JUDGMENT : C. Praveen Kumar, J. 1. The sole accused in Special Sessions Case No.31 of 2014 on the file of learned Special Sessions Judge-cum-X-Additional District and Sessions Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam, is the appellant herein. He was tried for an offence punishable under Section 3(ii)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 [for short, “the Act”] and sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for Life and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- [Rupees five thousand only] in default, to suffer Simple Imprisonment for Six Months for the offence punishable under Section 3(ii)(v) of the Act. He was also held liable to pay compensation of Rs.20,000/- [Rupees twenty thousand only] under Section 357 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 [for short, “Cr.P.C.”] to the prosecutrix. 2. The facts, in issue, are as under:- (a) P.Ws.2 and 3 are the parents of the victim, who was examined as P.W.1. It is said that P.W.1 who was studying 3rd class by staying in the Government Hostel, Bantumilli, came down to Munjuluru Village for Summer Vacation. On 24.04.2007, the said girl along with her parents went to the fields of the accused for coolie work. It is said that when P.W.1 was sitting under a coconut tree, at a distance of 20 yards, from where P.Ws.2 and 3 were working by keeping lunch box, the accused came to her and asked her to collect Tamarind [Chintakayalu] and accordingly took her to Cheema Chintakayalu trees which were behind her. There the accused is said to have thrown her on the ground, lifted her langa and committed rape. Thereafter, the accused asked her to sit on his lap and again committed rape on her, at which point of time blood oozed out from her private parts. At that time, the accused consoled her and thereafter threatened her with dire consequences, if she discloses the same to others and left the place to bring something to P.W.1. P.W.1 is said to have gone to her parents crying and when asked by her parents as to what happened, P.W.1 informed them about the incident and took them to the scene of occurrence. (b) P.W.2, who informed about the incident to the President of their village, was asked to lodge a report. Thereafter, P.W.2 is said to have gone to the Police Station by boarding a bus and lodged a report before P.W.14-Sub Inspector of Police. (b) P.W.2, who informed about the incident to the President of their village, was asked to lodge a report. Thereafter, P.W.2 is said to have gone to the Police Station by boarding a bus and lodged a report before P.W.14-Sub Inspector of Police. Basing on which, P.W.14 registered a case in Crime No.45 of 2007 for the offence punishable under Section 376(f) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 [for short, “I.P.C.”] and Section 3(i)(x) of the Act. Ex.P14 is the First Information Report [F.I.R.]. The said F.I.R. is registered at 11.45 A.M. which reached the Court at 10.00 P.M. though the distance between Court and Police Station is less than 1 K.M. (c) P.W.16-Sub Divisional Police Officer, who took up investigation, reached the Police Station, collected the copy of F.I.R. and shifted the injured in 108 Ambulance to Government Hospital. He also informed to Superintendent of Police about the facts. He then visited the Government Hospital, examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and recorded their statements. Thereafter, he visited the scene of offence which is situated at the outskirts of Munjuluru fields of Pamarthivari Compound, prepared a rough sketch of the scene and also Ex.P5 observation report in the presence of P.W.7. At the scene, he claims to have recorded the statements of P.Ws.4 to 10. After recording the statements, he altered the section of law to one under Section 3(i)(xii) of the Act. Ex.P18 is the altered memo. (d) It is also to be noted here that P.W.1 was sent to P.W.13-Civil Assistant Surgeon on 24.04.2007 itself, who examined her and gave Ex.P12 report. According to the doctor, the injuries have been caused by violent attempt to sexual offence. (e) P.W.16-SDPO, who continued with the investigation arrested the accused on 26.04.2007 and pursuant to arrest made, he seized M.Os.1 to 3 i.e. Lungi, Shirt and Towel. He also produced the accused before P.W.15-Civil Assistant Surgeon, who certified that accused is capable of having sexual intercourse. Ex.P15 is the Potency Certificate. He sent a requisition on 31.07.2007 to the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bantumilli for recording Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of P.Ws.1 to 3. 3. He also produced the accused before P.W.15-Civil Assistant Surgeon, who certified that accused is capable of having sexual intercourse. Ex.P15 is the Potency Certificate. He sent a requisition on 31.07.2007 to the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bantumilli for recording Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of P.Ws.1 to 3. 3. After completing the investigation, a Charge Sheet came to be filed, which was taken on file as P.R.C.No.06 of 2007 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bantumilli for the offences punishable under Section 376(f) I.P.C. and Section 3(i)(x)(xii) of SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989 against the accused. 4. On appearance of the accused, copies of the documents as required under Section 207 Cr.P.C. were supplied to him. As the case is triable by Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 Cr.P.C, accordingly, the same was made over to the Court of learned Special Sessions Judge-cum-X Additional District & Sessions Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam for trial and disposal in accordance with law. 5. Basing on the material available on record, strangely the learned Special Sessions Judge framed only one Charge under Section 3(ii) (v) of SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989. The same has been read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 16 and got marked Exs.P1 to P24 and M.Os.1 to 3. Out of sixteen witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.Ws.4 to 6 and 8 to 10 did not support the case of the prosecution and were treated hostile by the prosecution. 