JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Vijay Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State of U.P. i.e. respondent no. 3, Sri Madhukar Ojha, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4, Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 6, Sri Satyajit Banerji, learned counsel for respondent no. 7 and there is a request for adjournment on the ground of illness on behalf of Sri Taranjeet Singh Makkar, who appears for the HDFC Ergo General Insurance Co. Ltd-respondent no. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that all payments due from respondent no. 8 have been received by the petitioner no lis survives in so far as the respondent no. 8 is concerned, therefore, this Court has proceeded to hear the matter finally. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that for providing social security and welfare of the unorganized workers and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto, the Government of India introduced the Unorganized Workers' Social Security Act, 2008, and introduced a Welfare Scheme for unorganized workers in the name of Rashtriya Swastha Bima Yojana (hereinafter referred to as 'the RSBY') to cover a number of non BPL categories of informal Sector including street vendors, domestic workers, Beedi workers, building and construction workers and workers who had worked for more than 15 days in MNREGA for covering diseases which involved hospitalization. The beneficiaries under the Scheme were entitled to hospitalization coverage of upto Rs. 30,000/- for most of the diseases and the coverage was extended upto five Members of the same family. The Scheme was sponsored by the Central Government which had to pay 75 per cent of the premium and 25 per cent of the premium was to be paid by the State Government, in most of the States of the Country. 3. Under the RSBY, the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. was empaneled for various districts including the District Lucknow and the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. entered into an agreement with the Government of U.P. to provide health insurance services to the persons below poverty line and also beneficiaries covered under the RSBY. 3. Under the RSBY, the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. was empaneled for various districts including the District Lucknow and the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. entered into an agreement with the Government of U.P. to provide health insurance services to the persons below poverty line and also beneficiaries covered under the RSBY. The guidelines were issued by the Government of India and also by the State Government for settlement of claim, the latest being the one issued on 17.07.2012 by the Government of India and under Clause 2(iii), it has been provided that in case the Insurance Company has not received the necessary premium, then also they had to settle the claim of the hospital. However, liberty was granted to the Insurance Company to indicate that payment will be made after premium is received. The Insurance Company had to make a settlement of the claim within thirty days of receipt of the same but actual payment had to be made after premium was received. Since the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. was nominated for the District of Lucknow, the petitioner-Hospital entered into an agreement with ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. 4. The contract between the petitioner and the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. was for the financial year 2012-13, 2013-14 & 2014-15 and each year a fresh contract was signed. The petitioner provided health services to various beneficiaries and bills for payment were raised which was cleared by the Insurance Company up to 31.10.2014. In the year 2015, various Grievance Redressal Committees were constituted by the RSBY in order to effectively address the grievance raised by any of the parties. Since certain claims of the petitioner were not settled by the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. in time, it raised a claim before the respondent no. 5 i.e. the Chairman, District Grievance Redressal Committee/Chief Medical Officer, Lucknow, and also sent repeated e-mails to the respondent no. 5 for settlement of claims. 5. On 06.11.2015, the respondent no. 5 informed the petitioner that the claim of the petitioner-Hospital could not be settled as the Insurance Company had not received the premium from the Government and as soon as the premium is received, the claim will be settled. The respondent no. 5 on being approached in this regard passed an order after hearing both parties on 07.09.2016 directing the respondent no. The respondent no. 5 on being approached in this regard passed an order after hearing both parties on 07.09.2016 directing the respondent no. 6 to make all payments to the petitioner within a fortnight of the order. The payment was still not made by the respondent no. 6 on the ground that the premium have not been paid by the State Government. 6. It is the case of the petitioner that once the respondent no. 5 has passed the order dated 07.09.2016 directing the respondent no. 6 to make payment to the petitioner within a fortnight irrespective of the fact whether the premium was paid to it by the Government or not, it was incumbent upon the Insurance Company to comply with the directions of respondent no. 5 and make payments as are due to the petitioner. When no heed wad paid, the petitioner approached this Court with the following main prayers:- "I. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the part of the clause 2(iii) of the Government Order dated 17.07.2012 issued by the Opposite party no. 1, as contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition, as far it empowers the Insurance Company to withheld the payment of the Hospital even after verification of claims till the premium is received by the Insurance Company from the Government. II. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite party nos. 6 to 8 to make the payment of the claims authenticated and verified by the opposite parties immediately alongwith interest @ 8 % p.a. on delayed payment." 7. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that because the Insurance Company is taking shelter of the provisions of the Government Order dated 17.07.2012, which entitles it to settle the claim of the Hospital within a month but to refuse to make payment till it receives premium from the Government. The Government Order dated 17.07.2012 and its relevant clause has also been challenged. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Annexure 14 to the writ petition, which is a copy of the decision taken by the C.M.O. as Chairman of the District Grievance Redressal Committee. The Government Order dated 17.07.2012 and its relevant clause has also been challenged. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Annexure 14 to the writ petition, which is a copy of the decision taken by the C.M.O. as Chairman of the District Grievance Redressal Committee. The representative of the hospital and the Insurance Company were heard and it was observed that the hospital had provided free healthcare services to the beneficiaries under the agreement with the Insurance Company, and that reimbursement of its claim by the Insurance Company had been withheld only on the ground that there was a dispute between the State Nodal Agency and the Insurance Company and no premium has been paid to it by the State Nodal Agency; the Insurance Company could not withhold the amount claimed by the hospital only on the ground that no insurance premium had been paid by the State Government/State Nodal Agency to the Company. The C.M.O. had directed that Insurance Company should pay the hospital bills raised by it within 15 days. The Chief Executive Officer of the State Nodal Agency also wrote to the Insurance Company on 25.11.2016 directing it to make payments of dues to the petitioner as soon as possible. 