JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Yogeshwar Sharan Srivastava, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Shri Rajesh Shukla, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 05.07.2001, the Petitioner was suspended pending disciplinary proceedings against him. A Departmental enquiry was conducted and Petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 11.07.2002. Challenging the said dismissal order, the Petitioner filed Writ Petition (S/S) No.4274 of 2002 in which a specific stand was taken by the Petitioner that enquiry was not done in accordance with law and principles of natural justice was not followed. It is also submitted that no date, time and place was fixed by the Enquiry Officer, therefore, the impugned order could not survive. The writ petition was heard and decided and the Court passed order on 12.08.2008. The impugned order of dismissal was quashed. However, it was open for the respondents to proceed for departmental proceedings afresh. 3. The State filed Special Appeal No.63 of 2009 challenging the order dated 12.08.2008 which was disposed of with slight modification that State will complete departmental enquiry within four months. An enquiry was completed on 19.01.2011 and impugned order was passed by the disciplinary authority on 06.03.2013 and major punishment has been awarded to the petitioner fixing his salary to the lowest grade which is under challenge. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner in para 7 of the writ petition has submitted that Enquiry Officer did not fixed any date, time and place while proceeding in the enquiry and no oral examination was done. The Enquiry Officer completed the enquiry, ex-parte, only on the basis of reply of the Petitioner. He has submitted that the impugned order cannot survive in the eyes of law, which is a settled law and the same is violated under U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinater referred to as ‘Rules’). In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following judgments : (i). Abdul Salam vs. State of U.P. and others 2011 (29) LCD 832 ; (ii). Avadhesh Kumar Rastogi vs. State of U.P. and others 2004 (22) LCD 1 ; (iii). Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd through its Secretary and anor v. Raghunath Singh Rana and others in Civil Appeal No.2265 of 2011 ; (iv). Abdul Salam vs. State of U.P. and others 2011 (29) LCD 832 ; (ii). Avadhesh Kumar Rastogi vs. State of U.P. and others 2004 (22) LCD 1 ; (iii). Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd through its Secretary and anor v. Raghunath Singh Rana and others in Civil Appeal No.2265 of 2011 ; (iv). United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee in Civil Appeal No.8258 of 2009 2021 LiveLaw (SC) 109. (v). In Abdul Salam (Supra), the court in Para Nos. 16 to 19 and 24 to 27 has held as under : “16. Before coming to any conclusion, it would be relevant to mention the legal position with regard to the conduction of the departmental enquiry and award of punishment to a delinquent employee. Time and again, the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court has pronounced that in the matter of enquiry for awarding major punishment, no short-cut is permissible. The charge-sheet has to be furnished to the delinquent to apprise him of the charges, which should be specific along with the evidence, both oral and documentary, which the department intends to rely for upholding the charges. In case after service of charge-sheet, the delinquent needs any documents or copy thereof, such prayer has to be considered by the enquiry officer and the documents which are found relevant for enquiry are to be supplied to the delinquent. In case copies of any such document can not be supplied for any valid reason, free access has to be afforded to the delinquent for making inspection of such records. After this stage, the reply is to be submitted by the delinquent within the given time schedule and the enquiry is to proceed, fixing the date, time and place calling the delinquent. 17. Normally, the evidence by the department is required to be led first to prove the charges wherein the delinquent is also allowed to participate, who can crossexamine the witnesses, with opportunity of adducing the evidence either in rebuttal or for disproving the charges. It is thereafter that the enquiry officer has to submit its report either saying that any of the charges stand proved or not. There has to be corroborating evidence to prove the charge and without any material being placed by the department to substantiate the documentary evidence, the charge can not be found to be proved. It is thereafter that the enquiry officer has to submit its report either saying that any of the charges stand proved or not. There has to be corroborating evidence to prove the charge and without any material being placed by the department to substantiate the documentary evidence, the charge can not be found to be proved. There has to be a corroboration of facts from the documents on record and if any report is also being relied upon, the said report is also required to be authenticated by the person who has submitted the report, therefore, for this purpose the oral enquiry is required to be held for proving the charges. 18. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others Versus Saroj Kumar Sinha, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: "26. The first inquiry report is vitiated also on the ground that the inquiry officers failed to fix any date for the appearance of the respondent to answer the charges. Rule 7(x) clearly provides as under: "(x) Where the charged Government servant does not appear on the date fixed in the inquiry or at any stage of the proceeding in spite of the service of the notice on him or having knowledge of the date, the Inquiry Officer shall proceed with the inquiry ex parte. In such a case the Inquiry Officer shall record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge- sheet in absence of the charged Government servant." 