JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16.02.2004 passed by learned District Judge Kangra at Dharamshala, vide which, the appeal filed by the appellant (plaintiff before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a Civil Suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking a decree of a permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining the defendant from changing the nature of the land comprised in Khata No. 146 Khatauni No. 355 Khasra No. 2260 measuring 105-88 square meters situated in Up Mohal Dharamshala, Mouza and Tehsil Dharamshala, District Kangra as per the Jamabandi for the year 1990-91 (hereinafter referred to as the suit land). A relief of mandatory injunction was also sought against the defendant directing her to demolish the construction, if any, raised by her during the pendency of the suit. It was pleaded that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land. The plaintiff leased out part of the suit land to the defendant on 01.08.1977 on the condition that the defendant was not to change the nature of the suit land by raising construction of a permanent structure without obtaining prior permission of the plaintiff. The defendant started collecting construction materials to raise the superstructure on the suit land without seeking permission. She employed labour to raise construction. She was requested not to do so but in vain. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability, the suit being barred by limitation, the suit having not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction, the plaintiff being estopped to file the present suit by its acts, conduct and acquiescence. The contents of the plaint were denied on merits. However, it was not disputed that the plaintiff is the owner and the defendant is the lessee. It was asserted that the construction was raised with the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff by spending a huge amount of Rs. 5 lakh. The residential house has been in existence for more than 25 years and no new construction was raised. However, it was not disputed that the plaintiff is the owner and the defendant is the lessee. It was asserted that the construction was raised with the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff by spending a huge amount of Rs. 5 lakh. The residential house has been in existence for more than 25 years and no new construction was raised. The suit was not maintainable and the plaintiff had no cause of action to file the suit. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 5. The learned trial Court framed the following issues on 24.10.1994 & 28.02.2001: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction, as prayed for? OPP 2. Whether the defendant was leased out part of the suit land? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 4. Whether the Union of India is a necessary party? OPD 5. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff is stopped to file the present suit by his own act and conduct? OPD 6A. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD 7. Relief 6. Parties were called upon to produce the evidence and the plaintiff examined Karib Baksh (PW-1), and Jagdish Kaushal (PW2). The defendant examined herself (DW-1). 7. Learned Trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 30.05.1998. 8. The defendant filed an appeal and the matter was remanded to the learned Trial Court with a direction to re-hear the parties. 9. An application for amendment was filed, which was allowed and an additional issue was framed on 28.02.2001. No fresh evidence was led. Learned Trial Court held that the suit land was allotted to the defendant for raising a residential structure. She had raised a residential structure on the plot before 1980. It was not proved that the defendant had tried to change the nature of the suit land and the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of injunction. Hence, issues no. 2, 3 and 6 were answered in affirmative, the rest of the issues were answered in negative and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 10. It was not proved that the defendant had tried to change the nature of the suit land and the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of injunction. Hence, issues no. 2, 3 and 6 were answered in affirmative, the rest of the issues were answered in negative and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 10. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal. Learned First Appellate Court held that the defendant was to pay electricity or water charges. She was to be responsible for the High Court of H.P. repair and whitewashing. This showed that a construction was to be raised on the land. The defendant was liable to remove the construction raised upon the suit land at the time of the cancellation of the lease deed. So, no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff even if the permanent structure was raised by the defendant on the suit land. There was no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 11. Being aggrieved from the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, the plaintiff filed the present appeal. It was asserted that suit land is owned by the plaintiff and it was allotted to the defendant. The defendant started raising a permanent structure without the consent of the plaintiff. The plea taken by her that this was done with the consent of the plaintiff was not established. The defendant was not entitled to raise a permanent structure as per the allotment letter and the rent deed. The defendant was bound by the terms and conditions of the rent deed and the allotment letter. Learned Courts below had not considered the notification issued by the State Government constituting the Wakf Tribunal for the determination of the disputes pertaining to the Wakf property. The Court has no jurisdiction to hear and entertain the present suit. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 12. The present appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 03.10.2005: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction to hear and entertain the present suit. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 12. The present appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 03.10.2005: 1. What is the effect of notification, dated 01.12.2001, whereby the State Government of HP has established and constituted Wakf Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to the Wakf or Wakf property under the Wakf Act and especially when the suit property is admittedly the Wakf property. 2. Whether, even though, from the perusal of the allotment letter, Ex. PW1/A and the rent deed, Ext. PW1/B, it is clear that the defendant was not entitled to raise permanent structure/building on the land in dispute, even then, the learned Courts below were right in holding that the defendant was entitled to raise permanent structure/building over the suit land. 13. I have heard Mr. R.K Bawa learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sh. Ajay Kumar Advocate for the appellant-plaintiff and Sh. Vinay Kuthiala learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Rajinder Sharma learned counsel for the respondent/defendants. 14. Mr. R.K. Bawa learned Senior Counsel submitted that the defendant was to raise a temporary structure on the suit land as per the terms and conditions of the rent deed. Learned Courts below erred in ignoring the terms and conditions of the rent deed. The plaintiff being the owner is entitled to restrain the defendant from violating the terms and conditions of the deed, under which the allotment was made to the defendant. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 15. Mr. Vinay Kuthiala, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents supported the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below. He submitted that the land was allotted for raising construction as is apparent from the fact that the defendant was to pay the rent and taxes, water and electricity charges, which is not possible in case of a vacant land. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the defendant had a right to raise construction over the land. He submitted that the land was allotted for raising construction as is apparent from the fact that the defendant was to pay the rent and taxes, water and electricity charges, which is not possible in case of a vacant land. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the defendant had a right to raise construction over the land. Learned First Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff because the defendant is bound to restore the vacant possession of the suit land at the time of termination of the lease deed. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed. 16. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial question of law No.1: 17. The present suit was instituted on 09.06.1993. Wakf Act, 1995 came into force on 01.01.1996. It was laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sardar Khan v. Syed Najmul Hasan (Seth), (2007) 10 SCC 727 : 2007 SCC OnLine SC 300 that the provisions of the Act will not apply to the cases instituted before the commencement of the Act. It was observed: 10. It is relevant to mention here that the Wakf Act, of 1995 came into force with effect from 1-1-1996. Section 6 of the Wakf Act, 1995 relates to the disputes regarding wakfs property. Section 6 of the Act reads as under: “6. Disputes regarding wakfs.—(1) If any question arises whether a particular property specified as wakf property in the list of wakfs is wakf property or not or whether a wakf specified in such list is a Shia wakf or Sunni wakf, the Board or the mutawalli of the wakf or any person interested therein may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final: Provided that no such suit shall be entertained by the Tribunal after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the list of wakfs. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section and Section 7, the expression ‘any person interested therein’, shall, in relation to any property specified as wakf property in the list of wakfs published after the commencement of this Act, shall include also every person who, though not interested in the wakf concerned, is interested in such property and to whom a reasonable opportunity had been afforded to represent his case by notice served on High Court of H.P. him in that behalf during the course of the relevant inquiry under Section 4. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), no proceeding under this Act in respect of any wakf shall be stayed by reason only of the pendency of any such suit or of any appeal or other proceeding arising out of such suit. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall not be made a party to any suit under sub-section (1) and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against him in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules made thereunder. (4) The list of wakfs shall, unless it is modified in pursuance of a decision or the Tribunal under subsection (1), be final and conclusive. (5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a court in that State in relation to any question referred to in subsection (1).” From a perusal of the afore quoted section, there is no ambiguity that the intention was that from 1-1- 1996 no suit or other legal proceedings relating to the Wakf property shall be instituted in any civil court. 11. At the same time sub-section (5) of Section 7 also lays down that it will not affect any pending suit or appeal. Section 7 states the powers of the Tribunal to determine disputes regarding wakfs. Section 7 of the Act reads as under: “7. 11. At the same time sub-section (5) of Section 7 also lays down that it will not affect any pending suit or appeal. Section 7 states the powers of the Tribunal to determine disputes regarding wakfs. Section 7 of the Act reads as under: “7. Power of Tribunal to determine disputes regarding wakfs.