ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. N. Naha Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Tushar Dhar Diwan, learned Central Government Counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition under Section 482 of the CrPC with the following prayer:- “1. It is, respectfully prayed by the petitioners that the proceedings of Criminal Case No.74/MW Act/2015 pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class and Labour Court, Durg (CG) may kindly be quashed. 2. Any other relief/relief’s which this Hon’ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also please be granted to the petitioner.” 3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this case are that the petitioner was working on the post of Senior Vice President (Works) with the Company namely M/s. JK Lakshmi Cement Ltd., situated at Village Malpurikhurd Khasadih, Ahiwara, Tahsil Dhamdha, District Durg. The Company underwent an agreement with one M/s Gannon Dunkerly and Company Ltd., for the purpose of construction of a new cement plant which was duly performed by the latter. The completion of the work was duly informed to the authorities concerned with specific information of the work being over by the last week of January, 2015. The workers, 141 in numbers employed by the contractor were asked to collect their final dues including notice pay as well as compensation under the legal provisions applicable. However, the likely discontinuation of employment caused an agitation at the plant by the labours, which called for intervention of the statutory authorities. It is submitted that by the petitioner that the then Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C), Raipur extended improper behavior to harass the petitioner and his Company. In such course, a notice dated 4/9.2.2015 was issued by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C), Raipur alleging violation of the provisions of Section 25 N (1) (a) & (b) of the ID CT, 1947 and to show-cause in 15 days as to why legal action under Section 29 of the Act be not taken. The petitioner’s Company filed a writ petition being WPL No.46/2015 before this Court against such notice wherein notices were issued on 26.03.2015 by this Court. The petitioner’s Company filed a writ petition being WPL No.46/2015 before this Court against such notice wherein notices were issued on 26.03.2015 by this Court. Meanwhile, amidst all the agitation and protest by the petitioner’s Company and issuance of show-cause notice as stated above, the respondents communicated an inspection report dated 29/30.01.2015 pointing out the shortcomings found in the inspection in the establishment of the petitioner’s Company on 09.01.2015 requesting the Company to rectify the irregularities specified therein immediately and report compliance within a fortnight, failing which, legal action by way of prosecution/claim application would be taken. 4. The petitioner’s Company on being pointed out with the irregularities as stated above, rectified the same and informed the respondents about the same through a letter dated 10.02.2015, i.e. well within the time limit specified in the communication of the respondents as referred above. However, the rectification failed to deter the respondents from filing a complaint before the competent Court under Section 22A of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (for short “Act of 1948”), bearing Case No.74/MW Act/2015 dated 20.05.2015 wherein the learned trial Court issued summons vide order dated 01.06.2015. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the criminal proceedings set in motion by the learned trial Court is clearly an abuse of process of law causing a great harassment and agony to the petitioner warranting interference by this Court. He further submits that the forum of Court should not be permitted to be utilized for oblique purposes and when there is no prima facie material against the accused person and the chances of conviction in a criminal case are bleak, no useful purpose can be said to be served by permitting the continuation of criminal prosecution. Learned counsel for the petitioner then referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in (1992) Supp (1) 335 and submitted that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and for wrecking vengeance on the accused out of certain private and personal grudge, such a criminal proceeding should be quashed. He also submits that the issuance of inspection report dated 29/30.01.2015 after twenty days of the inspection on 09.01.2015 when no irregularity was pointed out smacks ill motive on the part of the respondents. He also submits that the issuance of inspection report dated 29/30.01.2015 after twenty days of the inspection on 09.01.2015 when no irregularity was pointed out smacks ill motive on the part of the respondents. Further, the complaint has been filed without recording any finding about rectification of the irregularities, as claimed by the Company of the petitioner in its reply dated 10.02.2015, for which in fact there was clear command in the communication dated 29/30.01.2015 and as such, the complaint apparently gets exposed of being a premediated one. The complaint filed before the trial Court did not disclose the filing of reply dated 10.02.2015 and claimed the lacuna as constituting offence under Section 22A of the Act of 1948, for which cognizance was sought, which is a clear abuse of process of law. He contended that in the present case in absence of the foundational facts necessary to establish the violation of the legal provisions even prima facie the initiation of the criminal prosecution is per se bad and is an abuse of process and as such, deserves to be quashed to secure the ends of justice. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dayle De’souza v. Government of India through Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) and another reported in 2021 LiveLaw (SC) 622, wherein the duty of the prosecution to initially establish the offence has been acknowledged and accounted for, in absence of which the onus would not be shifted on the accused to explain his defense. He further contended that the petitioners have challenged the criminal prosecution also on account of the failure of the respondents to implead the Company they are working with as an individual accused for it being a juristic person, owing to which the complaint is misconceived and not maintainable. It is submitted that in criminal jurisprudence in generally there is no concept of vicarious liability and in the cases of offence by Companies, the vicarious liability of the directors or any other person responsible for the business of the Company can be pleaded by deeming fiction subject to the impleadment of the Company as an independent principle accused for its having a distinct identity and reputation, alleging the commission of offence by the Company, in absence of which the proceeding is not tenable in the eyes of law. A specific mentioning of the present petitioner being responsible for the performance of business of the Company is the requirement coming next to be fulfilled, which is also an indispensable necessity to maintain the complaint regarding which hardly any endeavour is made by the respondents and as such, the complaint is misconceived on this count as well. The petitioner relying upon the case of Dayle De’souza (supra) and Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of UP & Anr., reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 971 dealing with the aspect of offence by Companies under the provisions of NI Act, 1881, in a similar manner to the present case, submit that the present complaint failing to satisfy the aforesaid requirements is a misconceived one deserving quashing by this Court. 