JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment & decree dated 23.8.2022, passed by the learned District Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., vide which the appeal filed by the appellant (defendant before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court seeking possession of the suit land mentioned in para-1 of the plaint. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the suit land. Hilnu, the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs constructed a house on Khasra No. 297/2 (new Khasra No. 2345/297). The predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs inducted the defendant as a tenant. The suit land with the house was sold by Hilnu son of Khwaja to the plaintiffs. The defendant was paying rent @ Rs.500/- per month to the plaintiffs till June 1998. The defendant filed a suit for declaration and injunction, which was dismissed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lahaul Spiti, at Kullu. The defendant filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track), Kullu which was dismissed. The plaintiffs are owners in possession as per the judgment passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lahaul Spiti, at Kullu. The defendant has not paid any rent since June 1998. The plaintiffs served a notice on 11.7.2007 demanding the rent. A notice terminating the tenancy was also issued on 7.8.2007; however, these notices were returned un-served. The plaintiffs issued a fresh notice on 9.12.2012, which was served upon the defendants on 13.12.2012. The defendant failed to vacate the house or pay the arrears of rent. Hence, the suit was filed for seeking the relief, mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement, taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability and cause of action, the plaintiffs having suppressed the material facts from the Court and the plaintiffs being estopped by their acts and conducts to file the civil suit. The contents of the plaint were denied on merits. It was asserted that Hilnu, the previous owner of the suit land, had filed a civil suit for injunction against the defendant and her husband. The suit was compromised between the parties. The contents of the plaint were denied on merits. It was asserted that Hilnu, the previous owner of the suit land, had filed a civil suit for injunction against the defendant and her husband. The suit was compromised between the parties. Hilnu relinquished 2-10 bighas of land in favour of the defendant. The defendant and her husband agreed not to interfere with the remaining part of the suit land. Hilnu executed a Sale Deed No. 902, dated 28.5.1992 in favour of the defendant. The defendant could not appear before the Revenue Authorities and mutation no. 3926 based on the sale deed was rejected. The defendant had filed a civil suit for injunction and the outcome of the civil suit does not affect the present suit. The defendant is the owner and not liable to pay any rent or mesne profit. The defendant and her family members have resided in the house since 1982. She was also paying the house tax. The suit was filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the same be dismissed. 4. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 5. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 20.4.2015 and additional issue on 17.1.2022 while dictating the judgment in order to avoid hardship to the parties:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the recovery of Rs.18,000/- as rent and Rs.12,000/- as use and occupation charges from 01.01.2013 to 28.02.2013 total sum of Rs.40,000/- alongwith interest and future use and occupation charges till disposal of the suit, as prayed? OPP. 1A. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for possession of suit property from the defendant, as prayed? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs are not owners of the suit property, as alleged? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiffs have no enforceable cause of action to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiffs have suppressed the true and material facts from the Court, as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their act and conduct to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD. 6. Relief. 6. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence and plaintiff no.1 examined herself (PW-1) and Rajeev Singh (PW-2). The defendant examined Kulbhushan Singh (DW-1), Om Prakash (DW-2), herself (DW-3), Bhagat Ram (DW-4), Om Prakash (DW-5) and Anjana (DW-6). 7. OPD. 6. Relief. 6. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence and plaintiff no.1 examined herself (PW-1) and Rajeev Singh (PW-2). The defendant examined Kulbhushan Singh (DW-1), Om Prakash (DW-2), herself (DW-3), Bhagat Ram (DW-4), Om Prakash (DW-5) and Anjana (DW-6). 7. The learned Trial Court held that defendant (Sheela Devi) filed a previous suit against the plaintiffs regarding Khasra No. 297, measuring 0-02-10 bighas and the house existing on the same. The suit was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Lahaul & Spiti at Kullu after holding that the plaintiffs were the owners. This judgment was upheld by learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Kullu. The sale deed executed by Hilnu in favour of the defendants was void because he had already sold the suit land to the plaintiffs and was not left with any right, title or interest to convey to the defendant. The documents produced by the defendant do not establish her ownership. Her plea that she had constructed the house was not proved and the plea of the plaintiffs that the defendant was a tenant was acceptable. The defendant did not pay any rent and her tenancy was terminated by a legal notice. She is liable to pay the rent and the mesne profit to the plaintiffs. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered issue no. 1, 1A in the affirmative, issue no. 2 to 5 in the negative and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the defendant filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned District Judge, Kullu. Learned First Appellate Court concurred with the findings of the learned Trial Court that the sale deed in favour of the defendant was bad because Hilnu had already sold the suit land to the plaintiffs on 26.3.1992 and subsequent transfers are subject to the previous transfer. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the plea of the defendant that she had constructed the house was not probable. The tenancy of the defendant was validly terminated by serving a notice. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved from the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below, the present appeal has been filed asserting that the learned Courts below did not appreciate the material placed before them. The real point of controversy was not considered. The tenancy of the defendant was validly terminated by serving a notice. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved from the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below, the present appeal has been filed asserting that the learned Courts below did not appreciate the material placed before them. The real point of controversy was not considered. The points raised by the defendant were not considered and there was non-compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC. The defendant is the owner and she was wrongly held to be a tenant. Hilnu had filed a civil suit against the defendant and her husband, which was compromised and Hilnu executed a sale deed in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff had also filed a civil suit No. 142 of 1993, which was decreed ex-parte. The relief sought in the present suit could have been sought in the previous suit; hence, the present suit is barred by Section 11 and Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. The plaintiffs have not identified the suit land and no executable decree could have been passed. The version of the defendant was duly proved by her witnesses. The plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendant was inducted as a tenant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below be set-aside. 10. The following substantial questions of law were proposed in the memorandum of appeal:- 1. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC since the plaintiffs had earlier filed civil suit bearing No. 142/93 which was decided on 29.08.1997 against the present appellant/ defendant? 2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs is hit by the principle of res-judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the judgment and decree passed in an earlier suit bearing No. 142/93 which was filed by the respondents/plaintiffs? 3. Whether the Courts below have misread, misinterpreted and misappreciated oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record? 4. 3. Whether the Courts below have misread, misinterpreted and misappreciated oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record? 4. Whether the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs does not comply the provisions of Order 6 of CPC by not identifying the suit property, therefore, on this account no executable decree can be passed in favour of the plaintiffs, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was required to be dismissed in its entirety? 5. Whether the learned Courts below have erred by holding the appellant/defendant to be tenant of the suit property keeping in view the sale deed Ex.DW-5/A, whereby the appellant/defendant had purchased the suit land from late Sh. Hilnu and erred by granting use and occupation charges and mesne profit along with arrears of rent? 6. Whether the appellant/defendant has pleaded and proved on record that she has acquired ownership rights by virtue of Sale Deed dated 28.05.1992, as such, she has become owner of the suit land and structure existing thereon? 11. I have heard Mr. Romesh Verma, learned SeniorAdvocate, assisted by Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate, for the appellant/defendant and Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs. 12. Mr. Romesh Verma,learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/defendant submitted that the learned Courts below erred in decreeing the suit. It was duly proved by the evidence on record that the defendant had purchased the suit land together with the house construed thereon from Hilnu, the previous owner. The plaintiffs had filed a civil suit previously which was decreed ex-parte; however, the plaintiffs had not sought the reliefof vacant possession, arrears of rent and the mesne profit. Therefore, the present suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC and Section 11 of CPC. The suit land was not properly identified and no decree could have been passed. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be admitted on the proposed substantial questions of law. 13. Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff supported the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. He submitted that learned Courts below had rightly held that the sale deed in favour of the defendant was bad because Hilnu had already conveyed his title to the plaintiffs and he had no title to convey to the defendants. 13. Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff supported the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. He submitted that learned Courts below had rightly held that the sale deed in favour of the defendant was bad because Hilnu had already conveyed his title to the plaintiffs and he had no title to convey to the defendants. The cause of action for filing a suit for possession had not accrued at the time of filing of the previous suit because the tenancy was not validly terminated. The present suit cannot be held to be barred by the principle of res-judicata and Order 2 Rule 2. Thus, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 14. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 15. It was submitted that the plaintiffs had filed a civil suit no. 142 of 1993, which was decided on 29.8.1997 vide judgment (Ex.P-5). The plaintiffs had not sought the relief of possession and arrears of rent in the previous suit; hence, the present suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 and Section 11 of CPC. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment (Ex.P-5) and decree (Ex.P-6) to substantiate his contention. This submission is not acceptable. The defendant has not proved the pleadings in the previous suit. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, (1964) 7 SCR 831 : AIR 1964 SC 1810 that bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC cannot be invoked without filing the copies of the pleadings. It was observed:- “7. Learned Counsel for the appellant, however, urged that in his plaint in the present suit, the respondent had specifically referred to the previous suit having been for mesne profits and that as mesne profits could not be claimed except from a trespasser there should also have been an allegation in the previous suit that the defendant was a trespasser in wrongful possession of the property and that alone could have been the basis for claiming mesne profits. We are unable to accept this argument. In the first place, it is admitted that the plaint in the present suit was in Hindi and that the word ‘mesne profits’ is an English translation of some expression used in the original. We are unable to accept this argument. In the first place, it is admitted that the plaint in the present suit was in Hindi and that the word ‘mesne profits’ is an English translation of some expression used in the original. The original of the plaint is not before us and so it is not possible to verify whether the expression ‘mesne profits’ is an accurate translation of the expression in the original plaint. This apart, we consider that learned Counsel's argument must be rejected for a more basic reason. Just as in the case of a plea of res judicata which cannot be established in the absence of the record of the judgment and decree which is pleaded as estoppel, we consider that a plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be made out except on proof of the plaint in the previous suit the filing of which is said to create the bar. As the plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits the defence which raises the bar has necessarily to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. The cause of action would be the facts which the plaintiff had then alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed. Without placing before the Court the plaint in which those facts were alleged, the defendant cannot invite the Court to speculate or infer by a process of deduction what those facts might be with reference to the reliefs which were then claimed. It is not impossible that reliefs were claimed without the necessary averments to justify their grant. From the mere use of the words ‘mesne profits’ therefore one need not necessarily infer that the possession of the defendant was alleged to be wrongful. It is also possible that the expression ‘mesne profits’ has been used in the present plaint without a proper appreciation of its significance in law. What matters is not the characterisation of the particular sum demanded but what in substance is the allegation on which the claim to the sum was based and as regards the legal relationship on the basis of which that relief was sought. What matters is not the characterisation of the particular sum demanded but what in substance is the allegation on which the claim to the sum was based and as regards the legal relationship on the basis of which that relief was sought. It is because of these reasons that we consider that a plea based on the existence of a former pleading cannot be entertained when the pleading on which it rests has not been produced. We therefore consider that the order of remand passed by the learned Additional District Judge which was confirmed by the learned Judge in the High Court was right. The merits of the suit have yet to be tried and this has been directed by the order of remand which we are affirming.” 