JUDGMENT : (J. Sreenivas Rao, J.) 1. This appeal, under section 37 (1) (a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, read with Section 13 (1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is filed aggrieved by the order dated 13-10-2022 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in Arbitration Application No.54 of 2016. 2. The appellant is the applicant in Arbitration Application No. 54 of 2016, which is SEW Infrastructure Limited, a company incorporated under the Laws of India and having its registered office at Begumpet, Hyderabad, hereafter called as SEW. The respondent No.1 is the Ethiopian Roadways Authority, hereafter called as ERA, an entity of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the respondent No.2 is the Bank of Abyssinia hereafter called as BOA and the respondent No.3 is the State Bank of India (SBI). 3. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE : 3.1 The appellant submitted a bid on 22-06-2022 for awarding contract works for construction of roads under Mombassa – Nairobi – Addis Ababa Corridor Phase III Project: Hawassa – Ageremarian Section, Lot 1 : Hawassa – Chuko in Ethiopia. In the bidding process floated by ERA, a contract for construction of roads was awarded to SEW and contract agreement dated 30.11.2012 was entered into by the parties. In terms of the contract the BOA has issued four Bank Guarantees (BGs) to ERA on the basis of counter BGs issued by SBI/third respondent on behalf of SEW. Out of four BGs, two BGs are Advance Bank Guarantees hereafter called as ABG, which are en-cashable on the condition of SEW applying the funds received for the project purposes, which are outside the scope of the roads project. The other two BG’s are Performance Bank Guarantees hereafter called as PBG, which are en-cashable upon declaring the contractor/SEW being in default under the contract. 3.2 While things stood thus, disputes arose between SEW and ERA, on delay in execution of the project. SEW claimed that delay is attributable to ERA, as it did not hand over the project sites without obstructions and encumbrances for execution of the road project. The General Conditions of Contract hereafter called as GCC provided for mechanism of forming a Dispute Board to which any dispute arising between the parties has to be referred. SEW claimed that delay is attributable to ERA, as it did not hand over the project sites without obstructions and encumbrances for execution of the road project. The General Conditions of Contract hereafter called as GCC provided for mechanism of forming a Dispute Board to which any dispute arising between the parties has to be referred. It is the case of SEW that as per Clauses 20.4 and 20.5 without referring the dispute to the Dispute Board and without following conditions of settlement under GCC, ERA unilaterally issued notice of termination dated 20.05.2016, which was served on SEW on 23.05.2016 giving a notice of 14 days for termination of the contract. SEW issued reply dated 30.05.2016 asserting that delay and slow progress of work was due to various reasons attributable to ERA. 3.3 In letter dated 22.04.2016, ERA provisionally extended the contract period by 60 days, which was expired on 21.06.2016. It appears that SEW made a request for extension of time but without considering the said application, ERA terminated the contract. 4. Taking recourse to clause 20.06 as the General condition of contract that envisages reference to Arbitral Tribunal for resolution of disputes the appellant herein filed Arbitration Application No. 54 of 2016 before this Court under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity “The Act”) for the following reliefs : i) to restrain ERA, its agents, officers, employees etc., by way of injunction from invoking two ABGs and two PBGs; ii) to restrain BOA from honouring/en-cashing ABG and PBG on behalf of SEW; iii) to restrain SBI from honouring/en-e-cashing counter BG issued to BOA; and iv) to stay operation of all further actions pursuant to the notice of termination, dated 20-05-2016 including any coercive steps and en-cashment of BG issued on behalf of SEW by BOA and SBI. 5. Initially, this Court passed interim order dated 06.06.2016, which reads as under : “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee for respondent No.3. We have perused the letter, dated 20.05.2016, bearing referenceNo.MMS/267/12-2221 and so also the letter, dated 22.04.2015 bearing reference No.AIC/RE/SEW/16/Contr./ 1146. It is not clear whether Bank guarantee has been encashed by respondent No.1. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 submits that respondent No.3 has not received any communication from respondent Nos.1 and 2. In the circumstances, issue notice to respondent Nos.1 and 2 returnable on 16.06.2016. It is not clear whether Bank guarantee has been encashed by respondent No.1. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 submits that respondent No.3 has not received any communication from respondent Nos.1 and 2. In the circumstances, issue notice to respondent Nos.1 and 2 returnable on 16.06.2016. In addition to Court notice, petitioner is directed to issue personal notice to respondent Nos.1 and 2 including service of notice through e-mail or any other mode and file affidavit of service. Stand over to 16.06.2016. Till 16.06.2016, parties are directed to maintain status quo. It is made clear that this Court has not examined merits of the case.” 6. The above said interim order was extended from time to time. 7. It is appropriate to notice that the interse dispute was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal at Paris, France in ICC Case No.23274/PTA. The Arbitral Tribunal concluded the proceedings and passed final award on 27.07.2021. 8. It appears from the record that after passing of the above interim order, Arbitration Application No.54 of 2016 was assigned to the learned single Judge. In the said case, Vacate Stay Petition was filed by BOA in I.A. No.2 of 2017 to vacate the interim order dated 06.06.2016. 9. Basing upon the pleadings and contentions of the appellant as well as second respondent, the learned single Judge framed the following issues : ISSUES: i. Whether applicant/SEW has made out a case of fraud, irretrievable injury and special equities so as to seek relief of injunction to restrain invocation of BGs. ii. Whether applicant/SEW has wrongly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to snatch interim order and whether any cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. iii. Whether the respondent No.1/ERA and respondent No.2/BOA have violated the status quo order dated 06.06.2016 passed by this Court and whether BOA be permitted to seek to vacate the interim order until it purges itself from contempt. iv. Whether status quo order passed by this Court can be continued post-award even when termination of contract and invocation of BGs were held to be valid by the Arbitral Tribunal. 10. iv. Whether status quo order passed by this Court can be continued post-award even when termination of contract and invocation of BGs were held to be valid by the Arbitral Tribunal. 10. The learned single Judge after considering the material evidence on record and after hearing both the sides, dismissed the Arbitration Application taking note of the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal dated 27-03-2021 more particularly or the Arbitral Tribunal held that invocation of BG’s is valid, vacated the interim order dated 06-06-2016. 11. Questioning the above said order passed by the learned single judge, the appellant filed the present appeal. 12. Sri Avinash Desai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant vehemently contended that the status quo order dated 06.06.2016 granted by this Court was intimated to ERA vide e-mail dated 10.06.2016. BOA was also intimated about the status quo order by personal notice dated 11.06.2016. Inspite of having knowledge of status quo order, ERA and BOA invoked the subject BG’s. BOA made payment under ABG on 20.11.2016 i.e., five months after interim status quo order was passed and payment under PBG was made on 10.10.2017 by BOA to ERA and they are liable for contempt for deliberately violating the orders of this Court. 12.1 He further contended that ERA and BOA colluded and illegally encashed BG’s under the guise of order dated 16.10.2017 passed by the Federal High Court of Ethiopia. Infact, the Ethiopian Court was misled by ERA and BOA and status quo order passed by this Court was suppressed. ERA has not even appeared before this Court to answer the claim of SEW. BOA cannot be permitted to act as proxy to ERA and seek to vacate the interim order. A party violating the interim order cannot be heard until it purges itself from contempt. BOA is responsible for the present state of things as Bank Guarantee amounts were paid in violation of orders of this Court. BOA is trying to achieve something indirectly, which ERA could not achieve directly. 12.2 The learned counsel would further submit that the learned single Judge ought to have considered the contention of the appellant that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 9 of the Act, as the appellant does not have any other remedy in law as per proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act and as amended in 2015. The Court hearing the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act only has the power to suspend the operation of the award and the said court has no power to pass further interim directions. Similarly, under the French Code of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeal has no power to pass interim orders as claimed in the Arbitration Application No.54 of 2016 filed under Section 9 of the Act. 12.3 The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the arbitral tribunal has erroneously held that invocation of BG’s was valid. Such conclusion is contrary to the findings recorded by the arbitral tribunal in Para No’s.223 to 225 of the award dated 27.07.2021. Though the SEW has made out a case for continuation of status quo order the same was not considered by the learned single Judge. 12.4 The learned counsel for the appellant would submits that the 2nd Respondent cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong in paying the amounts under the Performance and Advance Bank Guarantees in violation of the orders passed by this court dated 06.06.2016. ERA has not appeared before this Court till today to answer the allegations of irretrievable injury, unjust enrichment and invocation of BG’s in violation of order of this Court dated 06.06.20216. 12.5 In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in ULTRATECH CEMENT LIMITED v. RAJASTHAN RAJYA VIDYUT UTPADAN NIGAM, (2018) 15 SCC-210. He would urge that Section 9 orders can be passed post award and pending a challenge against the award as held in I. SUDERSHAN RAO v. EVERSHINE BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED : 2012 (6) ALT-343, GAIL (INDIA) LTD. v. LATIN RASAYANI PRIVATE LIMITED : 2014 SCC Online GUJ 14836, SAPTARISHI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TOURISM AND HOSPITALITY : 2019 SCC Online TS 1765 : (2019) 6 ALT 439 (DB), and MEDIMA LLC v. BALASORE ALLOYS LIMITED : MANU/WB/0540/2021. 13. Sri Rathan Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent contended that the Courts in India or at any rate Courts at Hyderabad do not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain this application. No part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. SEW is an Indian contractor. ERA is a State Entity in Ethiopia. BOA/Vacate Petitioner is a bank based in Ethiopia. SBI is a bank based in Hyderabad. No part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. SEW is an Indian contractor. ERA is a State Entity in Ethiopia. BOA/Vacate Petitioner is a bank based in Ethiopia. SBI is a bank based in Hyderabad. The contract was executed in Ethiopia. The project site is in Ethiopia. ABG and PBG were given through BOA. Merely the because SBI issued counter BG to BOA, it would not give rise to any cause of action for instituting this arbitration application before this Court. 13.1 The learned Senior Counsel contended that SEW has not made out any case for granting injunction to restrain ERA from invoking BG. There is no fraud or irretrievable injury alleged in the arbitration application. BOA was bound to honour the call for invocation of BG. If restraint orders are passed in matters relating to BG’s without adhering to settled principles of law, then entire global commercial transactions would collapse. BG is lifeline of commercial transactions. BOA does not have any say in the inter se disputes between SEW and ERA. The reputation and stakes of BOA are involved. In commercial transactions, banks are brought in to assure payment under BG’s. 13.2 The learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent also contended that the award dated 27.07.2021 has been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in France. Section 9 Petition can be invoked only to pass interim order for protecting assets before, during and after passing arbitration award. In view of the award dated 27.07.2021 being passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Arbitration Application No.54 of 2016 filed by the appellant has been rendered infructuous. The Arbitral Tribunal specifically held that invocation of BG’s are valid as per findings at Para Nos. 221, 227 and 228. BG is an independent contract. He would further submit that the dispute relating to bank guarantees is governed by ICC Uniform Rules of Demand Guarantees. The Arbitral Tribunal recognized that money has been paid by BOA to ERA under ABG and PBG. Finding has been given by the Arbitral Tribunal that contract was validly terminated and encashment of BG’s was valid. 13.3 The learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent further contended that SEW was awarded certain claims, they did not exercise option of enforcing the award in any of the countries either in India or Ethiopia. An appeal was filed by SEW challenging the award dated 27.07.2021. 