JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicants have challenged the order dated 13.04.2022, passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (N.I. Act Court No.30), Ahmedabad whereby in an application Exh.14 for grant of interim compensation under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, (hereinafter referred to as “N.I. Act”), the learned Magistrate has granted compensation @ 20% of the cheque amount in favour of the respondent no.2 (hereinafter referred to as “the complainant”) and directed the applicants to pay the same within 60 days from the date of order. 2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to filing of present application are that, the complainant has filed the private complaint being Criminal Case No.11782 of 2021 under Section 138 and 141 of the N.I. Act, as the cheques drawn by the accused for an amount of Rs.4 crore, in favour of the complainant were returned unpaid on the ground “account closed”. 2.1 According to the case of complainant, the applicants-accused availed a loan, under loan agreement dated 31.07.2018 and amount of Rs.5 crore was disbursed on various dates. The loan was repayable within 12 months from the date of disbursement along with the interest. The accused have defaulted in making payment. The cheques earlier given were dishonoured and thereafter, fresh four cheques each of Rs.1 crore issued in favour of the complainant which were again dishonoured which led to filing of criminal complaint and process was issued to the applicants-accused. The Court has recorded the plea on 13.12.2021 and matter posted for recording evidence on 17.08.2022. The cheques earlier given were dishonoured and thereafter, fresh four cheques each of Rs.1 crore issued in favour of the complainant which were again dishonoured which led to filing of criminal complaint and process was issued to the applicants-accused. The Court has recorded the plea on 13.12.2021 and matter posted for recording evidence on 17.08.2022. 2.2 The application Exh.14 was filed by the complainant under Section 143A of the N.I. Act and the same was opposed by the applicants herein by filing reply Exh.16, contending inter alia, that, the dispute is civil dispute and maliciously with dishonest intention the criminal complaint is filed; that, there is neither any debt or liability, nor, any default for which a criminal proceeding can be initiated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act; that, the accused had entered into loan agreement dated 31.07.2018 with the complainant for securing a loan of Rs.5 crore for expansion of joint venture company i.e. GSEC Monarch Deccan Aviation Pvt. Ltd. and as per the termsheet dated 12.12.2017, the accused were to transfer their business along with old debts, liabilities and dues of DCPL to GMDAPL and subsequently, it were transferred along with business transfer agreement and liability of the repayment of the loan to the complainant. After completion of all formalities, the loan was disbursed to the accused and the same was to be repaid within 12 months from the date of disbursement. The security cheques were given to the complainant and not for repayment of loan and therefore, cheque given as a security does not fall under the purview of Section 138 of N.I. Act and repayment of the loan was the responsibility of the new venture GMDAPL. 2.3 Learned trial Court after considering the contents of application Exh.14 and objections filed by the accused Exh.16 and having considered the contentions raised by learned counsel for the respective parties, vide its order dated 13.04.2022 directed the applicants-accused to pay 20% cheque amount within 60 days from the date of the order. While allowing the application, the trial Court recorded that, the accused have not pleaded guilty and objections raised in the reply cannot be considered at this stage as it is a matter of evidence. 3. Aggrieved with the order dated 13.04.2022, the original accused-applicants have preferred the instant application. 4. This Court has heard Mr. While allowing the application, the trial Court recorded that, the accused have not pleaded guilty and objections raised in the reply cannot be considered at this stage as it is a matter of evidence. 3. Aggrieved with the order dated 13.04.2022, the original accused-applicants have preferred the instant application. 4. This Court has heard Mr. A.S. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of the applicants-accused, Mr. A.H. Mohapatra, learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of respondent no.2-complainant and Mr. J. K. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent- State. 5. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that, the impugned order is a non-speaking order and passed in a mechanical way, without application of mind as there is not even a single reason stated for granting the interim relief by way of compensation; That, it is settled law that, any order which is devoid of reasons, is bad in law and cannot be sustained as reasons are “heart and soul” of the order and are the pillars basis which the order has to be executed or acted upon. Thus, therefore, the impugned order is in violation of principle of natural justice as no any reasons were assigned by the trial Court in awarding 20% compensation to the respondent no.2; That, the interim compensation under Section 143A of the N.I. Act is not mandatory and can be granted after assigning sufficient reasons for the same and therefore, the impugned order be quashed on this ground alone. 6. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel further submitted that, while passing the order, the factual aspect and dispute raised in the reply having not been considered by the trial Court. Referring to the statement and object of insertion of Section 143A, it was submitted that, the object behind the insertion of Section 143A is to provide relief during the pendency of the proceedings so that genuine complainants are not left waiting for years on account of undue delays and dilatory tactics of the accused. On the facts on hand, the applicants have appeared in every proceedings and there was no delay on their part which facts having not been considered by the trial Court in its true perspective and therefore, the trial Court has mechanically without considering the scope and purport of Section 143A, passed the order which does not sustain in eye of law. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel raised the contention that, the learned trial Court erroneously passed an order of conversion of summary trial to summons trial without providing an opportunity of being heard to the applicants and there is a non-compliance of Section 202 of Cr.P.C. as it is mandatory on the part of the Court to make preliminary inquiry, when the accused are residing outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. 8. In the aforesaid contentions, learned counsel Mr. Mishra would submits that case is made out to exercise extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court and therefore, he prays that the impugned order may be quashed and set aside. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. A.H. Mohapatra appearing for and on behalf of respondent no.2- complainant submitted that order under Section 143A of the N.I. Act can be passed while the complaint is not yet adjudicated upon and the guilt of the accused has not yet been determined. Thus, therefore, he submitted that, no error of law could be said to have committed by the Court below in allowing the application. He would further urge that, the accused at the stage of passing the order under Section 143A of the Act cannot insist on the Court to adjudicate the defense of non-maintainability of the complaint, more particularly, in the facts of the present case, the Court below has observed that, the defense of the applicants-accused cannot be appreciated at this stage and therefore, the impugned order cannot be construed to have been passed without recording reasons. The accused herein was available for recording of the plea after 12 months of filing of the complaint. Thus, it is evident that, the present application is nothing but an attempt to delay the adjudication of the complaint before the Court below. The applicants-accused have already filed a quashing petition raising all the contentions raised hereinabove before this Court and the same is pending for adjudication. 10. Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the complainant, raised the contention that the application in the present form under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable. Placing reliance on the case of Estralla Rubber Vs. 10. Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the complainant, raised the contention that the application in the present form under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable. Placing reliance on the case of Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (Private) Ltd. ( 2001 (8) SCC 97 ), contended that, High Court while acting under Article 227, cannot exercise its power as an appellate Court and has not vested with unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardships or wrong decisions made within the limits of jurisdiction of the subordinate Courts. Citing the another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil ( 2010 8 SCC 329 ) to submit that, in exercise of its powers of superintendence, High Court cannot interfere with mere errors of law or fact or just because another view then the one taken by the Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. Thus, therefore, he urged that, in the present case, the Court below has passed the impugned order considering contentions raised by respective parties, and after considering the contents of the complaint and reply of the accused-applicants and provision of Section 143A and therefore, at this stage, no any exceptional circumstances exist to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction, warranting interference by this Court. 11. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties. Perused the impugned order and material placed on record. 12. Before adverting to the contentions raised by learned counsel for the respective parties, it would be relevant to note that, Section 143A of the N.I. Act was inserted by Act 20 of 2018 and was brought into effect from 01.09.2018. It is also important to understand the intent behind introduction of said section to the Act as there is a huge backlog of pendency of cases pertaining to dishonour of cheques and it is because of delaying tactics of the drawers of cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings. Thus, it is necessary to provide relief during pendency of the proceedings to the complainants who are waiting for years on account of undue delays and dilatory tactics, the provision has been inserted by amending the Act. 13. It is necessary to refer Section 143A of the N.I. Act which reads as under: ‘‘143A. Thus, it is necessary to provide relief during pendency of the proceedings to the complainants who are waiting for years on account of undue delays and dilatory tactics, the provision has been inserted by amending the Act. 13. It is necessary to refer Section 143A of the N.I. Act which reads as under: ‘‘143A. Power to direct interim compensation (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant— (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent. of the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (2 of 1974) shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section.’’ 14. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that, the trial Court may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. Admittedly, the Delhi Court in case of M/s. Jsb Cargo and Freight Forwarder Pvt. Ltd. (CRL.MC. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that, the trial Court may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. Admittedly, the Delhi Court in case of M/s. Jsb Cargo and Freight Forwarder Pvt. Ltd. (CRL.MC. 2663 of 2021) decided on 20.12.2021, held that, the provision of Section 143A N.I. Act essentially a directory and cannot be termed as mandatory in nature. Even, the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Petition No.100261/2022 (Vijaya vs. Shekharappa & Anr.) decided on 17.02.2022 reported in 2022 Live Law (Kar) 82 has also taken similar view. Thus, the section is directory in nature and considering the words “may” the provision itself shows that discretion is vested with trial Court to direct interim compensation to be paid by the accused and same shall not exceed 20% of amount of cheque. 15. It is settled position of law that, when there is a discretionary power, the Court has to exercise it by assigning proper reasons of the conclusion, failing which the exercise of discretion will become arbitrary. 16. In light of the settled law and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the issue arise for determination whether case is made out for exercising extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court warranting interference with the impugned order? 17. Before dealing with the issue, let us examine the conclusion arrived by the Court below in its impugned order. Paragraph-6 of the order is relevant to consider which reads as under: “Having considered the complaint and that the accused have not pleaded guilty as well as the object of amendment, this Court is of the view this application deserves to be allowed. So far as the objections taken in the reply by the learned advocate for the accused is concerned, this Court is of view that same cannot be considered at this stage and it is a matter of evidence. Hence, this Court consider that this application is maintainable. Hence, overall consideration the facts and circumstances of this case, it seems to be judicious to pass following order in the interest of justice: Order Accordingly, this application of the complainant is allowed. The accused is hereby ordered to pay 20% cheque amount to the complainant within 60 days from the date of order.” 