— (1) If, after the commencement of this Act, any question arises, whether a particular property specified as wakf property in a list of wakfs is wakf property or not, or whether a wakf specified in such list is a Shia wakf or a Sunni wakf, the Board or the mutawalli of the wakf, or any person interested therein, may apply to the Tribunal having jurisdiction in relation to such property, for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall be final: Provided that— (a) in the case of the list of wakfs relating to any part of the State and published after the commencement of this Act no such application shall be entertained after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the list of wakfs; (b) in the case of the list of wakfs relating to any part of the State and published at any time within a period of one year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act, such an application may be entertained by Tribunal within the period of one year from such commencement: Provided further that where any such question has been heard and finally decided by a civil court in a suit instituted before such commencement, the Tribunal shall not reopen such question. (2) Except where the Tribunal has no jurisdiction by reason of the provisions of sub-section (5), no proceeding under this section in respect of any wakf shall be stayed by any court, tribunal or other authority by reason only of the pendency of any suit, application or appeal or other proceeding arising out of any such suit, application, appeal or other proceeding. (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of wakfs and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final. (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of wakfs and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final. (5) The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter which is the subject matter of any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced in a civil court under sub-section (1) of Section 6, before the commencement of this Act or which is the subject matter of any appeal from the decree passed before such commencement in any such suit or proceeding or of any application for revision or review arising out of such suit, proceeding or appeal, as the case may be.” 12. In the exercise of power under Section 83 of the Act, the Wakf Tribunal was constituted on 23-2-1997. By virtue of sub-section (5) of Section 7, it clearly transpires that the Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter which is the subject matter of any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced in a civil court under sub-section (1) of Section 6, before the commencement of this Act i.e. if any suit has been instituted in any civil court prior to coming into force of the Wakf Act, 1995, then the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to decide such matter and it will be continued and concluded as if the Act has not come into force. 13. Now coming to the facts of the present case, it is an admitted fact that the suit was filed on 19-12-1976 before the Addl. District Judge, Jaipur and arguments were heard and judgment was reserved on 16-12-1995 and the judgment was delivered on 23-1-1996 against which the appeal was filed before the High Court on 1-3-1996. Therefore, from these facts, it is clear that the suit was pending since 19-12-1976 i.e. prior to the commencement of the Act i.e. 1-1-1996. Therefore, by virtue of subsection (5) of Section 7, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to decide the suit or the appeal arising from that suit. In the present case, the appeal which was filed by the respondents (herein) arises out of the judgment and decree passed by the Addl. District Judge, Jaipur on 23-1-1996 in a suit filed on 19-12-1976. In the present case, the appeal which was filed by the respondents (herein) arises out of the judgment and decree passed by the Addl. District Judge, Jaipur on 23-1-1996 in a suit filed on 19-12-1976. Therefore, the appeal which was filed before the High Court against the judgment and decree passed on 23-1-1996 by the Addl. District Judge, Jaipur, will not be governed by this Act. By sub-section (5) of Section 7, a special provision has been made that on pending suit or proceeding or appeal or review or revision, the Act will not be applicable. In Syed Inamul Haq Shah [ AIR 2001 Raj 19 ] the learned Single Judge only considered the effect of Section 85 but did not examine the effect of sub-section (5) of Section 7 and, on the basis of Section 85, it was held that in all the proceedings which were pending before the civil court, the civil court will have no jurisdiction. With great respect, perhaps the attention of the learned Single Judge was not drawn to sub-section (5) of Section 7 which specifically provides an exception that this will not be applicable to the pending suits, appeals and revisions. It has a purpose behind it that when the Act was made prospective, how can it operate retrospectively, therefore, all pending matters were taken out from the purview of this Act. 18. A similar view was taken in Bhanwar Lal v. Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf, (2014) 16 SCC 51 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 432 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 811, wherein it was held: 12. As per sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act, if any question arises, whether a particular property specified as wakf property in a list of wakfs is wakf property or not, it is the Tribunal which has to decide such a question and the decision of the Tribunal is made final. When such a question is covered under sub-section (1) of Section 7, then obviously the jurisdiction of the civil court stands concluded to decide such a question in view of the specific bar contained in Section 85. When such a question is covered under sub-section (1) of Section 7, then obviously the jurisdiction of the civil court stands concluded to decide such a question in view of the specific bar contained in Section 85. It would be pertinent to mention that, as per sub-section (5) of Section 7, if a suit or proceeding is already pending in a civil court before the commencement of the Act in question, then such proceedings before the civil court would continue and the Tribunal would not have any jurisdiction. 