supra) it is clear that petitioner being a Pradhan has no right to object to a complaint or report that it was not in accordance with Rule 3 of the Rules, 1997 as well as District Magistrate can take cognizance of the impugned communication which is an inquiry conducted by an ‘Inquiry officer’ and in order to verify the findings of impugned communication and he is still at liberty to verify the outcome of impugned communication to proceed or not to proceed to seize financial and administrative power and to constitute a three member committee to perform function or and proceed to take action against Pradhan i.e. the petitioner and before taking any such decision by way of an inquiry conducted under section 95 (1) (g) of Act, 1947 shall be in accordance with law abiding with substantial compliance of principles of natural justice. 16. In view of above discussion, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned communication. However, it is made clear that any observations made in this order will not be construed as a finding and District Magistrate will take appropriate decision on basis of impugned communication (a preliminary inquiry) in accordance with law and in terms of procedure prescribed under the Act of 1947 and Rules of 1997. 17. The prayers made in this writ petition are rejected. 18. Writ petition is disposed of with aforesaid direction.