9. In the counter affidavit filed by the State Government, it has come out that the National Grievance Redressal Committee by its order dated 08.01.2018 had directed payment of Rs.3.63 crores by the State Nodal Agency to the Insurance Agencies for settling of claims of various hospitals. However, these figures were not final as a high-powered committee of U.P. Swasthya Bima Kalyan Samiti had decided to constitute a third-party audit through expert IT professionals of the State Government, to accurately identify the correct figure of smart cards prepared by Insurance Companies and thereafter final payment would be done by the State Nodal Agency to the Insurance Companies. In the agreement dated 01.10.2012, extended from time to time between the Insurance Company and the petitioner, the State Government is not a party and the aforesaid agreement did not contain any clause for holding the State Government responsible for any claim of the petitioner, in any dispute between the State Nodal Agency and the Insurance Company. In the agreement dated 01.10.2012, extended from time to time between the Insurance Company and the petitioner, the State Government is not a party and the aforesaid agreement did not contain any clause for holding the State Government responsible for any claim of the petitioner, in any dispute between the State Nodal Agency and the Insurance Company. The Government of India also in its order dated 17.07.2013 had directed all claims to be settled mandatorily by Insurance Company within one month from the receipt of such claims from the treating hospitals and wherever necessary premium had not been received by the Insurance Company and it becomes the reason for delay in claim settlement, the Insurance Company would still take a decision on the claims within the stipulated time limit and convey to the concerned hospital clearly that payment would be made after premium is received. 10. Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 6 has pointed out from the copy of the Contract entered into between the petitioner-Hospital and respondent no. 6 Article 16 which relates to miscellaneous provisions and Clause 7 thereof which relates to the law applicable to the agreement and Arbitration clause. He has pointed out sub Clause (ii) & (iii) of Clause 7 wherein it has been provided that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in relation to the agreement or the breach, termination or irregularity thereof, shall be settled by Arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Arbitral Tribunal would be comprised of three Arbitrators, one Arbitrator appointed by each party and one another Arbitrator appointed by mutual consent of the Arbitrators, so appointed. It has been pointed out that the place of Arbitration would be Mumbai and any award whether interim or final shall be made only in Mumbai. 11. It has further been argued by Sri Sanjeev Singh, on the basis of counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 6 that in terms of the Advisory issued by the Central Government dated 17.07.2012, the Insurance Company can withhold payment to the Hospital in case it does not receive premium amount. 11. It has further been argued by Sri Sanjeev Singh, on the basis of counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 6 that in terms of the Advisory issued by the Central Government dated 17.07.2012, the Insurance Company can withhold payment to the Hospital in case it does not receive premium amount. In the absence of payment of premium by the Central and State Government, the Insurance Company had informed the petitioner that the claim raised by it will only be considered after such premium is paid by the Government under the RSBY. It is the case of the Insurance Company that since payment of premium has not been made, the Insurance Company cannot be held liable. Moreover, the petitioner on its own cannot assume that the bills raised by it are genuine and authenticated by the answering respondents, as the claims have not been processed by the Insurance Company in the absence of premium being paid to it. Also, the State Nodal Agency and the Government have raised questions regarding the correct number of verified Smart Card for the beneficiaries under the RSBY and the State Nodal Agency and the Government have been denying the premium amount claimed by the Insurance Company and unless the issue of verification of Smart Cards is settled by the Government/State Nodal Agency, it cannot be said that the entire claim raised by the petitioner-Hospital on the basis of treatment of Smart Card beneficiaries is genuine and authenticated. It has been further been argued that the petitioner has not submitted any document to establish that the entire claim raised by the petitioner has been verified and authenticated by the Insurance Company. 12. It has also been argued that the order passed by the District Grievance Redressal Committee dated 07.09.2016 was passed ignoring the provisions contained in Clause 2(iii) of the Government Order dated 17.07.2012 issued by the Central Government and outstanding premium amount of Rs. 62.63 crores for Phase 4 & 5 of the RSBY still remains to be paid. 13. The arguments advanced by Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 have been adopted by Sri Satyajit Banerji, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 7- National Insurance Company Ltd. 14. 62.63 crores for Phase 4 & 5 of the RSBY still remains to be paid. 13. The arguments advanced by Sri Sanjeev Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 have been adopted by Sri Satyajit Banerji, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 7- National Insurance Company Ltd. 14. Sri Madhukar Ojha, learned counsel for the RSBY, on the other hand, has referred to the counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4 wherein it has been stated that the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. has participated in the 4th & 5th rounds of RSBY launched by the Government of India in the State of U.P. and the State Nodal Agency was appointed to implement the aforesaid Scheme with the help of Insurance Companies nominated/empaneled in this regard. The State Government/Nodal Agency had to make payment of State's share of premium of 25 per cent to the Insurance Company and the remaining 75 per cent had to be paid by the Central Government on the basis of verified enrollment data of the identified beneficiaries. The Insurance Company enrolled the 1,06,680 beneficiaries and in the 4th round, raised invoice for payment of Insurance premium to the State Nodal Agency. Only 85,452 beneficiaries were found to be correctly identified, for which the Insurance premium of Rs. 2.78 crores was paid to the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd., in between December 2012 to May, 2013. 15. The Insurance Company aggrieved by the decision of the State Nodal Agency regarding number of verified beneficiaries Smart Cards and premium paid on that basis approached the State Grievance Redressal Committee for rectifying the same. The State Grievance Redressal Committee found genuine grant of enrolled beneficiaries as 84,291, for which Rs. 2.77 crores was to be paid to the Insurance Company and therefore, Rs. 1,00,000/- that was paid in excess by the State Nodal Agency was to be recovered from the Insurance Company. 