JUDGMENT : Chowdhary, J. 1. This appeal, under Section 17 of the J&K State Consumers Protection Act (as was then applicable), has been preferred by the Appellant-Insurance Company against the award dated 6th of December, 2018 passed by the erstwhile J&K State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC) Srinagar (for short “the Commission”) in a complaint No. 57/2018, titled ‘Ruhail Manzoor Gunna v. National Insurance Company Limited’, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.4.50 lacs, along with interest @ 10 % per annum from the date of complaint, besides litigation costs of Rs.20,000/- were awarded in favour of the complainant/ Respondent herein. 2. The brief facts of the case, as these emerge from the perusal of the pleadings on record, are that the complainant/ Respondent herein as owner of vehicle (Tata 407M-2014 Goods Carriage) bearing Registration No. JK01W-1652, insured it with the Appellant-Insurance Company for a sum of Rs.7,06,325/-, with the validity of the insurance policy being from the 24th day of April, 2014 till 23rd of April, 2015. 2.1. The said vehicle is stated to have met with an accident at Raingi, Baramulla on 12th of January, 2015, as a result of which the vehicle suffered total damage. An intimation about the said accident and the loss suffered to the vehicle was given to the Appellant-Insurance Company, who deputed a surveyor, namely, H. S. Mehta, for assessment of the loss. The surveyor reported that the vehicle in question has suffered total loss and, accordingly, assessed the loss at Rs.4,59,000/-. However, the Appellant-Insurance Company did not settle the aforesaid claim/ loss of the Respondent herein. 2.2. The Respondent filed a complaint before the Commission, thereby claiming a sum of Rs.7,06,325/-, as principal amount, on account of the loss suffered with interest @ 12 % per annum from the date of loss till the date of final payment. Besides, he also claimed a sum of Rs.2.00 lacs for the unreasonable delay caused in the settlement of the claim and for the mental agonies suffered due to the deficient services of the Insurance Company, coupled with a sum of Rs.2.00 lacs as compensation for the unfair trade practices adopted by the Appellant-Insurance Company and Rs.1.00 lacs as litigation expenses. 3. 3. The Appellant-Insurance Company is claimed to have filed a Written Statement before the Commission, wherein the only objection taken in opposition to the claim was that the vehicle of the complainant did not carry a valid permit on the date of accident and, therefore, the complainant could not be compensated by the Company, inasmuch as the vehicle was being plied in violation of one of the fundamental conditions of the policy of insurance, as such, the claim was repudiated. 4. The Commission, after hearing the Counsel for the parties, passed an award on 6th of December, 2018, whereby the Appellant-Insurance Company has been directed to pay an amount of Rs.4.50 lacs to the Respondent, along with interest @ 10% from the date of complaint as well as litigation costs to the tune of Rs.20,000/-. 5. The impugned award has been assailed by the Appellant-Insurance Company, inter alia, on the following grounds: “a. That, admittedly, the vehicle in question at the time of accident was being plied without having the Route Permit. The Commission has allowed the complaint on the ground that the Respondent has deposited the requisite fee and it was for the RTO to issue the Permit and as such the objections raised by the Appellant regarding Route Permit is not sustainable. The Commission did not consider the admitted fact that the Vehicle was driven without Route Permit. The record reveals that the Vehicle had been registered on 22.07.2014 Communication dated 01.12.2015 issued by ARTO Kashmir to the Insured annexed by the Company with their written version reveal that the Insured had deposited permit fee vide GR No.7209909 dated 14.07.2014 but till date i.e. upto the date of said communication, he has not submitted necessary papers to the ARTO office. The accident of the Vehicle has been taken on 12.01.2015 meaning thereby the vehicle was being plied without route permit on the date of accident. In terms of the said communication, it is revealed that the ARTO office has not issued the Route Permit for the lapse of the insured as he has not submitted the necessary papers to the ARTO office. Mere depositing of the fees only will not amount to the granting of Route Permit. In terms of the said communication, it is revealed that the ARTO office has not issued the Route Permit for the lapse of the insured as he has not submitted the necessary papers to the ARTO office. Mere depositing of the fees only will not amount to the granting of Route Permit. Even there was no lapse on the part of ARTO office for not issuing the Route Permit Hence, the impugned Judgment is liable to be set aside; b. That assuming but not admitting that there has been any lapse on the part of the ARTO for not issuing the Route Permit even then the Company cannot be held liable to indemnify the loss as the Vehicle had been plied admittedly without Route Permit on the date of accident. It is settled position of law