13.04.2022 Ahmedabad. 18. Hence, overall consideration the facts and circumstances of this case, it seems to be judicious to pass following order in the interest of justice: Order Accordingly, this application of the complainant is allowed. The accused is hereby ordered to pay 20% cheque amount to the complainant within 60 days from the date of order.” 13.04.2022 Ahmedabad. 18. On perusal of the findings recorded by the trial Court, this Court is of considered view that, the discretion having not been properly exercised by the trial Court while awarding 20% amount of compensation. The learned trial Court has not assigned any reasons as to why the complainant has been awarded interim compensation @ 20% of the cheque amount and not less than 20%. It is the discretion of the Court to award interim compensation from 1% to 20%, but subject to recording of proper reasons. On the facts of the present case, the learned trial Court has rightly did not discussed with the issue of defense raised by the accused herein as the question of disputed facts require to be tried after full fledge of the trial. However, the trial Court while determining the percentage of interim compensation, he or she should have assigned proper reasons stating that why the interim compensation amount @ 20% is required to be paid by the accused. It is mandatory on the part of the trial Court that whenever the Court exercise its jurisdiction under Section 143A of the Act, it shall record reasons as to why it directs the accused person to pay the interim compensation to the complainant. There is no straight jacket formula for assigning reasons, but it may vary case to case and depends upon facts of each case. The Bench of Madras High Court in the case of L G R Enterprises Sindu @ Lakshmi; V Mahadevan Iyer Vs. P Anbazhagan [2019 LawSuit (Mad) 899], in para-8 of the judgment, gave some illustration and/or example on the aforesaid subject which reads thus: “Therefore, whenever the trial Court exercises its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, it shall record reasons as to why it directs the accused person (drawer of the cheque) to pay the interim compensation to the complainant. The reasons may be varied. The reasons may be varied. For instance, the accused person would have absconded for a longtime and thereby would have protracted the proceedings or the accused person would have intentionally evaded service for a long time and only after repeated attempts, appears before the Court, or the enforceable debt or liability in a case, is borne out by overwhelming materials which the accused person could not on the face of it deny or where the accused person accepts the debt or liability partly or where the accused person does not cross examine the witnesses and keeps on dragging with the proceedings by filing one petition after another or the accused person absonds and by virtue of a non-bailable warrant he is secured and brought before the Court after a long time or he files a recall non-bailable warrant petition after a long time and the Court while considering his petition for recalling the non-bailable warrant can invoke Section 143A(1) of the Act. This list is not exhaustive and it is more illustrative as to the various circumstances under which the trial Court will be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 143A(1) of the Act, by directing the accused person to pay the interim compensation of 20% to the complainant.” 19. Undisputedly, on the facts of the present case, the trial Court has not assigned any reasons while awarding interim compensation @ 20% of the cheque amount and why it is not less than that. If trial Court would have assigned the reasons, then, this Court while examining the issue raised in the petition, could have examine the conclusion of the Court. In the case of Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab (1979 SCC (2) 368), the Apex Court has explained that, the reasons being a link between the materials on which certain conclusion are based and the actual conclusion. The Apex Court in its various judgments time and again held that, it is always desirable to record reasons in support of final conclusions even statute do not impose an obligation upon the Court as it is expected to act fairly and in consonance with the basic rule of law. It is settled position of law that, recording of proper reasons would be essential, so that, the Appellate Court would have advantage of considering the opinion of the trial Court on the reasons which had weighed with the Court. It is settled position of law that, recording of proper reasons would be essential, so that, the Appellate Court would have advantage of considering the opinion of the trial Court on the reasons which had weighed with the Court. 20. In light of the above principles and on perusal of the impugned order, this Court is in complete agreement with the contention raised by learned counsel for the applicants that, discretionary order without reasons is not sustainable in the eye of law. This Court is of considered opinion that, the impugned order is devoid of any reasons as conclusion arrived at by the trial Court for awarding 20% of the cheque amount, is without assigning proper and sufficient reasons and discretionary power having not been properly exercised by the Court, as a result, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law. 21. The contentions raised by learned counsel for the applicants do not require to discuss in detail as the quashing petition against the filing of complaint, is pending before Coordinate Bench of this Court wherein all the contentions as raised hereinabove with regard to issuance of process having been raised by the applicants. Even otherwise, while determining the interim compensation, it is not desirable by the trial Court to deal with the question of disputed facts and defense, as it is the subject of trial proceedings. 22. The contention raised by learned counsel for the respondent no.2 that the petition in the present form is not maintainable, is not acceptable. There cannot be any dispute with regard to law laid down by the Apex Court in the cited judgments, but fact remains that the questions raised in the cited judgments were pertaining to power to be exercised under supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, whereas in the present case, the petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 13.04.2022 is quashed and the matter is remanded back to the trial Court with a direction to decide the application Exh.14 within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of this order, in accordance with law. 24. Nothing in this judgment shall tantamount to a finding on the merits of the case. 25. 24. Nothing in this judgment shall tantamount to a finding on the merits of the case. 25. In view of the issue involved in the present application, the Registrar General is directed to circulate copy of this judgment to all Judicial Officers of the State.