ORDER : 1. The petitioner has assailed the judgment and decree/award dated 14.05.2016 passed in Civil Suit No. 12-A/2016 parties being “Dharam Singh Thakur Vs. Viranchi Toppo”, by the National Lok Adalat, Khandpeeth No. 05, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) on the ground that the said compromise judgment and decree/award has been obtained by playing fraud. 2. The facts of the present case are that the respondent filed a civil suit for specific performance of the contract in respect of suit land bearing survey No. 334/1, 334/2, 334/3, 335/1, 335/2, 336 & 337 admeasuring 3.962 hectares situated in Village Baghera, Patwari Circle No. 17, Revenue Circle Ghumka, Tahsil & District Rajnandgaon (C.G.). The suit was filed on the ground that the petitioner entered into an agreement to sell with the respondent for a sale consideration of Rs.3 lacs and the deed was executed on 16.12.2013. Rs.20,000/- was given as earnest money and the balance amount of Rs.2,80,000/- was to be given at the time of execution of the sale deed and the sale deed was to be executed within one year. Rin-Pustika was missing; therefore, the petitioner executed an agreement for extension of time on 20.07.2014 and 11.02.2015. In between, possession was handed over to the respondent on 20.07.2014. It is further stated that when after the expiry of the prescribed period, the sale deed was not executed, a legal notice was sent to the petitioner/defendant and thereafter, a civil suit was filed on 24.02.2016. The petitioner/defendant appeared before the learned trial Court on 20.04.2016 and on the request of both the parties, the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat which was scheduled on 14.05.2016. On 14.05.2016, both the parties appeared before the National Lok Adalat and a joint compromise application was filed. On the basis of the terms and conditions of the compromise application, the National Lok Adalat passed an award/decree. According to the terms and conditions of the compromise application, the petitioner/defendant will execute the registered sale deed in the respect of land in question within six months and the remaining consideration will be paid at the same time. 3. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner/defendant belongs to an aboriginal tribe and the land in question was purchased by him in the year 2005-2006 through a registered sale deed. 3. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner/defendant belongs to an aboriginal tribe and the land in question was purchased by him in the year 2005-2006 through a registered sale deed. He would further submit that at the time of negotiation, some other persons were present and the total consideration amount was Rs.30 lacs, but it was agreed between the parties that to save stamp duty, sale deed of Rs.3 lacs would be executed. He would further submit that the respondent/plaintiff has not paid the balance amount and filed a suit for specific performance of the contract. He would further submit that as per guidelines, the rate of one-acre land of the same locality was Rs.4,66,000/- and the market value was Rs.5,00,000/- per acre in the year 2013 and the total value of the suit land was about Rs.50 lacs. He would further submit that the witnesses namely Rakesh Soni and Ajay Garudik have also played fraud against him. His next contention is that the petitioner is an illiterate villager living in a remote area and therefore, he could not understand the terms and conditions of the compromise application. He would also submit that the learned Lok Adalat ought to have complied with the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Legal Services Act. He would further submit that though there was a transaction between two tribes, in the absence of permission from the competent authority according to the provisions of Section 165(6) of the Land Revenue Code, the entire transaction is void. Mr Paranjpe has placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Phulchand Exports Limited Vs. O.O.O. Patriot, (2011) 10 SCC 300 ; in the matter of State of Punjab and Another Vs. Jalour Singh and Others, (2008) 2 SCC 660 ; and judgments passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Punau Vs. Ajitram, reported in 1975 AIR (MP) 236; Mewalal Kanhaiyalal Vs. Jankibai, reported in 1994 MPLJ 369 and Ram Kishore Vs. Smt. Battoobai, reported in 2000 (2) M.P.L.J. 148 . 4. On the other hand, Mr. Amiyakant Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, would oppose the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner. Ajitram, reported in 1975 AIR (MP) 236; Mewalal Kanhaiyalal Vs. Jankibai, reported in 1994 MPLJ 369 and Ram Kishore Vs. Smt. Battoobai, reported in 2000 (2) M.P.L.J. 148 . 