ORDER : 1. Instant writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to “the plaintiff”) assailing the order dated 16.08.2022 passed by the District Judge, District Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 31/2018, returning the plaint filed for passing off the Trade Mark action on the ground of having no territorial jurisdiction. 2. Heard learned counsel for both parties, perused the impugned order as well as plaint and other material placed before this Court. 3. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff has filed the present suit under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 on the ground of passing off action, which falls within Section 134 (1) (c) of the Trade Marks Act 1999 (hereinafter referred to “the Act of 1999”). The plaintiff has pleaded that since 10.04.2008, the plaintiff using Trade Mark “Lal Qila” for the business of Paint Brush etc. Undisputedly, the plaintiff has no registration of Trade Mark “Lal Qila.” In Para No. 21 of the plaint, the plaintiff has pleaded in respect of accrual of cause of action for passing off action in the following manner: ^^;g fd oknh dks Áfroknh ds mDr d`R; dh lwpuk ,oa tkudkjh fnukad 13-07-2015 dks ÁkIr gqbZ fd Áfroknh }kjk oknh ds VªsMekdZ dh udy dj ^^yky fdyk** ds uke ls jax isUV djus dh czq'k t;iqj egkuxj ds nqdkunkjksa ds ek/;e ls cspuk ÁkjEHk fd;k gS rFkk Áfroknh }kjk bu NksVs&NksVs nqdkunkjksa dks fcy@bUoksbZl vkfn tkjh ugha dh tkrh gS] blfy, bu nqdkunkjksa }kjk Hkh Áfroknh ds eky dk dksbZ fcy@bUoksbZl tkjh ugha fd;k tkrk gS] Áfroknh ds }kjk t;iqj egkuxj esa eky cspus ds dkj.k mDr okn dks ÁLrqr djus dk okn dkj.k mRiUu gqvk gS] tks vHkh rd yxkrkj cnLrwj fujUrj tkjh gSA** 4. In support of aforesaid averments, no other particulars have been placed on record. 5. Respondent-defendant (hereinafter referred to “the defendant”), after service of notice, filed an application under Order 7 Rule 10 and 11 CPC read with Section 20 CPC and disputed the aforesaid pleadings and raised an objection that no jurisdiction has accrued in the Jaipur District and therefore, the plaintiff’s suit is not liable to be entertained in view of Section 20 CPC. For ready reference relevant portion of the application filed by the defendant is as under: ^^¼v½ ;g fd oknh }kjk vius okni= dh en la[;k 21 esa okn dkj.k ds lEcU/k esa ;g o.kZu fd;k gS fd ^^oknh dks Áfroknh ds mDr d`R; dh lwpuk ,oa tkudkjh fnukad 13-07-2015 dks ÁkIr gqbZ fd Áfroknh }kjk oknh ds VªsMekdZ dh udy dj ^^yky fdyk** ds uke ls jax jksxu djus dh czq'k t;iqj egkuxj ds nqdkunkjksa ds ek/;e ls cspuk ÁkjEHk fd;k gS rFkk Áfroknh }kjk bu NksVs&NksVs nqdkunkjksa dks fcy@bUoksbZl vkfn tkjh ugha dh tkrh gS] blfy, bu nqdkunkjksa }kjk Hkh Áfroknh ds eky dk dksbZ fcy@bUoksbZl tkjh ugha fd;k tkrk gS] Áfroknh ds }kjk t;iqj egkuxj esa eky cspus ds dkj.k mDr okn dks ÁLrqr djus dk okn dkj.k mRiUu gqvk gS] tks vHkh rd yxkrkj cnLrwj fujUrj tkjh gSA** ijUrq oknh }kjk ,slk dksbZ rF; mDr okni= esa of.kZr ugha fd;k gS fd ftlls ;g lkfcr gksrk gks fd Áfroknh t;iqj egkuxj dk fuoklh gks ;k vius ykHk gsrq dksbZ eky t;iqj egkuxj esa foØ; dj jgk gks vkSj uk gh fdlh ,slh nqdku] ÝsUokbZlh ;k ,tsUV dks i{kdkj cuk;k x;k gS ftlls ;g lkfcr gksrk gks fd Áfroknh }kjk t;iqj egkuxj esa O;kikfjd ykHk gsrq O;kikj fd;k jgk gSA bl Ádkj oknh dk okn /kkjk 20 ds vkKkid Áko/kkuksa ds foijhr gksus ds dkj.k [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA** 6. The trial court, vide impugned order dated 16.08.2022, adverting to provisions of Section 134 (1) (c) of the Act of 1999 and Section 20 CPC as also placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Sanjay Dalia and Another, (2015) 10 SCC 161 , has recorded a fact finding that merely on the basis of averments of plaint as made in Para No. 21, it may not be held