7. After the closure of Prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, to which, he denied. However, he did not adduce any evidence in support of his plea. 8. Relying upon the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 coupled with the medical evidence, the learned Special Sessions Judge, convicted the accused under Section 3(ii) (v) of SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989 and sentenced him as stated supra. Against the said conviction under Section 3(ii()(v) of the Act, the present appeal came to be filed. 9. 8. Relying upon the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 coupled with the medical evidence, the learned Special Sessions Judge, convicted the accused under Section 3(ii) (v) of SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989 and sentenced him as stated supra. Against the said conviction under Section 3(ii()(v) of the Act, the present appeal came to be filed. 9. Sri K. Sai Mohan Rao, learned counsel for the appellant mainly submits that the entire case has to be thrown out on the ground of incorrect framing of charge. He would submit that Section 3(ii)(v) of the Act itself is not an offence unless an offence punishable for a major offence has been committed, for which, they should have been a separate charge or a combination of Section 3(ii)(v) of the Act read with Section 376 I.P.C. In the absence of the same, he would submit that the conviction imposed, would not stand to the test of legal scrutiny. He relied upon two judgments of the Division Bench of Composite High Court in Katkam Raajanna vs. State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. Hyderabad, 2010 (2) ALT (Crl) 252 (D.B.) and in Gangula Venkateswara Reddy and others vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 1 ALD (Crl.) 453 in support of his plea. 10. However, Sri Soora Venkata Sainath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor opposed the same, contending that since the substance of the charge refers to commission of rape, non-framing of charge under Section 376 or 375 I.P.C. may not matter much. He relies upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Subhash @ Pappu, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 336 to contend that no prejudice is caused to the accused due to non-framing of a separate or independent charge or an alternate charge under Section 376 I.P.C. He also relies upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Patan Jamal Vali vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 343 in support of his plea. 11. The point that arises for consideration is, whether the trial Court was right in convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) simplicitor? 12. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to refer the Section 3(2)(v) of SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989, which is as under:- “3. 11. The point that arises for consideration is, whether the trial Court was right in convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) simplicitor? 12. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to refer the Section 3(2)(v) of SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989, which is as under:- “3. Whoever not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe… (v) commits any offence under the Penal Code, 1860 punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine; Under Section 3(2)(v), an enhanced punishment of imprisonment for life with fine is provided where (i) The offence is committed by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; (ii) The offence arises under the penal Code and is against a person or property and is punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more; and (iii) The offence is committed “on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” or such property belongs to such a person.” The word ‘on the ground’ came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following judgments:- In Dinesh Alias Buddha vs. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SCC 771 the Hon’ble Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Arijit Pasayat held as under:- “58. Being cognizant of the limitation of Section3(2)(v) - as it stood earlier - in dealing with matters of intersectionality, we are however bound to apply the standard that has been laid down in the law. The expression “on the ground” was considered in a two-judge Bench judgment of this Court in Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan, where the Court speaking through Justice Arijit Pasayat held: “15. Sine qua non for application of Section 3(2)(v) is that an offence must have been committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the instant case no evidence has been led to establish this requirement. It is not case of the prosecution that the rape was committed on the victim since she was a member of Scheduled Caste.” 59. In the instant case no evidence has been led to establish this requirement. It is not case of the prosecution that the rape was committed on the victim since she was a member of Scheduled Caste.” 59. The Court held that in the absence of evidence to that effect, the offence under Section 3(2)(v) would not stand established. This principle was subsequently followed in a two judge Bench judgment of this Court in Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra where it was held that merely because a woman belongs to the SC & ST community, the provisions of the SC & ST Act would not be attracted in a case of sexual assault. This Court observed that there was no evidence to prove the commission of offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act. 60. The contours of the terms “on the ground of” have been explicated by this Court in the following cases. In Ashrafi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, a two judge Bench of this Court held that conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act cannot be sustained because the prosecution could not prove that the rape was committed only on the ground that the woman belonged to the SC & ST community. This Court speaking through Justice R. Banumathi held: “9. The evidence and materials on record do not show that the Appellant had committed rape on the victim on the ground that she belonged to Scheduled Caste. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act can be pressed into service only if it is proved that the rape has been committed on the ground that PW-3 Phoola Devi belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In the absence of evidence proving intention of the Appellant in committing the offence upon PW-3-Phoola Devi only because she belongs to Scheduled Caste community, the conviction of the Appellant Under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act cannot be sustained.” (emphasis added) 61. In another judgment of this Court in Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., Justice R Banumathi speaking for this Court held: “As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar”-Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” (emphasis supplied) 13. Similarly, the word ‘on the ground’ was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Patan Jamal Vali’s case [supra 4th cited]. The Bench after referring to the authorities on the subject held as under:- “65. The issue as to whether the offence was committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST or such property belongs to such member is to be established by the prosecution on the basis of the evidence at the trial. We agree with the Sessions Judge that the prosecution's case would not fail merely because PW1 did not mention in her statement to the police that the offence was committed against her daughter because she was a Scheduled Caste woman. However, there is no separate evidence led by the prosecution to show that the accused committed the offence on the basis of the caste identity of PW2. While it would be reasonable to presume that the accused knew the caste of PW2 since village communities are tightly knit and the accused was also an acquaintance of PW2's family, the knowledge by itself cannot be said to be the basis of the commission of offence, having regard to the language of Section 3(2)(v) as it stood at the time when the offence in the present case was committed. As we have discussed above, due to the intersectional nature of oppression PW2 faces, it becomes difficult to establish what led to the commission of offence - whether it was her caste, gender or disability. This highlights the limitation of a provision where causation of a wrongful act arises from a single ground or what we refer to as the single axis model. This highlights the limitation of a provision where causation of a wrongful act arises from a single ground or what we refer to as the single axis model. Though, Section 3(2)(v) of the Act came to be amended with effect from 26.01.2016 by replacing the word “on the ground” with “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe”, but, the amendment was long after the incident in question and as such the same is not applicable to the case on hand. 14. Keeping in view the law laid down in the judgments referred to above, it is now to be seen whether an offence was committed, on the ground that the victim girl was a member of Scheduled Caste? 15. Neither the evidence of P.W.2 nor the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 would establish that the offence was committed on the ground that P.W.1 belongs to Scheduled Caste. The evidence available on record establishes that on the fateful day P.W.1 along with her parents went to the land of the accused, where her parents were doing agricultural operations. At that time, the accused came there and by asking her to collect tamarind, took her behind the tamarind trees, forcibly threw her on to the ground and thereafter committed the offence. Again, he made her sit on his lap and then committed rape, at which point of time, there was bleeding. He consoled her and thereafter threatened her with dire consequences. It is said that when the accused left the victim and went to get something for the victim girl, P.W.1 is said to have gone to her parents and informed about the incident. Similar is the version of P.Ws.2 and 3. 16. It is the fact that P.W.1 was a minor as on the date of incident and that she belongs to Scheduled Caste [Mala community] which stands established through the evidence of P.Ws.11 and 12. But, as observed by the Hon’ble apex Court in Patan Jamal Vali’s case, merely because the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or that the accused was aware that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste does not by itself lead to an inference that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste, unless evidence to that effect is placed on record. In the absence of the same, we feel that the trial Court erred in convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. 17. The next question that arises for consideration is, whether this Court can convict the accused under Section 376(2)(f) I.P.C in the absence of any specific charge to that effect (or) in other words whether any prejudice is caused to the accused, if the Court convicts the accused under Section 376(2)(f) I.P.C? 18. Before proceeding further, we will first refer to the judgment relied upon by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in The State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Subhash [supra 3rd cited]. In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para 7 of the said judgment, categorically held that while framing a charge, the respondent was not specifically charged under Section 302 r/w. Section 149 I.P.C. But, the trial Court observed that the accused did commit murder by knowingly and intentionally causing death of Bengali and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. The respondent/accused was also charged for the offence punishable under Section 148 I.P.C, in which, it was mentioned that the accused and others, who were members of an unlawful assembly, formed themselves to carryout the common object of that assembly and committed the offence of rioting with deadly weapons. 