16. The Insurance Company also participated in the 5th round of RSBY in the State of U.P. and the Insurance Company provided enrollment to 75,587 beneficiaries for which Rs. 1.72 crore was claimed as premium amount. On verification by the State Nodal Agency, the figure of 53,810 beneficiaries was found to be correct for which premium of Rs. 1.23 crores was paid to the Insurance Company between March 2014 to March, 2015. 1.72 crore was claimed as premium amount. On verification by the State Nodal Agency, the figure of 53,810 beneficiaries was found to be correct for which premium of Rs. 1.23 crores was paid to the Insurance Company between March 2014 to March, 2015. The Insurance Company again approached the State Grievance Redressal Committee for rectifying the alleged wrong verification but it was found that Rs. 6.03 crore was recoverable from the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. and Rs. 9.66 crore was payable to the respondent no. 6 at the end of 5th round of RSBY. As per the orders of the National Grievance Redressal Committee dated 08.01.2018, an amount of Rs. 3.63 crore has to be conditionally paid to the Insurance Company on production of affidavit that this amount would be used only to pay the outstanding dues of Hospitals like that of the petitioner and after due verification of the Smart Card, prepared by the Insurance Company of identified beneficiaries. 17. The High powered Committee of U.P. Swastha Bima Kalyan Samiti had decided to constitute a Third Party Audit through expert IT professionals of the State Government to accurately access the correct figure of Smart Cards prepared by the Insurance Companies and thereafter final payments shall be made by the State Nodal Agency to the Insurance Company concerned. 18. In the counter affidavit filed by the State Nodal Agency, the respondent no.4, it has been stated that the Insurance Company has generated several fraudulent smart cards for unidentified and ineligible beneficiaries, and that respondent no.4 has made payment of the enrolled beneficiaries by the Insurance Company after due verification process which has been found to be correct by the Social Audit Team of the Government of India constituted on the directions of the Secretary, Health and Family Welfare, Union of India, for the purpose of verification of enrolment software processes. The verification process adopted by the State Nodal Agency was challenged by the Insurance Company before the State Grievance Redressal Committee and State Grievance Redressal Committee made minor enhancement in the verified figures and such order was later on upheld by the National Grievance Redressal Committee. The verification process adopted by the State Nodal Agency was challenged by the Insurance Company before the State Grievance Redressal Committee and State Grievance Redressal Committee made minor enhancement in the verified figures and such order was later on upheld by the National Grievance Redressal Committee. A copy of the recommendations of the Social Audit Team have been filed as Annexure to the counter affidavit where it was noted that rejection by the State Nodal Agency of the figures provided by the Insurance Companies for reimbursement was mainly on account of change in the name of the head of the family, other than one indicated in the pre-enrolment data. The Social Audit Team had found the Insurance Company's claims unconvincing. The Committee observed that the enrolment figure for all such smart cards where there was a change in the name of the head of the family should be disallowed, and no premium was required to be paid to the concerned Insurance Company in all such cases. It was also found that the Insurance Company had issued multiple smart cards on single Unique Relationship Number (URN). The State Nodal Agency had stressed that these duplicate cards were the result of not following of prescribed procedures by the Insurance Company in the field during enrolment as such the possibility of mischief could not be ruled out. The team observed that the issue of multiple cards under the same URN is prohibited. The State Nodal Agency was directed to identify beneficiaries of duplicate cards by analysis of the URN data and payment should be made to the Insurance Companies only for one single card thereafter by the State Nodal Agency. Also, delivery of smart cards to beneficiaries on the spot i.e. on the date of enrolment itself was not ensured by the Insurance Company. Insurance companies were demanding premium on pro rata basis for all such cards, because according to them, such cards had been delivered to the beneficiaries. The State Nodal Agency emphasised that the Tender Document itself provided that payment of premium for only delivered cards is to be made on pro rata basis. The onus to prove the delivery of cards to the correct beneficiary was not delayed beyond the specified period by the Insurance Company. 19. The State Nodal Agency emphasised that the Tender Document itself provided that payment of premium for only delivered cards is to be made on pro rata basis. The onus to prove the delivery of cards to the correct beneficiary was not delayed beyond the specified period by the Insurance Company. 19. With regard to the agreement dated 01.10.2012, which has been made the basis of the writ petition, it has been argued on behalf of the State Nodal Agency that the agreement was exclusively between the petitioner and the Insurance Company and the State Nodal Agency was not a party to the said agreement. With regard to the Government of India Advisory dated 17.07.2012, it has been submitted that the Insurance Company has to settle/verify all claims mandatorily within one month of receipt of such claims from the Hospitals, and even if necessary premium has not been received by the Insurance Company, it may still verify the claim but make payment after premium is received. The Insurance Company has not verified the claim of the petitioner. Although, no such advisory was issued by the Government to withhold even verification of the hospital's claim. 20. The Social Audit Team constituted by the State Nodal Agency is on the directions of the Secretary, Health and Family Welfare, Union of India for the purpose of verification of enrollment, software processing especially with respect to possibility of fictitious enrollment, examination of enrolled figures by the Insurance Companies. The verification process adopted by the State Nodal Agency was challenged in State Grievance Redressal Committee, which was disposed of with minor enhancement in verified figure of beneficiaries and such order was upheld by the National Grievance Redressal Committee. The payment cannot be made by the State Nodal Agency without verification of beneficiaries Smart Card as prepared by the Insurance Companies. 21. In the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4, subsequent developments have been mentioned wherein the order passed by the District Grievance Redressal Committee and the order passed by the State Nodal Agency to make payment only after verification, has been brought on record and it has been pointed out that none of the orders so passed have been challenged by any of the Insurance Companies, the respondent nos. 6, 7 & 8 before any higher Forum i.e. the National Grievance Redressal Committee or any court of law. 22. 