JUDGMENT 1. This civil revision petition is directed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the order dtd. 20/2/2017 in I.A.No.1073 of 2016 in AS SR No.18367 of 2015 passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. 2. Heard learned counsel for petitioner as well as the respondent No.2. None appeared for respondent No.1. Perused the record. 3. The revision petitioners - defendants preferred an appeal aggrieved by the decree and judgment dtd. 9/9/2015 in O.S.No.1117 of 2012 passed by the VI Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, along with an application in I.A.No.1073 of 2016 under Order 41 Rule 7(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to condone the delay of 96 days in filing the appeal. The Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad vide order dtd. 20/2/2017 in I.A.No.1073 of 2016 in ASSR No.18367 of 2015 passed the following order: "...Perused the judgment dtd. 9/9/2015 in O.S.No.1117 of 2012. Considering the fact that there are several other 15 defendants available on record, but no one contacted the counsel in time to prefer the appeal and the reasons stated by the petitioners for the abnormal delay of 96 days is neither sufficient nor convincing to condone the same. Accordingly, the petition is devoid of merits. In the result, the petition is dismissed without costs". 4. Learned counsel for petitioners contended that the petitioners have rightly shown the sufficient cause and explained the delay of 96 days. In spite of the same, the trial Court dismissed the application to condone the delay of 96 days without any valid reasons. Therefore, the impugned order suffers from infirmity and prayed to allow the revision. 5. Learned counsel for petitioners placed reliance of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others,(2013) 12 Supreme Court Cases 649. whereunder at Para No.14 held as under: "14. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906, the Court, after referring to New India Insurance Co. whereunder at Para No.14 held as under: "14. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906, the Court, after referring to New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shanti Misra ( (1975) 2 SCC 840 , N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy ( (1998) 7 SCC 123 : AIR 1998 SC 3222 , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani ( (1996) 3 SCC 132 and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma (1996) 10 SCC 634 , came to hold that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief". 6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has submitted that he has no objection to set aside the impugned order dtd. 20/2/2017 in I.A.No.1073 of 2016 in AS SR No.18367 of 2015 passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. 7. I have heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties and the only questions that arise for consideration is, whether there is sufficient cause to condone the delay of 96 days in preferring the appeal and whether the impugned order sustainable in law? 8. The legislature has conferred the power to condone the delay by enacting Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to both the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression 'sufficient cause' shown is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. 9. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach and the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. 10. In Esha Bhattacharjee's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the question of considering the application for condonation of delay, categorically held in para No.21 to 21.13 as under: "21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2 (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4 (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11 (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude". 11. Keeping the above principles in view, coming to the instant case, the revision petitioners have filed an appeal against the judgment and decree dtd. 9/9/2015 in O.S.No.1117 of 2012 passed by the VI Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The contents of the affidavit disclose that the delay occurred was due to hectic business activity, the petitioners could not contact their counsel to prefer the appeal in time and thereby the delay of 96 days was occurred in preferring the appeal. After taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present case and in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment cited above, the petitioners have satisfactorily explained the reasons for the delay of 96 days as they were not in a position to contact their counsel because of their business activity and that the petitioners urged that if the delay is not condoned, there will be great miscarriage of justice. 12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, there are merits in the condonation application and the sufficient cause for condonation of delay is satisfactorily explained by the revision petitioners, needs to be considered. 13. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the trial Court committed error by dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 96 days and the impugned order suffers from infirmity and the same is liable to be set aside. 14. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order dtd. 20/2/2017 in I.A.No.1073 of 2016 in ASSR No.18367 of 2015 passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad is hereby set aside. 14. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order dtd. 20/2/2017 in I.A.No.1073 of 2016 in ASSR No.18367 of 2015 passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad is hereby set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed.