ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The petitioner herein namely, J.K. Lakshmi Cement Ltd. seeks to challenge the constitutional validity of the rules enacted by notification dated 29-4-2003 namely, the Chhattisgarh Gram Panchayat Terminal Tax (Assessment and Collection) Goods Export in Limits Rules, 2003 (for short, ‘the Rules of 2003’) framed by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Serial No.14 of Schedule II read with sub-section (2) of Section 77, subsection (1) of Section 78 & Section 79 and also read with sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adnihiyam, 1993 (for short, ‘the Act of 1993’), which came into force with effect from 29-4-2003 on the ground that the Rules of 2003 are unconstitutional as it suffers from vice of excessive delegation and also seeks to challenge the correspondences dated 19-9-2016 (Annexure P-10) & 26-10- 2016 (Annexure P-11) as without jurisdiction and without authority of law, and finally seeks an appropriate writ restraining respondent No.4 in particular from imposing terminal tax upon the petitioner. 2. The above-stated challenge to the constitutional validity of the Rules of 2003 has been made on the following factual backdrop:- Petitioner’s Case: - 3. The petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and engaged in the business of manufacturing of cement and its sale to public at large. While conducting its business, the petitioner company was served with memo dated 24-12-2015 (Annexure P-2) by respondent No.4 Gram Panchayat, Malpuri Khurd asking to be subjected to a meeting convened with the representatives of the Gram Panchayat and arrange to process for fixation of taxes to be paid by it which the petitioner company replied by memo dated 12-1-2016 (Annexure P-3) requesting the Collector to interfere in the matter restraining respondents No.3 & 4 from taking any coercive action against it and asked for some time, as the Sarpanch of respondent No.4 Gram Panchayat was accused in criminal case arising out of assault over the plant of the petitioner company, but despite the said situation, respondent No.4 did not wait for reasonable time and by letter dated 1-2-2016 (Annexure P-4) communicated the unilateral decision to recover the taxes obligatory/or optional from the petitioner company followed by memo dated 16-4-2016 (Annexure P-5). However, respondent No.3 – Janpad Panchayat, Dhamdha issued letter dated 19-9-2016 (Annexure P-10) directing the petitioner company to pay various taxes including terminal tax for which a meeting was scheduled on 27-9-2016 asking the presence of the representative of the petitioner company, however, since the meeting did not take place on 27-9-2016, such a meeting was fixed on various dates, however, the same could not take place and on many occasions, the petitioner company was informed about absence of its representative despite his presence being there, which was firmly and categorically communicated to the authorities vide Annexure P-11 collectively. As such, respondent No.3 has decided to impose taxes in violation of Rule 2(12) of the Rules of 2003 as informed by letter dated 25-9-2017 (Annexure P-12) to which the petitioner company firmly replied stating that without confirming the applicability of the Rules of 2003 to the petitioner, it would be unreasonable to subject the petitioner company to taxes as intended by the respondents time and again. However, the writ petition has been amended by inserting para 8.14(A) impugning letter dated 19-9-2016 (Annexure P-10) which for the first time referred to ‘terminal tax’ and also impugning letter dated 26-10-2016 (Annexure P-11) whereby the Janpad Panchayat asked the petitioner company to appear in a meeting on 7-11-2016 in its office in presence of certain officials contrary to what is prescribed in Rule 2(12) of the Rules of 2003. It is the case of the petitioner company that the imposition of terminal tax in the manner proposed under Schedule I appended to the Rules of 2003 is bad in law. It is the further case of the petitioner that the respondent State of Chhattisgarh by virtue of framing the Rules of 2003 has delegated the discretion upon the Gram Panchayats to impose terminal tax which could not have been delegated in light of the provisions contained in Article 246(3) of the Constitution of India read with Entry 56 of List II—State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. As such, the action of the State Government in view of having exceeded its jurisdiction to delegate the power of levy of tax to Gram Panchayat is ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India and therefore it be declared ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution. Respondents’ case: - 4. As such, the action of the State Government in view of having exceeded its jurisdiction to delegate the power of levy of tax to Gram Panchayat is ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India and therefore it be declared ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution. Respondents’ case: - 4. Return has been filed on behalf of the State/respondents No.1 & 2 stating inter alia that the provision of imposition of terminal tax is squarely covered by Entry 56 of List II—State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and the said levy is sanctioned by Section 77 of the Act of 1993 and the Rules of 2003, which are framed thereunder laying down the guidelines and parameters of levy, is in nature of a subordinate legislation. It is further stated that the constitutional validity of imposition of terminal tax on goods exported from the limits of the local body in the context of Section 127(1)(xvi) of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961, has been upheld by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Monji Kalyanji and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1987 MPLJ 643 which has further been followed in the matter of Smt. Meera Khandelwal v. State of M.P. and others, AIR 1997 MP 163 and also in the matter of Northern Coal Fields Ltd. v. The State of M.P. and another, 2010(2) M.P.H.T. 202 (DB) : 2010 SCC OnLine MP 22. It has also been stated that the delegation made by the State Government is in line with the constitutional provisions contained in Article 243H of the Constitution of India and therefore the writ petition deserves to be dismissed, as imposition of terminal tax on the part of Gram Panchayat is strictly in accordance with law. 5. Similar stand has been taken by respondent No.4 Gram Panchayat in line with the stand taken by the State Government and prayer has been for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. 5. Similar stand has been taken by respondent No.4 Gram Panchayat in line with the stand taken by the State Government and prayer has been for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. Rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioner stating that the Rules of 2003 have failed to satisfy the norms of Section 77 read with Schedule I of the Act of 1993 in real sense in terms of Article 246 read with List II—State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and as such the Rules of 2003 deserve to be struck down as unconstitutional and violative of the constitutional provision. Submissions: - 7. Dr. N.K. Shukla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, would submit that the Rules of 2003 enacted by the State Government delegating full authority/discretion in favour of the Gram Panchayat – respondent No.4 by way of Rule 1(2) of the Rules of 2003 is invalid and violative of Article 246(3) of the Constitution of India and the delegation of full authority/discretion in favour of the Gram Panchayat by the State Government without prescribing any precondition on fulfillment of which the Gram Panchayat could implement the Rules of 2003 in its limits by proceeding in terms of Rule 1(2) of the Rules of 2003 giving uncanalised power and arbitrary authority to the Gram Panchayat. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that imposition of tax without approval of the State Government would amount to excessive delegation. In that view of the matter, the Rules of 2003 deserve to be struck down. Learned Senior Counsel would rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Vasu Dev Singh and others v. Union of India and others, (2006) 12 SCC 753, Hamdard Dawakhana and another v. The Union of India and others, AIR 1960 SC 554 and Kishan Prakash Sharma and others v. Union of India and others, (2001) 5 SCC 212 to buttress his submissions. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Amrito Das, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents No.1 & 2, would submit that in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of Section 95 read with sub-section (2) of Section 77 of the Act of 1993, the State Government has framed the rules known as the Gram Panchayat Optional Taxes and Fees (Conditions and Exceptions) Rules, 1996 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1996’), which provide for various heads and rates at which the tax has to be imposed and in furtherance of the Rules of 1996, exercising the powers contained under Sections 77(2), 78(1), 79 & 95(1) of the Act of 1993, the Rules of 2003 have been framed. The Rules of 2003 are categorical in its terms and provide for a clear mechanism for levy of terminal tax on any goods (lime stone) exported from the limits of the Gram Panchayat and therefore the Rules of 2003 cannot be said to have delegated arbitrary and uncanalised power to the Gram Panchayat. The Rules of 2003 provide for the commodity (lime stone) on which the levy is to be made and it further provide rate on which the terminal tax is to be collected. The Gram Panchayat is statutorily bound to act strictly in accordance with the Rules of 2003 and in case, there is any breach or violation, the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Manner and Limitation of Appeals against taxation) Rules, 1995 shall apply. Power to impose terminal tax by municipalities has already been considered and decided by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in Monji Kalyanji (supra), Smt. Meera Khandelwal (supra) and Northern Coal Fields Ltd. (supra). As such, it is not the case of excessive delegation of legislative authority in favour of the Gram Panchayat and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. Mr. Ratan Pusty, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 Janpad Panchayat, would support the submissions made by Mr. Das, learned Additional Advocate General. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 11. The grounds for adjudging the constitutional validity of a statute is well settled by judgments rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court from time to time. Principles for Examining Constitutional Validity : - 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 11. The grounds for adjudging the constitutional validity of a statute is well settled by judgments rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court from time to time. Principles for Examining Constitutional Validity : - 12. A Statute is construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. Therefore, a presumption that the Legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the Legislature, or that it has transgressed other constitutional mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, is always on the person who challenges its vires. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition, page 592.) 13. It is a settled principle of law that the Statute enacted by the Parliament or State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. 14. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary and others), (2017) 9 SCC 1 held that legislation can be struck down if it is manifestly arbitrary and manifest arbitrariness is the ground to negate legislation as well under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been observed by their Lordships as under: - “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” 15. Very recently, in the matter of Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 813, it has been held by three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court that judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive by observing as under: - “68. It could thus be seen that the role of the judiciary is to ensure that the aforesaid two organs of the State i.e. the Legislature and Executive function within the constitutional limits. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The role of this Court is limited to examine as to whether the Legislature or the Executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution. However, while doing so, the court must remain within its self-imposed limits.” 16. Thereafter, in Dr. Jaya Thakur (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon their earlier judgment in the matter of Binoy Viswam v. Union of India and others, (2017) 7 SCC 59 and reviewing their earlier decisions, speaking through B.R. Gavai, J., have held that the statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly, and observed as under: - “70. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. To do so, the Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provision under challenge cannot stand. It has been held that unless there is flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions, the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared bad. 71. It has been held that unless there is flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions, the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared bad. 71. It has been the consistent view of this Court that legislative enactment can be struck down only on two grounds. Firstly, that the appropriate legislature does not have the competence to make the law; and secondly, that it takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions. It has been held that no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or the other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. It has been held that Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. 72. It has been held by this Court that there is one and only one ground for declaring an Act of the legislature or a provision in the Act to be invalid, and that is if it clearly violates some provision of the Constitution in so evident a manner as to leave no manner of doubt. It has further been held that if two views are possible, one making the statute constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former view must always be preferred. It has been held that the Court must make every effort to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute, even if that requires giving a strained construction or narrowing down its scope. 73. It has consistently been held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. It has been held that if the law which is passed is within the scope of the power conferred on a legislature and violates no restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a court may think of it. 74. It has been held that if the law which is passed is within the scope of the power conferred on a legislature and violates no restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a court may think of it. 74. It could thus be seen that the challenge to the legislative Act would be sustainable only if it is established that the legislature concerned had no legislative competence to enact on the subject it has enacted. The other ground on which the validity can be challenged is that such an enactment is in contravention of any of the fundamental rights stipulated in Part III of the Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution. Another ground as could be culled out from the recent judgments of this Court is that the validity of the legislative act can be challenged on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. However, while doing so, it will have to be remembered that the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.” 17. Furthermore, in the matter of Dental Council of India v. Biyani Shikshan Samiti and another, (2022) 6 SCC 65 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. B.R. Gavai, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, held in paragraphs 27 & 28 of the report as under: - “27. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. 28. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. 28. It has further been held by this Court in the said case that for challenging the subordinate legislation on the ground of arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is not in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It has further been held that it cannot be done merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant circumstances which the Court considers relevant.” 