13.3 The learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent further contended that SEW was awarded certain claims, they did not exercise option of enforcing the award in any of the countries either in India or Ethiopia. An appeal was filed by SEW challenging the award dated 27.07.2021. Only the Courts in France have jurisdiction. When, admittedly, the parties submitted themselves to jurisdiction of Courts in France, the Courts in other countries should refrain to entertain the disputes, as otherwise it would erode the faith in the system and have an adverse impact on the commercial transactions. 13.4 The learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent further contended that a suit was filed by ERA against BOA and as per order passed by the Ethiopian Court dated 27.07.2021, the BOA had to pay money under ABG’s and PBG’s to ERA. He further submitted that Section 9 petition merges with the final award and the learned single Judge had rightly dismissed the arbitration application by giving cogent findings and there is no illegality and irregularity, error in the impugned order. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for respective parties, now the points that arises for consideration in this appeal are as follows : i) whether this Court is having jurisdiction to continue the proceedings under section 9 of the Act ? ii) whether the appellant is entitled for the relief as claimed in Arbitration Application No.54 of 2016 under section 9 of the Act, when the appeal filed by the appellant against Arbitral Award is pending before the appellate court ? and iii) to what relief ? 15. As per General Conditions of Contract, Clause 20.06 provides for arbitration, which reads as follows: “20.6 Arbitration 20.6.1 Any dispute between the Parties arising out of or in connection with the Contract not settled amicably in accordance with GC Clause 20.5 above, and in respect of which the DB’s decision (if any) has not become final and binding, shall be finally settled by arbitration. Arbitration shall be conducted as follows: (a) for contracts with foreign contractors, international arbitration; (i) with proceedings administered by the institution designated in the Particular Conditions, and conducted under the rules of arbitration of such institution; or, if so specified in the Particular Conditions, (ii) international arbitration in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); or (iii) if neither an arbitration institution or UNCITRAL arbitration rules is specified in the Particular Conditions, with proceedings administered by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and conducted under the ICC Rules of Arbitration; by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said arbitration rules. The place of arbitration shall be the neutral location specified in the Particular Conditions, and the arbitration shall be conducted in the language for communications withlaws of Employer’s country …” 16. Admittedly, when the Arbitration Application No.54 of 2016 is pending before this court the Arbitral proceedings commenced and the arbitral tribunal passed an award on 27-7-2021. In the said award, the Arbitral Tribunal specifically held that invocation of Bank Guarantee is valid. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal also relied upon the very same judgments that were relied before the learned single Judge. 18. The learned single Judge considered the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in ULTRATECH CEMENT LTD. In ULTRATECH CEMENT LIMITED (supra) Supreme Court held as under: “7. As to whether the orders passed by the different courts, which culminated in the two orders, extracted hereinabove, dated 13-12-2013 [Mangalam Cement Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1333] and 14-3-2014 [Mangalam Cement Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine SC 1692], would continue even after the passing of the arbitral award, in our considered view, would depend on the nature of the prayer made by the appellant, when the application under Section 9 was filed, before the Court concerned. We have extracted hereinabove the prayer made by the appellant in its Section 9 application. We have extracted hereinabove the prayer made by the appellant in its Section 9 application. A perusal thereof reveals that the interim injunction was sought “…till adjudication of the dispute arises between the parties by appointing the arbitrator by the applicant as per Clause 9 of the agreement dated 15-10-2004 signed by and between the applicant and the respondent, passing of the award by the arbitrator, and also till enforcement of the said award…”.It is therefore apparent that the interim prayer made by the appellant under Section 9 of the Act in the very first instance was till the enforcement of the award. It is undoubtedly apparent from a perusal of Section 9 of the Act, extracted above that the enforcement of the award can be effected only under Section 36 of the Act. The aforesaid stage has not yet emerged. The stage presently is of the interregnum, between the passing of the award, and the enforcement of the award under Section 36 of the Act. 8. We are of the view that the prayer made by the appellant clearly included the period, after the pronouncement of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal. In the above view of the matter, it is not possible for us to hold that the proceedings pending before this Court, have been rendered infructuous. In any case, it is now imperative for us to determine whether or not the impugned interim order, should continue till the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act (presently pending before the District Judge) are concluded. We are satisfied in directing that the appellant shall, with effect from the date of the commencement of the arbitral award, pay for the fly ash taken by it from the respondent at the rate of Rs 245 per metric tonne (i.e. in consonance with the arbitral award), till the determination of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act. We however clarify, that in case, for any reason, the arbitral award is set aside or modified, as prayed for by the respondent Nigam, the appellant would be liable to pay the higher amount, as the respondent would have been able to procure, as disclosed by the auction already held in 2011 (for the period with effect from 2012). We however clarify, that in case, for any reason, the arbitral award is set aside or modified, as prayed for by the respondent Nigam, the appellant would be liable to pay the higher amount, as the respondent would have been able to procure, as disclosed by the auction already held in 2011 (for the period with effect from 2012). Likewise, in case the appellant before this Court succeeds, and is held to be entitled to pay a lesser amount, the payment with effect from 2012 would be regulated by the said determination.” 19. As noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court the appellant prayer under section 9 application was comprehensive and therefore held that application filed before commencement of arbitral proceedings can still be perused. 