4. On the other hand, Mr. Amiyakant Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, would oppose the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner. He would submit that the petition preferred by the petitioner is not maintainable according to the provisions of Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. He would further submit that the impugned award was passed on 14.05.2016 and Execution Case No. 01/2017 was filed on 23.11.2017, the petitioner/defendant entered appearance before the executing Court on 22.02.2017 to 19.07.2017 and thereafter he filed this petition, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. He would further submit that before the executing Court, the petitioner sought time on the ground that he was suffering from typhoid and in between he preferred the writ petition before this Court. He would further submit that the land in question is not situated 100 meters far from the main road. He would also submit that the petitioner purchased 07 different plots in the same locality from different land owners in the year 2005 itself and the highest consideration amount paid by him was Rs.44,640/-. Therefore, the contention made by learned counsel for the petitioner that the market value of the property was Rs.5 lacs per acre in the year 2013 is not correct. His next submission is that the parties entered into an agreement to sell; the time was extended twice; the defendant failed to execute the sale deed; legal notice was sent to the defendant; a civil suit was filed; with the consent of the parties the matter was referred to Lok Adalat; a joint application was moved by the parties; the parties appeared before the National Lok Adalat and with the consent of the parties, the award was passed. Therefore, there was no smell of fraud at any point in time and the petitioner/defendant kept mum for a considerable period after the date of award. Thus, he would submit that the petition preferred by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Tiwari has placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Srinivasappa & Ors. Vs. M. Mallamma & Ors. Thus, he would submit that the petition preferred by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Tiwari has placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Srinivasappa & Ors. Vs. M. Mallamma & Ors. reported in 2022 AIR (SC) 2381 and in the matter of Chairman, State Bank of India and Another Vs. M J James, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301 . 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the documents annexed with the instant petition. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhargavi Constructions and Another Vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy and Others, reported in (2018) 13 SCC 480 has held that the award of Lok Adalat can be challenged only by filing a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court and that too on very limited grounds. The relevant para-24 is reproduced herein below:- “24. In our considered view, the aforesaid law laid down by this Court is binding on all the courts in the country by virtue of mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution. This Court, in no uncertain terms, has laid down that challenge to the award of Lok Adalat can be done only by filing a writ petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court and that too on very limited grounds. In the light of clear pronouncement of the law by this Court, we are of the opinion that the only remedy available to the aggrieved person (respondents herein/plaintiffs) was to file a writ petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court for challenging the award dated 22-8-2007 passed by the Lok Adalat. It was then for the writ court to decide as to whether any ground was made out by the writ petitioners for quashing the award and, if so, whether those grounds are sufficient for its quashing.” 7. Now coming to the judgments relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. In the matter of Phulchand Exports Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 held that in each of the cases mentioned in Section 23 of the Contract Act, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. 8. In the matter of Phulchand Exports Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 held that in each of the cases mentioned in Section 23 of the Contract Act, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. In para 36 & 37 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “36. Section 23 of the 1872 Act read as under: “23. What considerations and objects are lawful and what not.– The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless– it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.” 37. The transactions covered by Section 23 are the transactions where the consideration or object of such transaction is forbidden by law or the transaction is of such a nature that, if permitted, would defeat the provisions of any law or the transaction is fraudulent or the transaction involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or where the court regards it immoral or opposed to public policy. Whether a particular transaction is contrary to a public policy would ordinarily depend upon the nature of transaction. Where experienced businessmen are involved in a commercial contract and the parties are not of unequal bargaining power, the agreed terms must ordinarily be respected as the parties may be taken to have had regard to the matters known to them.” Section 23 of the Contract Act deals with what considerations and objects are lawful and what are not. If an agreement is not forbidden by law, it would not defeat the provisions of any law, it is not fraudulent, it does not involve or imply injury to any person or property or it is not opposed to public policy, are lawful agreements. In the present case, the agreement was entered into by the parties on 16.12.2013 and time was extended on 20.07.2014 and 11.02.2015. In the present case, the agreement was entered into by the parties on 16.12.2013 and time was extended on 20.07.2014 and 