Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 428 (HP)

Prabhat Thakur v. Collector Land Acquisition

2023-10-13

RANJAN SHARMA

body2023
JUDGMENT : Ranjan Sharma, J. Since the issue involved and relief sought in these petitions is similar and, therefore, they were taken up together for arguments and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The petitioners in Arbitration Case No.748 of 2023 have filed the instant petition with the following prayer:- “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that in view of the facts stated above the application may kindly be allowed and the time limit for completing the Arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Reference Case No.30 of 2018 titled as Prabhat Thakur and another v. Collector Land Acquisition, National Highways Authority of India pending before the learned Arbitrator under National Highways Authority of India-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, may kindly be extended for a further period of six months or any other orders or directions which this Ld. Court may deem fit be passed in the interest of justice.” 3. In Arbitration Case No.749 of 2023, petitioner, has filed the instant petition with the following prayer:- “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that in view of the facts stated above the application may kindly be allowed and the time limit for completing the Arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Reference Case No.64 of 2018 titled as Ram Chand v. Land Acquisition Collector, National Highways Authority of India pending before the learned Arbitrator under National Highways Authority of India-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, may kindly be extended for a further period of six months or any other orders or directions which this Ld. Court may deem fit be passed in the interest of justice.” 4. Facts in brief are that pursuant to Notification issued by the Central Government on 22.03.2012 for acquisition of land for National Highway under National Highways Act, 1956, acquisition proceedings were initiated. 5. Case of the petitioners in Arbitration Case No.748 of 2023 is that his land/building situated in Khasra No(s).1362/1 and 137/1 along with fruit bearing trees existing thereupon, situate in Muhal Simsa (Ranghari), Tehsil Manali, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, was acquired vide Award No.50, dated 30.03.2017 passed by Respondent No.1 (Collector Land Acquisition, National Highways Authority of India) for widening/four laning, maintenance, management and operation of National Highway-21 on the stretch of land from New Chowk to Manali. Likewise, the land of the petitioner-Ram Chand in Arbitration Case No.749 of 2023 in Khasra Nos.635, 636 situate in Mohal Bashing, Phati Banogi, Kothi Sari, Tehsil and District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, was acquired vide Award Nos.3, dated 09.05.2016 and supplementary Award No. 3/1 dated 30.09.2016, passed by respondent No.1 (Collector Land Acquisition, National Highways Authority of India) for widening/four laning, maintenance, management and operation of National Highway-21 on the stretch of land from New Chowk to Manali. 6. Feeling aggrieved against the respective award(s), the petitioners filed Reference Petition(s) under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act before the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner Mandi Division, who started the arbitral proceedings in Arbitration Reference Case No. 30 of 2018 titled as Prabhat Thakur & another Versus Collector Land Acquisition, National Highways Authority of India and in Arbitration Reference Case No.64 of 2018, titled as Ram Chand Versus Land Acquisition Collector, National Highways Authority of India, in which the petitioners and the respondent-National Highways Authority of India participated without any objection to the continuation of these proceedings. 7. Surprisingly, the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner passed an order on 08.02.2023 and 07.02.2023 that the mandate of the Arbitrator to decide these cases has already expired and the case files were kept in abeyance, so as to enable the parties to seek extension in arbitral proceedings from the Competent Court of Law. 8. We have considered the matter in entirety and it is borne out from the records that non-completion of the arbitral proceedings within the period of twelve months under Section 29A (1) and even the extended period of six months thereafter under Section 29A (3) of the Act was attributable, either due to administrative reasons or on account of COVID and post-COVID effects and therefore, the petitioner cannot be put to a disadvantageous position. Moreover, the order passed by the Arbitrator on 08.02.2023 and 07.02.2023 directing the parties to seek extension from this Court under Section 29A (5) of the Act reveals that the Arbitrator intended to conclude the proceedings, but for the delay, which had occurred either due to administrative reasons or on account of COVID and for reasons not attributable to the parties. 9. 9. In this context, this Court is of the view that application under Section 29A (5) of the Act for extension of time, needs to be accepted, as the litigants-petitioners cannot be put to a disadvantageous position either due to the inaction of the respondent-NHAI or the non-conclusion of arbitral proceedings by the Arbitrator due to administrative reasons or on account of COVID and other reasons which were beyond the control of the Arbitrator. In this background, a reference is made to the judgments passed by this Court in Arbitration Appeal No. 17 of 2022 titled as Manpreet Kaur Versus National Highway Authority of India decided on 11.08.2023 and in Arbitration Case No.491 of 2023 titled as Rup Lal Verma Versus The Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Competent Authority & Anr. and connected matter, decided on 19.08.2023. Relevant Paras of Rup Lal Verma’s case (Supra) read as under:- “5. Keeping in view the rival contentions of the parties, the following questions arise for determination of this Court: (i) Whether this Court can extend time for concluding the arbitral proceedings beyond eighteen months period as specified in Section 29A (1) & (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act? (ii) Whether the delay attributed to an Arbitrator or any of the parties to arbitral proceedings will fall within the ambit of ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 29A (5) of the Act? 6. LEGAL PROVISIONS: 6(i). Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to have a recap of the provisions of Section 4, Section 5, Section 14, Section 15, Section 29A and Section 32A of the Act, which are reproduced here-in-below: 4. Waiver of right to object: A party who knows that — (a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may derogate, or (b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement, has not been complied with any yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay or, if a time limit provided for stating that objection, within that period of time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to so object. 5. Extent of judicial intervention: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. 14. 5. Extent of judicial intervention: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. 14. Failure or impossibility to act: (1) The mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate and he shall be substituted by another arbitrator, if — (a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay; and (b) he withdraws from his office or the parties agree to the termination of his mandate. (2) If a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), a party may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, apply to the Court to decide on the termination of the mandate. (3) If, under this section or sub-section (3) of section 13, an arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party agrees to the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, it shall not imply acceptance of the validity of any ground referred to in this section or sub-section (3) of section 12. 15. Termination of mandate and substitution of arbitrator: (1) In addition to the circumstances referred to in section 13 14, the mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate: (a) where he withdraws from office for any reason; or (b) by or pursuant to agreement of the parties. (2) Where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced. (3) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where an arbitrator is replaced under sub-section (2), any hearing previously held may be repeated at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. (4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an order or ruling of the arbitral tribunal made prior to the replacement of an arbitrator under this section shall not be invalid solely because there has been a change in the composition of the arbitral tribunal. 29A. Time limit for arbitral award: (1) The award shall be made within a period of twelve months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference. 29A. Time limit for arbitral award: (1) The award shall be made within a period of twelve months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section, an arbitral tribunal shall be deemed to have entered upon the reference on the date on which the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be, have received notice, in writing, of their appointment. (2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as the parties may agree. (3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding six months. (4) If the award is not made within the period specified in subsection (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period: Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent. for each month of such delay. (5) The extension of period referred to in subsection (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court. (6) While extending the period referred to in subsection (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence and material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and material. (7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal. (8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this section. (7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal. (8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this section. (9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party. 32. Termination of proceedings: (1) The arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2). (2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings where — (a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the respondent objects to the order and the arbitral tribunal recognizes a legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute. (b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings, or (c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or impossible. (3) Subject to section 33 and sub-section (4) of section 34, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral proceedings. 6(iii). While adjudicating the question of termination of the mandate of an arbitrator in the proceedings under Section 11(6) vis-à-vis the proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in the case of Swadesh Kumar Agarwal vs. Dinesh Kumar Agarwal and other, reported in 2022 (7) SCALE 448 that the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator can take place or arise in any of the eventualities in Section 14(1)(a), on an application, made to the concerned Court under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and not in an application under Section 11(8) of the Act. The relevant paragraphs 8, 11(v) and 13 are reproduced as under: “8. The relevant paragraphs 8, 11(v) and 13 are reproduced as under: “8. Even otherwise, once the arbitrator was appointed by mutual consent and it was alleged that the mandate of the sole arbitrator stood terminated in view of Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, 1996, the application under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 to terminate the mandate of the arbitrator in view of section 14(1)(a) of the Act shall not be maintainable. Once the appointment of the arbitrator is made, the dispute whether the mandate of the arbitrator has been terminated on the grounds set out in section 14(1)(a) of the Act, shall not have to be decided in an application under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996. Such a dispute cannot be decided on an application under Section 11(6) of he Act and the aggrieved party has to approach the concerned “court” as per sub section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. 