JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the notice as contained in memo no. 660 dated 19.08.2020 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) as well as the notice as contained in memo no. 904 dated 28.10.2020 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent no.4 – the Circle Officer, Govindpur, Dhanbad under the Provision of Section 3 of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1956”) wherein it has been alleged that the petitioner has encroached the land appertaining to New Khata No. 142, New Plot Nos. 1492 and 1623 (Old Plot Nos. 220, 224 and 225), Mouza - Susnilewa, Thana No. 88, measuring an area of 15.5 decimals (hereinafter referred to as “the said land”) which is a public land. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 06.11.2020 passed by the respondent no. 4 in Encroachment Case No. 01/2020-21, whereby it has been held that the said land is a public land and the petitioner has been directed to remove encroachment from the said land. The petitioner has also prayed for issuance of direction upon the respondents to correct the entries with respect to the said land in the khatiyan prepared after revisional survey in which the same is recorded as “Hawai Adda”, however, from the very beginning, the same is a raiyati land and has never been acquired by the respondent authorities. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the land appertaining to Khata No. 41, Plot Nos. 220, 224 & 225 measuring an area of 1 decimal, 10 decimals and 27 decimals respectively (total area 38 decimals) of Mouza- Susnilewa, Thana No. 88 under P.S. Barwadda Chowki, District -Dhanbad was originally purchased by Mukund Lal Ganeriwal by virtue of registered sale deed dated 10.02.1961. Mukund Lal Ganeriwal died leaving behind his two sons namely, Yatindra Nath Ganeriwal & Banwari Lal Ganeriwal and one daughter namely, Smt. Leelawati Devi Agrawal as his legal heirs. Since Yatindra Nath Ganeriwal and Banwari Lal Ganeriwal died issueless, the said land exclusively came in the share of Smt. Leelawati Devi Agrawal being the sole surviving legal heir of Mukund Lal Ganeriwal. Accordingly, the said land was mutated in her name and rent was also paid to the erstwhile State of Bihar under Thoka No. 232. Since Yatindra Nath Ganeriwal and Banwari Lal Ganeriwal died issueless, the said land exclusively came in the share of Smt. Leelawati Devi Agrawal being the sole surviving legal heir of Mukund Lal Ganeriwal. Accordingly, the said land was mutated in her name and rent was also paid to the erstwhile State of Bihar under Thoka No. 232. Thereafter, Smt. Leelawati Devi Agrawal sold the said land measuring an area of 38 decimals to the vendor of the petitioner (M/s J.S. Enterprises) by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 14.02.2011 and after that the vendor of the petitioner had been in continuous uninterrupted possession of the said land by getting the same mutated in its name. The jamabandi of the said land was also opened in its name and the rent was being paid by it under Thoka No. 931. The petitioner purchased part of the said land measuring an area of 6 decimals out of total area of 38 decimals from M/s J.S. Enterprises vide registered sale deed no. 6571 dated 07.07.2015 and jamabandi of the said land was opened in his name. 3. It is further submitted that 13 decimals of the land appertaining to Plot Nos. 224 & 225 of the said khata has also been purchased by Smt. Suman Agrawal, the wife of the petitioner vide registered sale deed no. 6570 dated 07.07.2015 which has been mutated in her name and rent for the same is being paid by her to the State Government. Suddenly, the petitioner received notices as contained in memo no. 660 dated 19.08.2020 and memo no. 904 dated 28.10.2020 issued by the respondent no. 4 under Section 3 of the Act, 1956 calling upon him to file show cause reply along with evidence by presenting himself before the said respondent as to why encroachment from the said land be not removed. The petitioner submitted his reply claiming his title and possession over the said land. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even if some wrong entry has been made in the Khatiyan recently uploaded on the website of Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, the said notices under the Act, 1956 could not have been issued in a mechanical manner based on that entry. 5. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even if some wrong entry has been made in the Khatiyan recently uploaded on the website of Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, the said notices under the Act, 1956 could not have been issued in a mechanical manner based on that entry. 5. It is also submitted that “Khata Number” of the said land has been mentioned in the sale deed as 41, whereas in the impugned notice, it has been written as 142. Smt. Suman Agrawal has not been served any notice under the Act, 1956, however, the notice served to the petitioner also mentions the land which was purchased by her. 6. During pendency of the instant writ petition, the impugned order dated 06.11.2020 was passed in Encroachment Case No. 01/2020-21 by which the respondent no. 4 came to a finding that since in the New Khatian, land of Khata No. 142, Plot No. 1492, measuring an area of 15.5 decimals was recorded in the name of “Hawai Adda” (Government of India), the said land was a public land and hence, the direction was issued to the petitioner to remove the encroachment from the said land. 7. It is further submitted that one Meena Singh @ Mina Singh and Tejpal Desai, who have also purchased part of the said land, were issued notices under the