16. A similar view was taken in Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co., (1997) 1 SCC 99 , wherein it was held:- “7. A mere look at the said provisions shows that once the plaintiff comes to a court of law for getting any redress basing his case on an existing cause of action he must include in his suit the whole claim pertaining to that cause of action. But if he gives up a part of the claim based on the said cause of action or omits to sue in connection with the same then he cannot subsequently resurrect the said claim based on the same cause of action. So far as sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 CPC is concerned, bar of which appealed to both the courts below, before the second suit of the plaintiff can be held to be barred by the same it must be shown that the second suit is based on the same cause of action on which the earlier suit was based and if the cause of action is the same in both the suits and if in the earlier suit plaintiff had not sued for any of the reliefs available to it on the basis of that cause of action, the reliefs which it had failed to press in service in that suit cannot be subsequently prayed for except with the leave of the court. It must, therefore, be shown by the defendants for supporting their plea of bar of Order 2, Rule 2, sub-rule (3) that the second suit of the plaintiff filed in 1982 is based on the same cause of action on which its earlier suit of 1980 was based and that because it had not prayed for any relief on the ground of passing off action and it had not obtained leave of the court in that connection, it cannot sue for that relief in the present second suit. So far as this plea of the defendants is concerned there is a threshold bar against them for their failure to bring on record the pleadings of the earlier suit which unfortunately has not been properly appreciated by the courts below. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal [ (1964) 7 SCR 831 : AIR 1964 SC 1810 ] speaking through Ayyangar, J. in this connection has laid down as under: “In order that a plea of a bar under Order 2, Rule 2(3), Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out (1) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based, (2) that in respect of that cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief, (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, unless there is an identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on the basis of inferential reasoning. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on the basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar under Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. It is common ground that the pleadings in C.S. No. 28 of 1950 were not filed by the appellant in the present suit as evidence in support of his plea under Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. The learned trial Judge, however, without these pleadings being on the record inferred what the cause of action should have been from the reference to the previous suit contained in the plaint as a matter of deduction. At the stage of the appeal the learned District Judge noticed this lacuna in the appellant's case and pointed out, in our opinion rightly, that without the plaint in the previous suit being on the record, a plea of a bar under Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code was not maintainable.” 8. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of this Court the learned trial Judge as well as the learned Single Judge of the High Court ought to have held that the plea raised by the defendants in the present case is barred at the threshold as the defendants had not produced on the record of the trial court the pleadings in the first suit. Thus there is a complete bar against the defendants from raising the bar of Order 2, Rule 2, sub-rule (3) against the plaintiff in the present case. In this connection, we may refer to one submission made by the learned counsel for the defendants which appealed to the learned Single Judge of the High Court. He submitted that the averments in the second suit of the plaintiff were that the first suit was misconceived and proper relief was not prayed for. In this connection, we may refer to one submission made by the learned counsel for the defendants which appealed to the learned Single Judge of the High Court. He submitted that the averments in the second suit of the plaintiff were that the first suit was misconceived and proper relief was not prayed for. Therefore, it can be inferred that the second suit was hit by the bar of Order 2, Rule 2, sub-rule (3) CPC and he further submitted that at least in the counter filed in reply to the special leave petition the defendants have produced the copy of the plaint in the first suit. We fail to appreciate how this effort on the part of the defendants can be of any avail to them. Firstly, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbux Singh case [ (1964) 7 SCR 831 : AIR 1964 SC 1810 ] has clearly ruled that there cannot be any inference about the bar of Order 2, Rule 2, sub-rule (3) CPC which may be culled out from plaint in the second case and secondly once the plea of bar of Order 2, Rule 2, sub-rule (3) was not available to the defendants in the suit in the absence of the pleadings in the earlier suit being brought on the record by them in support of their case before the trial court they had missed the bus especially when even before the High Court no attempt was made by the defendants to produce the pleadings in the earlier suit by way of an application for additional evidence. Therefore, it is too late in the day for the defendants to contend that along with counter in the special leave petition before us they had produced a copy of the plaint in the earlier suit. In the light of the clear pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in the case of Gurbux Singh [ (1964) 7 SCR 831 : AIR 1964 SC 1810 ], it must be held that it was not open to the defendants to raise the contention of the bar of Order 2, Rule 2, sub-rule (3) CPC in the present case and, therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court was clearly in error in non-suiting the plaintiff on that ground. 