11.02.2015. It is not a case of the petitioner/defendant that at any point in time, he challenged the veracity, legality or propriety of the agreement entered into between the parties. The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for the specific performance of the contract and the award was passed by the Lok Adalat when the matter was referred, therefore, the petitioner/defendant cannot take a plea that the contract was unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable. 9. In the matter of Jalour Singh (supra), the order of the Lok Adalat was not passed by the consent of the parties or in pursuance of any compromise or settlement between the parties therefore the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the award passed by the Lok Adalat. The relevant para – 10 & 12 are reproduced herein below:- “10. The order of the Lok Adalat in this case (extracted above), shows that it assumed a judicial role, heard parties, ignored the absence of consensus, and increased the compensation to an extent it considered just and reasonable, by a reasoned order which is adjudicatory in nature. It arrogated to itself the appellate powers of the High Court and “allowed” the appeal and “directed” the respondents in the appeal to pay the enhanced compensation of Rs.62,200 within two months. The order of the Lok Adalat was not passed by consent of the parties or in pursuance of any compromise or settlement between the parties, is evident from its observation that “if the parties object to the proposed order they may move the High Court within two months for disposal of the appeal on merits according to law”. Such an order is not an award of the Lok Adalat. Being contrary to law and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat, it is void in the eye of the law. Such orders which “impose” the views of the Lok Adalats on the parties, whatever be the good intention behind them, bring a bad name to the Lok Adalats and legal services. 12. Being contrary to law and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat, it is void in the eye of the law. Such orders which “impose” the views of the Lok Adalats on the parties, whatever be the good intention behind them, bring a bad name to the Lok Adalats and legal services. 12. It is true that where an award is made by the Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any court. If any party wants to challenge such an award based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds. But where no compromise or settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the order, or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have heard and disposed of the appeal on merits.” In the present case, the parties appeared before the competent civil Court and thereafter the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat. The parties moved an application detailing their terms and conditions of compromise and thereafter the parties appeared before the National Lok Adalat and in their presence, the award was passed. Therefore, the judgment passed in the matter of Jalour Singh (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 10. In the matter of Punau (supra), it is held that the transaction was in contravention of Section 165(6) of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 therefore, the transaction would be void by reason of Section 23 of the Contract Act. Para – 12 is reproduced herein below:- “[12] A.P. Sen, J. in Soma v. Bcer-chand, S.A. No. 556 of 1965, D/- 27-3-1970 (Madh. Para – 12 is reproduced herein below:- “[12] A.P. Sen, J. in Soma v. Bcer-chand, S.A. No. 556 of 1965, D/- 27-3-1970 (Madh. Pra.) was required to consider whether a transaction in contravention of Section 165 (6) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, would be void or voidable. The learned Judge relying on his earlier decision is Sukhsen v. Shravan Kumar, ( 1972 MPLJ 95 ) (supra) held that such a transaction would be void by reason of Section 23 of the Contract Act and in order to work out equities between the parties, Section 65 of the Contract Act might be attracted.” In the present case, it is not in dispute that both parties belong to the scheduled tribe category and admittedly there was no permission. The issue of permission in transactions between the tribes has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhaiji Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and Others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 692 , where the Hon'ble Supreme has held that sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 170-B employ the expressions “every person”, “any person” and “all such transaction of transfer”; whereas sub-section (2-A) speaks of “any person, other than a member of an aboriginal tribe. In the present case, in pursuance of an agreement to sell, a civil suit was filed; the petitioner/defendant participated in the proceedings without any objection with regard to Section 165(6) or Section 170-B of the Land Revenue Code and with his consent the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat and finally the award was passed. The petitioner, after filing of the execution case, has preferred this petition and the issue of fraud was never raised by the petitioner before any of the authorities before filing this petition, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the provisions of Section 165(6) or Section 170-B of the Land Revenue