27. A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-Rule shows that when the respondent had failed to submit the explanation to the charge sheet it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to fix a date for his appearance in the inquiry. It is only in a case when the Government servant despite notice of the date fixed failed to appear that the enquiry officer can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in such circumstances it is incumbent on the enquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge sheet. Since the Government servant is absent, he would clearly lose the benefit of cross examination of the witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish the charges the department is required to produce the necessary evidence before the enquiry officer. This is so as to avoid the charge that the enquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge. 28. But nonetheless in order to establish the charges the department is required to produce the necessary evidence before the enquiry officer. This is so as to avoid the charge that the enquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge. 28. An enquiry officer acting as a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/ Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents." 19. In the case of Union of India and others Versus Prakash Kumar Tandon and others, while examining the effect of not examining the witnesses, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: "14. In the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal as also the High Court cannot be said to have erred in holding that the said Mr. Walia should have been examined as a witness. 15. The principles of natural justice demand that an application for summoning a witness by the delinquent officer should be considered by the enquiry officer. It was obligatory on the part of the enquiry officer to pass an order in the said application. He could not refuse to consider the same. It is not for the Railway Administration to contend that it is for them to consider as to whether any witness should be examined by it or not. It was for the enquiry officer to take a decision thereupon. A disciplinary proceeding must be fairly conducted. An enquiry officer is a quasijudicial authority. He, therefore, must perform his functions fairly and reasonably which is even otherwise the requirement of the principles of natural justice." 24. In the present case it is evident from the records that the enquiry officer during the course of enquiry by order dated 03.07.2002 had come to the conclusion that it is necessary to provide opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee and for that purpose had fixed 15.07.2002. In the present case it is evident from the records that the enquiry officer during the course of enquiry by order dated 03.07.2002 had come to the conclusion that it is necessary to provide opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee and for that purpose had fixed 15.07.2002. However, on 15.07.2002 enquiry could not be held, so another date was fixed. Thereafter certain dates were fixed by the enquiry officer and it was by an order dated 29.8.2002, the enquiry officer had observed that no other document is required to be given to the delinquent employee, therefore, 07.09.2002 was fixed for submitting reply by the delinquent. It is admitted fact as borne out from the enquiry report dated 17.10.2002 that the delinquent employee had submitted his written reply on 05.10.2002. However, from the perusal of record it appears that no date, time and place was fixed by the enquiry officer for holding oral enquiry after submission of the reply to the charge-sheet by the delinquent employee and the entire enquiry proceedings were completed on the basis of chargesheet and the reply submitted by the delinquent employee, relying on the documentary evidence submitted in support of the alleged charges. 25. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment has come to the conclusion that the enquiry officer did not examine any witnesses as there was no need to summon any witness for the simple reason that in support of the charges, only the documents were relied upon and the documents were so categorical that they were not required to be proved by any witness. It has been further observed by the learned Single Judge that if we examine the report of the enquiry officer, indeed, the documentary evidence seems to be so whelming that it was not obligatory for the enquiry officer to have called any witness in support of the charges. 26. The learned Single Judge, however, did not take into consideration that if the witnesses were not required to be examined in support of the charges, even then it was incumbent upon the enquiry officer to have fixed the date, time and place after submission of the reply to the chargesheet by the delinquent for holding oral enquiry in order to appreciate the evidences filed in support of the charges in presence of the delinquent employee and call upon the department to prove the alleged charges. There is no denial about the fact that such exercise was not done by the enquiry officer in the present case. 27. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the departmental enquiry conducted against the appellant-petitioner on the basis of which the punishment of dismissal from service was awarded, was not held in accordance with law as propounded by the Apex Court as well as this Court, as discussed above.” 5. In Avadhesh Kumar Rastogi (Supra), in Para 5, the Court has held that : 5. We are of the view that the procedure followed by the Inquiry Officer and the conclusions drawn by him against the petitioner are vitiated in law. There can be no debate on the point that even if the delinquent official was not replying the charges by filing written statement and was avoiding to participate in the inquiry, it was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to fix a date, time and place of the inquiry and to intimate the delinquent official about the same and to receive oral or documentary evidence in support of the charges. In this connection, a reference may be made to a recent judgment of this Court in Radhey Kant Khare v. U.P. Coop. Sugar Factories Federation Ltd., (2003 (21) LCD 610) wherein it has been held that notice should be issued to the delinquent official indicating date, time and place of the inquiry. In the instant case, the Inquiry Officer neither held any oral inquiry nor intimated date, time and place of such inquiry to the petitioner nor received any oral or documentary evidence in support of the charges. In fact, there was no material before him, on the basis of which it could have been said that the charges were proved. It was a case where oral evidence was a must, to prove that the different sellers identified as non scheduled caste were in fact scheduled caste. The Inquiry Officer appears to have entertained the belief that if the employee was not denying the charges by filing a written statement, there was no necessity of receiving any evidence in support of the charges. Legally speaking this belief was not correct. So the order of dismissal from service is vitiated in law and deserves to be quashed. The Tribunal could not appreciate this infirmity in the inquiry and in the dismissal order. Legally speaking this belief was not correct. So the order of dismissal from service is vitiated in law and deserves to be quashed. The Tribunal could not appreciate this infirmity in the inquiry and in the dismissal order. Hence, its order also deserved to be quashed.” 