18. Similarly, in the matter of PGF Limited and others v. Union of India and another, (2015) 13 SCC 50 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down certain guidelines by taking note of certain precautions to be observed whenever the vires of any provision of law is raised before the Court and cautioned the Courts in paragraph 37 as under: - “37. The Court can, in the first instance, examine whether there is a prima facie strong ground made out in order to examine the vires of the provisions raised in the writ petition. The Court can also note whether such challenge is made at the earliest point of time when the statute came to be introduced or any provision was brought into the statute book or any long time-gap exists as between the date of the enactment and the date when the challenge is made. It should also be noted as to whether the grounds of challenge based on the facts pleaded and the implication of the provision really has any nexus apart from the grounds of challenge made. With reference to those relevant provisions, the Court should be conscious of the position as to the extent of public interest involved when the provision operates the field as against the prevention of such operation. With reference to those relevant provisions, the Court should be conscious of the position as to the extent of public interest involved when the provision operates the field as against the prevention of such operation. The Court should also examine the extent of financial implications by virtue of the operation of the provision vis-a-vis the State and alleged extent of sufferance by the person who seeks to challenge based on the alleged invalidity of the provision with particular reference to the vires made. Even if the writ court is of the view that the challenge raised requires to be considered, then again it will have to be examined, while entertaining the challenge raised for consideration, whether it calls for prevention of the operation of the provision in the larger interest of the public. We have only attempted to set out some of the basic considerations to be borne in mind by the writ court and the same is not exhaustive. In other words, the writ court should examine such other grounds on the above lines for consideration while considering a challenge on the ground of vires to a statute or the provision of law made before it for the purpose of entertaining the same as well as for granting any interim relief during the pendency of such writ petitions. For the abovestated reasons it is also imperative that when such writ petitions are entertained, the same should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and on a time-bound basis, so that the legal position is settled one way or the other.” Legal Analysis and Discussion : - 19. After having considered the principles for examining the constitutional validity of an Act or the Rules, it would bring us to the facts of the case. 20. By virtue of Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993 read with Schedule II enacted under the said provision, which deals with other optional taxes, fees, etc. to be imposed by Gram Panchayats (Schedule II A, serial No.14), Gram Panchayats can impose any other tax, which the State Legislature has power to impose under the Constitution of India. Thus, the State Legislature has power to levy terminal tax as provided under Schedule II A, serial No.14. to be imposed by Gram Panchayats (Schedule II A, serial No.14), Gram Panchayats can impose any other tax, which the State Legislature has power to impose under the Constitution of India. Thus, the State Legislature has power to levy terminal tax as provided under Schedule II A, serial No.14. The Rules of 2003 have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Serial No.14 of Schedule II read with Sections 77(2), 78(1) and 79 and also read with Section 95(1) of the Act of 1993. The Rules of 2003 framed by the State Government in light of the aforesaid statutory provisions have been called in question on the ground that by virtue of Rule 1(2) of the Rules of 2003, delegation of absolute authority in favour of the Gram Panchayat without prescribing any precondition on fulfillment of which the Gram Panchayat could implement the Rules of 2003, suffers from vice of excessive delegation. 21. The Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, came into force on 24-4-1993 to give effect to one of the directive principles of State policy, namely, Article 40 of the Constitution, which directs the State to organise Village Panchayats as a unit of self-government. Part IX of the Constitution (The Panchayats) confers certain powers on local self-governments. It promises duration of 5 years, free and fair election, representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the administration of institutions of local self-government and "no interference" by other organs of the State. By virtue of the provisions contained in Part IX of the Constitution, the Panchayats have been empowered to formulate and implement their own programs of economic development and social justice in tune with their status as the third tier of government which is mandated to represent the interests of the people living within its jurisdiction. The system of Panchayats envisaged in Part IX aims at establishing strong and accountable systems of governance that will in turn ensure more equitable distribution of resources in a manner beneficial to all. (See Village Panchayat, Calangute v. Additional Director of Panchayat-II, (2012) 7 SCC 550 .) 22. On coming into force of the said Constitutional Amendment, the States were required by the Centre to take steps to organise village panchayats on the lines of the provisions of the said Constitutional Amendment by making new law or amending the existing law suitably. (See Village Panchayat, Calangute v. Additional Director of Panchayat-II, (2012) 7 SCC 550 .) 22. On coming into force of the said Constitutional Amendment, the States were required by the Centre to take steps to organise village panchayats on the lines of the provisions of the said Constitutional Amendment by making new law or amending the existing law suitably. The M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 was in force at that time and in order to bring the said Act in tune with the constitutional amendment i.e. Part IX of the Constitution and as per Articles 243B & 243H of the Constitution, the M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 was enacted with effect from 25-1-1994 and on the reorganisation of the State of Madhya Pradesh and coming into force of the State of Chhattisgarh on 1-11-2000, the Chhattisgarh Government vide notification dated 7th June, 2001, issued the Adaptation of Laws Order, 2001, and adapted the M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 as the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993. The Act of 1993 is an act to consolidate and amend the law relating to establishment of Panchayats with a view to ensure effective involvement of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in the local administration and development activities. 23. Article 243H of the Constitution provides for powers to impose taxes by, and funds of, the Panchayats. It provides that the Legislature of a State may, by law, authorise a Panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, rolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits, as may be specified in the law. It states as under: - "243H. Powers to impose taxes by, and funds of, the Panchayats.?The Legislature of a State may, by law,? (a) authorise a Panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits; (b) assign to a Panchayat such taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the State Government for such purposes and subject to such conditions and limits; (c) provide for making such grants-in-aid to the Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the State; and (d) provide for constitution of such Funds for crediting all moneys received, respectively, by or on behalf of the Panchayats and also for the withdrawal of such moneys therefrom, as may be specified in the law." 24. Chapter IX of the Act of 1993 deals with Taxation and Recovery of claims. Section 77 of the Act of 1993 provides for Other taxes. Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993, with which we are concerned, states that with the previous approval of the Janapad Panchayat, a Gram Panchayat and with the previous approval of the Zila Panchayat, a Janpad Panchayat may impose any of the taxes specified in the Schedule II. Section 78(1) provides for Power of State Government to regulate taxes by making rules to regulate the imposition, assessment, collection and sharing of taxes under Section 77. Section 93 of the Act of 1993 provides for delegation of powers. Section 93(1) states that the State Government, may by notification, delegate to or confer on any officer subordinate to it or to any Panchayat all or any of the powers conferred upon it by or under this Act, except the powers relating to framing of rules. Section 95 is the general rule making power of the State Government to carryout the purposes of the Act of 1993. 