Code would not attract. The petitioner, after filing of the execution case, has preferred this petition and the issue of fraud was never raised by the petitioner before any of the authorities before filing this petition, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the provisions of Section 165(6) or Section 170-B of the Land Revenue Code would not attract. It would be worthy to take note of the fact that in all decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, there were issues with regard to Section 165(6) and Section 170-B of the Land Revenue Code, whereas in the present case, the petitioner has challenged the award passed by the National Lok Adalat and thus, the present case is distinguishable from the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in the matters of Punau (supra), Mewalal Kanhaiyalal (supra) and Ram Kishore (supra). 11. Now coming to the judgments relied on by learned counsel for the respondent. 12. In the matter of K. Srinivasappa (supra) the award of Lok Adalat was challenged on the ground of fraud. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in the absence of any conclusive proof as to the fraud on the part of the objectors, the High Court could not have set aside the compromise decree. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para – 27, 28, 29 & 35 has held as under:- “[27] At the outset, we observe that we do not find any reason forthcoming from the judgment of the High Court while setting aside the order of the Lok Adalat dated 07th July, 2012 whereby the terms of the compromise were recorded. To recall a compromise that has been recorded would call for strong reasons. This is because a compromise would result ultimately into a decree of a Court which can be enforced just as a decree passed on an adjudication of a case. This is also true in the case of a compromise recorded before a Lok Adalat. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which is extracted as under: “21. This is also true in the case of a compromise recorded before a Lok Adalat. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which is extracted as under: “21. Award of Lok Adalat.- (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of Section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870). (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award.” [28] Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 equates an award of the Lok Adalat, to a decree of a Civil Court and imputes an element of finality to an award of compromise passed by the Lok Adalat. When the Lok Adalat disposes cases in terms of a compromise arrived at between the parties to a suit, after following principles of equity and natural justice, every such award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court and such decree shall be final and binding upon the parties. Given the element of finality attached to an award of the Lok Adalat, it also follows that no appeal would lie, under Section 96 of the CPC against such award, vide P.T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job, 2005 6 SCC 478 . [29] While we recognise that a Writ Petition would be maintainable against an award of the Lok Adalat, especially when such writ petition has been filed alleging fraud in the manner of obtaining the award of compromise, a writ court cannot, in a casual manner, de hors any reasoning, set aside the order of the Lok Adalat. The award of a Lok Adalat cannot be reversed or set aside without setting aside the facts recorded in such award as being fraudulent arrived at. The award of a Lok Adalat cannot be reversed or set aside without setting aside the facts recorded in such award as being fraudulent arrived at. [35] It is a settled position of law that where an allegation of fraud is made against a party to an agreement, the said allegation would have to be proved strictly, in order to avoid the agreement on the ground that fraud was practiced on a party in order to induce such party to enter into the agreement. Similarly, the terms of a compromise decree, cannot be avoided, unless the allegation of fraud has been proved. In the absence of any conclusive proof as to fraud on the part of the objectors, the High Court could not have set aside the compromise decree in the instant case.” In the present case, it has not been demonstrated by the petitioner that any fraud was played from the very inception. The petitioner appeared before the civil Court after getting a summons; with the consent of the parties the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat and after filing an application for compromise, the award was passed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the compromise deed. Therefore, in the absence of any conclusive proof of fraud, the award passed by the National Lok Adalat cannot be interfered with. 13. Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act also provides that every award passed by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute. In the present case before passing the award, principles of natural justice have been complied with and thus, such decree shall be final and binding upon the parties. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, there are no good grounds to interfere with the award passed by the National Lok Adalat, Khandpeeth No. 05, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.). 14. Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.