JUDGMENT : Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 27.1.2021 passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Jagdalpur, District Bastar (CG) in Sessions Case No.15/2018, whereby, he has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.2000/-, in default, to further undergo R.I. for 3 months. 2. Case of the prosecution is that Lachhindar Baghel S/o late Shivnath Baghel is the cousin brother of deceased – Lachhindar Baghel S/o late Jhimtu Baghel. As per the merg information lodged by Lachhindar Baghel S/o Shivnath Baghel on 1.10.2017 at 13:15 hours at Police Station Kondenar, the job of the deceased was to issue ticket to the shopkeepers in the weekly Barupata market. On 30.9.2017, at 2.30 p.m., the deceased had gone to the said weekly market on his cycle but when he did not return till late evening, a search was made on 1.10.2017 in the morning and thereafter, it was informed by the son of the deceased - Dharmu Baghel (PW-2) that some unknown persons have killed his father near the nursery. The cycle of the deceased was also lying near the dead body and the injury was caused by a sharp weapon on his neck. Sub Inspector - Vimal Vatti (PW-18) has registered the First Information Report against unknown persons vide Ex.P/2; spot map was prepared vide Ex.-P/3; and Naksha Panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P/6. From the son of the deceased, a box of mobile hand set and an old SIM card were seized vide Ex.P/7, blood stained and plain soil were seized vide Ex.P/8; and cycle and other articles of the deceased were seized vide Ex.P/9. During investigation, it has been revealed that the deceased used to practice witchcraft by which he killed the brother of co-accused Sonsingh Baghel and he also used to harass co-accused Chandruram, therefore, these two coaccused persons hired the present appellant – Farsuram Kashyap and co-accused Rajman Baghel by paying them an amount of Rs.1 lakh. During investigation, the Police recorded the memorandum statements of the accused persons and on the basis of the memorandum of the present appellant, the mobile of the deceased was recovered vide Ex.P/19. During investigation, the Police recorded the memorandum statements of the accused persons and on the basis of the memorandum of the present appellant, the mobile of the deceased was recovered vide Ex.P/19. Further, the appellant also disclosed that he had thrown the knife in Nainkur Matkot pond near the mud road, which has been recovered vide Ex.P/20. In the postmortem report – Ex.- P/27, Dr. Pradeep Baghel (PW-16) has opined that the death was homicidal in nature and that the injuries which have been inflicted upon the deceased could be caused by the knife, which has been recovered from the appellant vide Ex.P/28. The call details have been collected vide Ex.P/36 and the FSL report of the knife has been exhibited as Ex.P/45, in which, human blood has been found. 3. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet has been filed. The appellant and other co-accused abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 20 witnesses and exhibited 45 documents. The statements of the appellant and other five accused persons namely Dharamsingh Nayak, Rajman Baghel, Suknath Nag, Sonsingh Baghel and Chandruram @ Chanduram were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which, they pleaded innocence and false implication and they have not adduced any defence evidence. 4. The trial Court after completion of trial and upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, by the impugned judgment, acquitted the five other accused persons - Dharamsingh Nayak, Rajman Baghel, Suknath Nag, Sonsingh Baghel and Chandruram @ Chanduram from the charges levelled against them under Sections 148, 302/149, 201/149, 120-B of the IPC and Sections 4, 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonahi Pratadna Adhiniyam, 2005 and the present appellant has also been acquitted from the charges under Sections 148, 201/149,120-B of the IPC and Sections 4, 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonahi Pratadna Adhiniyam, 2005. However, the trial Court held the appellant herein guilty under Section 302 of the IPC and by its impugned judgment, he was convicted and sentenced as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is contrary to law and the trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is contrary to law and the trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective. He submits that there is no eyewitness to the incident and the case is based only on the memorandum- Ex.P/16 and seizure-Ex.P/19 & Ex.P/20, whereby, the mobile and knife have been recovered. Though the independent witnesses Maniram Mourya (PW-10) and Tameshwar Thakur (PW-19) have not proved the said documents and there are material discrepancies in their evidence but despite such infirmities, the trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and proceeded to convict him for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid which has been called in question by way of this appeal. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the State would support the impugned judgment and submit that the mobile of the deceased was recovered from the appellant and the knife, which the appellant used for committing murder of the deceased, has also been seized at his instance, for which, the appellant has not given any explanation, therefore, the conviction is well merited, which does not call for any interference. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 8. Dharmu Baghel (PW-2), son of the deceased, has categorically deposed that one day i.e. on 1.6.2017, he and his father (deceased) were returning from Salhepal market on their respective cycles and he was riding ahead of his father. When they reached near Salhepal Mallapara, one motorcyclist came from the front and assaulted his father, who was riding behind him, on his shoulder with a knife. Since he was ahead of his father and it was dark, he could not identify the assailant. The said incident was reported by his father to the Police Station and thereafter, a compromise has been arrived at between co-accused Sonsingh and his father and Sonsingh promised that he would never make any allegation with regard to witchcraft against him. He further stated that on 31.9.2017 (correct date is “30.9.2017”) at 2:30 p.m., his father had gone to the weekly market of Barupata. The deceased would usually return home by evening after his work but on the said date, he did not return. He further stated that on 31.9.2017 (correct date is “30.9.2017”) at 2:30 p.m., his father had gone to the weekly market of Barupata. The deceased would usually return home by evening after his work but on the said date, he did not return. On the next day i.e. 1.10.2017, in the morning, he set out to find his father and found that the dead body of his father was lying near the nursery plant and at some distance, his cycle and other articles i.e. slippers and umbrella were also lying near the side of the road and thereafter, he informed his elder uncle {Lachindar Baghel (PW-1)} about the death of his father. Lachhindar Baghel (PW-1) gave Merg intimation -Ex.P/1, based upon which, FIR- Ex.-P/2 was registered. Lachhindhar Baghel (PW-1) deposed that his younger brother (deceased) was murdered by some unknown persons by inflicting injury on his neck. Dr. Pradeep Baghel (PW-16) has proved his Autopsy Report-Ex.P/27 and has found that the nature of the death was homicidal and he has found one sharp injury on the neck of the deceased and the said fact was not rebutted in the cross-examination. Hence, the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of the deceased is homicidal in nature is a correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding. 9. Now, the material question for consideration is whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question? 10. Admittedly, the present case is based on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution has connected the present appellant to the crime in question on the basis of the Memorandum-Ex.P/16, by which, one mobile of the deceased has been recovered vide Ex.P/19 and a knife, which has been used in the crime, has been recovered vide Ex.P/20. Since there is no eye-witness in this case and the case was completely based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances are required to be established. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sattatiya alias Satish Rajanna Kartala Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 210 , has reiterated the law laid down at paras 12, 13 & 14, which are reproduced hereunder:- “12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sattatiya alias Satish Rajanna Kartala Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 210 , has reiterated the law laid down at paras 12, 13 & 14, which are reproduced hereunder:- “12. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, this Court held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, the following tests must be satisfied : (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so as to complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none-else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” 13. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 , it was held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and falsity or untenability of the defence set up by the accused cannot be made basis for ignoring serious infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case. The Court then proceeded to indicate the conditions which must be fully established before conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence. These are : (SCC p. 185, para 153) – (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency ; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 14. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86 , it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.” 11. Therefore, we would explore the evidence and chain of events to find out as to whether it connects the dotted line and is so complete to prove the guilt towards the accused-appellant. The prosecution has connected the present appellant to the crime in question on the basis of the memorandum-Ex.P/16, by which, one mobile of the deceased vide Ex.P/19 and a knife, which has been used in the crime, have been recovered vide Ex.P/20. 12. PW-2 Dharmu Baghel, son of the deceased, has deposed that on the fateful day, his father had gone to Barupata market having Mobile containing Nos.8120077984 and 8435865694 and when he tried to contact his father, his mobile came switched off and the same was also not found near the dead body. Vimal Vatti (PW-18), Investigating Officer, stated that on 2.10.2017, he seized the box of the mobile handset -vide Ex.-P/7 in presence of Kumma Kashyap (PW-5) and Laxman Thakur (PW-9) and in the said box, IMEI Number of the deceased’s mobile was mentioned. Kumma Kashyap (PW-5) has also supported the fact that the mobile box and SIM card wrapper were seized from the son of the deceased and in the cross-examination, the said fact was unshaken. Kumma Kashyap (PW-5) has also supported the fact that the mobile box and SIM card wrapper were seized from the son of the deceased and in the cross-examination, the said fact was unshaken. Even in para 10 of his cross-examination, this witness has reiterated the said fact although the other Panch Witness - Laxman Thakur (PW-9) has turned hostile. Moreover, he has also admitted his signature being at Ex.P/7 and on the basis of the IMEI number of the deceased’s mobile, the call detail record of the IMEI Nos. 911461150332361 and 911461150332379 were obtained from Vibhor Rastogi (PW-22) vide Ex.P/36-37. Vibhor Rastogi (PW-22) has proved the said fact about the call details of the said IMEI Numbers from 30.9.2017 to 11.10.2017. Vibhor Rastogi (PW-22), who is the Service Provider of the IDEA company, materially deposed that IMEI number of the mobile of the deceased was used in Mobile No.9294734049 from 4.10.2017 to 11.10.2017 and further stated that the said IMEI number was used up to 30.9.2017 till 14:26:14 hours in the mobile of the deceased vide Ex.P/36 and P/37. This witness further informed that in the name of the wife of the appellant, a SIM card for mobile No.9294734049 was issued as per the customer application Form - Ex.P/38. Vijay Paikra (PW-23), Inspector, has sent a letter-Ex.P/41 to the Nodal Officers, Cyber Cell, Jagdalpur for obtaining call detail record and certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. Vibhor Rastogi (PW-22) had provided the same and proved the call detail record vide Ex.P/36 and P/37 and Certificate vide Ex.P/39. Hence, from the aforesaid evidence, the prosecution has successfully proved the fact that the mobile handset of the deceased which he had used immediately before his death was not found near the dead body and the same mobile handset was being used with a new SIM issued in the name of wife of the appellant. Further, the new SIM has been got issued immediately after the incident i.e. on 4.10.2017. 13. Dayamani Kashyap (PW-14), wife of the deceased, has categorically stated that she got issued a new SIM card along with her husband/appellant and the same was also being used by her husband. Further, the new SIM has been got issued immediately after the incident i.e. on 4.10.2017. 13. Dayamani Kashyap (PW-14), wife of the deceased, has categorically stated that she got issued a new SIM card along with her husband/appellant and the same was also being used by her husband. The appellant has not given any explanation as to why he obtained a new SIM card in the name of his wife and even he has not given any explanation in his accused statement to the effect that in what manner the mobile handset of the deceased came in his possession. 14. Durgesh Sharma (PW-24), Investigating Officer, deposed that on 16.10.2017, he recorded the disclosure statement-Ex.P/16 of the appellant in presence of Maniram Mourya (PW-10) and Tameshwar Thakur (PW-19) in front of the house of the appellant at village Dongripara Pujaripara and in pursuance of which, the mobile of the deceased was recovered from the pocket of the trouser of the appellant vide Ex.P/19 and the blood stained knife was also seized from the place - Nainkur Matkot pond near the mud road vide Ex.P/20, where the appellant threw the knife after the incident. 15. Dr. Pradeep Baghel (PW-16) has categorically opined and proved its report Ex.P/28 to the effect that the injuries which have been found on the body of the deceased, could be inflicted by the knife, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In the crossexamination, the only discrepancy is with regard to the description of knife as the Investigating Officer has mentioned the measurement of knife approximately, whereas, the Doctor has prepared his report after measurement of the knife and thus, the minor variation is not significant. In the FSL Report-Ex.P/45, human blood was found on Article ‘C’ – knife. In the cross-examination, the appellant has not given any explanation with regard to the FSL report as to how blood stain was found on the knife which has been recovered from him. 16. The examination and cross-examination of the material independent witnesses Maniram Mourya (PW10) and Tameshwar Thakur (PW-19) relating to disclosure statement- Ex.P/16 of the appellant and seizure memo Ex.P/19 & P/20, have not been completed in one stroke and the same have been recorded in a piecemeal manner. The cross examination of Maniram Mourya (PW-10) was adjourned for lunch time and the same was started thereafter. The cross examination of Maniram Mourya (PW-10) was adjourned for lunch time and the same was started thereafter. The said witness in his Chief Examination categorically supported the case of the prosecution and at para 5, 12 & 13 clearly deposed that at the instance of the appellant, the mobile and knife had been recovered. However, for the reasons best known to the said witness, this witness has taken a complete Uturn and stated that he had never gone with the Investigating Officer at village Dongriguda Pujaripara Dhuragaon and Bade Badal, where such recovery has been made. This witness vide para 13 clearly deposed that the appellant and the Police had gone near the pond wherefrom the knife has been recovered. Similarly, the other Panch Witness - Tameshwar Thakur (PW-19), in para 3 of his Chief examination clearly deposed that they had gone in search of the appellant with the Investigating Officer from Jagdalpur to Lohandiguda and from Dongripara, the mobile of the deceased was recovered from the appellant vide Ex.P/19. He also deposed that Maniram Mourya (PW- 10) had also accompanied him to such place. In para 7 & 8 of this examination, he further supported the prosecution story about the recovery of the knife at the instance of the appellant vide Ex.P/16 and admitted his signature being on it vide Ex.P/20. Further in para 14-22, he reaffirmed the said fact that the mobile and knife were recovered in pursuance of the statement of the appellant. The examination-in-chief of this witness was done on 10.8.2018, however, his cross-examination was adjourned on the ground that the same is to be started in presence of the accused as the question of identity is involved. The cross-examination was started from 13.8.2019 i.e. after two days and on the said date, this witness resiled from his earlier statement. However, both the above witnesses have not explained as to why they have stated differently in their examination-in-chief and crossexamination. 17. The cross-examination was started from 13.8.2019 i.e. after two days and on the said date, this witness resiled from his earlier statement. However, both the above witnesses have not explained as to why they have stated differently in their examination-in-chief and crossexamination. 