20. As compared to said prayer, the prayer sought in the Section 9 application herein is limited. It reads as under : 1) Restrain Respondent No.1, its agents, Officers, Employees etc., by way of injunction from invoking the subject Bank Guarantee issued by the Respondent No.2 which was counter guaranteed by 17 Respondent No.3 on behalf of the petitioner herein, the details of which are as under : Bank Name Bank Guarantee, Date & No. Amount of Guarantee Expiry Date Bank of Abyssinia Ethiopia 23-11-2012 ETB 33,564,500.23 22.04.2017 Bank of Abyssinia Ethiopia 23.11.2012 USD 3543440.08 22.04.2017 Bank of Abyssinia Ethiopia 11.02.2013 ETB 77,727,733.00 31.08.2016 Bank of Abyssinia Ethiopia 11-02-2013 BOA/IBD/APG/006/2012 USD 5,744,060.00 31.08.2016 2) Restrain Respondent No.2, its agents, officers, employees etc., from honouring/en-cashing the subject Bank Guarantee issued to Respondent No.1 on behalf of the petitioner as stated in the prayer (1) above. 3) Restrain Respondent No.3 its agents, officers, employees etc., from honouring/en-cashing the counter Bank Guarantee issued to Respondent No.2 for the petitioner herein above. 4) Stay the operation of all further actions pursuant to the notice of termination dated 20.05.2016, including any coercive steps and encashment of bank guarantees issued on behalf of the petitioner by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 5) Pass an ad-interim injunction directing the Respondent No.1 to submit the proceeds of the aforementioned Bank guarantees invoked (if already en-cashed) along with @ 18% p.a. from the date of encashment upto date of such retention by it, in the Registry of this Court, such proceeds may be deposited in interest bearing securities with a Nationalised Bank; and 6) Award costs of prosecuting this Application. 21. 21. In I. SUDERSHAN RAO (supra), the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as under: “7. Thus, the first point to be considered is whether Section 9 of the Act has no application to a situation where the award is passed and consequently the present AOP is not maintainable. Section 9 of the Act provides for grant of interim relief by the Court and the object of this provision is too well known to require any mention here. The opening words of Section 9 read “a party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court” and the section then sets out various types of interim reliefs which can be sought by a party. It is clear that the words “at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36” clearly show that the interim reliefs stipulated in the said section can be sought even after the passing of the award but before it becomes enforceable. … … 20. In our considered view, proviso (a) is only a procedural devise to ensure that an application filed under Section 9 in a petition pending under Section 34 is conveniently disposedof as an application connected to such a petition and also to bring to the notice of the Court, if necessary, about the urgency in the matter and press for even an expeditious disposal of both the matters. Rule 8 or Section 9 of the Act cannot however be construed as laying down that an independent application under Section 9 is not maintainable when a petition under Section 34 is pending. … … 27. Coming to the argument of Sri Ramakrishna Reddy on the third point, it is true that the arbitral Tribunal refused the relief of specific performance, but its award is under challenge in the application filed by the second respondent under Section 34 of the Act and that has still to be decided. It cannot be presumed at this stage that the award will be confirmed by the trial Court. What should be noted is that whether the refusal of relief of specific performance by the arbitral Tribunal is right has to be decided by the Court. It cannot be presumed at this stage that the award will be confirmed by the trial Court. What should be noted is that whether the refusal of relief of specific performance by the arbitral Tribunal is right has to be decided by the Court. In such a situation, the trial Court cannot be faulted for exercising power under Section 9 to grant temporary injunction to preserve the disputed property till adjudication of the second respondent's petition under Section 34 of the Act No provision or precedential authority has been brought to our notice to hold that just because the arbitral Tribunal refused the relief of specific performance, the Court under Section 9 has no power to pass an order for preservation of the property though of-course that will be subject to the final orders which may be passed by the Court in the petition or application under Section 34 with respect to the award.” 22. In GAIL (INDIA) LTD. (supra), the High Court of Gujarat held as under: “23. This court, respectfully, does not agree with the view adopted by the Bombay High Court in the case of Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Company Limited (supra) that the object and purpose of an interim measure after the passing of the arbitral award but before it is enforced is to secure the property, goods or amount for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement. In the opinion of this court, section 9 of the Act does not draw any distinction between the party who has succeeded in the arbitral proceedings and a party who has failed therein. Under the circumstances, either party would be entitled to approach the court seeking an interim measure under section 9 of the Act. The contention that the respondent could not have availed of the benefit undersection 9 of the Act as the award already stood enforced, therefore, does not merit acceptance.” 23. In SAPTARISHI HOTELS PVT. LTD. (supra) this Court held as under: “35. The afore-stated case law makes it clear that the Court exercising power under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is not restrained from interfering with the arbitral Award even by way of modification. It can modify the Award, by sustaining it in relation to parts thereof and setting it aside in relation to others, as long as such parts are severable. It can modify the Award, by sustaining it in relation to parts thereof and setting it aside in relation to others, as long as such parts are severable. Therefore, the very foundational premise, which formed the basis for the decisions in DIRK INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED and NUSSLI SWITZERLAND LTD., stands shaken. Once it is accepted that the Court exercising power under Section 34 can modify the Award, if warranted, as per the provisions thereof and in the light of the case law cited supra, the party whose claim was rejected during the arbitral proceedings, as reflected in the final Award, cannot be left remediless (See SUNIL VASUDEVA v. SUNDAR GUPTA) during the pendency of the petition filed by such party under Section 34. It may be necessary for such party to seek interim measures of protection, as contemplated under Section 9. As rightly pointed out by the Gujarat High Court in GAIL (INDIA) LTD., there is no distinction drawn, as per the language of Section 9, between a party who has succeeded in the arbitral proceedings as opposed to a party who has lost and both are equally entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 9, even after passing of the final arbitral Award but before execution thereof. In this context, it may be noted that even if the final Award is a ‘nil’ Award as in the case on hand, once it is accepted that there is a possibility of the nature of the Award being changed by exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under Section 34, it cannot be ruled out that a ‘nil’ Award may transform into an Award favouring one or the other party. Be it noted that in the case on hand, both parties have filed petitions under Section 34 and they are pending consideration. That being so, until the disposal of these pending petitions under Section 34, the appellants cannot be non-suited on the ground that the Award in question is a ‘nil’ Award, disentitling them from invoking the provisions of Section 9.” 24. In MEDIMA LLC (supra), the High Court of Calcutta held as under: “18. The other point of objection taken by the award-debtor pertains to non-availability of the remedy under Section 9 in a post-award scenario in relation to a foreign award which is enforceable under Part 11 of the Act. Is this argument legally tenable? In MEDIMA LLC (supra), the High Court of Calcutta held as under: “18. The other point of objection taken by the award-debtor pertains to non-availability of the remedy under Section 9 in a post-award scenario in relation to a foreign award which is enforceable under Part 11 of the Act. Is this argument legally tenable? For the above, the respondent relies on the language of Section 9, the relevant part of which is set out below: “9. Interim Measures, etc. by Court.-(1) A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a court …” 19. The language “… and an arbitral award made or to be made…” in section 2(2) read with the proviso makes it clear that Section 9 would apply in a post-award scenario subject to the other conditions of the proviso being satisfied. Second, the perceived gap between Section 9 so far as it mentions enforcement under Section 36 and the enforceability – recognition under Part II would defeat the very purpose of introduction of the proviso to Section 2(2) if allowed to magnify into a conflict. There is every chance that an award-holder of an arbitration which took place outside India would be rendered remediless if prompt and effective interim measures are not granted to the award- holder in the interregnum in relation to the assets of the award-debtor which are located in India. In other words, if suitable interim measures are not granted to a foreign award-holder and the award is made to pass the tests for enforcement under Part II, the award-holder may be denuded of its rights. The act, together with the amendments, intends to facilitate quick resolution of disputes through alternative means. Hence, asking an award-holder to wait until the award is recognised and enforced is antithetical to the very objective of the Act. The Law Commission in its 246th Report noticed the aforesaid as also the lack of an efficacious remedy in furtherance of the award. 20. It may hence be said, and with good reason, that Section 9 read with the proviso to Section 2(2) would require a purposive construction which would be in line with the intention of the framers for bringing in the proviso by the Amendment Act of 2016. 20. It may hence be said, and with good reason, that Section 9 read with the proviso to Section 2(2) would require a purposive construction which would be in line with the intention of the framers for bringing in the proviso by the Amendment Act of 2016. The objective of the amendment was to make the proviso workable, not stultify it by reason of a conflict with Section 9.” 25. In DIRK INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED (supra), the Bombay High Court held as under : “13. Two facets of Section 9 merit emphasis. The first relates to the nature of the orders that can be passed under clauses (i) and (ii). … Clause (ii) contemplates an interim measure of protection for: (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; and (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration; … and (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The underlying theme of each one of the sub-clauses of clause (ii) is the immediate and proximate nexus between the interim measure of protection and the preservation, protection and securing of the subject-matter of the dispute in the arbitral proceedings. In other words, the orders that are contemplated under clause (ii) are regarded as interim measures of protection intended to protect the claim in arbitration from being frustrated. The interim measure is intended to safeguard the subject-matter of the dispute in the course of the arbitral proceedings. The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realizable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement. ... Contextually, therefore, the scheme of Section 9 postulates an application for the grant of an interim measure of protection after the making of an arbitral award and before it is enforced for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement of the award. An interim measure of protection within the meaning of Section 9(ii) is intended to protect through the measure, the fruits of a successful conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. A party whose claim has been rejected in the course of the arbitral proceedings cannot obviously have an arbitral award enforced in accordance with Section 36. The object and purpose of an interim measure after the passing of the arbitral award but before it is enforced is to secure the property, goods or amount for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement. 14. The Court which exercises jurisdiction under Section 34 is not a court of first appeal under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appellate court to which recourse is taken against a decree of the trial Court has powers which are co-extensive with those of the trial Court. A party which has failed in its claim before a trial Judge can in appeal seek a judgment of reversal and in consequence, the passing of a decree in terms of the claim in the suit. The court to which an arbitration petition challenging the award under Section 34 lies does not pass an order decreeing the claim. Where an arbitral claim has been rejected by the arbitral tribunal, the court under Section 34 may either dismiss the objection to the arbitral award or in the exercise of its jurisdiction set aside the arbitral award. The court to which an arbitration petition challenging the award under Section 34 lies does not pass an order decreeing the claim. Where an arbitral claim has been rejected by the arbitral tribunal, the court under Section 34 may either dismiss the objection to the arbitral award or in the exercise of its jurisdiction