13. On a conjoint reading of Section 7 and Section 85, the legal position is summed up as under: 13.1. In respect of the questions/disputes mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 7, exclusive jurisdiction vests with the Tribunal, having jurisdiction in relation to such property. 13.2. The decision of the Tribunal thereon is made final. 13.3. The jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of any dispute/question or other matter relating to any wakf, wakf property for other matter, which is required by or under this Act, to be determined by a Tribunal. 13.4 [Ed.: Para 13.4 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed. B.J./65/2013 dated 31-10-2013.] - There is however an exception made under Section 7(5) viz. those matters which are already pending before the civil court, even if the subject matter is covered under sub-section (1) of Section 6, the jurisdiction of the civil court would continue and the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to determine those matters. 14. The present suit was instituted in the year 1980 i.e. much before the Wakf Act, 1995 was enacted. Therefore, if the subject matter is covered by subsection (1) of Section 6, the jurisdiction of the civil court remains by virtue of Section 5 [sic 7(5)] of the Act. To enable us to find an answer to this, the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 also become relevant and need to be noticed at this juncture. Before that, we would like to state the scheme of Chapter II of the Act which contains all these sections including Section 7 Chapter II starts with Section 4.” 19. Therefore, in view of binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the provisions of the Wakf Act will not apply to the suits, which were instituted before the commencement of the Wakf Act. Therefore, in view of binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the provisions of the Wakf Act will not apply to the suits, which were instituted before the commencement of the Wakf Act. Since in the present case, the suit was instituted before the commencement of the Wakf Act; therefore, the Civil Court had the jurisdiction and there will be no effect of the notification issued by the State Government or the enforcement of the Wakf Act on the present case. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial question of law No.2: 20. Column 6 of the allotment letter (Exhibit PW1/A) shows the description of the property as a plot 30 feet x 34 feet equal to 113 square yards inside Khasra No.1005/527 situated in Gurudwara Road, Dharmshala. Learned Courts below heavily relied upon column 14, in which the purpose was specified as residential and column No. 17, in which the tenant was to pay taxes electricity or water charges for repair and whitewashing to conclude that the defendant had a right to raise construction on the suit land because the electricity and water charges can only be paid in respect of the building and not in respect of the plot. Similarly, whitewashing can be carried out on a building and not on the plot. Learned Trial Court did not consider the provisions of the rent deed, wherein it was mentioned: “Whereas land comprising in Khasra no. 1005/527 measuring 30 x 34 113 square yards situated at Dharmsala Tehsil Kangra District Kangra which is bounded as under and shown in red ink in the plan attached, is a wakf property, dedicated for the maintenance of Mosque and vests in the Punjab Wakf Board, Ambala Cantt. And whereas I Smt. Shanta Devi wife of Sh. Maya Ram resident of Dharamsala wants to take it on rent for temporary construction for eleven months from Wakf Board. 8. In case of any new laws, rules or directions, which may be in future made by the provincial or Central Government or under any emergency it may become necessary for the Punjab Wakf Board to get back this plot, it will be opened to the Wakf Board to rescind the contract even before the expiry of the lease period and I will deliver its possession to Wakf Board after removing the temporary construction made thereon. 9. 9. I alone will be responsible for any action of the Government Municipal Committee or Court’s’ order which it may take against me for unplanned temporary construction made by me on its for its use for unhygienic.” 21. It is apparent from a bare perusal of the rent deed that the defendant had taken the suit land for temporary construction. This fact was mentioned not only in the opening clause of the rent deed but in clauses 8 and 9 as well. Therefore, it is apparent that the defendant was permitted to raise a temporary construction for which she could get the electricity and water charges and she could whitewash the same. 22. Learned First Appellate Court noticed that as per the Rent Agreement, a temporary structure was to be raised but stated that the plaintiff would not be prejudiced because the defendant would be liable to hand over the vacant possession after demolition of the existing construction. It is apparent that the learned First Appellate Court misdirected itself. It is not the question of delivery of the vacant possession but the question of being bound by the terms and conditions of the contract entered between the parties. Once the defendant had taken the land for temporary construction, she could not have been permitted to violate the same by raising a permanent structure. 