JUDGMENT : 1. Heard on admission. 2. This appeal arises out of judgment of acquittal dated 03.09.2021 passed by the learned Trial Court in the matter of prosecution of Respondent No. 1 for alleged commission of offences under Sections 302, 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3/25 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/victim would argue that despite there being reliable ocular testimony of the mother of the deceased (PW-11) and corroboration of the same by the Forensic report regarding cause of death of the deceased by bullet injury and also seizure of pistol from the accused, acquittal has been ordered which is perverse and contrary to reliable piece of evidence both direct and circumstantial in nature. 4. We have gone through the impugned judgment of acquittal. 5. We find that in order to grant acquittal on benefit of doubt, the learned Trial Court has taken into consideration that the FIR itself was lodged by the so called eye-witness, the mother of the deceased, after two months of the incident. Further, we find that though there is an evidence with regard to recovery of a pistol from the accused, there is no evidence collected by the prosecution with regard to the bullet which is alleged to have caused injury to the deceased. In fact, no bullet was recovered from the body, nor any exit wound was found. Other signs of bullet injury were also not found, but only puncture wound was noted in the postmortem report. There is no report of the armorer or ballistic export to establish live link between the firearm allegedly seized from the accused. There is not even an evidence of the firearm capable of being fired. The learned Trial Court taking into consideration such serious discrepancies in the case of the prosecution, has acquitted the respondent-accused granting benefit of doubt. 6. It is well settled that the scope of interference against judgment of acquittal is extremely limited. Once the view taken by the learned Trial Court is plausible and there is possibility of more than one view out of which, one view has been preferred by the Trial Court and acquittal has been granted by giving benefit of doubt, no interference is called for. 7. Therefore, in view of the above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the acquittal. 8. 7. Therefore, in view of the above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the acquittal. 8. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.