ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Since common question of fact and law is involved in all these writ petitions, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Jeedhanlal and his wife Kheermati filed two separate applications before the Rent Controller/Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Dabhra for grant of eviction under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 (for short, ‘the Act of 2011’) which was ultimately considered and granted by the said authority on 24-4-2023 and when two appeals being Appeal Nos.31A/2023 & 32A/2023 were preferred by common tenant Vijay Kumar Gupta, the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur, by orders dated 17-7-2023 dismissed both the appeals holding that Rent Controller was appointed by the State Government in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 2011 only by notification dated 6-11-2012, which was notified in the Official Gazette on 14-9-2022, therefore, the date on which these applications were preferred before the Rent Controller on 28-8-2022, the Act of 2011 was not in force and therefore the two appeals preferred before it under Section 13 of the Act of 2011 are not maintainable and accordingly dismissed the appeals and the order passed by the Rent Controller i.e. Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has also been held to be unsustainable and accordingly dismissed both the appeals. Feeling aggrieved against the orders passed by the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, landlords and tenant both have preferred the above stated writ petitions. 3. Ms. Palak Jindal, learned counsel appearing for both the landlords – Jeedhanlal & Kheermati, would submit that the Rent Control Tribunal has committed grave legal error in holding that the Act of 2011 was inapplicable to Nagar Panchayat, Dabhra, as it was made applicable only by notification dated 6-9-2022 published in the Gazette on 14- 9-2022. In fact, by work distribution memo dated 5-5-2022, the Collector, Janjgir-Champa, had already assigned the work of Rent Controller under the Act of 2011 to the Joint Collector and thereafter, notification has been issued on 6-9- 2022 under Section 7(1) of the Act of 2011, which has already been published on 14-9-2022 in the Gazette authorising the Deputy Collector to function as Rent Controller and final order has been passed on 24-4-2023. In that view of the matter, the Rent Control Tribunal is absolutely justified in holding that under Section 9 of the Act of 2011, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to hear and pass orders on their applications. She would further submit that the date on which the order was passed i.e. 24-4-2023, notification dated 14-9-2022 was already published in the Gazette, therefore, the Rent Controller had jurisdiction and as such, the finding recorded by the Rent Control Tribunal deserves to be set aside qua the observation made with regard to competence of the Rent Controller to hear and dispose off their applications under Section 9 of the Act of 2011. 4. Mr. Rishi Sahu, learned counsel appearing for tenant Vijay Kumar Gupta, would submit that the appeals are clearly maintainable in view of the notification dated 14-9-2022 and as such, the orders impugned deserve to be set aside. 5. Mr. Amrito Das, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State, would submit that the applications were considered and granted on 24-4-2023 much after the notification under Section 7(1) of the Act of 2011 was issued and published on 14-9-2022 and as on that date (24-4-2023) on which order was passed, the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to hear and pass orders on the applications of the landlords, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Rent Control Tribunal deserves to be set aside. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 7. By order dated 5-5-2022, the Collector, Janjgir-Champa by its work distribution memo authorised the Joint Collector Ms. Divya Agrawal to exercise the jurisdiction as Rent Controller of Dabhra area under the provisions of the Act of 2011 and thereafter, on 28-8-2022, the subject application for eviction was filed under the provisions of the Act of 2011 and thereafter, notification under Section 7(1) of the Act relating to District Sakti was issued on 6-9-2022, published in the Gazette on 14-9-2022 and thereafter only, on 24-4- 2023, order was passed by the Rent Controller under the provisions of the Act of 2011 directing eviction of the tenant. Feeling aggrieved against the order dated 24-4-2023, the tenant/petitioner in W.P.