JUDGMENT : MEHTA, J. 1. The instant bunch of writ petitions filed by the petitioner M/s. Srinath Travels Agency under Article 226 of the Constitution of India involves identical controversy and thus, the same are being decided by this common order. 2. Basic facts relevant and essential for disposal of these writ petitions are being referred from Writ Petition No.1570/2017 because the complete set of relevant documents and pleadings are available in this file. 3. The petitioner herein is engaged in the transport business and owns private transport vehicles viz. buses. A service order dated 11.05.2016 was issued to the petitioner by the company Hindustan Zinc Limited for a period of four years commencing from 11.05.2016 to 10.05.2020. By virtue of this service order, the petitioner was engaged to deploy 23 vehicles at different locations of Hindustan Zinc Limited so as to ferry its employees to and fro from the factory and office premises. On receiving the service order, the petitioner submitted applications to the Road Transport Department in the prescribed form under Section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for obtaining “private service vehicle” permits. These applications were accompanied with the service order dated 11.05.2016. The RTA, Udaipur scrutinized the applications and granted 23 “private service vehicle” permits to the petitioner on different dates between 01.09.2016 to 29.11.2016. Below Point No.6 relating to the specification and number of persons permitted to be carried, it was noted that the persons to be carried would be Hindustan Zinc Limited employed as per the service order. The petitioner deposited the road tax for 23 vehicles covered under the permits period upto March 2017 and started plying the vehicles in the capacity of representative, agent and agency of Hindustan Zinc Limited as per the terms and conditions of the service order. It is stated that a news item came to be published in the ‘Rajasthan Patrika’ newspaper edition dated 20.01.2017 alleging inter alia that huge loss of revenue had been caused to the transport department on account of collusion between the department officials, Hindustan Zinc Limited and the petitioner. Pursuant to this reporting, the Anti Corruption Bureau officials seized relevant documents from the office of the RTA Udaipur and criminal cases came to be registered. Pursuant to this reporting, the Anti Corruption Bureau officials seized relevant documents from the office of the RTA Udaipur and criminal cases came to be registered. Immediately thereafter, the DTO, Udaipur (Rajsamand) issued notice dated 20.01.2017 to the petitioner requiring it to show cause as to why, the “private vehicle service” permits granted to it in the garb of the service order may not be suspended/cancelled as the same were in violation of Section 86 of the Motor Vehicles Act. On the basis of the enquiry conducted by department, the DTO proceeded to pass the order dated 25.01.2017 whereby, all 23 permits, referred to above, granted to the petitioner were suspended assigning the following reasons: i=koyh esa miyC/k lk{;ksa] vkosnu i= ds lkFk izLrqr nLrkostksa ,ao ftyk ifjogu vf/kdkjh] mn;iqj ,oa bl dk;kZy; ds izorZu dfeZ;ksa }kjk izdj.k ls lacaf/kr okguksa dh tkWp djus dh izfdz;k esa ik;s x;s lk{;ksa dk eksVj;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 dh /kkjk 2 ¼35½ rFkk /kkjk 2 ¼7½ dk voyksdu djus ij] eSa bl fu.kZ; ij igWqapk gwWa fd lacaf/kr QeZ }kjk mDrkuqlkj mYysf[kr Øekad 1 ls 23 rd izkIr futh lsok ;ku ds vuqKki=ksa dk mi;ksx ^^lafonk;ku** ds :i esa ;g fl) djrk gS fd ftl mn~ns'; ds fy, vuqKki= izkIr fd;k tkuk Fkk og vuqKki=/kkjh }kjk Nqik;k x;kA ;g d`R; eksVj;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 dh /kkjk 86 ¼1½¼Mh½ dh Js.kh esa vkrk gS tks vuqKk/kkjh ds fo:) bl izko/kku ds rgr dk;Zokgh djus ds fy, Ik;kZIr lk{; gSA vr% eSa uSu flag lksढ+k] ftyk ifjogu ,oa vfrfjDr lfpo] izknsf'kd ifjogu izkf/kdkj mn;iqj eSllZ JhukFk VsoYlZ ,tsUlh] ukFk}kjk] jktleUn dks bl dk;kZy; }kjk tkjh fuEu vuqKki= dks eksVj;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 dh /kkjk 86 ds vUrxZr iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, rRdky izHkko ls fuyafcr djrk gWwaA The DTO observed in the order dated 25.01.2017 that the vehicles were being used as contract carriages, however, while applying for the permits, the transporter, concealed material facts and thus, the permits were liable to be suspended by virtue of Section 86(1)(D) of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as below: “86. Cancellation and suspension of permits.-(1) The transport authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit- (a) ….. Cancellation and suspension of permits.-(1) The transport authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit- (a) ….. (d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation, or ….” Pursuant to suspension of permits, the DTO issued separate orders whereby, road tax was qualified as applicable to contract carriage permits and penalty was calculated and the petitioner was directed to deposit the same. The vehicles in question were also seized on 25.01.2017. 4. In one of the cases, the petitioner challenged the order of seizure and the demand notice by filing an appeal to the appellate authority but in the remaining matters, the impugned orders whereby, the petitioner’s vehicles were seized and the demands were raised, have been challenged by filing these writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. In consequence of ad interim orders passed by this Court, these vehicles were ordered to be released to the petitioner on interim custody/ Supurdaginama. This Court is apprised that the petitioner has satisfied the demand notices by paying the amounts albeit under protest. 