ORDER : Since the issue involved in all these Writ Petitions is one and the same, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of all these cases by way of this common order. 2. The workmen filed four Miscellaneous Petitions on the file of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur (hereinafter called, ‘the Labour Court’) to direct the employer-society for payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% with interest at 12% per annum from due date till the date of realization. The Labour Court, vide order dated 14.12.2015, partly allowed the said petitions, directing the employer-society to pay subsistence allowance to the workmen. Aggrieved by the said orders, the employer-society filed four Writ Petitions, viz., W.P.No.19698 of 2017, W.P.No.19541 of 2017, W.P.No.19551 of 2017 and W.P.No.19553 of 2017 and the workmen filed three Writ Petitions, viz., W.P.No.10436 of 2016, W.P.No.16937 of 2016 and W.P.No.16947 of 2016 for not granting interest on the amount of subsistence allowance determined by the Labour Court. 3. For the sake convenience, this Court is inclined to mention the pleadings in W.P.No.19698 of 2017. The parties will be referred to as ‘workmen’ and ‘society’. 4. The workmen were originally joined as an employee in the society and they were subsequently promoted as Secretary. Thereafter, the workmen were put under suspension on 11.08.2003 and they have challenged the said suspension before the composite High Court and the composite High Court, vide order dated 26.08.2003 in W.P.M.P.No.22284 of 2003, suspended the operation of the suspension order. Basing upon the said order, the workmen were taken to duty on 31.12.2004. Again, the workmen were put under suspension on 10.11.2006 on the ground of misappropriation of funds of the society. The petitioner worked from 31.12.2004 to 09.11.2006 in the society, but he was paid salary by the society for the said period. Therefore, the workmen filed Miscellaneous Petitions under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act against the society, seeking to direct the employer-society to pay subsistence allowance with interest. 5. The case of the society is that the workmen are not entitled to monthly salary as mentioned in the petitions and as per G.O.Ms.No.94 dated 28.02.2004. He would further contend that the workmen are not entitled to salary @ Rs.4,000/- per month and they are entitled to the last pay drawn i.e., @ Rs.3,200/- per month in pursuance of Section 116(C) of the A.P.Co-operative Societies Act. He would further contend that the workmen are not entitled to salary @ Rs.4,000/- per month and they are entitled to the last pay drawn i.e., @ Rs.3,200/- per month in pursuance of Section 116(C) of the A.P.Co-operative Societies Act. The society has laid the contention as to the maintainability of the Miscellaneous Petition under Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and though the contention was raised, nothing was placed before the Court to substantiate the said contention. Basing on the submissions made by both sides, the Labour Court passed an order dated 14.12.2015, directing the society to pay subsistence allowance as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said order, the society filed four Writ Petitions, viz., viz., W.P.No.19698 of 2017, W.P.No.19541 of 2017, W.P.No.19551 of 2017 and W.P.No.19553 of 2017, on the ground that (1) the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the Miscellaneous Petitions under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, (2) that the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, is not applicable to the Cooperative Societies and (3) that the workmen are not entitled for subsistence allowance. The workmen filed three Writ Petitions, viz., W.P.No.10436 of 2016, W.P.No.16937 of 2016 and W.P.No.16947 of 2016 for not granting interest by the Labour Court. 6. Sri P.Vara Prasada Rao, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the 1st respondent herein- State would contend that he adopted the arguments of the learned counsel for the society and he would further submit that workmen have joined as Clerk in the society and that they are not entitled to salary @ Rs.4,000/- per month and they are entitled to the last drawn pay, i.e., @ Rs.3,200/- per month in pursuance of Section 116(C)(1) of the A.P.Cooperative Societies. 7. Under sub-section (6) of Section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, where an employee was placed under suspension pending enquiry into grave misconduct the employer shall pay a subsistence allowance equivalent to 50% of the last drawn wage for the first six months and at 75% of the last drawn wage beyond six months during the period of suspension. Admittedly, in view of the said provision, the workmen are entitled to subsistence allowance. Hence, the issue No.3 is answered in favour of the workmen and against the employer-society. 8. Admittedly, in view of the said provision, the workmen are entitled to subsistence allowance. Hence, the issue No.3 is answered in favour of the workmen and against the employer-society. 8. Coming to the other ground raised by the society – i.e., application of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, to the Co-operative Societies. For better understanding, Section 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, is extracted hereunder: "77. Application of this Act to Co-operative Societies – Notwithstanding anything in the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, the provisions of this Act shall apply to the Cooperative Societies." 9. In view of Section 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, the said Act is applicable to the Co-operative Societies. Hence, the issue No.2 is answered in favour of the workmen and against the society. 10. The other contention raised by the society is that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute of entitlement of the subsistence allowance of the workmen and the Labour Court can only interpret an award or settlement on which the claim is based. Whereas in the present case, there is no award and therefore the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue upon raised by the workmen by exercising power under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. For the said proposition, learned counsel for the society relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and another, (2022) 5 SCC 629 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen and it can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based, relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and another, (1995) 1 SCC 235 . The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Labour Court’s jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an Executing Court and as per the settled preposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Relying on the said judgment, learned counsel for the society would submit that as there is no award, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the workmen. 11. Learned counsel for the society would submit that an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not a proper procedure which should be followed. He submits that there is no plea existing the right of the workman to get his pay protected and further submits that until and unless there is an order from any competent authority or the Court crystallizing the right of the workman, the monetary benefits, flowing out from such right cannot be enforced by filing an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He submits that the proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is in the nature of execution proceedings and since in the instant case, there is no plea existing or predetermined right, initiation of the proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not proper and hence prayed to allow the Writ Petitions. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the workmen relied on a judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S.Rajagopalan etc., AIR 1964 Supreme Court 743 and he would contend that as per the said judgment, the power of the Labour Court in the proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act being akin to that of the Executing Court, the Labour Court is not competent to interpret the award or settlement, on which the workman bases his claim under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and that the power of the Executing Court is to interpret the power of execution proceedings. Relevant extract from the said judgment is as under:- "Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his` existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under s. 33C (2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under s. 33C (2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests." This decision itself indicates that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act extends to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman’s right rests, like the Executing Court’s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution, where the basis of the claim is referable to the award or settlement, but it does not extend to the determination of the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim, if there be no prior adjudication or recognition of the same by the employer. 13. Learned counsel for the workmen also relied on another judgment of the Full Bench of the composite High Court in the case of Mandegam Radhakrishna Reddy v. Sri Bharathi Velu Bus Service and another, (1986) LAB. I.C. 80, wherein a Full Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh laid down the remedies under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it is held in the said judgment at paragraph Nos.39 and 40 as follows: 39. On the basis of the legal position emerging from the various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court we have to decide whether mere denial by the employer of the right of the employee to the wages ousts the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. On the basis of the legal position emerging from the various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court we have to decide whether mere denial by the employer of the right of the employee to the wages ousts the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It is an admitted fact that during the period 19th December, 1970 to 11th October, 1973 there was no order of suspension pending enquiry against the workman nor was any order of termination passed against him. It was casually stated that the employee abandoned the service on the date of accident and did not report for duty thereafter. This plea appears to have been taken for objection sake only. The Labour Court rejected the plea as one without substance. Thus the relationship of employer and employee continued between the appellant and the first respondent during the said period. There was also no denial by the employer of the fact that the appellant was entitled to the wages for the said period if he continued to be an employee of the first respondent. In such a case, if there was denial by the employer of the right of an employee to receive wages which he was entitled to under a statute, by such mere denial the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to enquire into the matter will not be excluded. What all the Labour Court to enquire into the matter will not be excluded. What all the Labour Court had to do in such a situation was to enquire into the question whether the workman had an existing right to wages or not. In the instant case the Labour Court did only that and had rightly enquired into the jurisdictional fact as to the existence of the workman's right to claim wages and thereafter held that the appellant as an employee of the first respondent was entitled to the wages claimed by him from 19th December, 1970 to 11th October, 1973. In such a case we do not find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction. 40. A further arguments was advanced on behalf of the first respondent placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Divisional Superintendent South Central Railway, Secunderabad v. Labour Court, Hyderabad 1983 (2) An. In such a case we do not find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction. 40. A further arguments was advanced on behalf of the first respondent placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Divisional Superintendent South Central Railway, Secunderabad v. Labour Court, Hyderabad 1983 (2) An. W.R. 244, that after seizure of the driving licence of the appellant by the police, the first respondent, under law, could not avail his services as a driver and as such his claim for wages was not maintainable. We are not able to understand as to how the seizure of the driving licence by the police would bring about a cessation of relationship of employer-employee between the first respondent and the appellant. By the mere fact that a workman was unable for a certain period to discharge the duties of particular nature does not made him any the less an employee of his master. The relationship of employer and employee does not depend upon the nature of duties performed by an employee. Thus the plea of denial has nothing to do with the status of the appellant as an employee. 14. Following the above said two judgments, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.P.State Textile Development Corporation Ltd., Hyderabad v. Presiding Officer, Hon’ble Labour Court, Guntur and others, 2013(4) ALT 227 (D.B.) held that mere denial, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to enquire into the matter would not be excluded and that the Labour Court had rightly enquired into the jurisdictional fact as to the existence of the workman’s right to the claim made by him. 15. As per the judgment of the Constitutional Bench in P.S.Rajagopalan’s case (3 supra), the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim made by a workman under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the said judgment was not referred in the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the society in Bombay Chemical Industries’s case (1 supra). As per the judgment of the Constitutional Bench in P.S.Rajagopalan’s case (3 supra), the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim made by a workman under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the said judgment was not referred in the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the society in Bombay Chemical Industries’s case (1 supra). As per the judgment of the Constitutional Bench in P.S.Rajagopalan’s case (3 supra), the Labour Court having jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and in the present case, there is no disputed questions of facts and the society admitted that the workmen are the employees of the society and they are also admitted about the payment of subsistence allowance. The payment of the amount basing upon the last drawn pay is the issue raised by the society by way of counter in the Miscellaneous Petition No.26 of 2007. Except that, nothing was denied by the society. Basing upon the admissions made by the society-employer, the Labour Court has allowed the contention of the workmen and directed the society to pay the subsistence allowance. Therefore, there is no flaw in the order passed by the Labour Court 16. The workmen filed three Writ Petitions for not awarding interest by the Labour Court and the learned counsel for the workmen has relied on the judgment of the composite High Court in W.P.Nos.16826 of 2014, 24018 of 2014 and 1750 of 2016 dated 06.04.2016. This Court, while relying on the judgment of the Madras High Court and the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gammon India Limited v. Noranjan Dass, (1984) 1 Lab. LJ 233, awarded interest on the delayed payments. This Court, while ordering notice, has directed to pay 50% of the awarded amount in the Miscellaneous Petition and the said amount was paid. Therefore, this Court is inclined to direct the society to pay interest @ 6% per annum on the balance amount which was due to the workmen. 17. With the above direction, all the Writ Petitions are disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs of the Writ Petitions. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, in these Writ Petitions shall stand closed.