(C) Nos.3571/2023 & 3611/2023 preferred two appeals under Section 13(1) of the Act of 2011 before the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal which were dismissed by the learned Tribunal relying upon the decision passed by the learned Single Bench in the matter of Prakash Kumar v. Kanahiya Lal Agrawal and others, 2015(3) C.G.L.J. 465, holding that prior to 14-9-2022, the Act of 2011 was not in force in the municipal area of Nagar Panchayat, Dabhra and recorded following finding in paragraph 9 of the order: - 9@ N0x0 HkkM+k fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 2011 fnukWad 06@11@2012 dks jkti= esa izdkf'kr gksus ds lkFk ykxw gks x;k FkkA bl vf/kfu;e ds ykxw gksus ds laca/k esa fof/k dks nks Hkkx esa fd;k x;k gSA izFker% fnukWad 06@11@2012 ls uxj ikfydk ftyk eq[;ky;ksa esa ykxw gks x;k gSA f}rh; Hkkx ds vuqlkj mu {ks=ksa dks ykxw gqvk] ftUgsa le;≤ ij jkti= esa vf/klwpuk }kjk vf/klwfpr fd tk,A ;g er ekuuh; N0x0 mPp U;k;ky;] fcykliqj ¼N0x0½ }kjk izdk'k dqekj fo:) dUgS;k yky o vU; 2015 ¼1½ N0x0 ,y-vkj-MCY;w- 388 esa Hkh izfrikfnr gSA bl vf/kfu;e ds vuqlkj uxj iapk;r MHkjk ftyk&tkatxhj pkaik dks fnukWad 06 flrEcj] 2022 dh vf/klwpuk dzekad&587@1315@2022 ds vuqlkj fnukWad 14@09@2022 dks jkti= esa izdkf'kr dj N0x0 HkkM+k fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 2011 dh/kkjk&7 dh mi/kkjk&1 ds rgr miftyk/kh'k dks HkkM+k fu;a=d ds :i esa fu;qDr fd;k x;k gSA blls Li"V gS fd bl fnukWad ls iwoZ uxj iapk;r MHkjk ftyk&tkatxhj pkaik tgka okn Hkou fLFkr gS mlesa N0x0 HkkM+k fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 2011 dk izko/kku ugha FkkA 8. In principle, the learned Single Judge in Prakash Kumar (supra) held that the Act of 2011 at the first instance was made applicable to such Municipal areas, which are comprising the District Headquarters in the State and later on to such of the other Municipal areas which the State notifies it from time to time in official gazette. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16 & 18 of the decision rendered by this Court in Prakash Kumar (supra) state as under: - “14. On reading the relevant sections of the Act of 2011, it would show that the Act of 2011 received the assent of the President on the 5th October, 2012 and Governor on the 23rd May, 2011, thereby the Act of 2011 came into force on 06.11.2012. On reading the relevant sections of the Act of 2011, it would show that the Act of 2011 received the assent of the President on the 5th October, 2012 and Governor on the 23rd May, 2011, thereby the Act of 2011 came into force on 06.11.2012. But sub-section 2 of Section 1 arrest the uniform applicability in entire State. Reading of Section (1) (2) of the Act of 2011 would reveal that at the first instance the act would be applicable to such Municipal areas, which are comprising the District Head Quarters in the State and latter on to such of the other Municipal areas which the State notifies it from time to time in official gazette. 15. So reading of the application of the Act of 2011 shows that it is in two fold. Firstly to the Municipal District Head Quarter and secondly to the areas, which are notified. Admittedly, Sakti was not a Municipal area comprising District Head Quarters, therefore, necessarily for application of the act, notification is a condition precedent. 16. Section 14 of the Act of 2011 speaks of repeal and savings. The Section starts with the word “On this Act, becoming the law, through notification in the Official Gazette, the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961” shall stand repealed meaning thereby for the purpose of Sakti, unless and until notification is made, the Act of 2011 would not become law for respective area. 18. Taking into such proposition and reading of Section 14 of the Act of 2011 it lays down the application of the Act of 2011 other than the District Head Quarter will depend on the notification, thereafter the old Act of 1961 would be applicable unless and until is repealed by the notification. Therefore, in the line of query, it would be relevant that new act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities. Consequently, it is held that when the civil suit was filed on 06.01.2014 in the instant case, the old Act of 1961 was applicable with full force as new Act of 2011 was not notified for Sakti Municipality.” 9. Now, the question for consideration would be, whether such an interpretation as extended by the learned Single Judge in Prakash Kumar (supra) is in accordance with law? 10. Now, the question for consideration would be, whether such an interpretation as extended by the learned Single Judge in Prakash Kumar (supra) is in accordance with law? 10. In order to resolve the controversy, it would be appropriate to notice Section 1 of the Act of 2011, which states as under: - “1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. (2) It shall extent in first instance to such of the Municipal areas which are comprising the District Headquarters in the State and latter on to such of the other Municipal areas or any areas within the State as the State Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, specify from time to time. (3) It shall come into force from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.” (The Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 received the assent of the President on 5th October, 2012 and the Governor on 23rd May, 2011, published in the Chhattisgarh Rajpatra (Asadharan) on 6th November, 2012.) 