that any cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff in Jaipur. The plaintiff has neither made the specific and clear averments nor has supported his averments by any documents. The plaintiff has neither made the specific and clear averments nor has supported his averments by any documents. For ready reference, the relevant portion of findings of the trial court as recorded in the impugned order dated 16.08.2022 are being extracted hereunder: ^^oknh dh vksj ls ;g Hkh dFku fd;k gS fd ykŒ t;kfroknh }kjk oknh ds VªsMekdZ ¼yky fdyk½ ds feyrs tqyrs uke ¼ykyfdyk½ ls isUV czq'k bR;kfn cukdj t;iqj esa foØ; djus dk dk;Z fd;k jgk gSA ysfdu mDr foØ; dk dk;Z fjVsy] NksVs eksVs nqdkunkjksa }kjk fd;k tkrk gS] ftldk dksbZ fcy@bUoksbZl t;iqj fLFkr nqdkunkjksa }kjk tkjh ugha fd;k tkrk gS] ftlds vHkko esa nLrkost ÁLrqr djuk laHko ugha jgk gSA vr% okndkj.k t;iqj esa mRiUu gqvk gSA ysfdu ek= bu dFkuksa ls gh ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk gS fd Áfroknh oknh ds Ák;j ;wtj VªsMekdZ ¼yky fdyk½ ds le:i vius ÁksMDV dk uke ¼ykyfdyk½ j[kdj t;iqj esa mDr uke ls foØ; dj jgk gksA tgka ij bl Ádkj dksbZ nLrkost okni= esa is'k ugha fd;k x;k gS] ogka ij t;iqj esa okndkj.k mRiUu gqvk ugha ekuk tk ldrk gS vkSj tgka ,slh fLFkfr gksrh gS] ogka ij mDr Áko/kku /kkjk 134 ¼1½¼lh½ VªsMekdZ vf/kfu;e] 1999 rFkk /kkjk 20 lhŒihŒlhŒ dks lkFk&lkFk iढ+us ij ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd oknh dks okn ÁLrqr djus dk dsoy mlh txg ij vf/kdkj ÁkIr gS] tgka ij Áfroknh fuokl djrk gS vFkok viuk O;olk; dj jgk gSA ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; ds }kjk mDr U;kf;d }"Vkrksa esa Áfrikfnr fl}karksa esa Hkh /kkjk 134 ¼1½¼lh½ ds laca/k esa ikflax vkWQ ds ekeys esa lquok;h dk vf/kdkj /kkjk 20 lhŒihŒlhŒ ls 'kkflr gksus ds ckjs esa ekxZn'kZu fn;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa esjs fouez erkuqlkj bl U;k;ky; dks bl Ádj.k dh lquok;h dk {ks=kf/kdkj ÁkIr ugha gksus ls ;g Ádj.k l{ke U;k;ky; esa is'k djus gsrq oknh dks ykSVk;s tkus dk vkns'k fn;k tkrk gSA ;g i=koyh bl U;k;ky; ls QSlyk'kqekj gksA** 7. Leaned counsel for petitioner, in his vehement argument, has made a persuasive attempt and canvased before this Court that pleadings stated in Para 21 of the plaint are sufficient at this stage to interfere that a cause of action has arisen to the plaintiff to institute the suit for passing off under Section 134 (1) (c) of the Act of 1999 against the defendant. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Delhi High Court delivered in case of RSPL Ltd. vs. Mukesh Sharma and Another, 2016 (68) PTC 178 [Del]. 8. Heard. Considered. 9. From perusal of pleadings stated in Para 21 of the plaint, this Court finds that there is only bald statements that the defendant has started to sell goods in the name of “Lal Qila” through shopkeepers in Jaipur Metropolitan. No particulars in respect of details of shopkeepers or other dates etc. have been made. It is not in dispute that except making such averments in Para 21, no other better particulars nor any documents nor substantive material either before the trial court or before this Court have been placed on record. It is not in dispute that the firm of defendant situated in Kayasthan (Kayasthan) Street, Sherkot, District Bijnor (U.P.) and there is no Office of defendant firm at Jaipur nor it is the case of plaintiff. Therefore, the question arose before this Court whether averments made by the plaintiff in Para 21 may be treated as material facts to draw the accrual of the cause of action in respect of passing off the Trade Mark of “Lal Qila” within jurisdiction of Jaipur Metropolitan? The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Harkirat Singh vs. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511 has made a distinction between “Material facts” and “particulars.