19. In view of the above, the Court held that the ingredients for an offence punishable under Section 302 r/w. Section 149 and Section 148 I.P.C were specifically brought to the notice of the accused. After referring to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 12 SCC 546 , held that though Section 149 I.P.C. was not referred to but the contents of Section 149 I.P.C. are reflected in the Charge framed under Section 148 I.P.C. no prejudice is caused, if the accused was convicted under Section 302 r/w. Section 149 I.P.C. 20. But, the learned counsel for the appellant tried to contend that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court will not apply to the facts of the case, in the absence of a specific charge for the major offence committed by the accused. According to him, in the said judgment, the Court categorically held that if the ingredients of the section are implicit in the charge framed, a conviction can be sustained. 21. According to him, in the said judgment, the Court categorically held that if the ingredients of the section are implicit in the charge framed, a conviction can be sustained. 21. It would be appropriate to refer to the two judgments of Division Bench of Composite High Court at Hyderabad. In Katkam Raajanna [supra 1st cited], the Division Bench was dealing with the situation where the trial Court framed charges against A.1 under Sections 376, 305 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, but after trial, the Lower Court acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 305 I.P.C. and convicted the accused under Section 376 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. It was a case where on 01.09.1997 A.1 dashed the victim, lifted her into a Maize field, threatened her and forcibly committed rape on her, while A.2 was standing in support of A.1. Subsequently, the victim committed suicide on 15.04.1998 and died on 27.04.1998. After the incident on 15.04.1998, the Sub-Inspector of Police, on receipt of information, proceeded to the hospital and recorded the statement of the injured and then registered a case under Section 376 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The Magistrate who was examined as P.W.17 also recorded the Dying Declaration of the injured/victim, which was marked as Ex.P26. Dealing with the offence under Section 376 I.P.C. the High Court held that neither Ex.P26-Dying Declaration nor Ex.P27-F.I.R is sufficient to find A.1 guilty for the said offence. 22. However, dealing with the said offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the Court held that if an offence is committed by the accused under the provisions of the Penal Code, for which the punishment is ten years or more and that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, then only Section 3(2)(v) of the Act gets attracted. It was held that in order to attract Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the trial Court should have framed a charge for the major offence as well or for an offence of I.P.C. r/w. Section 3(2)(v) of the Act for enhanced punishment. In the absence of the same, the Court held that when once an offence under Section 376 I.P.C. is not made out, conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act alone is impermissible under law. 23. In the absence of the same, the Court held that when once an offence under Section 376 I.P.C. is not made out, conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act alone is impermissible under law. 23. In Gangula Venkateswara Reddy’s [supra 2nd cited], the Court was dealing with a situation where the appellants were tried for an offence under Section 302 I.P.C, alternatively under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act and Section 148 I.P.C. The accused were sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for Life and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- each under the major offence and further sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each for the offence under Section 148 I.P.C. The trial Court after convicting the accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act held that no conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. is warranted, as there is a conviction under Section 148 I.P.C. This was sought to be challenged, contending that in the absence of any conviction under Section 302 I.P.C, the appellants could not have been convicted under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, on the ground that the offence was committed on the deceased as belonging to Scheduled Caste. But, however, the Division Bench went into the merits of the case and held that no offence under Section 302 I.P.C. was made out against the appellants. 24. Dealing with the legal issue involved, namely as to conviction of the accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, in the absence of any material to convict the accused under Section 302 I.P.C, the Court after referring the two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 557 and Ramdas vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170 held that since there is no material to convict the accused under Section 302 I.P.C. mere fact that the victim happened to be a girl belonging to Scheduled Caste, does not attract the provisions of the Act, when the prosecution has failed to explain that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 25. In both the judgments referred to above, there was a charge for an offence punishable under the Penal Code, in which, the punishment was ten years or more. 25. In both the judgments referred to above, there was a charge for an offence punishable under the Penal Code, in which, the punishment was ten years or more. While acquitting the accused for the offence under Penal Code, the Division Bench held that there cannot be a conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. 