11. A focused reading of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act of 2011 would reflect that the legislative mandate of the State Legislature is to make the said law applicable to the State of Chhattisgarh from the date of its publication in the official gazette. The Act of 2011 having become the law applicable in the State of Chhattisgarh, came into force from the date of its publication as an Act in the official gazette i.e. 6-11-2012 and also for the reason that sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act of 2011 will have to be read with Section 14 of the Act of 2011, which provides repeal of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (old law). Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 2011 states as under: - “14. Repeal and Savings.—(1) On this Act, becoming law, through notification in the Official Gazette, the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. XLI of 1961) in its application to the State of Chhattisgarh is hereby repealed.” 12. Section 14(1) of the Act of 2011 clearly mandates that on the Act of 2011, becoming law, through notification in the Official Gazette, in the instant case on 6-11-2012, the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 in its application stands repealed. Section 14(1) of the Act of 2011 clearly mandates that on the Act of 2011, becoming law, through notification in the Official Gazette, in the instant case on 6-11-2012, the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 in its application stands repealed. As such, by virtue of Section 14(1) read with Section 1(3) of the Act of 2011, the erstwhile Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 stood repealed in the entire State of Chhattisgarh with effect from 6-11-2012 i.e. the date of publication of the said Act in the Official Gazette. 13. The term ‘its publication’ as employed in sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act of 2011 cannot be dissected to mean multiple publications, firstly for the Act of 2011 to become the law of the State; and secondly, for the provisions of the Act of 2011 to become applicable to the areas other than municipal areas comprising in the district headquarters. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act of 2011 merely defers to the enforceability of redressal mechanism provided under the Act of 2011 for the areas other than municipal areas {as defined in sub-section (6) of Section 2 – definitions clause} comprising in the district headquarters and the said deferment further is controlled by Section 7(1) of the Act of 2011, which provides for appointment of Rent Controller. Section 7(1) of the Act of 2011 provides as under: - “7. Establishment of Rent Controller.—(1) For every district, the State Government shall appoint one or more officers not below the rank of a Deputy Collector, as Rent Controller with territorial jurisdiction as to be specified by the District Collector.” 14. A glance of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 2011 would show that the State Government shall appoint one or more officers not below the rank of a Deputy Collector, as Rent Controller with territorial jurisdiction as to be specified by the District Collector, for every district. A glance of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 2011 would show that the State Government shall appoint one or more officers not below the rank of a Deputy Collector, as Rent Controller with territorial jurisdiction as to be specified by the District Collector, for every district. Consequently, the State Government has to appoint a Rent Controller for the concerned area to enforce the redressal mechanism provided under the Act of 2011 for the purpose of Section 7 of the Act of 2011 for the areas other than the municipal areas which are comprising the District Headquarters in the State and it has to be by a Notification in the Official Gazette which in this case has been notified on 6-9-2022 and published in the Gazette on 14-9-2022, which states as under: - vkokl ,oa i;kZoj.k foHkkx ea=ky;] egkunh Hkou] uok jk;iqj vVy uxj vVy uxj] fnukad 6 flrEcj 2022 vf/klwpuk Øekad 5871@1315@2022@LFkkiuk@32- & NRrhlx<+ HkkM+k fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 2011 dh/kkjk&1 dh mi/kkjk&2 o 3 ,oa&mi/kkjk&6 esa iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dks iz;ksx esa ykrs gq,] jkT; 'kklu ,rn~}kjk] NRrhlx < + HkkM+k fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 2011 dh/kkjk&7 dh mi/kkjk&1 ds rgr jkT; ds Hkhrj fuEufyf[kr uxj ikfydk ifj"kn ,oa uxj iapk;rksa esa izR;sd ftys ds tks mi ftyk/kh'k ls fuEu Js.kh dk u gks] HkkM+k fu;a=.k ds :i esa fu;qDr djrk gS rFkk mldk dk;Z{ks= dysDVj }kjk fofufn`"V fd;k tk;s %& Ø- ftyk dk uke uxj ikfydk ifj"kn ,oa uxj iapk;r dk uke ¼1½ ¼2½ ¼3½ 1 ls 19 xxx Xxx 20 Tkaktxhj uxj ikfydk ifj"kn] Tkaktxhj&uSyk] pkaik] 'kfDr] vdyrjkA uxj iapk;r] u;kckjk}kj] cykSnk] [kjkSn] f'kojhukjk;.k] vaMekj] tStSiqj] MHkjk] panziqj] lkjkxkao] uokx<+] jkgkSnA 21 ls 27 Xxx Xxx 15. Thus, it is evidently clear that the notification referred under sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act of 2011 is distinct and has a different purpose/object sought to be achieved. The said notification referred to under Section 1(2) is to enforce the redressal mechanism provided under the Act of 2011, by establishing the office of the Rent Controller to exercise power and jurisdiction under the Act of 2011 for the areas other than municipal areas comprising in district headquarters. The said notification shall always follow the notification under Section 1(3). The said notification referred to under Section 1(2) is to enforce the redressal mechanism provided under the Act of 2011, by establishing the office of the Rent Controller to exercise power and jurisdiction under the Act of 2011 for the areas other than municipal areas comprising in district headquarters. The said notification shall always follow the notification under Section 1(3). The notification under Section 1(3) has led to repeal of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act of 1961’) in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act of 2011. As such, the notification under Section 1(2) read with Section 7(1) of the Act of 2011 is enabling in nature and ceases the deferment intended to under Section 1(2). The express repeal of the Act of 1961 by Section 14(1) of the Act of 2011 with effect from 6-11-2012 would mean that the Act of 1961 has come to an end as if the Act of 1961 had never existed for all practical purposes as the object of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statute book except for certain purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 16. Effect of repeal was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore and others, (1975) 3 SCC 512 and it has been held that “repeal” connotes abrogation or obliteration of one statute by another, from the statute book as completely “as if it had never been passed”; when an Act is repealed, “it must be considered (except as to transactions past and closed) as if it had never existed”. It was pertinently observed by their Lordships as under: - “15. The general rule of construction is that the repeal of a repealing Act does not revive anything repealed thereby. But the operation of this rule is not absolute. It is subject to the appearance of a "different intention" in the repealing statute. Again such intention may be explicit or implicit. The questions, therefore, that arise for determination are : Whether in relation to cigarettes, the 1941 Act was repealed by the 1954 Act and the latter by the 1958 Act? Whether the 1954 Act and 1958 Act were repealing enactments? Again such intention may be explicit or implicit. The questions, therefore, that arise for determination are : Whether in relation to cigarettes, the 1941 Act was repealed by the 1954 Act and the latter by the 1958 Act? Whether the 1954 Act and 1958 Act were repealing enactments? Whether there is anything in the 1954 Act and the 1958 Act indicating a revival of the 1941 Act in relation to cigarettes? 16. It is now well settled that "repeal" connotes abrogation or obliteration of one statute by another, from the statute book as completely "as if it had never been passed"; when an Act is repealed, "it must be considered (except as to transactions past and closed) as if it had never existed". (Per Tindal, C.J. in Kay v. Goodwin, (1830) 6 Bing 576, 582 and Lord Tenterdon in Surtees v. Ellison, (1829) 9 B & C 750, 752 cited with approval in State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co, (1964) 4 SCR 561: AIR 1964 SC 1284 ). 17. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but one of substance, depending upon the intention of the Legislature. If the intention, indicated expressly or by necessary implication in the subsequent statute was to abrogate or wipe off the former enactment, wholly or in part, then it would be a case of total or pro tanto repeal. If the intention was merely to modify the former enactment by engrafting an exception or granting an exemption, or by superadding conditions, or by restricting, intercepting or suspending its operation, such modification would not amount to a repeal – (see Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. pp. 349, 353, 373, 374 and 375; Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. pp. 164, 390 based on Mount v. Taylor, (1868) LR 3 CP 654; Sutherland's Statutory Construction 3rd Edn. Vol. I, paragraphs 2014 and 2022, pp. 468 and 490). Broadly speaking, the principal object of a repealing and amending Act is to 'excise dead matter, prune off superfluities and reject clearly inconsistent enactments’ – see Mohinder Singh v. Mst. Harbhajan Kaur, 1955 Cr LJ 990 : AIR 1955 Punj 141 : ILR (1955) Punj 625. 