11(i) to (iv) xxx…. xxx…. xxx 11(v). In a case where there is a dispute/ controversy on the mandate of the arbitrator being terminated on the ground mentioned in Section 14(1)(a), such a dispute has to be raised before the “Court” defined under Section 2(e) of the Act, 1996 and such a dispute cannot be decided on an application filed under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. The controversy and/ or the dispute, whether the mandate of the sole arbitrator under section 14(1) (a) of the Act, 1996 stands terminated or not shall have to be considered by the court on an application filed under section 14(2) of the Act, 1996.” (Underlining Ours) 8. ANALYSIS-FIRST QUESTION: 8(i). While dealing the first question, as to whether this Court can extend time beyond eighteen months period as specified in Section 29A (1) & (3) (5) of the Act and if so, when, how and by which method-procedure. To examine this a reference to the definition of “Court”, in Clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section (2) reads as under:- 2. To examine this a reference to the definition of “Court”, in Clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section (2) reads as under:- 2. (e) “Court” means— (i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes; (ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, and in other cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to that High Court;” 8(ii). For the sake of repetition, the provisions of Section 29A (4) & (5) read as under:- (4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period: Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent. for each month of such delay. Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said application: Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced. (5) The extension of period referred to in subsection (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court. 8(iii). The words the “Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of period so specified, extended the period”, occurring in Section 29A (4) are of great significance. 8(iii). The words the “Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of period so specified, extended the period”, occurring in Section 29A (4) are of great significance. The definition of Section 2(e) read with Section 29A(4) leaves no room for any doubt that the Court means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court. Accordingly, this Court (High Court) is empowered to adjudicate the application for grant of extension to the mandate of the arbitrator as well as the arbitral proceedings. Now, the connecting issue is the stage as to when, such a request for extension can be made. A bare reading of these words, occurring in Section 29A (4) of the Act empowers any of the parties to file an application for extension under Section 29A (5) of the Act, “prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified” in Section 29A (1) & (3) of the Act. Meaning thereby, that such an application, can be made before or even after the expiry of the eighteen months period. These words give life and validity to the mandate of arbitrator and also to arbitral proceedings so as to render substantial justice to the parties in arbitration when, the parties have willingly participated in the proceedings without demur beyond eighteen months’ period till the passing of the order on 12.01.2023, Annexure P-I. 8(iv). The words, “the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extend the period”, in Sub-Section (4) & (5) of Section 29A have been embedded in the statute book with a purpose to render substantial justice to the parties and to meet out unforeseen eventualities i.e. delay due to COVID or natural disaster(s) or such like circumstances or other bonafide reasons, revealing sufficient cause, for non-completion of arbitral proceedings. These words have a purpose and rationale that the parties should neither be made to suffer or prejudiced nor could their rights, interests or claims be defeated or frustrated due to the delay or non-completion of proceedings by the adjudication-arbitrator and/or the Respondents-NHAI. Accordingly, the Court is empowered to extend the time to conclude the arbitral proceedings, even after the expiry of eighteen months period, as specified in Section 29A (1) & (2) and in instant case, the prayer of petitioners falls within the parameters of law and deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the Court is empowered to extend the time to conclude the arbitral proceedings, even after the expiry of eighteen months period, as specified in Section 29A (1) & (2) and in instant case, the prayer of petitioners falls within the parameters of law and deserves to be allowed. 9. ANALYSIS-SECOND QUESTION: 9(i). So far as the second question is concerned, it is worth considering as to whether the delay by the arbitrator or delay by any of the parties in completion of arbitral proceedings, well constitute “sufficient cause” as contemplated in Section 29A (5) of the Act. It has come on record that the arbitral proceedings could not be completed within a time-line of twelve months and even within the further extendable six months i.e. within a total period of eighteen months and even thereafter till passing of orders dated 12.01.2023, Annexure P-I, and the non-conclusion was attributable to variety of reasons i.e. COVID-19 Pandemic, as the Arbitrator, being a functionary of the state government functionary had to look-after revenue, law and order and other administrative work. On query, the learned counsel for respondent No.2 has stated that the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Mandi has more than 2500 whooping land references which are pending, in which the parties had participated willingly without any objection or demur, but the delay had attributed primarily on account of the whooping pendency of land references; due to COVID-19 Pandemic; and due to administrative reasons & other bona fide