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that what particulars could be recorded to be “Material facts” would depend upon facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. Relevant portions of the judgment are being extracted hereunder: “The expression ‘material facts’ has neither been defined in the Act nor in the Code. According to the dictionary meaning ‘material’ means fundamental, vital, basic, cardinal, central, crucial, decisive, essential, pivotal, indispensable, elementary or primary. [Burton’s Legal Thesaurus, (3rd Edn.) p.349]. The phrase ‘material facts’, therefore, may be said to be those facts upon which a party relies for its claim or defence. In other words, ‘material facts’ are facts upon which the plaintiff’s cause of action or the defendant’s defence depends. What particulars could be said to be ‘material facts’ would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. In other words, ‘material facts’ are facts upon which the plaintiff’s cause of action or the defendant’s defence depends. What particulars could be said to be ‘material facts’ would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to establish the existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts and must be stated in the pleading by the party. A distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘particulars’ however, must not be overlooked. ‘Material facts’ are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence. ‘Particulars’ on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. ‘Particulars’ thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise. All ‘material facts’ must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial.” 10. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court has been relied upon by the High Court of Delhi in case of RSPL Ltd. (supra), where upon the counsel for petitioner has placed reliance. 11. This Court having enlightened by aforesaid judgments and after adverting to pleadings averred by the plaintiff in Para 21 is of opinion that such pleadings are not sufficient and cannot be treated as “Material facts” to draw an inference at this stage that a cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff for instituting the suit for passing off action against the defendant within the territory of Jaipur. This Court does not mean that pleadings are required to be proved by way of evidence at this stage but pleadings should be pleaded in such a manner with material facts, so that prima facie a case is made out to give rise to a cause of action. Pleadings pleaded in Para 21 of the plaint cannot be treated as “Material facts.” No details of shopkeepers or no dates etc. have been narrated. The bald statement in vague and casual manner, may not be held sufficient; more particularly, for filing a suit for passing off the Trade Mark, to institute a civil suit where no cause of action has accrued. In absence of material facts, obviously the evidence on non-pleaded facts is not permissible as the fundamental principle is that the evidence is required to be adduced to the pleaded facts. Therefore, the arguments that the cause of action would be proved after adducing evidence is not tenable, since the material facts to give rise a cause of action within territory of Jaipur Metropolitan are absent. 12. For discussions and reasons made hereinabove, this Court does not find that the trial court has committed any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order and therefore, the same does not call for any interference and as such the writ petition is devoid of merits. 13. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. 14. Stay application and any other pending application, if any, stand disposed of.