17. Vol. I, paragraphs 2014 and 2022, pp. 468 and 490). Broadly speaking, the principal object of a repealing and amending Act is to 'excise dead matter, prune off superfluities and reject clearly inconsistent enactments’ – see Mohinder Singh v. Mst. Harbhajan Kaur, 1955 Cr LJ 990 : AIR 1955 Punj 141 : ILR (1955) Punj 625. 17. In the matter of G. Ekambarappa and others v. Excess Profits Tax Officer, Bellary, AIR 1967 SC 1541 , it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that repeal of an Act means revocation or abrogation of the Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies even in the case of partial repeal or repeal of part of Act. 18. The reasoning and finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in Prakash Kumar (supra) if accepted will lead to serious anomaly in the State, if two sets of rent control law is made operational in the State for different areas, which is not the object of sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act of 2011, as the object was only to defer the redressal mechanism provided for under the Act of 2011 for the areas other than municipal areas comprising in district headquarters till the Rent Controller is appointed under subsection (1) of Section 7 of the Act of 2011. Even otherwise, once the Act has come into force by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 1 read with Section 3 of the Chhattisgarh General Clauses Act, 1957, sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act of 2011 cannot make the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 operational. The aforesaid reasoning also ignores the effect of express repeal by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 2011, as the effect of repeal would be as if the Act of 1961 has never existed for all practical purposes and as the object of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statute book except for certain purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Therefore, we are unable to subscribe the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Prakash Kumar (supra). 19. Therefore, we are unable to subscribe the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Prakash Kumar (supra). 19. However, the matter can be approached from another angle as it is well settled law that conferment of jurisdiction at the time of disposal of a proceeding with the authority validate the proceeding/judgment even though the jurisdiction was lacking initially when the proceeding continued without objection and demur. In the matter of Sudhir G. Angur and others v. M. Sanjeev and others, (2006) 1 SCC 141 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that if a court has jurisdiction to try the suit, when it comes on for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted and observed as under: - “11. In our view, Mr G.L. Sanghi is also right in submitting that it is the law on the date of trial of the suit which is to be applied. In support of this submission, Mr Sanghi relied upon the judgment in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal Ishar Dass, AIR 1952 Bom 365 wherein it has been held that no party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a particular forum. It has been held that it is well settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the legislature expressly states to the contrary. It has been held that the procedural laws in force must be applied at the date when the suit or proceeding comes on for trial or disposal. It has been held that a court is bound to take notice of the change in the law and is bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came up for hearing. It has been held that if a court has jurisdiction to try the suit, when it comes on for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted. We are in complete agreement with these observations. As stated above, the Mysore Act now stands repealed. It could not be denied that now the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit.” 20. We are in complete agreement with these observations. As stated above, the Mysore Act now stands repealed. It could not be denied that now the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit.” 20. The principle of law laid down in Sudhir G. Angur (supra) was followed subsequently