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2023 DIGILAW 471 (HP)

Vishal Gandhi v. Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals

2023-11-22

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2023
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the order passed by learned JMFC, Nahan in Case No. 33 of 2020 titled M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals versus M/s Dharam Healthcare. The complainant filed a complaint before the learned JMFC asserting that the complainant is a proprietorship firm dealing in the manufacturing of drugs under the name and style of M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals Private Limited at Kala Amb, District Sirmaur. The accused used to purchase the drugs from the complainant. The accused issued three cheques drawn on State Bank of India in favour of the complainant. The accused no. 2 had issued the cheques being the Director of the Company with the assurance that the cheques would be encashed on presentation. The accused no.1 is also a Director of the Company and is In-charge of and is responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. The complainant presented the cheques but the cheques were returned with the remarks ‘Funds Insufficient’. The complainant requested the accused to make the payment but no payment was made; hence, the complainant served three legal notices on 30.11.2019, upon all the accused but no reply was sent. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court to take action as per the law. 2. The Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to proceed against the accused and ordered the issuance of the summons on 14.01.2020. 3. Being aggrieved from the order passed by learned JMFC, Nahan, the present petition has been filed. It has been asserted that the order is based upon surmises and conjectures. The learned JMFC, Nahan had not applied its mind. The complaint on behalf of the company can be filed by the Managing Director/Director of the Company, whereas, the authorization is in the name of Sheetal Sharma. The authorisation does not show him to be the Director of the Company. The complainant claims to be a proprietorship concern and cannot have any Director. Three separate notices were sent and a joint complaint was filed, which is not permissible. The cheques do not bear the signatures of the petitioner and the learned Trial Court erred in summoning him. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by learned JMFC, Nahan, be set aside. 4. Three separate notices were sent and a joint complaint was filed, which is not permissible. The cheques do not bear the signatures of the petitioner and the learned Trial Court erred in summoning him. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by learned JMFC, Nahan, be set aside. 4. I have heard Mr Dinesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, Ms Shalini Thakur, learned counsel for respondent no.1/complainant and Ms Shashi Kiran, learned counsel for respondent no.2/original accused. 5. Mr Dinesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the complainant has described itself to be a proprietorship concern and also stated that Sheetal Sharma is one of the Directors, who was authorized by the complainant to file the complaint. This is not permissible because the Director can be of a Company and not of a proprietorship concern. Three cheques were dishonoured and three separate notices were issued. A single complaint was filed, which is not permissible. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed. 6. Ms Shalini Thakur, learned counsel for respondent no.1/complainant submitted that it was wrongly mentioned in the complaint that the complainant is proprietorship concerned. It is apparent from the name of the complainant that it is a private limited company. It had authorized Sheetal Sharma to file the present complaint. The consolidated complaint can be filed in respect of three cheques, therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Ms Shashi Kiran, learned counsel for respondent no. 2/accused supported the submission of Mr Dinesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused. 8. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was observed at page 716:- 17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the chargesheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. *** 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 10. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- 26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- 26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” emphasis supplied) 11. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial based on evidence led before the Court. It was observed: 10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going into detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”. 11. One other reason pointed out by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried. 12. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried. 12. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 13. It was submitted that three cheques were dishonoured and three notices were issued and it is not permissible to file a single complaint. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by Allahabad High Court in Gulshan Seth versus Additional Chief Magistrate and another, (2019) 4 CIVIL COURT CASES 508 = (2019) 4 CriCC 151 , that a joint trial for the dishonour of four cheques is permissible in view of Section 219 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “11. Apparently, the said provision makes it permissible for an accused to be tried at one trial when he is charged with more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months, whether in relation to the same person or not, but the number of such offences is not to exceed three. In case, therefore, dishonour of each cheque is regarded as a separate offence, the offence relating to dishonour of three out of the four cheques under Section 138 of the Act can surely be charged and tried at the same trial. The said question almost on identical facts arose before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s Kumar Rubber Industries, Kapurthala vs. Sohan Lal, (2002) 2 RCR(Criminal) 111, wherein paragraphs no. 