set aside the arbitral award. The setting aside of an arbitral award rejecting a claim does not result in the claim which was rejected by the Arbitrator being decreed as a result of the judgment of the court in a petition under Section 34. To hold that a petition under Section 9 would be maintainable after the passing of an arbitral award at the behest of DIPL whose claim has been rejected would result in a perversion of the object and purpose underlying Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. DIPL's application under Section 9, if allowed, would result in the grant of interim specific performance of a contract in the teeth of the findings recorded in the arbitral award. The interference by the Court at this stage to grant what in essence is a plea for a mandatory order for interim specific performance will negate the sanctity and efficacy of arbitration as a form of alternate disputes redressal. What such a litigating party cannot possibly obtain even upon completion of the proceedings under Section 34, it cannot possibly secure in a petition under Section 9 after the award. The object and purpose of Section 9 is to provide an interim measure that would protect the subject-matter of the arbitral proceedings whether before or during the continuance of the arbitral proceedings and even thereafter upon conclusion of the proceedings until the award is enforced. Once the award has been made and a claim has been rejected as in the present case, even a successful challenge to the award under Section 34 does not result an order decreeing the claim. In this view of the matter, there could be no occasion to take recourse to Section 9. Enforcement for the purpose of Section 36 as a decree of the Court is at the behest of a person who seeks to enforce the award.” 26. In HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED’ (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: “36. In this view of the matter, there could be no occasion to take recourse to Section 9. Enforcement for the purpose of Section 36 as a decree of the Court is at the behest of a person who seeks to enforce the award.” 26. In HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED’ (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: “36. Interpreting Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dirk (India) (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd. [Dirk (India) (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481 : (2013) 7 Bom CR 493] held that : (SCC OnLine Bom para 13) “13. … The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement.” 27. In KANWAR SINGH SAINI’s case (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: “17. Application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC lies only where disobedience/breach of an injunction granted or order complained of was one that is granted by the court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which is naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the final order. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. (Vide A.R. Sircar v. State of U.P. [1993 Supp (2) SCC 734 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 896 : (1993) 24 ATC 832], Shiv Shanker v. U.P.SRTC [1995 Supp (2) SCC 726 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1018 : (1995) 30 ATC 317 ], Arya Nagar Inter College v. Sree KumarTiwary (1997) 4 SCC 388 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 967 : AIR 1997 SC 3071 ] , GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1998) 3 SCC 376 : AIR 1998 SC 1566 ] and Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra [ (2005) 8 SCC 423 ]. 28. In STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. (SAIL) (supra), the High Court of Delhi held as under: “7. We are unable to appreciate this submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant for the reason that as Mr. Dutt has rightly pointed out that should the arbitrator reject the claim petition, this order would automatically become a nullity and should the claim petition be allowed, the said order will hold the field and the interim would merge in the final order.” 21. In ULTRATECH CEMENT LIMITED’s case (supra) interim order was passed in favour of the appellant on 31.01.0214 wherein the appellant was allowed to purchase fly ash from the respondent Nigamat Rs.250 per metric tonne. The arbitration award was passed on 18.02.2015 and supplementary award on 17.05.2015. Under the awards, the appellant was allowed to carry away fly ash for another period of five years from 2012 to 2017 at the rate of Rs.245 per metric tonne and the said price was lower than the price determined under Section 9 (Rs.250 per metric tonne) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the prayer made by the appellant included the period, after the pronouncement of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal and it is not possible to hold that the proceedings pending before the Court have been rendered infructuous. The Supreme Court held that the prayer made by the appellant included the period, after the pronouncement of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal and it is not possible to hold that the proceedings pending before the Court have been rendered infructuous. It was specifically observed by the Supreme Court in para 8 that the appellant shall, with effect from the date of commencement of the arbitral award, pay for the fly ash taken by it from the respondent at the rate of Rs.245 per metric tonne (i.e. in consonance with the arbitral award), till the determination of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act. As the arbitral award was in favour of the appellant it was held that interim order dated 31.01.2014 has not been rendered infructuous. In other words, the interim order was continued as it would be a step-in-aid to the final award/ enforcement of award and not in derogation of the award. 22. The judgment in I. SUDERSHAN RAO’s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. The issue in the said case is not seeking relief of extension of pre-award interim order post-award. In the said case, the claim of specific performance of contract of sale was rejected by award of the Arbitral Tribunal dated 12.01.2008. The claimants/appellant filed application under Section 9 of the Act for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondents from alienating or creating third party interest over the application schedule property, pending disposal of the application under Section 34 of the Act challenging the award. In that context, it was held by a learned Division Bench of this Court that the Court under Section 9 of the Act has power to pass interim order even after the Arbitral Tribunal refused relief of specific performance when Section 34 application is pending. 