JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant herein under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.02.2015 passed in Sessions Trial No. 79/2014 by the learned Sessions Judge Balod, District: Balod (C.G.), by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of IPC and has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. 2. Case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 03.08.2014, at about 09:00 pm, the appellant caused death of his wife Rambai by strangulation and thereby committed the offence. The further case of the prosecution is that the marriage of the appellant was solemnized with Rambai (now deceased) and they were residing together along with their father PW-1 Ramdayal Markandey and mother PW-7 Bishobai. On the date of the offence, father and mother of the appellant had gone to village: Bhatagaon to borrow money from one of their relatives and they were informed to return back immediately to their house and when they returned, they found the dead body of their daughter-in-law Rambai lying dead on the bed. Since, the appellant used to suspect the character of his wife and on 03.08.2014, the appellant and deceased both were quarreling, on that count, on 03.08.2014, the appellant strangulated the deceased with the help of a rope by which she died, pursuant to which Merg Intimation vide Ex. P/18 was registered at the instance of PW-1 Ramdayal Markandey. Dehati Nalshi was registered vide Ex. P/18-A and FIR was registered vide Ex.P/18-B. Spot Map was prepared vide Ex.P/5. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex. P/9 rope was recovered from the possession of the appellant vide Ex.P/8. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-3 and the dead body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by PW-4 Dr. Geeta Mishra, who has proved the postmortem report Ex.P-12 and her query report is Ex. P/13. According to postmortem report, cause of death of deceased was due to strangulation which was homicidal in nature. 3. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-3 and the dead body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by PW-4 Dr. Geeta Mishra, who has proved the postmortem report Ex.P-12 and her query report is Ex. P/13. According to postmortem report, cause of death of deceased was due to strangulation which was homicidal in nature. 3. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. After completion of investigation, the appellant was chargesheeted before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he has not committed the offence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses and brought on record 18 documents. The defence has examined none and not exhibited any document. 5. The trial Court after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced as above against which the present appeal has been preferred. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the Trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC as there is no evidence on record to convict the appellant for the aforesaid offence. More particularly, Ex.P/1 i.e. Dehati Merg Intimation has been relied upon by the Trial Court to hold that the appellant and deceased both were together in the house and no other persons were there in the house, but the Dehati Merg Intimation which was recorded under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. (Ex.P/1) is not a substantive piece of evidence unless there is other evidence on record to hold that the appellant and deceased were together in the house, therefore, conviction of the appellant is unsustainable in law. 7. Learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the Trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and Ex. P/1 (Dehati Merg Intimation) has rightly been relied upon to base the conviction and as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. P/1 (Dehati Merg Intimation) has rightly been relied upon to base the conviction and as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for the consideration would be whether the death of deceased- Rambai was homicidal in nature ? 10. The learned trial Court has recorded an affirmative finding in this regard and held the death of deceased- Rambai to be homicidal in nature relying upon the expert medical opinion of Dr. Geeta Mishra (PW-4) who has proved the postmortem report (Ex.P-12) in which cause of death is said to be due to strangulation and nature of death is said to be homicidal. Considering the statement of Dr.Geeta Mishra (PW-4) as well as the postmortem report (Ex. P-12) and the grievous injury suffered by the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held the death of deceased- Rambai to be homicidal in nature and we hereby affirm the said finding recorded by the trial Court. 11. Now, the question would be, whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question ? 12. The Trial Court has answered this question in affirmative relying firstly upon the nature of the death to be homicidal in nature as the deceased-Rambai died by strangulation and the strangulation mark was found on the neck of the deceased and pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex. P/9, the rope has been recovered from his possession vide Ex.P/8 proved by PW-2 Arun Kumar and PW-3 Ramchand Barle. However, the Trial Court relying upon Ex.P/1 i.e. Dehati Merg Intimation recorded under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. came to the conclusion that the appellant and deceased were alone in the house on the date of the offence. It is pertinent to mention here that PW-1 Ramdayal Markandey, father of the appellant only proved Ex. P/1 i.e. Dehati Merg Intimation and his signature in the Merg Intimation, but he did not make any statement before the Court that on the date of offence, the appellant and deceased both were together in the house and none else were there. It is pertinent to mention here that PW-1 Ramdayal Markandey, father of the appellant only proved Ex. P/1 i.e. Dehati Merg Intimation and his signature in the Merg Intimation, but he did not make any statement before the Court that on the date of offence, the appellant and deceased both were together in the house and none else were there. The Trial Court has taken Ex.P/1 i.e. Dehati Merg Intimation recorded under Section 174 of Cr.P.C, as a substantive piece of evidence to hold that the appellant and deceased were together in the house on the date of the offence and the appellant did not explain as to how and in what circumstances, the deceased Rambai has died in view of Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act. 13. Now, the question would be, whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act would be applicable or not? 14. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under:- “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. — When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 15. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101 of the Evidence Act, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 of the Evidence Act which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 16. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. 16. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under:- “11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49(B).” 17. Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 18. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “22. 18. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused. 19. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 , while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 20. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 20. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 778 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence. 21. Now, the question is, whether the prosecution has discharged its initial or general burden or primary duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? 