6. Learned counsel Shri Rathi representing the petitioner, vehemently and fervently contended that no fraud was ever practiced by the petitioner when the applications were filed for grant of private service vehicle permits. The service contract issued to the petitioner by the corporate entity Hindustan Zinc Limited for whose employees’ the petitioner’s vehicles were to be deployed, was duly annexed with the applications for grant of permit. The impugned notices for suspension of permits and the seizure of the petitioners’ vehicles were issued purely on account of a malicious news article published in the ‘Rajasthan Patrika’ edition dated 20.01.2017. He urged that it was clearly stated in the order dated 25.01.2017 passed by the DTO, Udaipur that the permits granted to the petitioner were being suspended on account of non-disclosure of true facts as defined under Section 86(1)(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, as per Shri Rathi, there is no material on record to establish that the petitioner indulged in concealment of facts while submitting the applications for grant of “private service vehicle” permits. However, as per Shri Rathi, there is no material on record to establish that the petitioner indulged in concealment of facts while submitting the applications for grant of “private service vehicle” permits. He urged that if at all, the applications so filed were non-compliant of any rule or regulation, the transport authority treated the same as applications for contract carriage permits or in the alternative, the same could have either been rejected or granted under the applicable category. Nonetheless, on being satisfied with the service contract annexed with the applications filed by the petitioner, the transport authority granted the “private vehicle service” permits for the petitioner’s buses and hence, the impugned action of suspension of permits; seizure of the vehicles and demand of additional tax and penalty, is absolutely unjustified and illegal and deserves to be struck down. His alternative submission was that even if it is assumed that the petitioner should have been granted the permits in question as contract carriage permits then also, by virtue of notification dated 31.03.2006 as amended vide notification dated 08.03.2016, the permits of the petitioner would have to be treated as non-temporary fix contract/permits with an industrial/commercial entity and the special road tax would be payable on such permits subject to a maximum of Rs.12,500/-per month. Shri Rathi thus implored the Court to accept the writ petitions and quash the impugned demands of tax and penalty and prayed that the amounts already deposited may be ordered to be adjusted for upcoming eventualities. 7. Per contra, Shri Sudhir Tak, learned AAG representing the respondents, vehemently and fervently urged that the permits for “private service vehicles” were granted to the petitioner on account of the misrepresentation in the applications and on realizing the mistake, the vehicles were seized for the reason of non-payment of tax and the permits were suspended by adopting due process of law. He submitted that the petitioner was granted private service vehicle permits to ply the vehicles, however, the same were used as contract carriages in violation of the rules and the permits. Thus, as per Shri Tak, the transport authority was absolutely justified in suspending the permits and raising the tax liability and imposing penalty against the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner was granted private service vehicle permits to ply the vehicles, however, the same were used as contract carriages in violation of the rules and the permits. Thus, as per Shri Tak, the transport authority was absolutely justified in suspending the permits and raising the tax liability and imposing penalty against the petitioner. However, Shri Tak was not in a position to dispute the fact that in the order dated 25.01.2017, the relevant part whereof has been extracted herein above, the transport authority took the impugned action considering the petitioner’s applications to be in violation of Section 86(1)(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act, referred to supra. 8. The respondents, in their detailed reply, have not been able to even barely justify the aspersion that the permits in question were procured by practicing fraud. Shri Tak, during the course of oral submissions, fairly conceded that as a matter of fact, it is a case of permits of wrong category being granted under an inadvertent misconception rather than the permits having been procured by practicing fraud. Inspite of the above, Shri Tak’s submission was that once the mistake was realized, the transport authority was perfectly justified in demanding tax and imposing penalty upon the petitioner in view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules by presuming that the vehicles were operated as contract carriages during the relevant period. He submitted that the petitioner has already deposited the entire tax amount as demanded by the authority and thus, now it is estopped from challenging the impugned action. His submission was that the controversy has now been rendered purely academic and no useful purpose would be served by deciding the issues on merits. 9. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the material placed on record. 10. There is nothing on record to even prima facie satisfy the Court that the petitioner made any misrepresentation while filing the applications for grant of permits qua 23 of its vehicles which were deployed under the service contracts issued by Hindustan Zinc Limited for ferrying its employees to and fro. The relevant facts and documents were presented with the permit applications. At the same time, grant of Private Service Vehicle Permits to the petitioner was not permissible in the eyes of law. The relevant facts and documents were presented with the permit applications. At the same time, grant of Private Service Vehicle Permits to the petitioner was not permissible in the eyes of law. As per the definition provided under Section 2(33) of the Motor Vehicles Act, a ‘private service vehicle’ means a motor vehicle constructed or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver and “ordinarily used by or on behalf of the owner of such vehicle for the purpose of carrying persons for, or in connection with, his trade or business otherwise than for hire or reward but does not include a motor vehicle used for public purposes”. The import of the definition clearly means that the ‘private service vehicle’ would be one which is to be ordinarily used by or on behalf of the owner of such vehicle for the purpose of carrying persons for or in connection with his trade or business other than for hire or reward. The moment the petitioner’s vehicles were deployed by the Hindustan Zinc Limited through service contracts or in any other manner for transportation of Hindustan Zinc Limited’s employees, they could not have been covered under the definition of ‘private service vehicle’. Thus, the transport authority concerned acted with inherent illegality while granting permits in the nature of private service vehicles on the applications submitted by the petitioner based on the service contract issued by the Hindustan Zinc Limited. Thus, to this extent, the impugned action whereby, the permits were suspended cannot be faulted. However, the impugned order dated 25.01.2017 to the extant it conveys that the petitioner procured the permits by practicing fraud, is incorrect. Possibly, the permits were granted in form of ‘private service vehicles’ owing to ignorance of law but by no stretch of imagination, the petitioner’s applications can be branded to be fraudulent. It was the duty of the transport authority concerned to properly scrutinize and deal with the applications under the correct provision of law. The illegality thus, was on part of the transport authority concerned for which appropriate action should have followed. 11. Be that as it may. The conclusion that the impugned order dated 25.01.2017 is not happily worded and the aspersion of fraudulent procurement of permits has wrongly been casted on the petitioner, by itself, would not absolve it of the liability to pay tax as per the usage of the vehicle. 11. Be that as it may. The conclusion that the impugned order dated 25.01.2017 is not happily worded and the aspersion of fraudulent procurement of permits has wrongly been casted on the petitioner, by itself, would not absolve it of the liability to pay tax as per the usage of the vehicle. It is not disputed that the permits were granted to the petitioner in the month of September, 2016. The notification dated 08.03.2016 was prevailing at the relevant point of time and it is an admitted position that subsequent to the release of the vehicles, the petitioner was charged tax on these very vehicles as per the rates prescribed in this notification. 12. Resultantly, we are of the firm view that for the period during which the petitioner plied the vehicles under the incorrectly issued permits, it would have to be charged with the special road tax as quantified under the notification dated 08.03.2016 which reads as under: “In the said notification - (i) in the existing clause (4) of proviso appearing below the table, for the existing expression “Rs.25,000”, the expression “Rs.32,000” shall be substituted: (ii) after the existing clause (7) of proviso appearing below the table, the following new clauses shall be added, namely:- “(8) the Motor Vehicle specified in sub-clauses (v), (vi), (vii) or (viii) of clause 2 of the table and plying exclusively under a non-temporary fix contract with any industrial or commercial entity, the Special Road Tax shall be payable at the rate of 50% of the rate as mentioned against each in column number 2, subject to a maximum of Rupees 12,500/-per month. (9) if any vehicle, specified in clause (8) of proviso is found plying without appropriate permit they shall be liable to pay tax two times of tax as specified in clause (4) of this proviso for such vehicle.” 13. Consequently, the impugned demand notices are not sustainable in eyes of law and are hereby quashed. The tax liability of the petitioner for the subject period shall be calculated by the transport authority concerned in terms of Clause 8 of the amended notification dated 08.03.2016. The excess amount, if any, paid by the petitioner shall be adjusted against its future liabilities/dues with the department. 14. The writ petitions are allowed in the above terms. 15. No order as to costs. 16. A copy of this order be placed in each file.