17. In the matter of Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has expressed anguish for grant of adjournment after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, and issued directions not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, and the Presiding Officer of a Court owes a duty to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safeguarded. The observation made in para 6 reads thus : 6. In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the authority in State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh [ (2001) 4 SCC 667 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 798], wherein this Court deprecating the practice of a Sessions Court adjourning a case in spite of the presence of the witnesses willing to be examined fully, opined thus: (Shambhu Nath Singh case [ (2001) 4 SCC 667 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 798], SCC pp. 671-72, para 9) “9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present in court he must be examined on that day. The court must know that most of the witnesses could attend the court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness may be paid by the court is generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day. It is a sad plight in the trial courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day. This primitive practice must be reformed by the Presiding Officers of the trial courts and it can be reformed by everyone provided the Presiding Officer concerned has a commitment towards duty.” (Gurnaib Singh case [Gurnaib Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 7 SCC 108 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 49], SCC p. 123, para 31) 18. The Apex Court has time and again expressed the reasons for frequent turning of witnesses hostile i.e. either due to threats, coercion, lust or monetary consideration etc. The law is also well settled that there is no principle of law that the Police Officers evidence cannot be relied upon without corroboration. 19. In the matter of Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 SCC 588 , the following was observed vide para 13 : 13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh [1988 Supp SCC 686 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [ (2001) 1 SCC 652 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC 229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [ (2013) 6 SCC 595 : 2013 AIR SCW 3102] that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence. 20. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence. 20. In the present case, Durgesh Sharma (PW-24), Investigating Officer, is having a ring of truthfulness. His cross-examination has not made any dent in his credibility or reliability except that there was some minor discrepancy in it. It is significant that the IMEI of the deceased’s mobile which has been recovered during the investigation has also been tallied and it was found that the same was being used by the appellant. Merely because there is some minor discrepancy in his examination, this Court does not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence of the Investigating Officer because the Panch Witness might be won over during the cross-examination and moreover, his earlier statement has fully supported the case of the prosecution. 21. For the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the trial Court has rightly found proved the material circumstances against the appellant. The trial Court vide para 66 of its judgment has summarized the circumstances and after due appreciation of evidence, the following facts emerged against the appellant : (i) that the deceased on the fateful day kept the mobile which was not found after being murdered near his dead body: (ii) The mobile of the deceased was recovered at the instance of the appellant; (iii) the wife of the appellant obtained a new SIM vide Ex.P/28 on 4.10.2017 immediately after the incident and the same was found being used on the mobile of the deceased after his murder and further, the same was being used by the appellant; (iv) In pursuance of the discovery statement of the appellant, the blood stained knife containing human blood was recovered and the Doctor had opined that the injury which was present on the body of the deceased could be inflicted by the said knife; (v) The appellant has not given any explanation to the effect that as to in what manner the mobile of the deceased came in his possession nor he had given any explanation about the blood stains found on the knife, which was recovered from his possession. 22. 22. In the matter of Gulab Chand v. State of M.P., (1995) 3 SCC 574 : when the article of the deceased were found in the possession of accused the law relating to presumption under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be read along with the “important time factor”. If the ornaments in possession of the deceased are found in possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. The following was observed in para 4, which reads thus : 4.................It is true that simply on the recovery of stolen articles, no inference can be drawn that a person in possession of the stolen articles is guilty of the offence of murder and robbery. But culpability for the aforesaid offences will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of evidence adduced. It has been indicated by this Court in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan [(1952) 2 SCC 641 : AIR 1956 SC 54 : 1956 Cri LJ 150] that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from certain circumstances. It has also been indicated that where only evidence against the accused is recovery of stolen properties, then although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and murder might have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw an inference that the person in possession of the stolen property had committed the murder. A note of caution has been given by