25. Section 77(2) read with Schedule II, serial No.14, of the Act of 1993 deals with taxes which the Gram Panchayat is empowered to levy with the previous approval of the Janpad Panchayat and taxes that the Gram Panchayat can levy is the taxes specified in Schedule II. Section 77(2) read with serial No.14, which we are concerned with, states as under: - "77. Other taxes.?(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) With the previous approval of the Janapad Panchayat, a Gram Panchayat and with the previous approval of the Zila Panchayat, a Janpad Panchayat may impose any of the taxes specified in the Schedule II. (3) xxx xxx xxx SCHEDULE II [See sub-section (2) of Section 77] A—OTHER OPTIONAL TAXES, FEES ETC. TO BE IMPOSED BY GRAM PANCHAYATS 1 to 13. xxx xxx xxx 14. Any other tax, which the State Legislature has power to impose under the Constitution of India." 26. Entry 56 of List II—State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India reads as under: - "56. Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways." 27. xxx xxx xxx 14. Any other tax, which the State Legislature has power to impose under the Constitution of India." 26. Entry 56 of List II—State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India reads as under: - "56. Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways." 27. By virtue of the aforesaid provision, imposition of terminal tax is squarely covered by Entry 56 of List II—State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and the State Legislature has power to impose terminal tax. 28. The constitutional validity of imposition of terminal tax on goods exported from the limits of the local body/Municipality in the context of Section 127(1)(xvi) of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 by Municipality has been considered and upheld by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Division Bench) in Monji Kalyanji (supra) and it has been held as under: - "Section 127(1)(xvi) of the M.P. Municipalities Act which empowers a municipal council to impose terminal tax both on import and export is covered by Entry 56 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Terminal tax on export of goods by road from within municipal limits, imposed by the Municipal Comittee, Vidisha under Section 127(1) (xvi) of the M.P. Municipalities Act is hence valid. Such tax cannot fall under Entry 89 of the List I inasmuch as the said entry contemplates only such goods or passengers which are carried by railway, sea or air. It does not contemplate any terminal tax on goods or passengers carried by road or on inland waterways. The imposition of terminal tax could not be held discriminatory on the ground that other municipal councils had not imposed it, because the considerations for imposition of terminal tax may differ from municipal council to municipal council." 29. The principle of law laid down by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in Monji Kalyanji (supra) has been relied upon and followed further by the M.P. High Court in Smt. Meera Khandelwal (supra) and it has been held as under: - "9. In fact, the main source of the taxing event is Section 127(1)(xvi) and that is not violative of Art. 301 of the Constitution and Sec. 129 of the Act of 1961 only lays down the procedure. In fact, the main source of the taxing event is Section 127(1)(xvi) and that is not violative of Art. 301 of the Constitution and Sec. 129 of the Act of 1961 only lays down the procedure. The main question is the event of the taxation and that event having been held to be valid, next question is the procedure to levy this tax. This procedure is contained in Sec. 129 of the Act of 1961. The unamended provision of Section 129 of the Act of 1961 was also upheld by this Court in the case of Moniji Kalvanji v. State of M.P., 1987 MPLJ 643 : (AIR 1988 Madh Pra 220). Section 129 was amended by Act No. 12 of 1995 because of the 74th Amendment in the Constitution, whereby the Municipalities have been given more autonomy by inserting Part IX-A from Art. 243-P to Art. 243 ZG. In order to give effect to this Constitutional mandate which has been brought about by Amendment Act No. 12 of 1995, the procedure which existed earlier was amended so as to make these local bodies more effective and autonomous. Therefore, now the more autonomy has been given to these local bodies for augmenting their revenue and for effectively discharging their duties being local bodies. The earlier procedure laid down a detailed for inviting objections, consideration of objections and thereafter finalising the same. That procedure has now been dispensed with and now autonomous bodies like Municipal Councils have been given power to impose tax on the subjects given in Section 127 of the Act of 1961 with certain limitations which may be prescribed by the State Government. The State Government has prescribed the limitations and provided guidelines which have been reproduced above and in accordance with the frame work, the Municipal Council is competent to impose tax. This procedure contained in Section 129 of the Act of 1961 does not in any way violate Art. 301 of the Constitution." 30. Similarly, in the matter of Western Coalfields Ltd., Pathakhera v. Tahsildar, Betul and another, (2000) 1 MPLJ 352 , it has been held by the M.P. High Court that the State legislature has power to impose terminal tax under Entry 56 of List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution and the Municipality have full legal competence to impose terminal tax, by observing as under: - "5. ... ... The State legislature has power to impose this tax under Entry 56 of List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution. The State has passed it on to the Municipality which is authorised to impose it under section 127 of the Act. The Constitutional validity of the terminal tax has been upheld by the Division Benches of this Court in Monji Kalyanji v. State of M.P., 1987 MPLJ 643 and recently in Meera Khandelwal v. State of M.P., 1997 (2) MPLJ 333 . Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the terminal tax cannot be imposed on the export of coal from the municipal limits has no legal foundation. ... Even now it is not made clear how the coal is untouchable for the purpose of imposition of terminal tax over which the State and the Municipality have full legal competence. It is not a tax or cess on royalty on mineral rights covered by entries 52 or 54 of the union list. Sales tax is levied by the State on coal and that is beyond challenge because of Entry 54 of List II. Therefore, the terminal tax also is payable by the petitioner. It does not encroach or entrench upon any of the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. The power of regulation and control is separate and distinct from the power of taxation. The power to tax under Entry 56 of List II being a specific power, it cannot be cut down or in any manner fettered by the general power of control exercised by the Parliament. Taxing field is clearly demarcated. There is no clash or conflict. This is borne out from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 ." 31. Taxing field is clearly demarcated. There is no clash or conflict. This is borne out from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 ." 