22. In the present case, none of the prosecution witnesses including PW-1 Ramdayal Markandey father of the appellant herein made a statement before the Court that on the date of offence the appellant and deceased were in the house and none else were there, though PW-1 Ramdayal Markandey, father of the appellant herein, has lodged Ex.P/1 Dehati Merg Intimation, in which he has stated that on the date of offence, he and his wife PW-7 Bishobai both have gone to Village: Bhatagaon, to borrow some money from one of their relatives and looking to the statement before the Court by proving Ex.P/1, did not make any statement that on the date of the offence, only the appellant and deceased both were there in the house and none else were there. However, relying upon Ex.P/1 i.e. Dehati Merg Intimation, recorded under Section 174 of Cr.P.C., taking Ex.P/1 has incriminating piece of evidence, the Trial Court had recorded that the appellant had failed to explain in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. as to how and in what circumstances his wife died. 23. Section 174 of Cr.P.C. states as under: Police to enquire and report on suicide, etc. 23. Section 174 of Cr.P.C. states as under: Police to enquire and report on suicide, etc. (1) When the officer in charge of a police station or some other police officer specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf receives information that a person has committed suicide, or has been killed by another or by an animal or by machinery or by an accident, or has died under circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence, he shall immediately give intimation thereof to the nearest Executive Magistrate empowered to hold inquests, and, unless otherwise directed by any rule prescribed by the State Government, or by any general or special order of the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate, shall proceed to the place where the body of such deceased person is, and there, in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighborhood, shall make an investigation, and draw up a report of the apparent cause of death, describing such wounds, fractures, bruises, and other marks of injury as may be found on the body, and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or instrument (if any); such marks appear to have been inflicted. 24. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pedda Narayana and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1975 4 SCC 153 considered the nature and purpose of report under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. and held that the question regarding the details as to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what circumstances he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and scope of the proceedings under Section 174 and held in Para 11 as under “11. A perusal of this provision would clearly show that the object or the proceedings under Section 174 is merely to ascertain whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or an unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the death. The question regarding the details as to bow the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what circumstances he was assaulted appears to us to be foreign to the ambit and scope of the proceedings under Section 174. In these circumstances, therefore, neither in practice nor in law was it necessary for the police to have mentioned these details in the inquest report. In these circumstances, therefore, neither in practice nor in law was it necessary for the police to have mentioned these details in the inquest report. The High Court has adverted to this point and has rightly pointed out as follows "The learned Sessions Judge bad also stated that the details regarding the weapons armed by each of the accused and which accused had attacked on which part of the body of the deceased are not found in the inquest report and from this he sought to draw the inference that the statements of the witness now, found recorded under Section 174 Cr. P.C. could not have been the statements then read over to the panchayatdars. Column 9 of the inquest report shows that the injuries on the deceased were caused by knives and daggers. Column 11 (a) shows that Al to A3, A4 and A5 with 3 strangers came in the jeep driven by A4, got down the jeep, stabbed the deceased with daggers and knives, pushed P.W. 1, lifted the deceased, put him in the jeep, and drove' away the jeep and death was the result of the injuries inflicted. The object of holding any inquest as can be seen from under Section 174Cr.P.C. is to find whether a person died a natural death, or a homicidal death or due to suicide. It was therefore not necessary to enter all the details of the overt-acts in the inquest report. From the mere fact that these details were not noted in the inquest report it cannot be concluded that the statements given by the witnesses and read over at the inquest did not contain those overt-acts and the statements now produced are those of the witnesses which were taken later." 25. The contents of the inquest report cannot be treated as evidence but can be looked into to test veracity of witness/witnesses as rendered in the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab report in 1992 Supp 3 SCC 1. 26. Similarly, in the matter of Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh and Others reported in 2017 11 SCC 195 , it has been held that the inquest report is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can be looked into for testing the veracity of witness of the inquest and has held in Para 41 as under: 41. 26. Similarly, in the matter of Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh and Others reported in 2017 11 SCC 195 , it has been held that the inquest report is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can be looked into for testing the veracity of witness of the inquest and has held in Para 41 as under: 41. Further, the evidentiary value of the inquest report prepared under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. has also been long settled through a series of judicial pronouncements of this Court. It is well-established that inquest report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be looked into for testing the veracity of the witnesses of inquest. The object of preparing such report is merely to ascertain the apparent cause of death, namely, whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental or caused by animals or machinery etc. and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or instrument, the injuries on the body appear to have been inflicted. 27. Bearing in mind the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments and the ambit and scope of Section 174 of Cr.P.C., it is quite vivid that the Dehati Merg Intimation Ex.P/1 is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can only be looked into for testing the veracity of the witnesses of the inquest and considering the object of looking such report is only to ascertain the apparent cause of death and stating in what manner and with what weapon or instrument, the injuries on body appear to have been caused. The finding of the Trial Court holding and accepting the Ex.P/1 i.e. Dehati Merg Intimation as a substantive piece of evidence to base a finding that the appellant and deceased were staying together on the date of offence, in our considered opinion is a finding recorded by the Trial Court contrary to the law. More particularly no statement has been made by PW-1 Ramdayal Markandey before the Court that the appellant and deceased were alone in the house on the date of offence. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and as such, the prosecution has failed to discharge its primary burden for applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and as such, the prosecution has failed to discharge its primary burden for applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. As such, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.02.2015, passed by the learned trial Court is liable to be set-aside. 28. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC as well as the sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court is hereby set-aside. He is acquitted of the said charge by extending him the benefit of doubt. Since the appellant is in jail from 05.08.2014, we direct that he be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter/case. 29. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed. 30. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned and concerned Jail Superintendent for necessary information and action.