23. In GAIL (INDIA) LTD.’s case (supra), interim orders were passed in favour of the respondent on 28.01.2014 and 29.01.2014 pending arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator passed award on 30.10.2014 dismissing the claim of the respondent. The appellant preferred an appeal challenging interim order passed under Section 9 of the Act. The appellant withdrew the appeal on the ground that it has become infructuous due to passing of the award by the arbitrator in favour of the appellant and thereafter, the respondent moved an application for interim relief pending arbitration application. The appellant preferred an appeal challenging interim order passed under Section 9 of the Act. The appellant withdrew the appeal on the ground that it has become infructuous due to passing of the award by the arbitrator in favour of the appellant and thereafter, the respondent moved an application for interim relief pending arbitration application. In para 23 of the judgment, it was held by the Gujarat High Court that either party is entitled to approach the Court seeking an interim measure under Section 9 of the Act even if the party has failed in the arbitral proceedings. 24. The aforesaid view was subscribed by a learned Division Bench of this Court in SAPTARISHI HOTELS PVT. LTD.’s case (supra). In the said case final award dated 06.12.2018 was passed by the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting the claim of the appellant and counter claim of the respondent. Both the appellant and the respondent filed applications under Section 34 of the Act challenging the rejection of claims and counter claims respectively and it was held that even if ‘nil’ award is passed, it does not disentitle the party from invoking the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. The point involved in the MEDIMA LLC’s case (supra) was whether remedy under Section 9 of the Act is available in post-award scenario in relation to a foreign award, which is enforceable under Part II of the Act and it was held that the remedy under Section 9 of the Act is available. 25. The judgments in I. SUDERSHAN RAO’s case (supra); GAIL (INDIA) LTD.’s case (supra); SAPTARISHI HOTELS PVT. LTD.’s case (supra) and MEDIMA LLC’s case (supra) are not applicable to the facts of the present case and are of no help to the applicant/SEW herein. In all these four decisions, the application under Section 9 of the Act was filed after award was passed. This Court is not dealing with such issue in this case. The Court is only concerned with continuation of interim order post-award and at the instance of the applicant/SEW, against whom award was passed, more particularly, in regard to relief of invocation of BGs. 29. The learned senior counsel for the 2nd respondent relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in WANDER LTD. & ANR. The Court is only concerned with continuation of interim order post-award and at the instance of the applicant/SEW, against whom award was passed, more particularly, in regard to relief of invocation of BGs. 29. The learned senior counsel for the 2nd respondent relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in WANDER LTD. & ANR. V/s. ANTOX INDIA P.LTD, 1990 (Supp) SCC-727., wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that on grant of injunction under Order-39, Rule-1 of CPC at the first instance when the fact finding Court exercised its jurisdiction and rejected the claim of injunction, the first appellate court is not justified to interfere with the orders passed by the trial court. 30. The larger Bench of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in NUSSLI SWITZERLAND LTD. V/s. ORGANIZING COMMITTEE COMMON WEALTH GAMES in FAO (OS) 121 OF 2014 held as follows : 17. We highlight the catchwords of Section 9 : A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a court. 18. A plain textual reading of the above indicates that at any stage of the proceedings, before, during or after the making of the arbitral award (but before it is executed) a party to an arbitration agreement may approach the Court seeking interim measures. The word ‘but’ can either be a conjunction or a proposition or a noun or an adverb. In the textual setting in which the word ‘but’ finds itself in the section, it is obviously not used as a noun or an adverb. Whether the word ‘but’ is read as a conjunction or proposition would make no difference because if read as a conjunction, the section would read : ‘A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award and not before it is enforced’ and if read as a proposition, the section would read : A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award except before it is enforced’. 19. As noted by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court Section 2(h) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 defines ‘party’ to mean ‘a party to an arbitration agreement’. 19. As noted by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court Section 2(h) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 defines ‘party’ to mean ‘a party to an arbitration agreement’. And thus literally read the section could mean that any party, irrespective of whether or not it has or can have an enforceable claim in its favour, can avail the remedy under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 12. In paragraph 12 and 13 of its opinion, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has opined as under:- “12. Two facets of Section 9 merit emphasis. The first relates to the nature of the orders that can be passed under clauses (i) and (ii). Clause (i) contemplates an order appointing a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings. Clause (ii) contemplates an interim measure of protection for: (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; and (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration; (d) an interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; and (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The underlying theme of each one of the sub-clauses of clause (ii) is the immediate and proximate nexus between the interim measure of protection and the preservation, protection and securing of the subject-matter of the dispute in the arbitral proceedings. In other words, the orders that are contemplated under clause (ii) are regarded as interim measures of protection intended to protect the claim in arbitration from being frustrated. The interim measure is intended to safeguard the subject-matter of the dispute in the course of the arbitral proceedings. The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement. Now it is in this background that it is necessary for the Court to impart a purposive interpretation to the meaning of the expression “at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36”. Under Section 36, an arbitral award can be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. The arbitral award can be enforced where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired or in the event of such an application having been made, it has been refused. The enforcement of an award enures to the benefit of the party who has secured an award in the arbitral proceedings. That is why the enforceability of an award under Section 36 is juxtaposed in the context of two time frames, the first being where an application