circumstances beyond the control of the Arbitrator etc. That being so, the petitioners cannot be made to suffer for the fault of the adjudicating officer-Arbitrator and therefore, in view of the maxim “Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit”, meaning thereby, that the act of a Court shall prejudice no man, applies with full force in the instant case. 9(ii) The Hon’ble Apex Court has highlighted the applicability of these principles of “Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit” in following judgments: In Odisha Forest Development Corporation Ltd. Versus M/S Anupam Traders and Anr., reported in 2019 (17) Scale 531, while deling with claim for refund made pursuant to interim order of High Court, it has been held in Para 20, as under: “20. As noticed above, the appellant in any event would have the right to determine the loss suffered and recover the same in accordance with law as the process to retender, was at the ‘….. As noticed above, the appellant in any event would have the right to determine the loss suffered and recover the same in accordance with law as the process to retender, was at the ‘….. cost and risk’ of the private respondent as stated in the notice of termination. In that circumstance, when it is prima-facie indicated that due to the delay caused at the instance of the private respondents the value of the Kendu leaves had reduced, thereby causing loss, in view of legal proceedings initiated by the private respondents, the Court will have to bear in mind the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, namely, no party should suffer due to the act of Court. In such event, since the interim order was at the instance of the respondent the appellant should in our opinion be permitted to retain the amount and complete the process by providing opportunity to the private respondents.” In Karnataka Rare Earth and Another Versus Senior Geologist, Department of Mines & Geology and Another, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 783 , while adjudicating on a case where illegal mining lease was cancelled but due to stay, the same continued but on reversal-vacation of stay, the Courts claim for restitution was allowed as the petitioner despite illegality has persuaded Courts to pass interim orders, and in view of this, it was held as under: “10. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (supra), this Court dealt with the effect on the rights of the parties who have acted bona fide, protected by interim orders of the Court and incurred rights and obligations while the interim orders stood vacated or reversed at the end. The Court referred to the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit and held that the doctrine was not confined in its application only to such acts of the Court which were erroneous; the doctrine is applicable to all such acts as to which it can be held that the Court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. It is the principle of restitution which is attracted. It is the principle of restitution which is attracted. When on account of an act of the party, persuading the Court to pass an order, which at the end is held as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the act of such party, then the successful party finally held entitled to a relief, assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated in the same manner in which the parties would have been if the interim order of the Court would not have been passed. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the Court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost.” In Mohammed Gazi Versus State of M.P. and others, reported in (2000) 4 SCC 342 , while dealing with the issue as to whether a person’s security can be forfeited due to pendency of another writ in which he was not impleaded, it has been held in Paras 2 & 7 as under: “2. Whether a person can be penalised for no fault of his merely by resorting to equity clause in favour of the respondent-State particularly when such person is found to have not been benefitted or the State deprived of the benefits on account of the stay order issued by the Court? is the question of law to be decided in this appeal. Another related question requiring determination is as to whether on account of the pendency of the writ petition filed by another party without impleading the affected person as a party in which the stay order granted by the Court, such person can be directed to forfeit a part of the security amount deposited by him particularly when the court itself found that even the equities were equally balanced between the State and such person. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit - an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit - an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia - the law does not compel a man to do which he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. The applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey and Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee.” In Gursharan Singh and others Versus New Delhi Municipal Committee and others, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 459 , while dealing with issue of licence fee by Corporation which remained pending before the Apex Court, it has been held in Para 13 as under: “13. In view of the legal maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" which means that an act of court shall prejudice no man, N.D.M.C. is justified in making a claim for interest. Over the arrears which have remained unpaid for more than 12 years because of the interim orders passed by this Court. This aspect of the matter has been examined by this Court in the case of Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey. Although in the interim orders it has not been stated that in event of dismissal of the appeals and the writ petition, the appellants and the writ petitioner shall be liable to pay interest over the arrears of the licence fee, but that shall not debar this Court from passing any order in respect of payment of reasonable interest over the said amount.” In Raj Kumar Dey and Others Versus Tarapada Dey and Others, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 398 , while dealing with the non-performance of proceedings by arbitrator due to injunction, it has been held in Paras 6 & 7 as under: “6. We have to bear in mind two maxims of equity which are well settled, namely, "actus curiae neminem gravabit"- An act of the Court shall prejudice no man. In Broom's Legal Maxims. We have to bear in mind two maxims of equity which are well settled, namely, "actus curiae neminem gravabit"- An act of the Court shall prejudice no man. In Broom's Legal Maxims. 