6. In Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd (Supra) in Para Nos. 19 to 21 the court has held as under : “19. The compliance of natural justice in domestic/disciplinary inquiry is necessary has long been established. This Court has held that even there are no specific statutory rule requiring observance of natural justice, the compliance of natural justice is necessary. Certain ingredients have been held to be constituting integral part of holding of an inquiry. The Apex Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Their Workmen reported in (1964) 3 SCR 616 has laid down following:- “... An enquiry cannot be said to have been properly held unless, (i) the employee proceeded against has been informed clearly of the charges levelled against him, (ii) the witnesses are examined – ordinarily in the presence of the employee – in respect of the charges, (iii) the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any relevant matter, and (v) the inquiry officer records his findings with reasons for the same in his report.” 20. The Apex Court again in State Bank of India Vs. R.K. Jain and Ors., reported in (1972) 4 SCC 304 held that if an inquiry is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice or if no reasonable opportunity was provided to the delinquent to place his defence, it cannot be characterized as a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. In paragraph 23, the following was laid down:- “......As emphasised by this Court in Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1964) 3 SCR 601 , the termination of an employee's service must be preceded by a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. In paragraph 23, the following was laid down:- “......As emphasised by this Court in Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1964) 3 SCR 601 , the termination of an employee's service must be preceded by a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Therefore, it is evident that if the inquiry is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice or if no reasonable opportunity was provided to a delinquent to place his defence, it cannot be characterized as a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice......” 21. The Apex Court in State of Uttranchal & Ors. Vs. Kharak Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 had occasion to examine various contours of natural justice which need to be specified in a departmental inquiry. The Apex Court noticed earlier judgments where principles were laid down as to how inquiry is to be conducted. It is useful to refer paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15, which are to the following effect:- “…..9. Before analyzing the correctness of the above submissions, it is useful to refer various principles laid down by this Court as to how enquiry is to be conducted and which procedures are to be followed. 10. The following observations and principles laid down by this Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen and Anr. [1964] 3 SCR 652 are relevant: "... ... In the present case, the first serious infirmity from which the enquiry suffers proceeds from the fact that the three enquiry officers claimed that they themselves had witnessed the alleged misconduct of Malak Ram. Mr. Kolah contends that if the Manager and the other officers saw Malak Ram committing the act of misconduct, that itself would not disqualify them from holding the domestic enquiry. We are not prepared to accept this argument. If an officer himself sees the misconduct of a workman, it is desirable that the enquiry should be left to be held by some other person who does not claim to be an eye- witness of the impugned incident. As we have repeatedly emphasised, domestic enquiries must be conducted honestly and bona fide with a view to determine whether the charge framed against a particular employee is proved or not, and so, care must be taken to see that these enquiries do not become empty formalities. As we have repeatedly emphasised, domestic enquiries must be conducted honestly and bona fide with a view to determine whether the charge framed against a particular employee is proved or not, and so, care must be taken to see that these enquiries do not become empty formalities. If an officer claims that he had himself seen the misconduct alleged against an employee, in fairness steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. How the knowledge claimed by the enquiry officer can vitiate the entire proceedings of the enquiry is illustrated by the present enquiry itself. ... ..... ..... It is necessary to emphasise that in domestic enquiries, the employer should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman charged, give an opportunity to the workman to cross-examine the said evidence and then should the workman be asked whether he wants to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against industrial employees that at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross- examined even before any other evidence is led against him. In dealing with domestic enquiries held in such industrial matters, we cannot overlook the fact that in a large majority of cases, employees are likely to be ignorant, and so, it is necessary not to expose them to the risk of cross- examination in the manner adopted in the present enquiry proceedings. Therefore, we are satisfied that Mr. Sule is right in contending that the course adopted in the present enquiry proceedings by which Malak Ram was elaborately cross-examined at the outset constitutes another infirmity in this enquiry." 11) In ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 , it was held: "(1) Where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty- second Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence in respect of the charges. * * * Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a "reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him". Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence in respect of the charges. * * * Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a "reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him". The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. The proviso to Article 311(2) in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.” 