for setting aside an arbitral award has expired and the second where an application for setting aside an arbitral award was made but was refused. The enforceability of an award, in other words, is defined with reference to the failure of the other side to file an application for setting aside the award within the stipulated time limit or having filed such an application has failed to establish a case for setting aside the arbitral award. Once a challenge to the arbitral award has either failed under Section 34 having been made within the stipulated period or when no application for setting aside the arbitral award has been made within time, the arbitral award becomes enforceable at the behest of the party for whose benefit the award enures. Once a challenge to the arbitral award has either failed under Section 34 having been made within the stipulated period or when no application for setting aside the arbitral award has been made within time, the arbitral award becomes enforceable at the behest of the party for whose benefit the award enures. Contextually, therefore, the scheme of Section 9 postulates an application for the grant of an interim measure of protection after the making of an arbitral award and before it is enforced for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement of the award. An interim measure of protection within the meaning of Section 9(ii) is intended to protect through the measure, the fruits of a successful conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. A party whose claim has been rejected in the course of the arbitral proceedings cannot obviously have an arbitral award enforced in accordance with Section 36. The object and purpose of an interim measure after the passing of the arbitral award but before it is enforced is to secure the property, goods or amount for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement. 13. The Court which exercises jurisdiction under Section 34 is not a court of first appeal under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appellate court to which recourse is taken against a decree of the trial Court has powers which are co- extensive with those of the trial Court. A party which has failed in its claim before a trial Judge can in appeal seek a judgment of reversal and in consequence, the passing of a decree in terms of the claim in the suit. The court to which an arbitration petition challenging the award under Section 34 lies does not pass an order decreeing the claim. Where an arbitral claim has been rejected by the arbitral tribunal, the court under Section 34 may either dismiss the objection to the arbitral award or in the exercise of its jurisdiction set aside the arbitral award. The setting aside of an arbitral award rejecting a claim does not result in the claim which was rejected by the Arbitrator being decreed as a result of the judgment of the court in a petition under Section 34. The setting aside of an arbitral award rejecting a claim does not result in the claim which was rejected by the Arbitrator being decreed as a result of the judgment of the court in a petition under Section 34. To hold that a petition under Section 9 would be maintainable after the passing of an arbitral award at the behest of DIPL whose claim has been rejected would result in a perversion of the object and purpose underlying Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. DIPL’s application under Section 9, if allowed, would result in the grant of interim specific performance of a contract in the teeth of the findings recorded in the arbitral award. The interference by the Court at this stage to grant what in essence is a plea for a mandatory order for interim specific performance will negate the sanctity and efficacy of arbitration as a form of alternate disputes redressal. What such a litigating party cannot possibly obtain even upon completion of the proceedings under Section 34, it cannot possibly secure in a petition under Section 9 after the award. The object and purpose of Section 9 is to provide an interim measure that would protect the subject-matter of the arbitral proceedings whether before or during the continuance of the arbitral proceedings and even thereafter upon conclusion of the proceedings until the award is enforced. Once the award has been made and a claim has been rejected as in the present case, even a successful challenge to the award under Section 34 does not result an order decreeing the claim. In this view of the matter, there could be no occasion to take recourse to Section 9. Enforcement for the purpose of Section 36 as a decree of the Court is at the behest of a person who seeks to enforce the award.” 31. While considering the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court and other High Courts, the larger Bench of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court specifically held that proceedings under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 seeking interim measures post award was not maintainable. 32. We have examined the tenability of the grounds of appeal, documents placed on record, rival contentions of the parties and the judgments relied upon by them. 32. We have examined the tenability of the grounds of appeal, documents placed on record, rival contentions of the parties and the judgments relied upon by them. The records clinchingly show that the issue involved in this appeal is in respect of invocation of the bank guarantee only, which is also the subject matter in arbitral proceedings. Considering the entire documentary evidence on record and upon hearing the respective parties, the Arbitral Tribunal gave specific findings in Para Nos.163, 227, 288 in the Arbitral Award holding that invocation of ABG’s and PBG’s were lawful. Questioning the said Arbitral Award, the appellant has already filed an appeal before the appellate court and the same is pending. When the appeal is pending before the appellate court and the same is ceased by the said appellate court, the appellant is not entitled to seek relief under Section 9 of the Act. If any order is passed under Section 9 of the Act, it amounts to modification of the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. In view of the same, the appellant is not entitled to seek continuation of the relief sought in Arbitration Application No.54 of 2016 to restrain the respondents from invoking the bank guarantee under law. 33. In view of the foregoing reasons and the findings recorded by the learned single Judge, we do not find any illegality in the impugned order that calls for indulgence of this court. The learned single Judge has dealt with the issues involved in the Arbitration Application No.54 of 2016 meticulously, assigned reason lucidly and dealt with comprehensively and in our view the findings are based on sound reasoning. We do not find any merit in the appeal and this court affirms the findings of the learned single Judge and accordingly the appeal fails and the same is dismissed without costs. 34. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall stand disposed of.