17. This position was reiterated in S. Nazir Ahmad Vs. 17. This position was reiterated in S. Nazir Ahmad Vs. State Bank of Mysore 2007 (11) SCC 75 , and it was held:- 9. Now, we come to the merit of the contention of the appellant that the present suit is hit by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code in view of the fact that the plaintiff omitted to claim relief based on the mortgage, in the earlier suit OS No. 131 of 1984. Obviously, the burden to establish this plea was on the appellant. The appellant has not even cared to produce the plaint in the earlier suit to show what exactly was the cause of action put in the suit by the Bank in that suit. That the production of pleadings is a must is clear from the decisions of this Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal [ AIR 1964 SC 1810 : (1964) 7 SCR 831 ] and Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co. [ (1997) 1 SCC 99 : AIR 1997 SC 1398 : 1996 Supp (8) SCR 695] From the present plaint, especially Paras 10 to 12 thereof, it is seen that the Bank had earlier sued for recovery of the loan with interest thereon as a money suit. No relief was claimed for recovery of the money on the foot of the equitable mortgage. In that suit, the Bank appears to have attempted in execution, to bring the mortgaged properties to sale. The appellant had objected that the suit not being on the mortgage, the mortgaged properties could not be sold in execution without an attachment. That objection was upheld. The Bank was therefore suing in enforcement of the mortgage by deposit of title deeds by the appellant. 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Mohd. SalieLabbai v. Mohd. Hanifa, (1976) 4 SCC 780 , that, the respective pleadings of the parties in the previous suit have to be brought on record to determine the case of the parties. The recitals in the pleadings cannot be inferred from the judgment. It was observed (at page 790): “8. In the instant case according to the plaintiffs-respondents, the identity of the subject matter in the present suit is quite different from the one which was adjudicated upon in the suits which formed the basis of the previous litigation. The recitals in the pleadings cannot be inferred from the judgment. It was observed (at page 790): “8. In the instant case according to the plaintiffs-respondents, the identity of the subject matter in the present suit is quite different from the one which was adjudicated upon in the suits which formed the basis of the previous litigation. In our opinion, the best method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suits and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgments which operate as res judicata. Unfortunately however in this case the pleadings of the suits instituted by the parties have not at all been filed and we have to rely upon the facts as mentioned in the judgments themselves. It is well settled that pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals of the allegations mentioned in the judgment.” 19. This position was reiterated in V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava, (2004) 1 SCC 551 : 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1405, wherein it was observed at page 556: “12. The plea of res judicata is founded on proof of certain facts and then by applying the law to the facts so found. It is, therefore, necessary that the foundation for the plea must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried. A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal [see (Raja) Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb v. Gour Hari Mahato AIR 1936 PC 258 : 1936 All LR 786, Medapati Surayya v. Tondapu Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi [ AIR 1948 PC 3 : (1947) 2 MLJ 511 ] and Katragadda China Anjaneyulu v. Kattaragadda China Ramayya [ AIR 1965 AP 177 : (1965) 1 An LT 149 (FB)] ]. The view taken by the Privy Council was cited with approval before this Court in State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal (1970) 3 SCC 656 . The view taken by the Privy Council was cited with approval before this Court in State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal (1970) 3 SCC 656 . However, an exception was carved out by this Court and the plea was permitted to be raised, though not taken in the pleadings nor covered by any issue because the necessary facts were present to the mind of the parties and were gone into by the trial court. The opposite party had ample opportunity of leading the evidence in rebuttal of the plea. The Court concluded that the point of res judicata had throughout been in consideration and discussion and so the want of pleadings or plea of waiver of res judicata cannot be allowed to be urged. 13. Not only the plea has to be taken, but it has to be substantiated by producing copies of the pleadings, issues and judgment in the previous case. Maybe, in a given case only a copy of the judgment in the previous suit is filed in proof of plea of res judicata and the judgment contains exhaustive or in requisite details the statement of pleadings and the issues which may be taken as enough proof. But as pointed out in Syed Mohd. SalieLabbai v. Mohd. Hanifa (1976) 4 SCC 780 the basic method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suit and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgment which operates as res judicata. It is risky to speculate about the pleadings merely by a summary of recitals of the allegations made in the pleadings mentioned in the judgment. The Constitution Bench in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal AIR 1964 SC 1810 : (1964) 7 SCR 831 placing on a par the plea of res judicata and the plea of estoppel under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that proof of the plaint in the previous suit which is set to create the bar, ought to be brought on record. The plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits and, therefore, it is necessary for the defence which raises the bar to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. The plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits and, therefore, it is necessary for the defence which raises the bar to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. Such pleas cannot be left to be determined by mere speculation or inferring by a process of deduction what were the facts stated in the previous pleadings. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secy. of State for India in Council (1887-88) 15 IA 186: ILR 16 Cal 173 pointed out that the plea of res judicata cannot be determined without ascertaining what were the matters in issue in the previous suit and what was heard and decided. Needless to say, these can be found out only by looking into the pleadings, the issues and the judgment in the previous suit.” 20. Hence, in the absence of the pleadings in the previous litigation, it cannot be inferred that the present suit is barred by the principle of res-judicata or under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. 21. Even otherwise a perusal of the judgment shows that the previous suit was filed by the plaintiffs for seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant on the allegations that the plaintiffs were the owners in possession of the suit land. The defendant was a tenant. She was interfering with the suit land and raising construction on it. She was requested not to do so. Hence, the suit was filed to seek an injunction. It was never pleaded that the tenancy of the defendant was terminated. It was asserted in the present suit that the notice was served upon the defendant on 7.8.2007 terminating her tenancy which was not accepted. Again a fresh notice was issued on 9.12.2012 which was served upon the defendant. Therefore, the cause of action for filing the suit for possession by ejectment of the tenant had not arisen at the time of filing the previous suit and the necessary condition that the plaintiffs being entitled to the relief had omitted to sue for the same is missing. Similarly, it was asserted that the rent was not paid w.e.f. June, 1998. The previous suit was filed on 26.6.1993 and was decreed on 29.8.1997 much before the defendant stopped the payment of the rent. Similarly, it was asserted that the rent was not paid w.e.f. June, 1998. The previous suit was filed on 26.6.1993 and was decreed on 29.8.1997 much before the defendant stopped the payment of the rent. Hence, the cause of action for seeking the arrears of rent had also not accrued in favour of the plaintiffs at the time of filing the previous suit. Even otherwise, it was laid down by Andhra Pradesh High Court in Koduru Varalakshmamma v. Tata Raghulu, 1987 SCC OnLine AP 61 : (1987) 2 ALT 75 that the cause of action for each year’s rent is distinct and the suit filed for seeking the recovery of the arrears of rent for a particular year is not barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC, by a suit filed for the recovery of rent for previous years. It was observed: 5. In Chittoori Swamy v. Ravula Suryanarayana 1970 (2) An WR 173 a Division Bench of this Court in the context of considering the petition filed by the landlord for eviction under the A.P. Tenancy Act, in relation to the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC on the ground that the landlord should have included the claim for eviction for default for 1956-1957 and for failure to pay the rent for 1957-1958, it is held as follows:— “The relief of eviction enures to the landlord for each successive defaults Committed by the tenant Default in each year constitutes a separate cause of action for the eviction of the tenant. The cause of action for the default committed in respect of 1956-1957 is a distinct cause of action from the default committed in respect of 1957-1958, though the relief that would be ultimately granted in respect of these successive defaults may be the same relief of eviction. Order 2 Rule 2 does not require that the relief of eviction based on distinct causes of action should be included in the same suit.” 6. Each year is a self-contained unit for the purpose of payment of rent. The default in each year constitutes an independent cause of action and therefore, the question of arrears of rent for the different years coming within the purview of the same cause of action does not arise 22. Each year is a self-contained unit for the purpose of payment of rent. The default in each year constitutes an independent cause of action and therefore, the question of arrears of rent for the different years coming within the purview of the same cause of action does not arise 22. Therefore, the submission that the present suit is barred under Section 11 of CPC and under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC is not acceptable. 23. The defendant claimed that Hilnu had filed a civil suit against her which was compromised between the parties and Hilnu executed a sale deed (Mark-X) in her favour on 28.5.1992. Learned Courts below have concurrently found that Hilnu had already conveyed the suit land to the plaintiffs on 26.3.1992 and mutation No. 4113 (Ex.P-3) was attested in favour of the plaintiffs. This question was settled in the previous suit titled Sheela Devi Vs. Santosh Kumari. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) had specifically held in its judgment (Ex.PA) that Hilnu executed a registered sale deed in favour of the present plaintiffs. He could not enter into any compromise with the present defendant and the sale deed executed by him was void. This judgment was affirmed by learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Kullu vide his judgment (Ex.P-7). The suit filed by the defendant was dismissed as per these findings. The defendant is bound by these findings and cannot assert to the contrary. 24. The plaintiffs have relied upon the mutation (Ex.P-1) attested in their favour as per the registered sale deed dated 26.3.1992. The defendant stated in her cross -examination that she was not aware that Hilnu had executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence, she has not denied the title of the plaintiffs specifically. Learned Courts below had rightly held that Hilnu could not have executed any sale deed in favour of the defendant after conveying the suit land to the plaintiffs. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kavita Kanwar v. Pamela Mehta, (2021) 11 SCC 209 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 464, that no one can confer a better than what he has. It was observed at page 269:- “30.6. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kavita Kanwar v. Pamela Mehta, (2021) 11 SCC 209 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 464, that no one can confer a better than what he has. It was observed at page 269:- “30.6. It remains trite that no one can convey a better title than what he had; as expressed in the maxim: Nemo dat quod non habet [See, for example, Narinder Singh Rao v. Mahinder Singh Rao, (2013) 9 SCC 425 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 385, where the testatrix had bequeathed property in excess to her share and this Court held that the bequest has to be treated only to the extent of the share held by the testatrix.]. The testatrix never had any right over the property belonging to the appellant and could not have conveyed to Respondent 1 any property which was of the ownership of the appellant or which might be acquired or raised by the appellant in future by her own funds. On this ground alone, the will in question is required to be considered void as per Section 89 of the Succession Act, when the principal bequeathing stipulation in the will suffers from uncertainty to the hilt.” 25. Similar is the judgment in Mrs. Umadevi Nambiar Versus Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese (2022) 7 SCC 90 , wherein it was observed:- “19. It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of property that "no one can confer a better title than what he himself has" (Nemo dat quod non-habet). The appellant's sister did not have the power to sell the property to the vendors of the respondent. Therefore, the vendors of the respondent could not have derived any valid title to the property. If the vendors of the respondent themselves did not have any title, they had nothing to convey to the respondent, except perhaps the litigation.” 26. The plea taken by the defendant that she had purchased the suit land and constructed a house thereon was not proved. The possession of the defendant was duly established; hence the version of the plaintiffs was to be accepted as correct that the defendant was in possession as a tenant. The plea taken by the defendant that she had purchased the suit land and constructed a house thereon was not proved. The possession of the defendant was duly established; hence the version of the plaintiffs was to be accepted as correct that the defendant was in possession as a tenant. Even otherwise, this question has already been decided in the Civil Suit No. 142 of 1993, wherein the claim of the plaintiffs that the defendant was the tenant who had no right to interfere with the rest of the land was accepted and the suit was decreed for a permanent prohibitory injunction. 27. The plaintiffs stated that they had terminated the tenancy of the defendant by means of a notice dated 1.12.2012 (Ex.PW-1/A). This notice clearly mentions that the tenancy of the defendant was terminated on the expiry in December 2012. No infirmity has been shown in the notice. This notice was duly served upon the defendant and the acknowledgements Ex.PW-1/C and Ex.PW-1/B were received. Hence, learned Courts below had rightly held that the tenancy of the defendant was terminated by the plaintiffs. 28. It was submitted that learned Courts below erred in determining the mesne profit of Rs.6,000/- per month. This submission is not acceptable. Learned Trial Court held that the testimony of the plaintiffs that use and occupation charges are Rs.6,000/- per month was not challenged in the cross-examination. It was never suggested to the plaintiffs that the suit property would not have fetched the rent of Rs.6,000/- per month. Learned First Appellate Court concurred with these findings. These are pure findings of fact and are supported by the material on record. Thus, the plea that learned Courts below erred in determining the mesne profit @ Rs. 6,000/- per month cannot be accepted. 29. It was submitted that the suit was bad as the property was not identified. This is not correct. The suit was filed regarding khasra numbers mentioned in the copy of jamabandi for the year 2009-10 (Ex.PW-1/F). Therefore, the suit land was identified by a specific number in the revenue record and the plea that the decree was not executable is not acceptable. 30. Thus, the present appeal does not involve any substantial questions of law and the same cannot be admitted. Final order: 31. Therefore, the suit land was identified by a specific number in the revenue record and the plea that the decree was not executable is not acceptable. 30. Thus, the present appeal does not involve any substantial questions of law and the same cannot be admitted. Final order: 31. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed, so also pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.