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the report, it has been held thus: "21. The learned counsel for the petitioners next contends that the complaint covers four cheques, whereas Section 2019 of the Criminal Procedure Code bars clubbing in a single complaint more than three offences committed within a period of 12 months and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be quashed. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioners next contends that the complaint covers four cheques, whereas Section 2019 of the Criminal Procedure Code bars clubbing in a single complaint more than three offences committed within a period of 12 months and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be quashed. 22. Of course, the 1st respondent/complainant has clubbed four cheques in the complaint, but the learned counsel for the 1st respondent contends that the complaint cannot be quashed on this ground. 23. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent relied upon a decision of this Court in Anita vs. Anil K. Mehra, (1996) 1 RCR(Criminal) 257, where it was held as follows:- "Some help can be taken in this regard from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Kandimala Subbaiah and another, (1961) AIR SC 1241. The facts were different but it was observed that where alleged offences had been committed in the course of the same transaction, the abovesaid limitation will not apply. A similar argument (had taken) advanced before the Delhi High Court in the case of Stallion Shox Pvt. Ltd. Co. and others vs. Auto Tensions (P) Ltd, (1994) 1 RCR(Criminal) 3. Therein too it was argued that separate complaint should have been filed with respect to each cheque that was dis-honoured. The learned Single Judge of that Court negatived the plea by holding that no prejudice to caused to the petitioner by filing of one complaint. However, the accused were permitted to raise these points before the trial court. In fact for purposes of the present order, one is constrained to observe that as per the allegations, a specific amount was due. Certain post- dated cheques were issued. They were numbering 9/10 (already mentioned above in individual complaints). It was, therefore, one transaction and to state that there has to be a separate complaint with respect to each cheque that was dis-honoured, will not be correct. Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, will not be barred in the peculiar facts of the case. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in repelling the said arguments." 24. Therefore, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent contends that all these cheques from part of the same transaction, and that being so, a single complaint clubbing all these cheques is maintainable. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in repelling the said arguments." 24. Therefore, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent contends that all these cheques from part of the same transaction, and that being so, a single complaint clubbing all these cheques is maintainable. I agree with the learned counsel for the 1st respondent in this respect. In the present case on hand also, even according to the petitioners, the accounts of the partnership were settled, the retirement deed (Annexure R-4) was executed on 07.06.1996 and post-dated cheques were issued to the 1st respondent who was retiring from the partnership. Therefore all these form part of the same transaction a single complaint clubbing all the four cheques is, therefore, maintainable. So, the complaint cannot be quashed on the grounds urged by the petitioners. 25. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent further contends that even otherwise the complainant can choose before the trial Court the three cheques with reference to which he wants to restrict the prosecution. In this connection, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent refers to the decisions of the Madras High Court in Printo Stick v. H.C. Oswal, (1996) ISJ(Banking) 618 and S. Kiran v. L.C. Corporation, (1994) 2 CivCC 425 , which certainly support the contention of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, that the complainant can choose before the trial Court on which of these cheques he would maintain the prosecution, and that the complaint cannot be quashed on this ground." 12. In the present case, if the four cheques are finally held to be part of the same transaction, though apparently, they are, as these have been issued in the liquidation of the same debt of Rs.2,00,000/-, can well entail all the offences being charged and tried together by virtue of Section 220 Cr.P.C. The same would not vitiate proceedings as held in M/s Kumar Rubber Industries, Kapurthala (supra). In the event, it is held by the trial Court that these are not part of the same transaction, it would be open to the complainant to choose which of these three cheques, she would maintain the prosecution upon. In the event, it is held by the trial Court that these are not part of the same transaction, it would be open to the complainant to choose which of these three cheques, she would maintain the prosecution upon. This was precisely the situation in M/s Kumar Rubber Industries, Kapurthala (supra) and it was held there that the complaint is not liable to be quashed on this ground, subject of course to the complainant's right to choose, which of the three cheques she wants to pursue the prosecution about, in case it is held that it did not form part of the same transaction, within the meaning of Section 220 Cr.P.C. The view that a single complaint relating to more than one cheque is maintainable also finds support from a decision of the Karnataka High Court in Tiruchandoor Muruhan Spinning Mills (P) Ltd and others vs. Madanlal Ramkumar Cotton and General Merchants, (2000) ILR(Kar) 5000, where in paragraph no. 7 of the report, it has been held: "7. In so far as the important question raised for consideration in