JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 16.01.2014 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Korba, in Sessions Trial No.52/2013, by which the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further 1 year imprisonment. 2. Case of the prosecution, in short, is that the appellant and deceased both were brothers and residing separately in one house and admittedly on the date of offence, dispute regarding partition of ancestral property was in existence. On the date of incident, on 21.04.2013, at about 3:00 P.M., the deceased Pooran Singh abused the appellant herein on the pretext of partition and assaulted him by wooden log on which the appellant pushed the deceased by which the deceased collided with the wooden door frame and thereafter fell into the ground and suffered injuries and ultimately succumbed to death. The appellant informed the said incident to the village Kotwar Ganesh Das and Ganesh Das visited the house of the appellant and had seen that the dead body of Pooran Singh was lying in his courtyard and the matter was reported by the village Kotwar (PW-1) to the police. 3. Thereafter, the police reached to the spot and registered the FIR vide Ex.P-1 and spot inspection map was prepared by Ex.P-2 and thereafter the inquest has been prepared vide Ex.P-10 and upon the recommendation of panchas, the dead body was subjected to post-mortem, which was conducted by Dr. Jyoti Sahu (PW-4), who has proved post-mortem report vide Ex.P-11. According to the post-mortem report, the cause of death was due to shock and coma and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, bamboo stick was recovered which was sent for FSL and query report has been obtained by Ex.P-1, but no FSL report has been brought on record. According to the Doctor, the injury could have caused by such bamboo stick. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law, in which the appellant abjured his guilt and stated that he has not committed the offence. 4. According to the Doctor, the injury could have caused by such bamboo stick. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law, in which the appellant abjured his guilt and stated that he has not committed the offence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 7 witnesses and exhibited 18 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. 5. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced as above, against which the present appeal has been preferred. 6. Mr. Samir Singh, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the wooden log is alleged to have been seized, but no bloodstain has been found, as no FSL report has been brought on record. He further submits that the extra judicial confession made before Sudhram (PW-2) is not reliable, which is a weak piece of evidence; as such, the conviction of the appellant is liable to be set aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 7. Mr. Avinash Singh, learned State counsel submits that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. is well merited and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of deceased Pooran Singh was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has answered in affirmative holding the death of the deceased to be homicidal in nature relying upon the post mortem report Ex.P-11 proved by Dr. Jyoti Sahu (PW-4). In our considered opinion, the said finding recorded by the trial Court holding the death to be homicidal in nature is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and therefore, we hereby affirm the said finding. 10. Jyoti Sahu (PW-4). In our considered opinion, the said finding recorded by the trial Court holding the death to be homicidal in nature is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and therefore, we hereby affirm the said finding. 10. Now, the next question would be, whether the appellant is the author of the crime, to which the trial Court has firstly relied upon the extra judicial confession. Extra judicial confession 11. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the Court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, it may be difficult for the Court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the Court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration. [See : Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403 ] 12. In the matter of Sahadevan (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court further considered the earlier decisions including Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 259 and pertinently laid down the principle in paragraphs 15.1, 15.8 and 16 as under :- “15.1. In Balwinder Singh (supra) this Court stated the principle that: (SCC p. 265, para 10) “10. An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance.” 15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambigous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. (Ref. Sk. The extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. (Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B., (2011) 11 SCC 754 and Pancho v. State of Haryana, (2011) 10 SCC 165 .) The principles 16. Upon a proper analysis of the abovereferred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. These percepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused : (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. (iii) It should inspire confidence. (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law.” 13. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sahadevan (supra), it is quite vivid that in the instant case the appellant is said to have made extra judicial confession to Sudhram (P.W.-2) and the said fact on being enquired, the appellant had informed him that he had a quarrel with deceased and since the deceased had assaulted him by wooden log, he has pushed him by which he suffered grievous injury on his head and died. Thereafter, the police party came into the village and on interrogation also, the appellant had informed to the police that he has pushed the deceased by which he suffered injuries and he assaulted him by bamboo stick. Thereafter, the police party came into the village and on interrogation also, the appellant had informed to the police that he has pushed the deceased by which he suffered injuries and he assaulted him by bamboo stick. 14.Though the extra judicial confession is said to have been made but it is a weak piece of evidence in absence of supporting and corroborative piece of evidence, it would be absolutely unsafe to convict the appellant on the basis of extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant to Sudharm (PW-2), particularly when the exact words used by the accused while making extra judicial confession to Sudhram (PW-2) have not been stated in the testimony and therefore we hold that it would be unsafe to convict the appellant only on the basis of extra judicial confession to Sudhram (PW-2). 15. The next circumstance which has been pointed out is that bamboo stick has been seized from the possession of the appellant pursuant to his memorandum statement. Though it was seized and proved also and according to the query report vide Ex.P-12, Dr. Jyoti Sahu (PW-4) has opined that the injury could have been caused by the same, bamboo stick was sent for FSL, but the FSL report has not been brought on record; therefore, it could not be proved that it was the actual weapon which has been used for commission of offence. 16. The Supreme Court in the matter of Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 17 SCC 273 , considering the nature, scope and applicability of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, has held that discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot be wholly relied upon and has observed the following in paragraph 26 of the judgment :- “26. The discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot be wholly relied upon and conviction in such a serious matter cannot be based upon the discovery. Once the discovery fails, there would be literally nothing which would support the prosecution case. We have already held that the prosecution has failed to prove that the house where alleged bloodstains were found belonged exclusively or was possessed exclusively by the appellant, we have further pointed out that the discovery was absolutely farcical. Once the discovery fails, there would be literally nothing which would support the prosecution case. We have already held that the prosecution has failed to prove that the house where alleged bloodstains were found belonged exclusively or was possessed exclusively by the appellant, we have further pointed out that the discovery was absolutely farcical. There is one other very relevant factor ignored by both the courts that the prosecution never made any attempts to prove that the clothes belonged to the appellants. There is literally no evidence to suggest anything to that effect. Therefore, even if we accept the discovery, it does not take us anywhere near the crime. Both the courts below have ignored this very important aspect. Once these two important circumstances are disbelieved, there is nothing which would remain to support the prosecution theory.” 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, when the bloodstain in the bamboo stick is not proved in absence of FSL report, mere recovery would be of no help to the prosecution. 18. The next circumstance that has been pointed out by the prosecution is motive, since the appellant had property dispute with the deceased who was his real brother, therefore, he has been murdered. It is well settled law that previous enmity is a double-edged weapon, it can be used for false implication as well as correct implication and only on the basis of motive, accused person cannot be convicted and no other circumstance has been brought on record. In that view of the matter, the prosecution has failed to establish the five golden principles which constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 and thus the prosecution has failed to prove a case based on circumstantial evidence beyond reasonable doubt. 19. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant is set aside, he is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of I.P.C. The appellant is on bail, he need not surrender; however, his bail bonds shall remain in operation for a period of 6 months in view of the provisions contained in Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. 20. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is allowed.