31. The question as to whether a State Legislature can confer on a local body a power to levy a tax, has fallen for consideration before the Constitution Bench (seven Judges) of the Supreme Court in the matter of The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi and another, AIR 1968 SC 1232 in which the constitutional validity of Section 150(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 was challenged which provided for levy of taxation specified in sub-section (2) of Section 113 of the said Act by the Corporation by passing a resolution and also provided for prescribing maximum rates of tax to be levied and the question involved in that matter was, whether Section 150(1) of the Act of 1957 delegates completely unguided power to the Municipal Corporation in the matter of optional taxes and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and is unconstitutional, which their Lordships by majority held that Section 150(1) of the Act of 1957 does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and is a valid piece of legislation holding that a delegation of taxing power for local purposes to local bodies subject to control by Government or to such other procedural safeguards as the legislature considers necessary in the matter of imposition of taxes is well known and the delegation has been made to an elected body i.e. the Municipal Corporation, who is responsible to the people including those who pay taxes. It has been further held by their Lordships that the legislature has made Government the watch-dog to control the actions of the Corporation in the matter of fixing rates and other incidents of the taxes and that is also a check to see that reasonable rates are fixed by the Corporation when it proceeds to impose taxes under Section 150 of the Act of 1957 and the power of the Corporation to impose tax is inherent in the matter of exercise of power by subordinate public representative bodies, such as municipal bodies. It has also been held that Section 150(1) of the Act, which confers authority upon the Municipal Corporation by resolution to levy tax in respect of the optional taxes specified in Section 113(2) of the Act, has not violated the rule against excessive delegation of legislative authority. Finally, it was held that power conferred by Section 150(1) of the Act of 1957 on the Municipal Corporation is not unguided in the circumstances and cannot be said to amount to excessive delegation by observing as under: - “38. On a careful consideration therefore of the various provisions of the Act we must hold that the power conferred by Section 150 of the Act on the Corporation is not unguided in the circumstances and cannot be said to amount to excessive delegation.” 32. As such, the State legislature has power and jurisdiction to impose terminal tax on the goods exported to its panchayat limit. Since the State legislature has legal competence to impose terminal tax under Entry 56 of List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution and power of Municipality to levy terminal tax under Section 127(1)(xvi) of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 has duly been upheld by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in Monji Kalyanji (supra), reiterated in Smt. Meera Khandelwal (supra) and further reiterated in Western Coalfields Ltd., Pathakhera (supra). In The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court had already held that conferment of power in favour of Municipal Corporation to levy a tax cannot be termed to amount to excessive delegation. In light of this legal position being well settled, the Gram Panchayat by virtue of Section 77(2) read with Serial No.14 of Schedule II of the Act of 1993, is fully empowered to impose terminal tax with the previous approval of the Janpad Panchayat. 33. In order to regulate the imposition, assessment, collection and sharing of taxes under Section 77, the State Government in exercise of power conferred under Section 78(1) of the Act of 1993 has framed the rules, which is sought to be challenged branding that the State Government has delegated full authority/discretion in favour of the Gram Panchayat without prescribing any precondition on fulfillment making the rule as it suffers from vice of excessive delegation. It is not in dispute that the constitutional validity of serial No.14 of Schedule II enacted under Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993, which empowers the Gram Panchayat to impose any other tax which the State Legislature has power to impose under the Constitution of India, is not under challenge at all in this writ petition; what the petitioner seeks to challenge is, while framing the Rules of 2003 in exercise of the powers conferred by serial number 14 of Schedule II read with sub-section (2) of Section 77 and sub-section (1) of Section 78 and 79 and read with subsection (1) of Section 95 of the Act of 1993, uncanalised, unguided and arbitrary power has been conferred to the Gram Panchayat to levy terminal tax and its assessment and collection on the goods being exported within the panchayat limits in shape of Rule 1(2) of the Rules of 2003. Goods in terms of the Rules of 2003 is only lime stone (clinker). As in the Rules of 1996, the rate of terminal tax of the goods exported from Gram Panchayats for lime stone (clinker) was not prescribed, therefore, the Rules of 2003 were enacted prescribing the rules for imposition of terminal tax on the lime stone exported from the Gram Panchayat limits and it has to be exercised by the Gram Panchayat with the previous approval of the Janpad Panchayat. Rules 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9 of the Rules of 2003 prescribe the detailed procedure for imposing terminal tax on lime stone which state as under: - "3. Every person, businessman, establishment or license holder is responsible to collect Terminal Tax for the goods at the rate specified in the Schedule if he himself exports any goods as shown in Schedule or sells for the purpose of export. 4. The person, businessman, establishment or license holder, as mentioned in Rule 3 shall deposit in the Gram Panchayat Treasury the amount of Terminal tax collected during the last month on the goods exported from the Gram Panchayat limits through their shop/establishment along with the return up to 10th day of every month. 5. 4. The person, businessman, establishment or license holder, as mentioned in Rule 3 shall deposit in the Gram Panchayat Treasury the amount of Terminal tax collected during the last month on the goods exported from the Gram Panchayat limits through their shop/establishment along with the return up to 10th day of every month. 5. If on the examination of the return, the Sarpanch or the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat as the case may be, requires any additional information, he shall given the notice to the person concerned, businessman, establishment or license holder who shall submit such information within 30 days from the date of receipt of such notice. 6. "Tax assessment group" (Gram Panchayat Sarpanch or Secretary or any member of Gram Panchayat) who is authorized can enter into the concerned shop or establishment to examine the information given in the return with prior permission of Sarpanch/Secretary (Tax assessment group) and according to the necessity he can examine the accounts. 7. General administration committee of the Gram Panchayat, if feels necessary or from sources gets complaints on any person, Businessman or establishment then, with the prior permission of the State Govt. the documents and the goods of that person, Businessman or the establishment can be examined through the tax assessment group and for the propose of evidence such goods and documents can be sealed. 8. If the return is not submitted within the time period mentioned in Rule 4 or if the Terminal Tax is not deposited in Gram Panchayat Treasury then, at rate of 5% interest per month should be paid. For submitting wrong return, amount equal to 10 times payable tax shall have to be paid extra. However with Government's Prior permission, the penalty amount can be reduced. 9. Any person who contravenes any of these rules shall be punishable with fine to the extent of five hundred rupees." 34. Rule 3 of the Rules of 2003 obliges that every person, businessman, establishment or license holder is responsible to collect Terminal Tax for the goods at the rate specified in the Schedule if he himself exports any goods as shown in Schedule or sells for the purpose of export. Rule 3 of the Rules of 2003 obliges that every person, businessman, establishment or license holder is responsible to collect Terminal Tax for the goods at the rate specified in the Schedule if he himself exports any goods as shown in Schedule or sells for the purpose of export. The person named in Rule 3 are obliged to deposit the tax in the Gram Panchayat Treasury and detailed procedure for collection of tax in case of evasion of tax has been prescribed and power has been given to the General Administration Committee of the Gram Panchayat and even appeal against the order passed under the Rules of 2003 has been provided under the provisions the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Manner and Limitation of Appeal, Against Taxation) Rules, 1995 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1995’). 