10th edition, 1939 at page 73 this maxim is explained that this maxim was founded upon justice and good sense; and afforded a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. The above maxim should, however, be applied with caution. The other maxim is "lex non cogit ad lmpossibilia" (Broom's Legal Maxims-P. 162)-The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and the administration of it, said Sir W. Scott, with reference to an alleged infraction of the revenue laws, must yield to that to which everything must bend, to necessity; the law, in its most positive and peremptory injunctions, is understood to disclaim, as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of laws must adopt that general exception in the consideration of all particular cases.” 7. In this case indisputably during the period from July 26, 1978 to December 1982 there was subsisting injunction preventing the arbitrators from taking any steps. Furthermore, as noted before the award was in the custody of the court, that is to say, January 28, 1978 till the return of the award to the arbitrators on November 24, 1983, the arbitrators or the parties could not have presented the award for its registration during that time. The award as we have noted before was made on November 28, 1977 and before the expiry of the four months from November 28, 1977, the award was filed in the court pursuant to the order of the court. It was argued that the order made by the court directing the arbitrators to keep the award in the custody of the court was wrong and without jurisdiction, but no arbitrator could be compelled to disobey the order of the court and if in compliance or obedience with court of doubtful jurisdiction, he could not take back the award from the custody of the court to take any further steps for its registration then it cannot be said that he has failed to get the award registered as the law required. The aforesaid two legal maxims-the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform and an act of the Court shall prejudice no man would, apply with full vigour in the facts of this case and if that is the position then the award as we have noted before was presented before the Sub-Registrar, Arambagh on November 25, 1983 the very next one day of getting possession of the award from the court. The Sub-Registrar pursuant to the order of the High Court on June 24, 1985 found that the award was presented within time as the period during which the judicial proceedings were pending that is to say, from January 28, 1978 to November 24, 1983 should be excluded in view of the principle laid down in Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was wrong in holding that the only period which should be excluded was from July 26, 1978 till December 20, 1982. We are unable to accept this position. July 26, 1978 was the date of the order of the learned Munsif directing maintenance of status quo and December 20, 1982 was the date when the interim injunction was vacated, but still the award was in the custody of the court and there is ample evidence as it would appear from the narration of events hereinbefore made that the arbitrators had tried to obtain the custody of the award which the court declined to give to them. 9(iii). In the above background, the question No.2 is answered to the effect that once the delay in completion of arbitral proceedings was primarily on account of the Arbitrator and/or the Respondents-NHAI for reasons mentioned here-in-above then, the petitioners cannot be made to suffer for no fault attributable to them and the aforesaid reasons taken cumulatively, reflect “sufficient cause”, in the instant cases and that being so, this Court deems it fit and proper to extend the time under Section 29A (5) of the Act.” 10. Similar issue came up for discussion and the Coordinate Bench(es) of this Court, have granted extension with directions to conclude the arbitral proceedings, within a specified time-line, in the following identical cases : (i) Arb. Case No.2 of 2023, titled as Prakash Chand Versus LAC & Others. (ii) Arb. Similar issue came up for discussion and the Coordinate Bench(es) of this Court, have granted extension with directions to conclude the arbitral proceedings, within a specified time-line, in the following identical cases : (i) Arb. Case No.2 of 2023, titled as Prakash Chand Versus LAC & Others. (ii) Arb. Case No.44 of 2023, titled as Nand Lal alias Nand Lal Vardhan Verus Land Acquisition Collector and others. (iii) Arb. Case No.122 of 2022, titled as Dinesh Kumar Versus Land Acquisition Officer and another. (iv) Arb. Case No.43 of 2019, titled as Devki Nand Thakur Versus State of H.P. through Secretary (PW).” 11. CONCLUSION & DIRECTION(S) : In view of the above discussion, the present petitions are allowed, with the following directions : (i). Present petitions i.e. Arbitration Case No.749 of 2023 and Arbitration Case No.748 of 2023 are allowed; and the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, is directed to conclude the arbitral proceedings and make an award on or before 31.03.2024 positively. (ii). The petitioners and respondents are directed to extend all cooperation to the Arbitrator, so as to enable the completion of arbitral proceedings within the above stipulated period. (iii). The orders dated 08.02.2023 and 07.02.2023 in treating the mandate of the Arbitrator to have terminated is quashed and set-aside. (iv). The Arbitral Proceedings in Reference Petition No.30 of 2018, titled as Prabhat Thakur & another Versus Collector Land Acquisition, National Highways Authority of India and Arbitral Proceedings in Reference Petition No.64 of 2018, titled as Ram Chand Versus Land Acquisition Collector, National Highways Authority of India are restored, subject to the conditions here-in-above.