as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titled ‘National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Cheela Charthamma & Ors.’ that the vehicle which does not have valid Route Permit on the date of accident amounts to fundamental breach of the Policy conditions. Not only that plying of the vehicle without a valid a route permit is not only breach of the Policy conditions but also breach of law, as such, the Appellant could not be held liable to indemnify the owner, therefore, the impugned Judgment is bad in law; c. That the Commission has failed to appreciate that the owner has committed breach of the Policy conditions as the offending vehicle was being driven without Route Permit. Thus, the finding recorded by the Ld. State Commission is not correct in law. Since there is apparent breach of terms and conditions of the Policy of Insurance committed by the Inured and the subject matter was not plied in accordance with its “limitation as to use” detailed in the Policy Schedule itself. Therefore, the impugned Judgment is bad in law and liable to be set aside; d. That the Ld. State Commission had allowed the complaint at the preliminary hearing stage. It is submitted that Section 11 and 16 of the J&K State Consumers Protection Act 1987 requires giving opposite party notice and also opportunity of filing its version and if the opposite party would deny or dispute the allegations then the Ld. State Commission had allowed the complaint at the preliminary hearing stage. It is submitted that Section 11 and 16 of the J&K State Consumers Protection Act 1987 requires giving opposite party notice and also opportunity of filing its version and if the opposite party would deny or dispute the allegations then the Ld. State Commission has to give opportunity to the parties to place evidence on record It is submitted that the Ld State Commission has allowed the compliant without following the said procedure under the J&K Consumer Protection Act 1987, therefore, the impugned Judgment is liable to be set aside; and e. That the Ld. State Commission is also not right in awarding 10% interest from the date of filing of the complaint with litigation charges of Rs.20,000/- as there has been no deficiency in service on part of the Appellant. It is submitted that before settling the claim the respondent was given number of opportunities to produce the Route Permit which he failed to produce the same. Thereafter, the claim was considered on its merits and the same was closed about which the respondent was also informed vide communication dated 16.05.2016. Thus, there has been no deficiency on service on part of the Appellant in not settling the claim.” 6. Mr Aatir Javed Kawoosa, the learned Counsel, appearing for the Appellant-Insurance Company, has vehemently argued that the learned Commission has not appreciated the controversy involved in the matter in its true and correct perspective. He has argued that since the vehicle in question did not carry a valid route permit on the date of accident and, therefore, the complainant/ Respondent herein could not have been compensated by the Appellant-Insurance Company as the insured vehicle, at the time of accident, was being plied in contravention of one of the fundamental conditions of the policy of insurance. The learned Counsel has, accordingly, prayed that the impugned award be set aside, having been passed without appreciating the legal position. 7. Mr Sami Yaqoob, the learned Counsel representing the Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the complainant/ Respondent herein had applied for the grant of route permit with the RTO concerned on 14th of July, 2014, much before the date of accident and had even deposited the requisite fee also, therefore, it was for the RTO to issue the required permit. He has argued that the route permit was granted in favour of the vehicle much after the accident only because of the delay on the part of the RTO concerned and that the Respondent had completed his part by depositing the requisite fee well within time. In this backdrop, the learned Counsel submits that the impugned award passed by the Commission is a reasoned one and does not call for any interference in this appeal. He has, thus, prayed that the instant appeal be dismissed with costs. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings on record and considered the matter. 9. The plea of the Appellant that the learned Commission decided the complaint at the preliminary stage, without asking the parties to lead evidence, pales into insignificance, for the reason that there were no factual disputes between the parties, except for the admitted position that as on the date of accident, the complainant had no permit in his favour for the vehicle in question. The Commission has, thus, decided the case without recording evidence, in this backdrop of the matter. The short controversy involved in this appeal is whether or not a claim can be laid for the damages caused to the insured vehicle as a result of a ‘Road Traffic Accident’ (RTA) in absence of a valid route permit. 