this petition that the provisions of Section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code are attracted to the facts of the case is concerned, it is contended that the cause of action for the complainant arose only after service of notice to the accused. It is pointed out that the complainant has issued a single notice calling upon the accused by way of demand to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of service of notice and the accused failed to pay the cheque amount within the time stipulated under Section 138(b) of the Act and, therefore, the complainant filed a complaint within one month from the date of service of notice which is well within time. There is no bar for lodging a complaint for initiation of action under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In fact, it is not to his disadvantage but it is an advantage that a single complaint is lodged against the accused by the complainant. There is no bar for lodging a complaint for initiation of action under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In fact, it is not to his disadvantage but it is an advantage that a single complaint is lodged against the accused by the complainant. The cause of action giving rise to a complaint is upon the service of the notice contemplated under Section 138 (b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act and not upon the dishonour of the cheque and, therefore, the contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent that the provisions of Section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code are not applicable to the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be accepted." 14. A similar view was taken in Muzahir Hussain versus State of U.P. and another, 2009 STPL 1007, wherein it was observed: “21. The sixth plea taken by the learned counsel for the accused is that the joint complaint, in respect of the dishonour of two cheques, was not maintainable. There is no force in this plea also. It is to be seen that under Section 219 Cr. P. C. If the offences are of the same kind and punishable with the same punishment under the same section, the Court can try three offences of the same kind committed within a year together. In the present case, both the cheques were issued with a gap of two months only and they were dishonoured also in the same year. Hence, there is no legal bar to the joint trial of the case in respect of both these dishonoured cheques by means of a single complaint. The objection of the accused in this regard also is not maintainable.” 15. Therefore, there is no impediment in holding a joint trial in the present case. 16. It was submitted that the complaint is defective as Sheetal Sharma was not properly authorized. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s MMTC Limited versus M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., 2001 STPL 14773 SC, that the complaint cannot be quashed simply because the authorization was not proper. It was observed: “11. 16. It was submitted that the complaint is defective as Sheetal Sharma was not properly authorized. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s MMTC Limited versus M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., 2001 STPL 14773 SC, that the complaint cannot be quashed simply because the authorization was not proper. It was observed: “11. This Court has, as far back as, in the case of Vishwa Mitter v. O.P. Poddar, 1984(1) RCR (Crl.) 196: 1983(4) SCC 701 , held that it is clear that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance. It has been held that no court can decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint. It has been held that if any special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, then the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. In the present case, the only eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142 is that the complaint must be by the payee or the holder in due course. This criterion is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the appellant company. 12. In the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, 1998(1) RCR (Crl.) 309: 1998(1) SCC 687 , it has been held by this Court that the complainant has to be a corporeal person who is capable of making a physical appearance in the Court. It has been held that if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court. It is held that the court looks upon the natural person to be the complainant for all practical purposes. It is held that when the complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as a de facto complainant to represent the former in court proceedings. It is held that the court looks upon the natural person to be the complainant for all practical purposes. It is held that when the complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as a de facto complainant to represent the former in court proceedings. It has further been held that no Magistrate shall insist that the particular person, whose statement was taken on oath at the first instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. It has been that there may be occasions when different persons can represent the company. It has been held that it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the court to send any other person to represent the company in court. Thus, even presuming, that initially there was no authority, still, the Company can, at any stage, rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage, the Company can send a person who is competent to represent the company. The complaints could thus not have been quashed on this ground.” 17. It was also submitted that the cheques do not bear the signatures of the petitioner; however, it is a matter to be seen after the trial and cannot be adjudicated at this stage. 18. Thus, the present petition does not satisfy the requirement of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same cannot be allowed. Final Order: 19. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. The parties through their respective counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 13.12.2023.