12) In Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and Another, (1999) 2 SCC 2, it was held: "34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee's conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer, which are all arrived at behind the back of the employee -- even though such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such cases." 13) In Syndicate Bank and Others vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, (2006) 3 SCC 150 , the following conclusion is relevant: "18. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the enquiry officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice to the delinquent. It is only those documents, which are relied upon by the enquiry officer to arrive at his conclusion, the non-supply of which would cause prejudice, being violative of principles of natural justice. Even then, the non-supply of those documents prejudice the case of the delinquent officer must be established by the delinquent officer. It is well-settled law that the doctrine of principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice." 15. From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge: (i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge: (i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. (ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. (iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. (iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any.” 7. In United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee in Civil Appeal No.8258 of 2009, in paras 17 and 19 the Court has held as under : 17. Apart from cases of “no evidence”, this court has also indicated that judicial review can be resorted to. However, the scope of judicial review in such cases is limited. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India a three-judge bench of this court ruled that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority; it does not re-appreciate the evidence. The court held that: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority; it does not re-appreciate the evidence. The court held that: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the enquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold enquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 . may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 ], this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 19. The bank is correct, when it contends that an appellate review of the materials and findings cannot ordinarily be undertaken, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Yet, from H.C. Goel onwards, this court has consistently ruled that where the findings of the disciplinary authority are not based on evidence, or based on a consideration of irrelevant material, or ignoring relevant material, are mala fide, or where the findings are perverse or such that they could not have been rendered by any reasonable person placed in like circumstances, the remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution are available, and intervention, warranted. For any court to ascertain if any findings were beyond the record (i.e., no evidence) or based on any irrelevant or extraneous factors, or by ignoring material evidence, necessarily some amount of scrutiny is necessary. A finding of “no evidence” or perversity, cannot be rendered sans such basic scrutiny of the materials, and the findings of the disciplinary authority. However, the margin of appreciation of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution would be different; it is not appellate in character.” 8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the enquiry is vitiated. He has further submitted that though the Division Bench has directed to conclude the enquiry within four months but the same was completed within four years beyond stipulated time by the Court. He has further submitted that disciplinary proceedings as well as Enquiry Officer have committed grave error by not considering the fact that no date, time and place was fixed and earlier stand of the petitioner which was already adjudicated by Single Judge was again reiterated by them. He has further submitted that disciplinary proceedings as well as Enquiry Officer have committed grave error by not considering the fact that no date, time and place was fixed and earlier stand of the petitioner which was already adjudicated by Single Judge was again reiterated by them. He has submitted that respondents have lost their right to continue their enquiry, that too after remand. He has further submitted that the Petitioner has retired from service in the year 2014. It would not be feasible to remand the matter at this moment. 9. Shri Rajesh Shukla, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the Petitioner had committed misconduct and his reply was considered by the Enquiry Officer and thereafter enquiry report was submitted on the basis of which final order has been passed. He has submitted that there is no illegality and infirmity in the proceedings and order impugned is justified. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. It is admitted on record that earlier, the petition was allowed. The Writ Petition no. 4274 (S/S) of 2002 was disposed of with a direction to conduct fresh enquiry. The court had already observed that the principles of natural justice was not followed by the Enquiry Officer while conducting the enquiry. Once the matter was remanded on a specific point, there was no occasion to commit the same error by the Enquiry Officer and in the present case, second time, again it is admitted on record that the Enquiry Officer did not fixed any date, time and place and completed the enquiry only on the basis of reply submitted by the petitioner and stand has been taken by the petitioner in para 7 of the writ petition and same has been replied in para 8 of the counter affidavit. Nowhere, State has mentioned that any date, time or place for cross examination was fixed. Thus, it goes to show that enquiry was vitiated. In place of four months, they completed enquiry in four years that too without following the procedure. It would not be fit to remand the matter at this stage. It is also borne in mind that the Petitioner is retired from service in the year 2014. 12. In view of the above discussions made above, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 13. The writ petition is allowed. It would not be fit to remand the matter at this stage. It is also borne in mind that the Petitioner is retired from service in the year 2014. 12. In view of the above discussions made above, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 13. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 06.03.2013 passed by respondent no. 2 is quashed. Consequences to follow.