6, 7 & 8 before any higher Forum i.e. the National Grievance Redressal Committee or any court of law. 22. In a supplementary counter affidavit filed by the State Nodal Agency, it has been stated that during the operation of the RSBY Scheme, the ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company had reported certain anomalies to the State Nodal Agency. On further enquiry, discrepancies were found true and the same find mention in the report and in the observations of the NGRC regarding possibility of fraudulent claims raised during enrolment process. The State Nodal Agency, after due verification and enquiry of all such data requested the Government of U.P., which has released 7.27 crores of the State's share in favour of various Insurance Companies to be paid to various hospitals/service providers on 26.03.2021. 23. Sri Sanjeev Singh has stated on the basis of affidavit filed by the parties that although the respondent no. 6 has claimed more than Rs. 64 crores as premium. The State Nodal Agencies and the State Governments have admitted an amount of around Rs. 10 crores only, which contains part of State share and Central Government's share. 24. Certain other paragraphs of the supplementary counter affidavit have been pointed out by Sri Sanjeev Singh to show that there is a dispute with regard to premium being paid and since there is a dispute with regard to the premium being paid, the respondent no. 6 has rightly withheld the payment to the petitioner for treatment of beneficiaries and claims made by it. In any case, if the petitioner is aggrieved by any breach of condition of the agreement between the Insurance Company and the petitioner, the appropriate remedy would be under Clause 16.7 of the agreement. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Barai Singh and Co. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. [ (2015) 13 SCC 592 ] wherein it has been observed that the constitutional remedy of writ petition is always available to an aggrieved party and an arbitration clause in an agreement between the parties cannot ipso facto render a writ petition not maintainable. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Surya Constructions vs. The State of U.P. and Ors. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Surya Constructions vs. The State of U.P. and Ors. [ (2019) 16 SCC 794 ] where the amount payable to the appellant being wholly undisputed and in fact admitted in contempt proceedings before the High Court, still the High Court refused to interfere in the matter on the ground of contractual obligations and disputed questions of facts. Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in ABL International Ltd. and Anr. vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and Ors. [ (2004) 3 SCC 553 ] to say that once the amount that was payable was admitted, in pursuance of agreement entered into between the parties, then it was not right for the High Court to refuse the relief prayed for by the appellant and to relegate the parties to remedies available under the agreement. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gas Authority of India Ltd. vs. Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. and Ors. passed in CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 3504-3505 OF 2010, decided on 08.02.2023 and paragraph 20 thereof, where the Court observed that although the dispute arises from a commercial contract, the writ petition challenging the clauses of such contract was maintainable as it was not disputed that Gas Authority of India Ltd. is a Public Sector Undertaking and qualifies under the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution. At the time of entering into contract, GAIL was enjoying a monopolistic position with respect to the supply of natural gas in the country. The Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd., having incurred a significant expense in setting up appropriate infrastructure, had no choice but to enter into agreement with GAIL. Thus, there was a clear public element involved in the dealings between the parties and writ jurisdiction can be exercised when the State, even in its contractual dealings, fails to exercise a degree of fairness or practices any discrimination. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra Chess Association vs. Union of India and Anr. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra Chess Association vs. Union of India and Anr. [ (2020) 13 SCC 285 ] and paragraph 11 thereof, where it has been held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on High Courts the power to issue writs, and consequently, the jurisdiction to entertain actions for the issuance of writs not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but for any other purpose. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to various paragraphs in the said judgment to say that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that the High Court's powers are plenary in nature and are purely discretionary and no limits can be placed upon their discretion and that the bar relating to alternative remedy has to be considered to be a rule of self imposed limitation and it is essentially a Rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a Rule of law. Despite existence of an alternative remedy, it is within the jurisdiction or discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 30. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out from the Supplementary Counter Affidavit filed by the State Nodal Agency that a Coordinate Division Bench at Allahabad had directed payment to be made to various hospitals/petitioners by the Insurance Company, and direction has been issued also for payment of interest at the rate of 9% per annum for delay in releasing such amount. One such writ petition, namely, Writ-C No.18949 of 2019 was decided on 07.08.2019. 31. This Court has gone through Annexures 5, 6 and 7 pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner. It is apparent from SCA 5, which is an order dated 07.08.2019 passed in Writ-C No. 18949 of 2019, Anand Polyclinic and Trauma Centre and another Versus State of U.P. and three others, that the writ petition was filed for a direction to the Oriental Insurance Company to pay more than Rs.13 lakhs claimed by the petitioners under the RSBY within a reasonable time. The Court passed an Interim Order on 08.07.2019 directing the Managing Director to appear and explain why a direction be not issued to make payment with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, and for exemplary cost for compelling the petitioner to approach the Court. The Court passed an Interim Order on 08.07.2019 directing the Managing Director to appear and explain why a direction be not issued to make payment with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, and for exemplary cost for compelling the petitioner to approach the Court. In pursuance of the same, the Deputy Manager was present in Court and filed an affidavit that the amount had been paid through NEFT/ RTGS after deducting TDS. The Court directed interest to be paid from December 2018 as the Chief Executive Officer of State Nodal Agency had directed such payment to be made to the hospital on 05.11.2018. 32. The order dated 08.08.2019 is not a judgement as no issue was raised regarding maintainability of the writ petition for contractual obligations when the agreement between the parties, none of whom was State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, clearly provided for arbitration for settlement of disputes arising out of contract. 