35. The star submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that by Rule 1(3) of the Rules of 2003, the authority to impose and implement the Rules of 2003 in respect of terminal tax on the lime stone (clinker) scheduled therein has been conferred on the Gram Panchayat which is in violation of the provisions contained in Article 246(3) of the Constitution of India read with Entry 56 of List II—State List as prescribed in the Seventh Schedule, though power and jurisdiction is vested with the State Government exclusively to impose terminal tax on the goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways, the rule is bad in law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of In re Art. 143, Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc., AIR 1951 SC 332 . Paragraph 41 of the said judgment has been relied upon to hold that legislation delegating legislative powers on some other bodies is not a law on any of the subjects or entries mentioned in the Legislative Lists. It states as under:- "(41) ... I do not read Articles 245 and 246 as covering the question of delegation of legislative powers. In my opinion, on a true construction of Articles 245, 246 and the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, construed in the light of the judicial decisions mentioned above, legislation delegating legislative powers on some other bodies is not a law on any of the subjects or entries mentioned in the Legislative Lists. In my opinion, on a true construction of Articles 245, 246 and the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, construed in the light of the judicial decisions mentioned above, legislation delegating legislative powers on some other bodies is not a law on any of the subjects or entries mentioned in the Legislative Lists. It amounts to a law which states that instead of the legislature passing laws on any subject covered by the entries, it confers on the body mentioned in the legislation the power to lay down the policy of the law and make a rule of conduct binding on the persons covered by the law." 36. The Constitution Bench (seven Judges) of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) has held that the legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act. Where the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the Courts should not interfere. What guidance should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act with which the Court has to deal including its preamble. It has further been held by their Lordships that the nature of the body to which delegation is made is also a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether there is sufficient guidance in the matter of delegation. What form the guidance should take is again a matter which cannot be stated in general terms. It will depend upon the circumstance of each statute under consideration. Their Lordships also held that in the field of taxation the guidance may take the form of providing maximum rates of tax up to which a local body may be given the discretion to make its choice, or it may take the form of providing for consultation with the people of the local area and then fixing also rates after such consultation. Their Lordships by majority on review of earlier cases including Delhi Laws Act (1912) (supra), held as under: - "28. Their Lordships by majority on review of earlier cases including Delhi Laws Act (1912) (supra), held as under: - "28. A review of these authorities therefore leads to the conclusion that so far as this Court is concerned the principle is well established that essential legislative function consists of the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct and cannot be delegated by the legislature. Nor is there any unlimited right of delegation inherent in the legislative power itself. This is not warranted by the provisions of the Constitution. The legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act. Where the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere. What guidance should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act with which the Court has to deal including its preamble. Further it appears to us that the nature of the body to which delegation is made is also a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether there is sufficient guidance in the matter of delegation." 37. On behalf of the petitioner, Rule 1(3) of the Rules of 2003 has been sought to be challenged on the ground that it is a case of excessive delegation as the power to implement the Rules of 2003 has been given to the Gram Panchayat and even the approval of the State Government is not required to be taken before imposing terminal tax under Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993. 38. As noticed herein-above, the Gram Panchayats have been given constitutional status by the Constitution (Seventythird Amendment) Act, 1992, with effect from 24-4-1993. Article 243B(1) of the Constitution of India provides that there shall be constituted in every State, Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels in accordance with the provisions of this Part and further, Composition of Panchayats has been provided in Article 243C, clause (1) of which states that subject to the provisions of this Part, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions with respect to the composition of Panchayats. Article 243D provides that seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in every Panchayat. Article 243E provides for Duration of Panchayats etc., and Article 243H provides that the Legislature of a State may, by law, authorise a Panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits, as may be specified in the law. Accordingly, the erstwhile Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1990 has been repealed and the existing Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 came into force with effect from 25-1-1994 adapted by the State of Chhattisgarh. Section 8 of the Act of 1993 provides for Constitution of Panchayat, which states that a Gram Panchayat for a village, a Janapad Panchayat for a Block, and a Zila Panchayat for a district shall be constituted. Section 11 provides for Incorporation of Panchayat. It states that every Gram Panchayat, Janapad Panchayat and Zila Panchayat shall be body corporate by the names specified, therefor in the order under Section 3 for village or notification under Section 10 for Janapad Panchayat and Zila Panchayat as the case may be. Section 13 provides for Constitution of Gram Panchayat, which states that every Gram Panchayat shall consist of elected Panchas and a Sarpanch and Section 17 provides for election of Sarpanch and Up-Sarpanch. As such, after the constitutional amendment, Panchayats have been given the constitutional status and their powers and functions have been prescribed in the Act of 1993. Gram Panchayats are units of local self-government being democratic bodies at the local level, they have tenure of five years and their normal tenure cannot be curtailed otherwise than in accordance with law. The system of Panchayats envisaged in Part IX of the Constitution aims at establishing strong and accountable systems of governance that will in turn ensure more equitable distribution of resources in a manner beneficial to all. The system of Panchayats envisaged in Part IX of the Constitution aims at establishing strong and accountable systems of governance that will in turn ensure more equitable distribution of resources in a manner beneficial to all. As such, the petitioner's submission that power to implement the Rules of 2003 i.e. impose, levy and collect terminal tax conferred on the Gram Panchayat amounts to excessive delegation, deserves to be rejected particularly when the competent legislature while enacting the Act of 1993 in shape of Section 77(2) read with Schedule II, serial No.14, has clearly provided that Gram Panchayat can impose any other tax which the legislature has power to impose and the State Legislature has power to impose terminal tax on export of goods as held herein-above. As such, power to impose terminal tax by virtue of Section 77(2) read with Schedule II, serial No.14 of the Act of 1993 has been given to Gram Panchayat by the legislature, as power of the State Legislature to levy terminal tax on goods imported is well settled and is not under challenge. Only what has been questioned on behalf of the petitioner is, while framing the Rules of 2003, power and jurisdiction to implement the Rules of 2003 has been conferred to the Gram Panchayat ignoring the fact that this power to impose terminal tax has already been conferred to the Gram Panchayat by the State legislature while enacting Section 77(2) read with Schedule II of the Act of 1993 and the impugned Rules of 2003 have been framed by virtue of Section 78(1) of the Act of 1993, which confers power to the State Government to regulate taxes by providing that the State Government may make rules to regulate the imposition, assessment, collection and sharing of taxes under Section 77, which the State Government has enacted in shape of the Rules of 2003. 