in the matter of Jindal Vijaya nagar Steel (JSW Steel Ltd.) v. Jindal Pra x air Oxygen Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 521 and observed as under: - “65. We considered the above argument of Mr Nariman. Our answer to the above argument is as under: Though the Bombay High Court has in the impugned order dated 2-3-2006 observed that no part of the cause of action has arisen at Mumbai, it is submitted that the cause of action against the respondents has in fact arisen within the ordinary original jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court for the following reasons: It may be noted that the following sub-paragraphs below have been noted by the Bombay High Court in impugned order dated 2- 3-2006: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (h) The appellant had in fact shifted its registered office to Mumbai during the pendency of Section 9 petition in the Bombay High Court as it was more convenient to operate its registered office from Mumbai. It is submitted that where a court has jurisdiction to try the suit when it comes up for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date of institution as held in Sudhir G. Angur v. M. Sanjeev (SCC para 11). xxx xxx xxx” 21. It is submitted that where a court has jurisdiction to try the suit when it comes up for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date of institution as held in Sudhir G. Angur v. M. Sanjeev (SCC para 11). xxx xxx xxx” 21. In view of the above-stated analysis, we are of the considered opinion that once the Act of 2011 has already come into force with effect from the date of its publication in the official gazette i.e. 6-11-2012 by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 1 read with Section 14(1) of the Act of 2011, consequently, the subsequent notification in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 1 read with Section 7(1) of the Act of 2011 would only enforce the redressal mechanism provided in the Act of 2011 for disposal of the case in accordance with Section 9 and other provisions of the Act of 2011 on establishment of Rent Controller as it would authorise the Rent Controller to exercise the power and jurisdiction vested in him under Section 9 and other provisions of the Act of 2011 and in no case it amounts to deferment of the operation of the Act of 2011 for all practical purposes, as it had already come into force with effect from 6-11-2012 and the Act of 1961 had already been expressly repealed by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 2011 as held hereinabove. Accordingly, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Prakash Kumar (supra) cannot be held to be laying down good/correct law in this regard and it is held so accordingly. 22. Resultantly, it is held that in the instant case, the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue) was conferred with the authority of the Rent Controller under the Act of 2011 before passing of the final order by him, on 14-9-2022 and proceedings were conducted by him with the participation and consent of both the parties without any demur and protest and no objection was raised by the landlords and the tenant in that regard. The orders were passed by the Rent Controller on 24-4-2023. The orders were passed by the Rent Controller on 24-4-2023. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sudhir G. Angur (supra) and Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (supra), which were within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, the orders impugned passed by the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur are liable to be set aside and are hereby set aside. Both the appeals being Appeal Nos.31A/2023 & 32A/2023 are restored to the file of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur for hearing disposal in accordance with law. However, it is made clear that this Court has not made any observation qua the merits of the orders passed by the Rent Controller and observation and finding has only been reached as to whether the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to hear and decide the matters in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2011. However, by way of abundant precaution, it is made clear that this Court has not considered the effect of Section 14(2) of the Act of 2011 in this petition, as it has not arisen directly for our consideration and it will be considered in appropriate proceeding at appropriate stage. 23. The writ petitions stand allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No order to cost(s). 24. While parting with record, we appreciate the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Amrito Das, learned Additional Advocate General, who has not only submitted the written note, but also argued on the issue involved herein on short notice.