33. This Court has also gone through Interim Order passed by the same Coordinate Bench dated 05.07.2019 in Writ-C No. 1048 of 2019, Jeevan Dhara Hospital and Research Centre and another Versus State of U.P. and three others, and Interim Order dated 21.05.2019 in Writ-C No.17347 of 2019, M/s Ashirwad Hospital and Research Centre and another Versus Union of India and others. All the Interim Orders refer to the directions issued by the State Grievance Redressal Committee to the Regional Manager of Oriental Insurance company to make payment to the petitioner's hospitals and, thereafter, direct to make payments within one month or to appear in person before the Court. None of such interim orders are binding upon this Court. 34. This Court has considered the judgments as have been cited before us and finds that the judgment in the case of Ram Barai Singh and Co. None of such interim orders are binding upon this Court. 34. This Court has considered the judgments as have been cited before us and finds that the judgment in the case of Ram Barai Singh and Co. (supra), a writ petition was filed for interest on delayed refund of security deposit and against direction for recovery of labour escalation costs after completion of contract and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to notice that the agreement itself had worked out long back and in the earlier round of litigation as well as in the instant round of litigation, the respondents never raised any objection on the basis of arbitration clause, therefore, the High Court should not have remitted the matter on the ground of alternative remedy where no such objection was raised by the respondent at any stage. Availability of arbitration clause did not always forfeit the right of aggrieved party to file a writ petition. This Court has carefully considered the facts and finds that in the case of Ram Barai Singh and Co. (supra), it was a question of satisfactory performance of contract entered into between the Superintending Engineer of the Government of Bihar and the petitioner-company. 35. In the case of M/s. Surya Constructions (supra), the admitted dues for extra work done by the petitioner for U.P. Jal Nigam was claimed. The High Court had asked the U.P. Jal Nigam to decide the representation of the petitioner and in the decision on such representation, it had come out that the dues were admitted and were not being paid on account of various reasons. 36. In the case of Gas Authority of India Ltd. (supra), the dispute was between two Public Sector Undertakings, GAIL being the monopoly holder in supply of gas had entered into a contract for supply for such natural gas with IPCL which had set up and installed a Plant investing more than Rs. 4500/- crore in laying down pipelines between Hazira and the Plant at Gandhar. There was a dispute regarding the methodology of supply of gas and the price of gas. Hon'ble Supreme Court therefore in the context of such facts had made observations in paragraph 20, which has been read before us by the counsel for the petitioner. 37. 4500/- crore in laying down pipelines between Hazira and the Plant at Gandhar. There was a dispute regarding the methodology of supply of gas and the price of gas. Hon'ble Supreme Court therefore in the context of such facts had made observations in paragraph 20, which has been read before us by the counsel for the petitioner. 37. In the case of Maharashtra Chess Association (supra), a private agreement was entered into between the appellant and affiliated Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the second respondent, also a registered Society and the Governing Authority for Chess in India in the form of the Constitution and bye-laws of the latter. The question was with regard to the place/jurisdiction of Court to entertain the settlement of any dispute. The Court had observed that where several courts would have jurisdiction to try the subject matter of the dispute, the parties to a Contract can stipulate that a suit be brought exclusively before one of the several courts, to the exclusion of the others. The judgment rendered in the case of Maharashtra Chess Association (supra), is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the petitioner's case. 38. This Court has found from the arguments raised by the counsel for the parties and from the affidavits filed on their behalf that there is a serious dispute with regard to the verification of the beneficiaries/Smart Cards in between the State Nodal Agency and the Insurance Company. Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company, on the other hand, says that since premium has not been given due to dispute being raised regarding verification of Smart Card beneficiaries, it shall not make any payment to the petitioner. 39. The petitioner has no doubt challenged clause 2(iii) of the Central Government Advisory dated 17.07.2012 which empowered and entitle the Insurance Company to withhold payment of compensation in case of non-payment of premium. But this Court is of the opinion that such an Advisory/policy decision is of a routine nature which is found in all Insurance Policies. 40. Insurance coverage of the insured is as per the premium paid. Existence/continuance of any policy is dependant on payment of premium and non payment of the same would result in the end of the Insurance Policy and claim could be repudiated on that ground alone. 40. Insurance coverage of the insured is as per the premium paid. Existence/continuance of any policy is dependant on payment of premium and non payment of the same would result in the end of the Insurance Policy and claim could be repudiated on that ground alone. Therefore, the clause in the Government of India advisory is not arbitrary or unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 41. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the petitioner is claiming payment for services rendered by it under the agreement. 42. While considering the question of scope of judicial review of action by the State in a matter arising from a contract, and what is the effect of the contract not being statutory, and as to what constitutes public law element to bring in judicial review in contractual matters, the Supreme Court in M.P. Power (supra), considered the observations made by it in Radhakrishna Agarwal Versus State of Bihar (1977) 3 SCC 457 ; where petitions were filed against orders of the State Government revising the rate of royalty under a lease and the cancellation of the lease on various grounds. The Court was of the opinion that the only question which normally arose in such cases was as to whether the action complained of was in conformity with the agreement. It referred to the earlier judgements rendered, where the Supreme Court had observed that any duty or obligation falling upon a public servant out of a contract entered into by him as such public servant, cannot be enforced by the machinery of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. 43. In Banchhanidhi Rath Versus State of Orissa (1972) 4 SCC 781 , the Supreme Court had observed that if a right is claimed in terms of a contract such a right cannot be enforced in a writ petition. In Har Shankar Versus Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (1975) 1 SCC 737 ; the Constitution Bench had observed that ''a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations.' 44. The Court also took the view that it is the contract and not the executive power regulated by the Constitution which governs the relations of the parties. In Har Shankar Versus Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (1975) 1 SCC 737 ; the Constitution Bench had observed that ''a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations.' 44. The Court also took the view that it is the contract and not the executive power regulated by the Constitution which governs the relations of the parties. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power (supra) referred to the observations made by it in Mahavir Auto Stores Versus Indian Oil Corporation (1990) 3 SCC 752 ; where while referring to judgements in earlier cases, the Supreme Court had observed that the rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the Rule of Law applicable in situation or action by the State instrumentality in dealing with the citizens. Even though the rights of citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice equality and non-discrimination in the type of transactions and nature of the dealing as evident in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 45. In State of U.P. Versus Bridge and Roof Company India Ltd (1996) 6 SCC 22 ; the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of a writ petition filed by the respondent therein which was a Public Sector Corporation seeking payment allegedly due from the appellant State. The Court noted that the contract in question contained articles providing inter-alia for settlement of disputes by reference to arbitration. The very resort to Article 226 was found to be misconceived in the circumstances. The Court observed as follows:- "Firstly, the contract between the parties is a contract in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. It is governed by the provisions of the Contract Act or maybe, also by certain provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. Any dispute relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated, and could not have been agitated, in a writ petition. That is a matter either for arbitration as provided by the contract or for the civil court, as the case maybe. Any dispute relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated, and could not have been agitated, in a writ petition. That is a matter either for arbitration as provided by the contract or for the civil court, as the case maybe. Whether any amount is due to the respondent from the appellant - Government under the contract and, if so, how much and further the question whether retention or refusal to pay any amount by the Government is justified or not, are all matters which cannot be agitated in or adjudicated upon in a writ petition." (emphasis supplied) 46. In M.P. Power (supra), the Supreme Court also considered judgement rendered in Verigamto Naveen Vs. Government of A.P. (2001) SCC 344; which involved mining leases granted to a Corporation and sub lease, which was permitted by the Government which permission was later on sought to be withdrawn. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 21 as follows: - "21 ............... where the breach of contract involves breach of statutory obligation, when the order complained of was made in exercise of the statutory power by a statutory authority, though cause of action arises out of or pertains to contract, brings it within the sphere of public law because the power exercised is apart from contract. The freedom of the Government to enter into business with anybody it likes is subject to the condition of reasonableness and fair play as well as public interest. After entering into a contract, in cancelling the contract which is subject to the terms of the statutory provisions, as in the present case, it cannot be said that the matter falls purely in a contractual field..." 47. In paragraph 46 of the judgement in M.P. Power (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the observations made in ABL International Ltd Versus Export Credit Guarantee Corp of India Ltd (2004) 3 SCC 553 ; which involved a company incorporated under the Companies Act repudiating insurance claim made by the writ petitioner, in paragraph 27 as follows: - "27. In paragraph 46 of the judgement in M.P. Power (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the observations made in ABL International Ltd Versus Export Credit Guarantee Corp of India Ltd (2004) 3 SCC 553 ; which involved a company incorporated under the Companies Act repudiating insurance claim made by the writ petitioner, in paragraph 27 as follows: - "27. From the above discussion of ours, the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of the writ petition: (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against the State Or an instrumentality of the State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable.(b)Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A Writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable." 48. At the same time the Supreme Court in paragraph 28 of the same judgement had made the following observations : - "28. However, while entertaining and objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. - - - And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative Writ will not normally be exercised by the court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the state or its instrumentalities is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it fit and necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction." (emphasis supplied) 49. The Supreme Court steered clear of the criticism that it was not following the principles laid down by it in the State of U.P. Versus Bridge and Roof Corporation (supra), by noting that in the said case there was a contract which contained an arbitration clause but in ABL International (supra) there was no arbitration clause. 50. The Supreme Court steered clear of the criticism that it was not following the principles laid down by it in the State of U.P. Versus Bridge and Roof Corporation (supra), by noting that in the said case there was a contract which contained an arbitration clause but in ABL International (supra) there was no arbitration clause. 50. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power (supra) thereafter considered recent developments in law and culled out certain principles where High Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 can interfere in contractual matters also. It observed in paragraph 55 to 60 as follows: - "55. We may now notice the judgment of this court in Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India, which is also relied upon by the learned Additional Solicitor General. The said case actually involved the complaint of the writ petitioner therein that it was entitled to the benefit of Section 42 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which provided for certain deductions. The petitioner had entered into an agreement with the respondent, the Government of India. The case of the respondent, inter alia, was one denying the case of the petitioner that the omission of Section 42 was by oversight. The prayer in the writ petition itself inter alia was essentially to declare entitlement to the deduction under Section 42, inter alia. It is while dealing with the said case that this court no doubt proceeds to, inter alia, lay down as following after adverting to ABL limited (supra) also:--"69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances." "70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under: 70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness. 70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some discriminations. 70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so : and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. 70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary. 70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness.70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes." 56. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose, the specific question with which we are concerned with, namely, entertaining a writ petition in a contractual matter and where the specific question was the validity of the termination of the contract, fell for consideration. We may notice the following: "13. A writ court should ordinarily not entertain a writ petition, if there is a breach of contract involving disputed questions of fact. The present case clearly indicates that the factual disputes are involved." 