39. The word 'regulate' is wide enough to confer power on the State Government to regulate either by increasing the rate, or decreasing the rate, the test being what is it that is necessary or expedient to be done to maintain, increase, or secure supply of the essential articles in question and to arrange for its equitable distribution and its availability at fair prices. (See Sri Venkata Seetaramanjaneya Rice and Oil Mills and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh Etc., AIR 1964 SC 1781 .) In the matter of Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad and another, AIR 1973 SC 87 , the Supreme Court has held that under Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act 1951, the word “regulating” would include the power to prescribe that permission in writing should be taken before the holding of a meeting on a public street. As such, regulatory power has been conferred to the State Government to regulate the imposition, assessment, collection and sharing of taxes under Section 77 of the Act for which the State Government has framed the Rules of 2003 in exercise of power conferred under Section 78(1) of the Act of 1993 apart from the other enabling provisions to regulate the imposition, assessment, collection and sharing of optional taxes under Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993. 40. The further argument that the Rules of 2003 confer uncanalised and unlimited arbitrary power to the Gram Panchayat to impose terminal tax is also not correct in view of the fact that Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993 clearly provides that a Gram Panchayat may impose any of the taxes specified in Schedule II of the Act only with the ‘previous approval’ of the Janpad Panchayat. 41. The term ‘previous approval’ employed in Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993 is of significant importance. When a legislature confers a power to be exercised after ‘previous approval’ of a named authority, it cannot be validly exercised without such previous approval. For example restriction placed on police by Section 20A of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 not to take cognizance of any offence ‘without the previous approval of the District Superintendent of Police’ has been held to be mandatory by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matters of Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, 1995 (5) SCC 302 and Mohd. Yunus v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 8 SCC 459 . Yunus v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 8 SCC 459 . As such, the distinction is quite clear that when the requirement is only of ‘approval’ and not of ‘prior approval’ the action holds good; only if it is disapproved it loses its force (see High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh, (2003) 4 SCC 239 , p. 255 and Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 14th Edition, page 470.) As such, Gram Panchayat is empowered to impose terminal tax as specified in Schedule II of the Act of 1993 only with the previous approval of the Janpad Panchayat. As such, sufficient guidance has been prescribed by the Act itself on the Gram Panchayat to levy terminal tax, as previous approval of the Janpad Panchayat is required before imposing terminal tax upon any person. Right of Appeal : - 42. The order imposing tax by Gram Panchayat that too subject to approval by Janpad Panchayat has made subject to appeal by the appropriate appellate authority by virtue of Section 79 of the Act of 1993 in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed as per the Rules of 1995 read with Rule 10 of the Rules of 2003. 43. An appeal, as is well known, is the right of entering a superior court invoking its aid and interposition to redress an error of the court below. The central idea behind filing of an appeal revolves round the right as contradistinguished from the procedure laid down therefor. (See Kamla Devi v. Kushal Kanwar and another, (2006) 13 SCC 295.) 44. As such, the order imposing tax by Gram Panchayat subject to previous approval of Janpad Panchayat will be appealable before the prescribed appellate authority under Section 79 of the Act of 1993 read with the Rules of 1995 and legality, validity and correctness of the order imposing terminal tax can certainly be questioned before that authority in accordance with law, and the appellate authority would be at liberty to examine legality, validity and correctness of the order so passed by the Gram Panchayat imposing terminal tax. As such, in shape of appeal also sufficient safeguard has been provided for exercising the power to impose terminal tax at the instance of Gram Panchayat. 45. As such, in shape of appeal also sufficient safeguard has been provided for exercising the power to impose terminal tax at the instance of Gram Panchayat. 45. Similarly, Gram Panchayat has been empowered by the Act of 1993 to impose “any other tax” which the State Legislature has power to impose under the Constitution of India. Delegation has been made by the State Legislature by the Act of 1993 to Gram Panchayat, which is the elected body responsible to the people including those who pay taxes and which has also been held to be valid by the Supreme Court in The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) holding that so long as the power of taxation is exercised by the elected body there will always be a check in the form of the members thereof having to face the electorate after every four years with the liability of being thrown out if they act unreasonably and furthermore, it has been held that the Corporation has been assigned certain obligatory functions which it must perform and for which it must find money by taxation. It has also been assigned certain discretionary functions. If it undertakes any of them it must find money. Previous approval of a body called Janpad Panchayat is required which the Gram Panchayat has to seek before imposing tax and Janpad Panchayat is also a body constituted under the Act of 1993 in terms of Section 8(b) of the Act of 1993 and is also established under Section 10 of the Act and it is a responsible elected body. Therefore, it is quite established that conferment of responsibility of the rule making authority and regulating authority i.e. State Government under Section 77(1) of the Act of 1993 to levy and impose taxation, upon Gram Panchayat cannot be said to be suffering from excessive delegation, as it has been conferred to the elected body i.e. Gram Panchayat responsible to the electorate. Furthermore, previous approval of the Janpad Panchayat is required under Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993 for imposition of terminal tax and more particularly, the Act of 1993 itself has conferred power to Gram Panchayat to impose terminal tax as specified in Schedule II under Section 77(2) which remains unquestioned on behalf of the petitioner and further, the State Government had already regulated the imposition, assessment, collection and sharing of taxes by virtue of Section 78(1). Therefore, Gram Panchayat is having legal competence to impose terminal tax and its order imposing tax has been subjected to appeal before the prescribed authority in the manner prescribed and decision of the Gram Panchayat imposing tax i.e. the order imposing tax by the Gram Panchayat is not final and subject to appeal before the appellate authority. As such, power conferred by the legislature and further by the State Government giving responsibility to Gram Panchayat to impose tax in terms of Section 77(2) read with Serial No.14 of Schedule II of the Act of 1993 is neither uncanalised nor unrestricted power and therefore the Rules of 2003 framed by the State Government is in accordance with law, it is neither unconstitutional nor violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India and it does not suffer from vice of excessive delegation. 