6. On the other hand, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the petitioner on being found with certain shortcomings in an inspection carried out at its establishment was subjected to notice dated 29/30.01.2015 thereby asking to rectify the same and file a compliance report in a fortnight. However, on failure of the petitioner to do the needful, a complaint was filed before the competent criminal Court, whereupon cognizance was taken and summons were issued. He further submits that the shortcomings of the petitioner were serious in nature and were correctly taken cognizance of by the learned trial Court. He also submits that the shortcomings pointed out on the date of inspection clarified that the Company was at fault on such date, which made the filing of complaint imperative. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondents referred to a general power of attorney executed by the Company M/s. JK Lakshmi Cement Ltd. conferring substantial authority in favour of the petitioner herein. It was further submitted that as per clause 11 of the general power of attorney, the petitioner was responsible for compliance of the provisions of the Mines and Factories Act and Rules, Regulations etc. issued thereunder. Therefore, on the shortcomings being detected in the inspection, the petitioner was responsible for the shortcomings and therefore, was rightly prosecuted in the complaint case. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with the petition. 8. issued thereunder. Therefore, on the shortcomings being detected in the inspection, the petitioner was responsible for the shortcomings and therefore, was rightly prosecuted in the complaint case. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with the petition. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the records, it is quite vivid that the complaint in question was preceded with certain clash between the petitioner’s Company and the respondents. However, an inspection exercising the statutory powers by the respondents was carried out at the establishment of the petitioner’s Company and the shortcomings were communicated to it with a request to rectify the same and file a compliance report in a fortnight. As has been admitted by the respondents in reply, a compliance report was filed by the petitioner’s Company, which ought to have been considered and taken care of by the respondents. However, the respondents made a complaint against the petitioner, wherein summons were issued by the learned trial Court, which led to filing of the present petition under Section 482 CrPC. 9. From perusal of the records, it is clear that the complaint was filed despite filing of a compliance report dated 10.02.2015 without taking a decision with regard to the veracity of the corrections claimed to have made by the petitioner. It is not the case of the respondents that the compliance report was false or on a subsequent or fresh inspection the rectification claimed by the petitioner was not found as having done on spot. Therefore, this Court finds that the respondents have failed to discharge the initial burden of establishing first that the offence is committed by the Company the petitioner belongs to and and as such, fails to fulfill this legal obligation as accounted for in Dayle De’souza case (supra). As such, the initiation of criminal prosecution against the petitioner deserves to be quashed. 10. So far as failure of the respondents to implead the Company as an individual is concerned, the same has a fatal effect over the criminal prosecution. The Company is a juristic person and its distinct identity and reputation remaining at stake it is required to be impleaded as a distinct accused. In this connection, it would be appropriate to refer paragraph 22 of the the judgment in Dayle De’souza (supra) which is as under:- “22. The Company is a juristic person and its distinct identity and reputation remaining at stake it is required to be impleaded as a distinct accused. In this connection, it would be appropriate to refer paragraph 22 of the the judgment in Dayle De’souza (supra) which is as under:- “22. However, subsequent decisions of this Court have emphasised that the provision imposes vicarious liability by way of deeming fiction which presupposes and requires the commission of the offence by the Company itself as it is a separate juristic entity. Therefore, unless the Company as a principal accused has committed the offence, the persons mentioned in sub-section (1) would not be liable and cannot be prosecuted. Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, extends vicarious criminal liability to the officers of a Company by deeming fiction, which arises only when the offence is committed by the Company itself and not otherwise.” 11. The reliance placed on the general power of attorney by the counsel for the respondents is misconceived for the fact that the general power of attorney having not brought on record cannot be considered straightway during the course of arguments for want of necessary pleadings. Apart from this, in absence of impleading the Company in view of the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dayle De’souza (supra), placing a mere general power of attorney cannot be relied for filling up this substantial lacuna to maintain the complaint case. 12. Considering the above-stated facts and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Dayle De’souza (supra), I am of the considered opinion that criminal prosecution initiated against the petitioner is misconceived in law and permitting the same to go on will amount to an abuse of process of law, which can never be the object of law. Therefore, to secure the ends of justice, the criminal prosecution bearing Case No.74/MW Act/2015 pending before the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class and Labour Court, Durg deserves to be and is hereby quashed. However, the respondents are at liberty to file a fresh complaint, if so advised. 13. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.