this Court by indicating that suspicion should not take the place of proof. It appears that the High Court in passing the impugned judgment has taken note of the said decision of this Court. But as rightly indicated by the High Court, the said decision is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High Court has placed reliance on the other decision of this Court rendered in Tulsiram Kanu v. State [1951 SCC 92 : AIR 1954 SC 1 : 1954 Cri LJ 225]. In the said decision, this Court has indicated that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be read along with the “important time factor”. In the said decision, this Court has indicated that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be read along with the “important time factor”. If the ornaments in possession of the deceased are found in possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if several months had expired in the interval, the presumption cannot be permitted to be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. In the instant case, it has been established that immediately on the next day of the murder, the accused Gulab Chand had sold some of the ornaments belonging to the deceased and within 3-4 days, the recovery of the said stolen articles was made from his house at the instance of the accused. Such close proximity of the recovery, which has been indicated by this Court as an “important time factor”, should not be lost sight of in deciding the present case. It may be indicated here that in a later decision of this Court in Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka [ (1983) 2 SCC 330 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 447], this Court has held that the nature of the presumption and Illustration (a) under Section 114 of the Evidence Act must depend upon the nature of evidence adduced. No fixed time-limit can be laid down to determine whether possession is recent or otherwise and each case must be judged on its own facts. The question as to what amounts to recent possession sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies according as the stolen article is or is not, calculated to pass readily from hand to hand. If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that period. If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that period. In our view, it has been rightly held by the High Court that the accused was not affluent enough to possess the said ornaments and from the nature of the evidence adduced in this case and from the recovery of the said articles from his possession and his dealing with the ornaments of the deceased immediately after the murder and robbery a reasonable inference of the commission of the said offence can be drawn against the appellant. Excepting an assertion that the ornaments belonged to the family of the accused which claim has been rightly discarded, no plausible explanation for lawful possession of the said ornaments immediately after the murder has been given by the accused. In the facts of this case, it appears to us that murder and robbery have been proved to have been integral parts of the same transaction and therefore the presumption arising under Illustration (a) of Section 114 Evidence Act is that not only the appellant committed the murder of the deceased but also committed robbery of her ornaments.....…” 23. In the matter of Ganga Bai v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2016) 15 SCC 645 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appellant should have explained how the clothes and articles seized from them contained human blood, the effect of non explanation by the appellant, materially observed in para 12 reads thus : 12. In Nana Keshav Lagad v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 12 SCC 721 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 510, this Court had an occasion to consider a similar situation. Since the factual background, as such, is also explained therein, we shall extract the relevant paragraph as such: (SCC pp. 730-31, para 27) “27. The other submission made on behalf of the appellants was with reference to the human blood found on the clothes worn by A-1 and A-4. It was contended that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish through any independent evidence about the bloodstains found on the clothes of A-1, as well as the appellant in Crl. A. No. 1010 of 2008. The other submission made on behalf of the appellants was with reference to the human blood found on the clothes worn by A-1 and A-4. It was contended that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish through any independent evidence about the bloodstains found on the clothes of A-1, as well as the appellant in Crl. A. No. 1010 of 2008. In that respect instead of reiterating the details, it will be sufficient to refer to the conclusion reached by the trial court, while dealing with the said contention, which is found in para 63. The relevant part of it reads as under: ‘63. In the present case, the evidence of API Padwal in this respect is not seriously challenged or shattered. After all the accused were arrested under panchnama and at the time of arrest, panchnama of accused Nana bloodstained clothes were seized. It is not in any way contended or for that matter even whispered that IO API Padwal was having any rancour against the accused or he was motivated or interested in one-sided investigation with the sole object of implicating the accused. As a matter of fact, the investigation in this case appears to be totally impartial. When it transpired that two accused by name Sandeep and Ganesh, the juvenile delinquent have not taken part in the assault, their names were deleted from the prosecution case by filing report under Section 169 CrPC. Therefore, here the investigation has proceeded impartially and it is also not even for the sake of it, is suggested to API Padwal that, no such bloodstained clothes were recovered from the accused Nana, moreover, as per the settled position of law, there is no presumption in law that a police officer acts dishonestly and his evidence cannot be acted upon. Therefore, here the evidence of API Padwal is sufficient to prove the recovery of the bloodstained clothes of the accused. His evidence also goes to prove that all these articles, bloodstained clothes, etc. were sent to CA and as per the CA report, Ext. 61, the blood was detected on the clothes of the accused and the deceased and this blood was human blood…. In the present case, though the CA report, Ext. 61 shows that the said human blood was of Group B, CA report, Ext. were sent to CA and as per the CA report, Ext. 61, the blood was detected on the clothes of the accused and the deceased and this blood was human blood…. In the present case, though the CA report, Ext. 61 shows that the said human blood was of Group B, CA report, Ext. 62 about the blood sample of the accused states that the blood group could not be ascertained as the results were inconclusive, moreover, there is no CA of the blood sample of the deceased to prove that he was having Blood Group B. However, the fact remains that the stains of human blood were found on the clothes of accused Nana and he has not explained how these bloodstains were on his clothes and therefore, as observed in this authority, it becomes one more highly incriminating circumstance against the accused.’ In fact, as rightly noted by the trial court, it was for the appellants to have explained as to how the clothes worn by them contained human blood. In Section 313 questioning, no explanation was forthcoming from the appellants. In these circumstances, the said contention also does not merit any consideration.” 24. In the present matter, in a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., on a query being made with respect to FSL, the appellant did not has any explanation with regard to presence of human blood stains on the weapon, which was recovered on his disclosure and explanation on it was only ‘denial’. 25. In the matter of R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266 : the Supreme Court has observed that, a failure by the serologist to detect the origin of blood due to disintegration of the serum does not mean the blood stuck on the axe could not have been human blood at all. It has also held that, once the recovery is made pursuant to a discovery statement made by the accused, the matching and non-matching of blood group becomes insignificant. The significant observations made in paras 31 & 32 read as under : 31. A failure by the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe could not have been human blood at all. The significant observations made in paras 31 & 32 read as under : 31. A failure by the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe could not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it is possible, either because the stain is insufficient in itself, or due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that a serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood in question. However, in such a case, unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension, which a judicially conscientious mind may entertain with some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused in this regard. Once the recovery is made in pursuance of a disclosure statement made by the accused, the matching or non-matching of blood group(s) loses significance. (Vide Prabhu Babaji Navle v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 51 : 1956 Cri LJ 147], Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1963 SC 74 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 70], State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram [ (1999) 3 SCC 507 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 436], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [ (2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323 : AIR 2001 SC 330 ], John Pandian v. State [ (2010) 14 SCC 129 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 550] and Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab [ (2012) 11 SCC 205 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 438].) 32. In view of the above, the Court finds that it is not possible to accept the submission that in the absence of a report regarding the origin of the blood, the accused cannot be convicted, for it is only because of the lapse of time that the blood could not be classified successfully. Therefore, no advantage can be conferred upon the accused to enable him to claim any benefit, and the report of disintegration of blood, etc. cannot be termed as a missing link, on the basis of which the chain of circumstances may be presumed to be broken. 26. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, in light of the aforesaid principles, in a case resting completely on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be so complete so that they lead to only one conclusion that is the guilt of the accused. 26. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, in light of the aforesaid principles, in a case resting completely on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be so complete so that they lead to only one conclusion that is the guilt of the accused. When the above five circumstances have been proved by the prosecution against the appellant and each of which unerringly points towards the guilt of the appellant, which are taken cumulatively, there is no escape from the conclusion that they are consistent only with one hypothesis i.e. guilt of the appellant and wholly inconsistent with his innocence. 27. Considering the evidence on record, we are fully satisfied and convinced that the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for commission of offence under Section 302 of the IPC. There is absolutely no scope of interference with the impugned judgment. 28. The appeal being bereft of any substance deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.