46. The judgment relied upon on behalf of the petitioner i.e. Delhi Laws Act (1912) (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case as in the later judgment in The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 58 as under: - “58. Local bodies are subordinate branches of governmental activity. They are democratic institutions managed by the representatives of the people. They function for public purposes and take away a part of the government affairs in local areas. They are political sub-divisions and agencies which exercise a part of State functions. As they are intended to carry on local self-government the power of taxation is a necessary adjunct to their other powers. They function under the supervision of the Government. This supervision is considered necessary, because Municipal Councillors as a rule are unwilling to tax in a manner likely to affect themselves. House-holders seek to transfer burdens to tradesmen and vice versa. To insist that the legislature should provide for every matter connected with municipal taxation would make municipalities mere tax-collecting departments of Government and not self-governing bodies which they are intended to be. Government might as well collect the taxes and make them available to the municipalities. That is not a correct reading of the history of Municipal Corporations and other self-government institutions in our country.” 47. Government might as well collect the taxes and make them available to the municipalities. That is not a correct reading of the history of Municipal Corporations and other self-government institutions in our country.” 47. The petitioner has further sought to rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vasu Dev Singh (supra), which has also considered its earlier decision in Hamdard Dawakhana (supra). In Vasu Dev Singh (supra), the notifications issued by the State Government were challenged on the ground that the said notifications suffer from excessive delegation of legislative function/power. It was further alleged that the notifications under challenge therein were essential legislative functions and, therefore, the same could not have been delegated by way of notification. On the other hand, the contention of the State was that the notifications under challenge cannot be said to have been delegated legislation, on the contrary, the same were conditional legislation. Reference to the said judgment is absolutely inconsequential since the facts of the said case are substantially and materially different from the facts of the present case. 48. On the basis of the aforesaid legal analysis, we are of the considered opinion that by the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, which came into force with effect from 24-4-1993, Part IX has been introduced in the Constitution which directs the State to organise Village Panchayats as a unit of self-government and Article 243H has also been introduced in the Constitution mandating the Legislature of a State to authorise a Panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, rolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits. In compliance of the Constitutional Amendment, since the States were required to take steps to organise Village Panchayats on the lines of the provisions of the said Constitutional Amendment by making new law or amending the existing law suitably, the M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 was enacted by the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh with effect from 25-1-1994 and on the reorganisation of the State of Madhya Pradesh and coming into force of the State of Chhattisgarh with effect from 1-11-2000, the Chhattisgarh Government vide notification dated 7th June, 2001, issued the Adaptation of Laws Order, 2001 and adapted the M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 as the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, to consolidate and amend the law relating to establishment of Panchayats in consonance with Article 243H of the Constitution read with Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993. Chapter IX of the Act of 1993 deals with Taxation and Recovery of claims. Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993 empowers the Gram Panchayat to levy taxes specified in Schedule II with the previous approval of the Janpad Panchayat. Schedule II enacted under subsection (2) of Section 77 of the Act of 1993 deals with other optional taxes, fees etc. to be imposed by Gram Panchayats of which serial No.14 is one of the taxes which states that “any other tax, which the State Legislature has power to impose under the Constitution of India”. Under Entry 56 of List II—State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, the State Legislature has power to impose taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways and their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) have held that conferment of power by the Legislature to the Municipal Corporation to levy tax does not suffer from vice of excessive delegation being the valid piece of legislation. In Monji Kalyanji (supra) followed in Smt. Meera Khandelwal (supra) and further followed in Western Coalfields Ltd., Pathakhera (supra) by Division Bench of the M.P. High Court it has been held that the Municipality has power to impose terminal tax under Entry 56 of List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution by virtue of Section 127(1)(xvi) of the M.P. Municipalities Act. Under Section 78 of the Act of 1993, the State Government is empowered to make rules to regulate the imposition, assessment, collection and sharing of taxes under Section 77 by framing rules which have been framed in the instant case i.e. the Rules of 2003 which are sought to be challenged by way of this writ petition. 49. Tax is specified in Schedule II of the Act of 1993 which the Gram Panchayat is empowered to levy under Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993 and serial No.14 of Schedule II – any other tax, which the State Legislature is empowered to impose under the Constitution of India, has to be imposed by the Gram Panchayat only with the previous approval of the Janpad Panchayat and the provision of “previous approval” incorporated under Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993 is mandatory, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Anirudhsinhji (supra) and Mohd. Yunus (supra). 50. The order imposing tax by virtue of Section 77(2) read with serial No.14 of Schedule II of the Act of 1993 is subject to appeal before the prescribed appellate authority by virtue of Section 79 of the Act of 1993 in accordance with the Rules of 1995 as provided in Rule 10 of the Rules of 2003 within the prescribed time and the decision of such authority i.e. the prescribed appellate authority, shall be final and will be subject to writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Since the power of taxation has been conferred by the Legislature to the Gram Panchayat by the Act of 1993 who is an elected body and elected by the voters of the Gram Panchayat constituency, they are answerable to the electorate of the Gram Panchayat which is subject to regulatory power conferred to the State Government under Section 78(1) of the Act of 1993 by framing appropriate rules regarding imposition, assessment, collection and sharing of taxes as in the instant case the Rules of 2003. Thus, sufficient guidance and safeguard have been provided for exercise of power to impose terminal tax by the Gram Panchayat, and as such, uncanalised, unrestricted or arbitrary power has not been conferred to the Gram Panchayat, more particularly when power and jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayat under Section 77(2) read with serial No.14 of Schedule II of the Act of 1993 to levy terminal tax is not under challenge. 51. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that levy of terminal tax by Gram Panchayat is in accordance with Article 243H(1) of the Constitution of India read with Section 77(2) & Schedule II, serial No.14 of the Act of 1993 and further read with Sections 78(1) & 95(1) of the Act of 1993, and the Rules of 2003 do not confer any excessive, uncanalised, arbitrary and unrestricted power to the Gram Panchayat to impose, levy, collect and share terminal tax under Section 77(2) of the Act of 1993. As such, it is held that the Rules of 2003 are intra vires to the provisions of the Constitution and they do not suffer from vice of excessive delegation. Challenge made to the said rules are hereby rejected and challenge made to notification dated 29-4-2003 and the writ of mandamus sought restraining the respondents from imposing terminal tax is also hereby rejected. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).