23. Heavy reliance was placed upon the authority letter (Ext. PW-1/C) wherein it was mentioned that the defendant was trying to construct a building on the first floor without prior permission to hold that since the construction was raised earlier; therefore, the plaintiff cannot restrain the defendant from raising the further construction. The learned trial Court also held that it was not proved that the defendant had tried to change the nature of the plot in June 1993. This is not correct. Karim Baksh (PW1) specifically stated that the defendant tried to raise construction in the year 1993. He stopped the defendant but the defendant did not stop the construction, therefore, the suit had to be filed. Similarly, Jagdish Kaushal (PW2) stated that the defendant had raised construction during the pendency of the suit even after the issuance of the injunction order. He stated in his cross-examination that the construction was raised on 07.06.1993 or 08.06.1993 and the suit was filed immediately thereafter. They were the public officials and there was no reason to disbelieve their testimonies. Similarly, Jagdish Kaushal (PW2) stated that the defendant had raised construction during the pendency of the suit even after the issuance of the injunction order. He stated in his cross-examination that the construction was raised on 07.06.1993 or 08.06.1993 and the suit was filed immediately thereafter. They were the public officials and there was no reason to disbelieve their testimonies. Even the defendant had not disputed in the reply that the construction was raised. It was asserted that this construction was raised in the year 1979 and with the permission of the plaintiff by spending Rs. 5,00,000/-. Therefore, the fact that the construction was raised on the suit land was not in dispute. The only question was whether the defendant could have raised a permanent construction in violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement or not. Thus, the learned Courts below could not have held that the defendant had a right to raise construction, as the land was allotted for residential purposes. 24. It was submitted that the plaintiff has an alternative and efficacious remedy of eviction of the tenant and a suit for injunction does not lie. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down in Changa Weaving and Hosiery Factory v. Sanjiv Kumar, 2002 SCC OnLine P&H 476: PLR (2002) 132 P&H 695, that a landlord has a right to restrain the tenant from making any structural addition or alteration or changing the existing position without the consent of the landlord or the Rent Controller. It was observed: “4. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions of the learned counsel and regret my inability to accept the same because the injunction which has been granted is confined to making any structural addition or alternations and from changing the existing position or effecting any major repair in the shop illegally or forcibly without the prior consent of the landlord or the prior permission of the Rent Controller. The types of repair, addition and structural alterations stipulated in the injunction order are covered by Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the order passed by both the Courts below in so far as the defendant has been asked to approach the Rent Controller for necessary permission or seek the consent of the landlord i.e. plaintiff-respondents. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the first submission of the learned counsel.” 25. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the order passed by both the Courts below in so far as the defendant has been asked to approach the Rent Controller for necessary permission or seek the consent of the landlord i.e. plaintiff-respondents. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the first submission of the learned counsel.” 25. In the present case, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant was raising construction of a permanent nature in violation of the rent deed, which was acceptable on the balance of probability. The plaintiff could not have been asked to file a petition for eviction of the tenant and it had a right to approach the Civil Court for seeking an injunction. 26. It was submitted that both the learned Courts below have returned the concurrent findings of fact and this Court cannot interfere with these findings of fact. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy, (2020) 4 SCC 659 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 117 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 186, in support of this submission. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law that the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of the fact. However, in the present case, both the learned Courts below misread the rent deed, which was binding upon the parties to hold that the defendant had a right to raise permanent construction. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 : 2006 SCC OnLine SC 555, that the legal effect of the terms of the document and its construction are questions of law. When there is a misconstruction of a document, it gives rise to a question of law. It was observed: “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. The construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or a wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. 27. The construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or a wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. 27. Therefore, the mis-construction of a document will be a question of law and the High Court has a right to interfere with a findings of fact when they have been arrived at by misconstruing a document. Since, in the present case, both the learned Courts below have not considered the recital of temporary construction in the rent deed, they had misconstrued the same. They proceeded on the basis that the defendant had a right to raise construction of a residential house ignoring the words temporary construction, therefore, they had misconstrued a document and this Court has a right to interfere with the findings recorded by learned Courts below. 28. Thus, both the learned Courts below erred in holding that the defendant had a right to raise permanent structure on the suit land by ignoring the allotment letter (Ext. PW1/A) and the rent deed (Ext. PW1/B). Hence, this substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellant. Final order. 29. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below are ordered to be set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed for restraining the defendant from raising any permanent construction on the suit land. Since the extent of the permanent construction raised during the pendency of the suit has not been established hence no order of demolition can be passed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.