Act, 1956 only on the ground that in the new Khatian, the said land was recorded as “Bharat Sarkar–Hawai Adda” and the land encroachment proceeding was initiated against them. The aforesaid persons filed a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 2621/2020 which was disposed of vide order dated 09.11.2020 directing the respondent no. 3 to factually examine the matter and to pass appropriate informed order after providing due opportunity of hearing to them/their representative(s). The petitioners of that case were also given liberty to bring all available facts in relation to the land in question before the respondent no. 3 with further liberty to challenge the maintainability of the said land encroachment proceeding initiated by the respondent no. 3. However, after the aforesaid order dated 09.11.2020, the said respondent did not pass final order. 8. 3 with further liberty to challenge the maintainability of the said land encroachment proceeding initiated by the respondent no. 3. However, after the aforesaid order dated 09.11.2020, the said respondent did not pass final order. 8. It is also submitted that on bare perusal of the sale deed of Mukund Lal Ganeriwal executed in the year 1961, it would be evident that the land in question has all along been raiyati land and the same has never been acquired by the respondent authorities. There is no record available with the respondents to show that the said land belongs to “Bharat Sarkar Hawai Adda”. Wrong entry made in the revisional survey will not change the nature of land from raiyati to public. It has not been discussed in the impugned order dated 06.11.2020 passed in Encroachment Case No. 01/2020-21 as to how raiyati land was converted into public land. The impugned order dated 06.11.2020 is a non-speaking one which does not specifically answer the grounds taken by the petitioner. The title of the petitioner as well as his wife over the said land is quite evident and there was no occasion for the State Government to claim the same as government/public land. 9. It is further submitted that in the original khatiyan, the said land belonged to the private person and “Khata Number” of the same was mentioned as 41, however, the respondent no. 4 claimed that new khata of the said land was 142 which was recorded as “Airport” belonging to the Government of India. As such, the respondent no. 4 was required to verify the actual documents before issuing the notices under the Act, 1956. The respondent no. 4, while accepting the applications of mutation filed by the petitioner and his wife Suman Agrawal, had observed in the order dated 16.05.2016 that the said land was neither government land nor was under any land acquisition process, whereas for the same land, the said respondent has issued notices to the petitioner in the year 2020 stating that aforesaid land has illegally been encroached by him which is an arbitrary exercise of power. 10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents while referring to counter affidavit dated 29.01.2021 filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 submits that on enquiry, it has been found that the said land belongs to the Central Government. 10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents while referring to counter affidavit dated 29.01.2021 filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 submits that on enquiry, it has been found that the said land belongs to the Central Government. In the Revisional Survey Khatian also, it has been recorded in the name of “Bharat Sarkar–Hawai Adda” and the entry made therein has not been challenged by the petitioner at any point of time by filing an application under Section 87 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 or by filing any suit before the competent court of civil jurisdiction and thus the said entry as public land has attained finality by notifying the same through notification dated 03.06.2016 issued by the Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand. Since the petitioner had encroached the said land, a proceeding was initiated under the Act, 1956 in which after providing due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the order of eviction against him has been passed. 11. It is further submitted that against the order of eviction dated 06.11.2020 passed by the respondent no. 4 in Encroachment Case No. 01/2020-21, the petitioner preferred an appeal being JPLE Appeal No. 01/2021 before the respondent no. 3 – the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad which is still pending and hence, the present writ petition is not maintainable. 12. It is also submitted that the mutation neither creates nor extinguishes title nor raises any presumption of title of the occupant. Moreover, a new Collectorate Building has been constructed in the vicinity of the said land for the benefit of the public wherein having found that the petitioner has encroached over the public land, necessary order for removal of the encroachment has been passed. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner has been directed to remove encroachment from the said land on the ground that the same is a public land, whereas the claim of the petitioner is that the said land is not a public land and thus, the land encroachment proceeding initiated under the Act, 1956 itself was not maintainable. 14. To appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. 14. To appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Thummala Krishna Rao & Anr.” reported in (1982) 2 SCC 134 , wherein it has been held as under: “9. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by Section 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of "a very recent origin", cannot be stretched too far. That was also the view taken by the learned Single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Meharunnissa Begum v. State of A.P. [(1970) 1 Andh LT 88] which was affirmed by a Division Bench [Meherunnissa Begum v. Govt. of A.P. AIR 1971 AP 382 : (1971) 1 Andh LT 292 : ILR 1972 AP 44]. It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide. Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. 10. The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. 10. The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddin from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit. Maybe, that the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the property but, until that is done, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily. 15. In the case of “Rekha Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.” reported in 1992 SCC OnLine Pat 203: (1992) 2 PLJR 854 , learned Division Bench of Patna High Court (Ranchi Bench) has held as under: “7. It has been well settled by now that the summary remedy for eviction finder the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against the persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is "the property of Government". If there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it, and, on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. 8. In the instant case, unquestionably, the petitioners have a bona fide claim to litigate and they cannot be evicted save by the due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed under the Act is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process for evicting the petitioners. 9. The facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary course of law. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process for evicting the petitioners. 9. The facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary course of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property for a considerable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiting an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law.” 16. Thus, a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law and the Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. It has further been held that a person who is in occupation of a property for an appreciable length of time can be regarded, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. 17. In the case in hand, undisputedly, the petitioner as well as the prior owners of the said land had been in possession of the same since 1961 which was transferred from time to time by virtue of registered sale deeds. The jamabandi of the said land were opened in their name and they paid rent to the Government. The petitioner/his predecessors-in-interest continued to have possession of the said land for more than 60 years without any hindrance and disturbance from the respondent-State. The respondents have disputed the title of the petitioner/his predecessors claiming that in the revisional survey, the said land is recorded in the name of Central Government, however, they have failed to controvert the long possession of the petitioner/his predecessors-in-interest over the said land by virtue of different registered sale deeds coupled with long running jamabandi existing in their name as well as payment of rent of the same to the State Government. I am of the view that the land encroachment case in the nature of summary proceeding initiated by the respondents to evict the petitioner from the land in question cannot be said to be proper recourse since he is not an encroacher over the same rather, he is a bonafide purchaser of the said property. 18. One of the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents is that the present writ petition is not maintainable since the petitioner has already filed an appeal before the respondent no. 3. In reply to the said argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that an application for withdrawal of the appeal has been filed before the respondent no. 3, however, since the said respondent is not holding the court, the same could not be withdrawn. 19. I have perused the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of “Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. Vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal” reported in (2014) 1 SCC 603 , wherein it has been held that not entertaining petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite existence of an alternative remedy. It has further been held that some exceptions have been recognized for entertaining the writ petitions under Article 226 even when there is an alternative remedy i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice. 20. In the case in hand, since the proceeding of the Act, 1956 is itself not maintainable in its facts and circumstance, there is no need to direct the petitioner to resort to the appellate jurisdiction. 21. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the entire proceeding of Encroachment Case No. 01/2020-21 including the impugned notices as contained in memo no. 660 dated 19.08.2020 and memo no. 904 dated 28.10.2020, is hereby quashed. 21. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the entire proceeding of Encroachment Case No. 01/2020-21 including the impugned notices as contained in memo no. 660 dated 19.08.2020 and memo no. 904 dated 28.10.2020, is hereby quashed. The respondent-State is, however, at liberty to take appropriate civil remedy seeking its right, title and possession over the land in question. 22. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.