10. It is not in dispute that the Respondent has taken a comprehensive insurance policy nor is it in dispute that the accident took place during the subsistence of the policy. The policy was, therefore, valid on the date of the accident. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case titled ‘Amalendu Sahu v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited’, reported as ‘AIR 2010 Supreme Court Cases 2090’, at Paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, has held as under: “12. Reference in this case may be made to the decision of National Commission rendered in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited v. Gian Singh reported in 2006 CTJ 221 (CP). In that decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, it has been held that in a case of violation of condition of the policy as to the nature of use of the vehicle, the claim ought to be settled on a non-standard basis. In that decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, it has been held that in a case of violation of condition of the policy as to the nature of use of the vehicle, the claim ought to be settled on a non-standard basis. The said decision of the National Commission has been referred to by this Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Nitin Khandelwal reported in (2008) (7) SCALE 351: [AIR 2008 SC (Supp.) 1166]. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, in the case of Nitin Khandelwal (supra) this Court held: - ‘… The appellant Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle when the insurer has obtained comprehensive policy for the loss caused to the insured. The respondent submitted that even assuming that there was a breach of condition of the insurance policy, the appellant Insurance Company ought to have settled the claim on non-standard basis.’ 13. In the case of Nitin Khandelwal (supra), the State Commission allowed 75% of the claim of the claimant on the non-standard basis. The said order was upheld by the National Commission and this Court refused to interfere with the decision of the national Commission.” 11. In the present case, the Insurance policy No. 421003/31/14/6300000968 dated 24th of April, 2014 was valid w.e.f. 24th of April, 2014 to 23rd of April, 2015 and the accident to the vehicle in question had taken place on 12th of January, 2015, that is well within the period of the validity of the insurance policy. Admittedly, the vehicle, as on the date of accident, had no carriage permit which was required for the vehicle, though the owner of the vehicle had taken a plea that he had deposited the requisite fee of Rs.7,350/- vide G. R. No. 7209909 dated 14th of July, 2014. Admittedly, the vehicle, as on the date of accident, had no carriage permit which was required for the vehicle, though the owner of the vehicle had taken a plea that he had deposited the requisite fee of Rs.7,350/- vide G. R. No. 7209909 dated 14th of July, 2014. The policy is a Commercial Vehicle Package Policy, wherein limitation as to use has been given, which reads as under: - “Limitation as to use: The Policy covers use only under a permit within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Act , 1988 or such a carriage falling under Sub-section 3 of Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act , 1988.” No doubt, that under the Motor Vehicles Act , 1988, for a commercial vehicle, route permit is necessary, therefore, there is violation of the terms and conditions of the policy, however, the question is whether only on this account the entire claim of the complainant can be rejected in toto? In this regard, reference can be made to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in case titled ‘Amalendu Sahoo v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.’, ‘2010(3) CLT 1’, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, while referring to the Judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in ‘New India Assurance Company Limited v. Narayan Prasad Appaprasad Pathak’, ‘(2006) CPJ 144 (NC)’, in which it was observed that while granting the claim on non-standard basis, the National Commission set out the guidelines about settling all such non-standard claim, allowed the claim to the extent of 75% by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by observing in Paragraph No.16 as under: - “16. In the instant case the entire stand of the insurance company is that claimant has used the vehicle for hire and in the course of that there has been an accident. Following the aforesaid guidelines, this Court is of the opinion that the insurance company cannot repudiate the claim in toto.” Therefore, for breach of condition of policy, including limitation as to use, the claim is to be settled on non-standard basis upto 75%. 12. Reference can be made to another Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘B. V. Nagaraju v. M/S Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.’, ‘1996 (3) RCR (Civil) 304’. In that case, the vehicle carried passengers more than permitted in the policy. 12. Reference can be made to another Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘B. V. Nagaraju v. M/S Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.’, ‘1996 (3) RCR (Civil) 304’. In that case, the vehicle carried passengers more than permitted in the policy. It was observed that the use of the vehicle may be irregular in that manner, but not so fundamental a breach of contract so as to disentitle the insured from being indemnified for the damage caused to the vehicle. The terms of the policy of insurance are not to be construed so strictly and are to be read down to advance the main purpose of the contract. 13. Reference can also be made to another Judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in ‘Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. v. Sanjeev Kumar’, ‘II (2009) CPJ 135 (NC)’. In that case, the passenger car was being used as taxi. The claim was settled @ 75% on non-standard basis. In yet another Judgment of the National Commission in ‘The Manager ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Gafur Alamgeer Sayyad’, ‘2014 (2) CPR 130’, in which also private car was being used on hire basis. It was observed by the District Forum that there was no vital nexus between the accident and deviation of purpose in its use and claim was allowed at 75%. The order passed by the District Forum was challenged, which was upheld by the State Commission. Further, the order passed by the State Commission has been affirmed by the National Commission. 14. Reference can also be made to another Judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in ‘United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gaj Pal Singh Rawat’, reported in ‘2010 (1) CLT 14’. In that case, it was observed that in the absence of nexus between the licence of driver and accident, the insurer would be liable to allow the claim on non-standard basis. 15. Further, the National Commission, again, in its Judgment rendered in ‘Jaswant Singh v. National Insurance Company Ltd.’, ‘III (2008) CPJ 472’, allowed the complaint in the case of absence of route permit after observing that it was not so fundamental to have attributed to the cause of accident, after relying upon the Judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in ‘National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Bharathamma’, ‘ 2004 ACJ 2094 (SC)’. Ltd. v. Challa Bharathamma’, ‘ 2004 ACJ 2094 (SC)’. In that case also, the vehicle did not have a route permit. The main grouse of the opposite party was violation of policy terms and conditions, including limitation as to use. In that case, the Insurance Company, itself, had issued the instructions to settle the claim at 75% of the admissible claim. Apart from route permit, the accident was not denied. Therefore, the claim could be settled upto 75% of the admissible claim. 16. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in another case titled ‘National Insurance Company Limited v. Jogesh Roy & Anr.’, ‘2017 (2) CPR 252 (NC)’, held that the claim could not be repudiated on the ground that the vehicle did not possess permit on the date it met with the accident and upheld the order passed by the District Forum, observing that the District Forum had rightly relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amalendu Sahoo’s case (supra) and the Judgment of the National Commission in ‘National Insurance Company Limited v. Jaswant Singh’, ‘2013 (2) CPC 297 (NC)’. 17. The Apex Court in a case titled ‘National Insurance Company Limited v. Challa Bharathamma’, ‘ 2004 ACJ 2094 (SC)’, while dealing with a case arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act, where a person was found plying a vehicle without permit, held that he had violated a condition of the permit, which is an infraction and that the Insurance Company had a defence available on that aspect in terms of Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, however, it was held that the acceptability of a stand is a matter of adjudication. 18. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the absence of permit may be an infraction, however, it cannot be termed as so fundamental a breach of contract so as to disentitle an insured from being indemnified for the damage caused to the vehicle. In the light of the legal position, as discussed hereinabove, we are of the view that the contention raised by the Appellant that the insurer (Insurance Company) was entitled to repudiate the claim of the insured with regard to damage/ loss to the vehicle insured by the insurer of the insured-owner in toto is not tenable. 19. In the light of the legal position, as discussed hereinabove, we are of the view that the contention raised by the Appellant that the insurer (Insurance Company) was entitled to repudiate the claim of the insured with regard to damage/ loss to the vehicle insured by the insurer of the insured-owner in toto is not tenable. 19. Therefore, the Order impugned dated 6th of December, 2018 passed by the learned Commission, in our considered view, does not call for any interference in this appeal filed in terms of Section 17 of the Jammu & Kashmir State Consumer Protection Act. The impugned Order is, thus, upheld, as a result, this appeal is dismissed along with the connected CM(s), with modification of the impugned award to the extent of 75% of the assessed damage to the vehicle on non-standard basis. Interim direction(s), if any subsisting as on date, shall stand vacated.