26. But, in the instant case, there is no separate charge for an offence punishable under the Penal Code nor the charge describe the penal offence read with provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. 27. The charge reads as under:- “That you accused on 24.04.2007 at about 7.00 a.m. at Pamarthi Varidoddi situated at Munjuluru Village, Bantumilli Mandal committed rape on victim/prosequtrix belongs to SC-Maala thereby committed an offence under Sec.3(ii)(v) of SCs. & STs. (POA) Act, 1989 and within any cognizance.” 28. A reading of the charge from the above only state that on 24.04.2007 at 7.00 a.m. at Pamarthi Varidoddi situated at Munjuluru Village, Bantumilli Mandal, the accused committed rape on victim/prosecutrix belonging to SC-Maala. In the absence of any charge for an offence under the Penal Code, or there being no reference to Penal Charge being read with Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the argument that there cannot be a conviction under Section 3(2)(v) Simpliciter cannot be brushed aside. But, whether this charge is sufficient to convict the accused for the offence under Section 376(2)(f) I.P.C. or for that matter under Section 376 I.P.C. Though, the F.I.R. was rightly registered, but for reasons best known, no independent charge was framed for a penal offence. 29. A reading of the charge referred to above, does not anywhere indicate the age of the victim. Had the age of the victim been recorded, things would have been different. In the absence of age being mentioned in the charge, various other questions would arise for consideration namely whether she was a major, whether it was with her consent or against her will etc. A separate charge may at times be not necessary if certain basic ingredients of the case are mentioned in the charge. It is well established principle of Criminal Jurisprudence that the accused is required to prove the contents of the charge. But when the charge itself is not properly framed, as required under law, definitely it can be said that the accused is prejudiced. 30. It is well established principle of Criminal Jurisprudence that the accused is required to prove the contents of the charge. But when the charge itself is not properly framed, as required under law, definitely it can be said that the accused is prejudiced. 30. Even assuming for the sake of argument that contents of charge disclose an offence of rape, that no prejudice is caused, it is now to be seen whether an offence under Section 376 I.P.C. is made out? 31. On 24.07.2007, the parents of P.W.1 took her to the fields of the accused for coolie work, and she sat at a distance of 20 yards under the coconut tree; when the accused came and asked her to collect Tamarind from behind the trees of Cheema Chintakayalu; where he threw P.W.1 on to the ground and committed rape on her. But, one fact, which is required to be noticed here is, if she was really thrown on to the ground she would have sustained injuries on her body. But the doctor/P.W.13 who examined P.W.1, categorically states that there are no external injuries on the body. Secondly, the victim states that she was subjected to sexual intercourse not only once but after the first incident the accused made her sit on his lap and again committed rape. But, the doctor did not find any injuries to the Genital. 32. Further, the distance between the place where the parents of P.W.1 were working along with six others and the place where the incident is alleged to have taken place is about 15 feet. This piece of evidence came to be elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.7, who acted as panch for the scene of offence. When the scene of offence is at a distance of 15 feet, from where the parents of the victim were working along with six others, can it be believed that the accused would be committed such offence. 33. At this stage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor tried to contend that since the incident took place behind the Cheema Chintakayalu trees i.e. tamarind trees, possibility of P.Ws.2 and 3 seeing the incident is remote. At first blush, the said argument appeared to be quite impressive, but, a reading of the evidence of P.W.7 would show that in the cross-examination, he admitted that there are no Cheema Chintakayalu trees at the scene. At first blush, the said argument appeared to be quite impressive, but, a reading of the evidence of P.W.7 would show that in the cross-examination, he admitted that there are no Cheema Chintakayalu trees at the scene. It would be appropriate to extract the entire cross-examination of P.W.7, which is as under:- “It is true there are no Cheema Chenta at the scene of offence. Eeta bushes are at the height of 2 feet. It is true the scene of offence is at distance of 15 feet from the accused land. The scene of offence is visible from the land of accused equally the scene of offence is visible to the land of accused. It is not true to suggest I did not visit the scene of offence and I am deposing false at the instance of the Police, I signed in the Police Station.” 34. From the evidence of P.W.7, it establishes beyond doubt that there were no Tamarind trees at the scene of offence and that the scene of offence is visible to the persons standing in the land of the accused and that the distance between the scene of offence and the land where P.Ws.2 and 3 were working is only 15 feet. Therefore, it is highly impossible to believe that the accused would have committed such ghastly incident, when the said place is visible to the persons working in his land. Apart from the above three circumstances, it is also to be noted that P.W.1 claims to have informed about the incident to her father and mother when they were working in the fields and thereafter she was taken to the hospital in some vehicle by her parents. But, in the cross-examination, P.W.1 admits that she was unconscious when she was taken to the Police Station. Being unconscious, it is difficult to believe as to how P.W.1 would have been informed about the incident to the Police orally. Further, being unconscious, P.W.1 speaks about the events which taken place in the Police Station, more particularly, the Police calling Ambulance and her father giving a statement in the Police Station etc. 35. At this stage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor tried to contend that there is no enmity for the prosecution witnesses or for that matter P.Ws.1 to 3 to foist a false case against the accused. 35. At this stage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor tried to contend that there is no enmity for the prosecution witnesses or for that matter P.Ws.1 to 3 to foist a false case against the accused. But, there are no number of circumstances which came to be elicited in the cross-examination of the witnesses to show the involvement of other organizations in lodging the report and political differences in the village between the accused and the others. 36. Dealing with the same, it is to be noted that P.W.1 in her cross-examination admits that the lands of the accused are at a very longer distance and there was no necessity for her to go to said place along with her parents since she was not a coolie. It would be appropriate to extract the relevant portion in the cross-examination of P.W.1, which is as under:- “It is true there was no necessity for me to go to fields as I was not coolie. Witness says her house is by the side of road as she was alone she was taken by her parents.” 37. Further, to a suggestion that Kula Vivaksha Porata Samithi [KVPS] came to the Police Station, P.W.1 states that she does not remember. But, however admits that she has received compensation of Rs.25,000/- from the Government and that her father also made a representation to the Government to allot land and job. It would be appropriate to extract the same, which is as under:- “I do not know any leaders from Kula Vivaksha Porata Samithi came to the Police Station. Even I do not know on their instructions my father stated to the Police. I have received compensation Rs.25,000/- from the government. My father knows that he made representation to the Government to allot land and job and not true to suggest I did not go to the fields of accused and accused not committed any offence and this case is foisted my father was influenced by KVPS leaders to extract money from accused and to get incentives from Government and not true to suggest I am deposing false at the instance of my father and KVPS leaders.” 38. Coming to the cross-examination of P.W.2, who is the father of P.W.1, it was elicited in his cross-examination that six coolies were engaged by the accused on that day, and by the date of alleged offence, the accused has not paid the wages. He further admits that he has no association with KVPS and that he does not know their objects. But, however admits that Ex.P1 was drafted to his dictation. He also admits that one leader from KVPS came to the Police Station and drafted the report and that they have received Rs.50,000/ from the Government. He was also informed that the Government will provide land and job. He further admits that in the neighbouring lands, coolies were on work on that day but none of the neighbouring land owners and coolies came to him at the time of offence. It would be appropriate to extract the relevant portion in the cross-examination of P.W.2, which is as under:- “It is true the neighbouring lands also being trashed by coolies on that day. None of the neighbouring land owners and coolies came to me at the time of offence.” 39. From the answers elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.2 it is very clear that one leader from KVPS came to the Police Station, and the said leader drafted the report to his dictation, he was also informed that he would get Rs.50,000/- on lodging a report and that he made an application for job and land. Further, if really an incident of this nature has occurred, the coolies working in the neighbouring lands would have definitely joined and raised protest against the accused apart from helping him in lodging the report. P.W.2 who is an I.T.I. Graduate, did not lodge a report on his own, but after the arrival of a leader from KVPS, a report came to be prepared to the dictation of P.W.2. Probably, for this reason the said report reached the Magistrate Court at 10.00 P.M, though the distance between Police Station and the Court is less than 1 K.M. 40. Having regard to the above, a doubt arises as to whether really the incident occurred as suggested by the prosecution? Probably, for this reason the said report reached the Magistrate Court at 10.00 P.M, though the distance between Police Station and the Court is less than 1 K.M. 40. Having regard to the above, a doubt arises as to whether really the incident occurred as suggested by the prosecution? Ergo, when there is any amount of doubt as to the incident in question, convicting the accused for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (POA) Act, 1989 or for that matter under Section 376 I.P.C. does not arise. Viewed from both the angles, the conviction and sentence imposed in our view is not correct. 41. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant/accused in the Judgment dated 05.10.2016 in Special Sessions Case No.31 of 2014 on the file learned Special Sessions Judge-cum-X Additional District and Sessions Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam for the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (POA) Act, 1989, is set aside and he is acquitted for the said offence. Consequently, the appellant/accused shall be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case or crime. The fine amount, if any, paid by the appellant/accused shall be refunded to him. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.