57. Thereafter, the court went on to consider in detail the judgment of this Court in ABL (supra) and found that it was a case where the court granted relief as the facts were absolutely clear from the documentary evidence and it pertained to interpretation of such clauses of the contract of insurance. We need notice only paragraph 20 in M.K. Jose (supra). It reads as under: "20. We need notice only paragraph 20 in M.K. Jose (supra). It reads as under: "20. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities to highlight under what circumstances in respect of contractual claim or challenge to violation of contract can be entertained by a writ court. It depends upon facts of each case. The issue that had arisen in ABL International [ (2004) 3 SCC 553 ] was that an instrumentality of a State was placing a different construction on the clauses of the contract of insurance and the insured was interpreting the contract differently. The Court thought it apt merely because something is disputed by the insurer, it should not enter into the realm of disputed questions of fact. In fact, there was no disputed question of fact, but it required interpretation of the terms of the contract of insurance. Similarly, if the materials that come on record from which it is clearly evincible, the writ court may exercise the power of judicial review but, a pregnant one, in the case at hand, the High Court has appointed a Commission to collect the evidence, accepted the same without calling for objections from the respondent and quashed the order of termination of contract." (emphasis supplied) 58. In State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, the first respondent the successful tenderer had worked the contract for a year when he was visited with cancellation. This Court exhaustively referred to the earlier case law including ABL (supra) and Joshi Technology (supra) and held, inter alia, as follows:-- "23. It may be added that every case in which a citizen/person knocks at the doors of the writ court for breach of his or its fundamental rights is a matter which contains a "public law element", as opposed to a case which is concerned only with breach of contract and damages flowing therefrom. Whenever a plea of breach of natural justice is made against the State, the said plea, if found sustainable, sounds in constitutional law as arbitrary State action, which attracts the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - see Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121 at paragraph 7. Whenever a plea of breach of natural justice is made against the State, the said plea, if found sustainable, sounds in constitutional law as arbitrary State action, which attracts the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - see Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121 at paragraph 7. The present case is, therefore, a case which involves a "public law element" in that the petitioner (Respondent No. 1 before us) who knocked at the doors of the writ court alleged breach of the audi alteram partem rule, as the entire proceedings leading to cancellation of the tender, together with the cancellation itself, were done on an ex parte appraisal of the facts behind his back." 59. We have already concluded that PPA is not a Statutory Contract. However, that would not be the end of enquiry. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel, would point out that the contract, not being a statutory contract, assumes relevance only for the purpose of deciding as to whether the Court should relegate the writ applicant, to alternate remedies. In other words, while the Court would retain its discretion to entertain the petition or decline to do so, in the facts of each case, there is no absolute taboo against the Court granting relief, even if the challenge to the termination of a contract is made in the case of a contract, which is not statutory in nature, when the offending party is the State. In other words, the contention is that the law in this field has witnessed an evolution and, what is more, a revolution of sorts and a transformatory change with a growing realisation of the true ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The State, he points out, cannot play the Dr. Jekyll and Hyde game anymore. Its nature is cast in stone. Its character is inflexible. This is irrespective of the activity it indulges in. It will continue to be haunted by the mandate of Article 14 to act fairly. There has been a stunning expansion of the frontiers of the Court's jurisdiction to strike at State action in matters arising out of contract, based, undoubtedly, on the facts of each case. It remains open to the Court to refuse to reject a case, involving State action, on the basis that the action is, per se, arbitrary. 60. There has been a stunning expansion of the frontiers of the Court's jurisdiction to strike at State action in matters arising out of contract, based, undoubtedly, on the facts of each case. It remains open to the Court to refuse to reject a case, involving State action, on the basis that the action is, per se, arbitrary. 60. We may cull out our conclusions in regard to the points, which we have framed: i. It is, undoubtedly, true that the writ jurisdiction is a public law remedy. A matter, which lies entirely within a private realm of affairs of public body, may not lend itself for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction of the Court. ii. The principle laid down in Bareilly Development Authority (supra) that in the case of a non-statutory contract the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract and the decisions, which are purported to be followed, including Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra), may not continue to hold good, in the light of what has been laid down in ABL (supra) and as followed in the recent judgment in Sudhir Kumar Singh (supra). iii. The mere fact that relief is sought under a contract which is not statutory, will not entitle the respondent-State in a case by itself to ward-off scrutiny of its action or inaction under the contract, if the complaining party is able to establish that the action/inaction is, per se, arbitrary. iv. An action will lie, undoubtedly, when the State purports to award any largesse and, undoubtedly, this relates to the stage prior to the contract being entered into [See R.D. Shetty (supra)]. This scrutiny, no doubt, would be undertaken within the nature of the judicial review, which has been declared in the decision in Tata Cellular v. Union of India. v. After the contract is entered into, there can be a variety of circumstances, which may provide a cause of action to a party to the contract with the State, to seek relief by filing a Writ Petition. vi. Without intending to be exhaustive, it may include the relief of seeking payment of amounts due to the aggrieved party from the State. The State can, indeed, be called upon to honour its obligations of making payment, unless it be that there is a serious and genuine dispute raised relating to the liability of the State to make the payment. Without intending to be exhaustive, it may include the relief of seeking payment of amounts due to the aggrieved party from the State. The State can, indeed, be called upon to honour its obligations of making payment, unless it be that there is a serious and genuine dispute raised relating to the liability of the State to make the payment. Such dispute, ordinarily, would include the contention that the aggrieved party has not fulfilled its obligations and the Court finds that such a contention by the State is not a mere ruse or a pretence. vii. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a Writ Petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the Writ Petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the Writ Court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit. viii. The existence of a provision for arbitration, which is a forum intended to quicken the pace of dispute resolution, is viewed as a near bar to the entertainment of a Writ Petition (See in this regard, the view of this Court even in ABL (supra) explaining how it distinguished the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co., by its observations in paragraph-14 in ABL (supra)]. ix. The need to deal with disputed questions of fact, cannot be made a smokescreen to guillotine a genuine claim raised in a Writ Petition, when actually the resolution of a disputed question of fact is unnecessary to grant relief to a writ applicant. x. The reach of Article 14 enables a Writ Court to deal with arbitrary State action even after a contract is entered into by the State. A wide variety of circumstances can generate causes of action for invoking Article 14. x. The reach of Article 14 enables a Writ Court to deal with arbitrary State action even after a contract is entered into by the State. A wide variety of circumstances can generate causes of action for invoking Article 14. The Court's approach in dealing with the same, would be guided by, undoubtedly, the overwhelming need to obviate arbitrary State action, in cases where the Writ remedy provides an effective and fair means of preventing miscarriage of justice arising from palpably unreasonable action by the State. xi. Termination of contract can again arise in a wide variety of situations. If for instance, a contract is terminated, by a person, who is demonstrated, without any need for any argument, to be the person, who is completely unauthorised to cancel the contract, there may not be any necessity to drive the party to the unnecessary ordeal of a prolix and avoidable round of litigation. The intervention by the High Court, in such a case, where there is no dispute to be resolved, would also be conducive in public interest, apart from ensuring the Fundamental Right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When it comes to a challenge to the termination of a contract by the State, which is a non-statutory body, which is acting in purported exercise of the powers/rights under such a contract, it would be over simplifying a complex issue to lay down any inflexible Rule in favour of the Court turning away the petitioner to alternate Fora. Ordinarily, the cases of termination of contract by the State, acting within its contractual domain, may not lend itself for appropriate redress by the Writ Court. This is, undoubtedly, so if the Court is duty-bound to arrive at findings, which involve untying knots, which are presented by disputed questions of facts. Undoubtedly, in view of ABL Limited (supra), if resolving the dispute, in a case of repudiation of a contract, involves only appreciating the true scope of documentary material in the light of pleadings, the Court may still grant relief to an applicant. We must enter a caveat. The Courts are today reeling under the weight of a docket explosion, which is truly alarming. We must enter a caveat. The Courts are today reeling under the weight of a docket explosion, which is truly alarming. If a case involves a large body of documents and the Court is called upon to enter upon findings of facts and involves merely the construction of the document, it may not be an unsound discretion to relegate the party to the alternate remedy. This is not to deprive the Court of its constitutional power as laid down in ABL (supra). It all depends upon the facts of each case as to whether, having regard to the scope of the dispute to be resolved, whether the Court will still entertain the petition. xii. In a case the State is a party to the contract and a breach of a contract is alleged against the State, a civil action in the appropriate Forum is, undoubtedly, maintainable. But this is not the end of the matter. Having regard to the position of the State and its duty to act fairly and to eschew arbitrariness in all its actions, resort to the constitutional remedy on the cause of action, that the action is arbitrary, is permissible (See in this regard Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.). However, it must be made clear that every case involving breach of contract by the State, cannot be dressed up and disguised as a case of arbitrary State action. While the concept of an arbitrary action or inaction cannot be cribbed or confined to any immutable mantra, and must be laid bare, with reference to the facts of each case, it cannot be a mere allegation of breach of contract that would suffice. What must be involved in the case must be action/inaction, which must be palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle. An action, which is completely malafide, can hardly be described as a fair action and may, depending on the facts, amount to arbitrary action. The question must be posed and answered by the Court and all we intend to lay down is that there is a discretion available to the Court to grant relief in appropriate cases. xiii. A lodestar, which may illumine the path of the Court, would be the dimension of public interest subserved by the Court interfering in the matter, rather than relegating the matter to the alternate Forum. xiv. xiii. A lodestar, which may illumine the path of the Court, would be the dimension of public interest subserved by the Court interfering in the matter, rather than relegating the matter to the alternate Forum. xiv. Another relevant criteria is, if the Court has entertained the matter, then, while it is not tabooed that the Court should not relegate the party at a later stage, ordinarily, it would be a germane consideration, which may persuade the Court to complete what it had started, provided it is otherwise a sound exercise of jurisdiction to decide the matter on merits in the Writ Petition itself. xv. Violation of natural justice has been recognised as a ground signifying the presence of a public law element and can found a cause of action premised on breach of Article 14. [See Sudhir Kumar Singh (supra)]." (emphasis supplied) 51. This Court has carefully gone through the agreement and finds that it is an agreement between a private Insurance Company and the petitioner and the main relief sought by the petitioner is with respect to giving of a direction to the Insurance Company to make payment to the petitioner for the service provided in treating the beneficiaries. 52. This Court also finds that it is a non statutory contract which has an arbitration clause appended to it which had been signed by the petitioner with open eyes. If the petitioner claims any breach of such contract, the appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to approach the alternative Dispute Redressal Forum/Arbitral Tribunal as mentioned in clause 16.7 of the agreement signed between the private Insurance Company and the petitioner. The State Government is not a party to such Contract. 53. This Court therefore finds no good ground to show interference moreso, looking into the disputed questions of fact raised in the form of various affidavits filed by the parties. 54. In the result, the writ petition stands dismissed, leaving it open for the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum.