JUDGMENT Harpreet Kaur Jeewan, J. - The present criminal appeal has been filed by the prosecutrix under Section 372 Cr.P.C. against the judgement dated 19.11.2018 passed by Special Court, SAS Nagar, Mohali, vide which respondent No.1-accused Sajid was acquitted of the charge framed under Section 376(2) and 506 of IPC. 2.1 As per prosecution story, the appellant (prosecutrix) used to reside in a rented accommodation in village Sohana, District SAS Nagar, whereas respondent No.1 also used to reside in the same building on rent. Respondent No.1, who is brother-in-law (Devar) of the elder sister of the prosecutrix used to proclaim to the prosecutrix that he intends to perform marriage with her. Respondent No.1 also used to express that he loves the prosecutrix and had been promising to provide a good living to her. The prosecutrix came under his influence and on the promise of marriage respondent No.1 developed physical relationship with her. Respondent No.1 used to proclaim that the prosecutrix belongs to him and marriage can be performed at any time. However, later on respondent No.1 refused to perform marriage with the prosecutrix and for the last 4-6 months respondent No.1 had visited the house of the prosecutrix many times and committed rape with her against her consent and has also extended threats to the prosecutrix that in case he discloses about the same to anyone, consequences would be very bad. The prosecutrix informed about the occurrence to her father and criminal proceedings were initiated against respondent No.1 by way of registration of an FIR. The statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded, her medical examination was conducted and on completion of the investigation, challan was presented against the respondent No.1 under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 of IPC. 2.2 After compliance of the provisions of Section 207 Cr.P.C. regarding supply of the documents to the accused, charge was framed and respondent No.1-accused pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against him. 2.3 Prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused. Prosecutrix appeared as PW-1, her father Sh.Shakeel Ahmed appeared as PW-2. Sunita-PW-5, Head Mistress Primary School Zulafkarpur Garhi, District Bijnor, U.P. got the admission record of the school and proved the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 26.04.1993. PW-4 Nirmal Khan deposed that accused was residing in his house as a tenant along with his brother and brother's wife. Prosecutrix appeared as PW-1, her father Sh.Shakeel Ahmed appeared as PW-2. Sunita-PW-5, Head Mistress Primary School Zulafkarpur Garhi, District Bijnor, U.P. got the admission record of the school and proved the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 26.04.1993. PW-4 Nirmal Khan deposed that accused was residing in his house as a tenant along with his brother and brother's wife. He also deposed that prosecutrix, who is sister-in-law of the brother of the accused, also used to reside with them. He also deposed that after some time brother of the accused along with his wife and prosecutrix started living in a separate rented room. PW-3 LC Roop Kaur, tendered into evidence her affidavit and deposed having facilitated conducting the medical examination of the prosecutrix. PW-6 ASI Harpreet Singh, who is the Investigating Officer, proved all the documents prepared in the investigation. PW-7 Doctor Vineet Nagpal, deposed about conducting medical examination of the prosecutrix and also deposed that as per the report of the chemical examiner Ex.PW-7/D spermatozoa were detected in the contents of the vaginal swabs and he gave an opinion that the possibility of sexual intercourse cannot be ruled out. PW-8 HC Raj Kumar, tendered into evidence his affidavit PW- 8/A which is in the nature of formal evidence. 2.4 Respondent No.1-accused, denied the allegations in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and took a plea that he is innocent. He has admitted the relationship of the prosecutrix with him as being real sister of his sister-in-law (bhabi). He also stated that his brother along with his family as well as the complainant were residing in a rented accommodation from February, 2015 to September, 2015. During that period, the prosecutrix developed love relationship with him and they wanted to get married to each other but later on the prosecutrix became reluctant to marry him and started demanding money from him. Then in September, 2016, he could not pay any money and therefore, she lodged the present complaint against him which is totally false, he further stated that he had come to know that prosecutrix is having a physical relationship with another person as well but his whereabouts were not known to him. Earlier on 07.11.2016, he as well as the prosecutrix had arrived at a compromise that they will get married to each other but again later on the prosecutrix refused to marry him. Earlier on 07.11.2016, he as well as the prosecutrix had arrived at a compromise that they will get married to each other but again later on the prosecutrix refused to marry him. He further stated that he is still willing to marry the prosecutrix and he has never committed any rape upon the prosecutrix nor forced her to make any physical relationship with him. 2.5 After hearing the Public Prosecutor, defence counsel and perusing the evidence on record, trial Court acquitted respondent No.1-accused by giving him benefit of doubt. The trial Court observed the date of birth of the prosecutrix was 26.04.1993 and she was 23 years of age at the time of alleged occurrence. It was observed that as per the version of the prosecutrix, accused had developed sexual relationship with her on the pretext of getting married to her and as per the version of the accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he as well as the prosecutrix developed love relationship and they wanted to get married to each other but later on the prosecutrix became reluctant to marry him and started demanding money. In September, 2016 when he could not pay her any money to which she lodged the present complaint against him. The trial Court also observed that as per the version of the prosecutrix the accused refused to perform marriage about six months before the registration of the FIR and even during that period he had visited several times to her house and committed rape upon her. No such date or month as such of the sexual assault during the said period of six months has come on record and even no action was taken during these six months, which raises up a question to the testimony of the prosecutrix. 2.6 While relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Uday v. State of Karnataka" 2003(2) RCR (Criminal) 99 and "Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar", 2004(4) RCR (Criminal) 972 the learned trial Court observed that in the event of the accused's promise is not false and has not been made with the sole intention to seduce prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act(s) would not amount to rape. Learned trial Court has also observed that there may be a case where the prosecutrix agreed to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and affection for the accused and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do so. 2.7 The trial Court further observed that the prosecutrix was 23 years of age, therefore, she was having adequate intelligence and maturity to understand the significance and morality associated with the act she was consenting to and even father of the prosecutrix was aware of the fact that the prosecutrix and the accused are living together. The father of the prosecutrix could very well understand the consequences of his daughter and accused living together for the last three years and has testified in his cross-examination that he never cautioned his daughter to live separately as the accused was an unmarried boy. 2.8 Reference was also made by the trial Court to the Compromise Deed Ex.DA wherein it was mentioned that the said compromise was executed for the performance of marriage between the prosecutrix and the accused, though it was denied by the prosecutrix having signed it. The trial Court observed that from the evidence on record, it is indicated that it was prosecutrix who backtracked from the promise of marriage and not the accused. It was also observed that the act of physical relationship between the prosecutrix and the accused cannot be termed as rape as there was silence on the part of the prosecutrix. She is major and her father was aware of the fact that both are living together and she did not take any action regarding the same for a period of six months when the accused refused to get married to her and despite that he had been visiting her house and committing the said act of sexual intercourse even during the period of those six months. The version of the prosecutrix was found to be doubtful and accused-respondent No.1 was acquitted. 3 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent No.1-accused was brother-in-law (devar) of the sister of the prosecutrix. The version of the prosecutrix was found to be doubtful and accused-respondent No.1 was acquitted. 3 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent No.1-accused was brother-in-law (devar) of the sister of the prosecutrix. He used to proclaim to the prosecutrix that he is having love and affection for her from the core of his heart and he wants to perform marriage with her. The consent of the appellant-prosecutrix for sexual intercourse was obtained by respondent No.1-accused by giving the assurance that he will marry the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix has supported her case when she appeared as PW-1, however, the trial Court has not rightly appreciated the evidence on record while disbelieving the testimony of the prosecutrix. There is an ocular version given by the appellant which is further corroborated by medical evidence and it has been proved that the respondent No.1-accused had repeatedly committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, initially by giving her assurance that he would marry her and later on refused to marry her. Respondent No.1-accused is liable to be convicted for the charges framed against him. 4. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the record. The age of the prosecutrix is proved to be about 23 years and 05 months on the date of registration of the FIR i.e. on 04.09.2016. In the initial statement given to the Police (PW1/A), she disclosed her age as 23 years and even her date of birth as 26.04.1993 has been proved during the trial from the school record. Apart from this, it is also not disputed that both the prosecutrix and the respondent No.1-accused were known to each other being relatives. As per the version of the prosecutrix, the accused developed sexual relations with her on the promise that he would perform marriage with her. This fact is not disputed by respondent No.1-accused that both the parties had developed love relationship and they wanted to marry each other. This fact has been admitted by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is also observed that the prosecutrix has not alleged the exact date, month and year when they had developed the physical relationship for the first time. She has only alleged that six months prior to the registration of the FIR, the accused refused to marry her. She has only alleged that six months prior to the registration of the FIR, the accused refused to marry her. It is important to note that the prosecutrix has further alleged that even after that refusal, the accused had been visiting her house and had been forcibly committing rape against her wishes. The trial Court has rightly observed that the statement of the prosecutrix is highly doubtful since she has taken such a stand and is highly unbelievable that she would not report the matter for six months to anyone, had the respondent No.1 been violating her against her wishes. The initial version given by the prosecutrix in her statement recorded by the Police (PW1/A) is found contradictory to the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (PW/B). In the said statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she has not stated that the accused had refused to marry her six months before the registration of the FIR rather she has stated that whenever she used to ask the accused to get married to her he used to demand Rs.5 to Rs.7 lacs to get married to her. The demand of Rs.5 to Rs.7 lacs is missing in her statement recorded before the Police as well as in her statement recorded during the trial when she appeared as PW-1. Secondly, there is another contradiction in the version of the prosecutrix that she has nowhere stated during the trial when she appeared as PW-1 that the accused had refused to marry her six months prior to the registration of the FIR or that he had been visiting her house even thereafter and had been forcibly committing sexual intercourse. Rather she has given another version that after the accused refused to marry her, he stopped coming to the rented premises and thereafter, he again came and had entered into a scuffle with her and then committed rape upon her and this happened 05 to 06 months prior to the registration of the FIR. 5. Rather she has given another version that after the accused refused to marry her, he stopped coming to the rented premises and thereafter, he again came and had entered into a scuffle with her and then committed rape upon her and this happened 05 to 06 months prior to the registration of the FIR. 5. In the light of the aforesaid contradictory version given by the prosecutrix at various stages, it is also observed that in her cross-examination she has admitted this fact that she has filed the present case only for the reason that Sajid had refused to marry her whereas the accused had categorically stated under his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that they had developed love relationship but the complainant became reluctant to marry him and started demanding money from him. The accused had also set up a document (Ex.D/A) in his defence and took a plea that both the parties have compromised the matter and agreed to marry each other. He has categorically stated that after the said compromise on 07.11.2016, the complainant again refused to marry her. In her cross-examination, the prosecutrix has also stated that after the registration of the present case, there were conversations of Sajid (accused) with her where he again offered to marry her, however, she refused the same as by that time he got married somewhere else. Though she has refused to execute the compromise Ex.DA but she has categorically taken a stand that she is not inclined to marry the accused if he offers to marry her even today as he has already performed the marriage. 6. In her cross examination, the prosecutrix has stated that for the first time Sajid had developed physical relations with her about 3 to 4 years ago and after that they started living together in one room and used to have physical relationship daily. She had informed her father only when Sajid refused to marry her and she had disclosed about her sexual assault by Sajid to her father somewhere around 27/28.08.2016. The present case was registered on 04.09.2016 which means for a period of about 3 to 4 years, the prosecutrix and the accused had been living together and for such a long period the prosecutrix has never objected to the said relationship. 7. The present case was registered on 04.09.2016 which means for a period of about 3 to 4 years, the prosecutrix and the accused had been living together and for such a long period the prosecutrix has never objected to the said relationship. 7. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances, it is to be seen as to whether the relationship between the prosecutrix and the accused was a consensual relationship or not ? 8. The offence of 'Rape" has been defined under Section 375 IPC. One of the essential ingredient to prove the said offence is that one of the act as mentioned therein should have been committed "without the consent" or "against the will" of the prosecutrix. Absence of the said ingredient is evident on record. 9. In the present case, one of the important ingredient of Section 375 IPC is missing and it is evident on record that it was a consensual relationship between the parties. For such a long period of 3 to 4 years, the prosecutrix remained silent. With regard to the alleged act having been committed six months prior to the registration of the FIR without her consent is also found doubtful, in view of the discrepant and contradictory statement made by her at various stages of the trial. 10. While dealing with the question of "consent" and as to whether the "consent" vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Pramod Surayabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr", 2019(4) R.C.R. Criminal 135 observed that promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time when it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bears a direct nexus to the women's decision to engage in the sexual act. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as under:- "10. Where a woman does not "consent" to the sexual acts described in the main body of Section 375, the offence of rape has occurred. While Section 90 does not define the term "consent", a "consent" based on a "misconception of fact" is not consent in the eyes of the law. 11. Where a woman does not "consent" to the sexual acts described in the main body of Section 375, the offence of rape has occurred. While Section 90 does not define the term "consent", a "consent" based on a "misconception of fact" is not consent in the eyes of the law. 11. The primary contention advanced by the complainant is that the appellant engaged in sexual relations with her on the false promise of marrying her, and therefore her "consent", being premised on a "misconception of fact" (the promise to marry), stands vitiated. 12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Sonar which was a case involving the invoking of the jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court observed: "15... An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. "Consent" is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person to permit the doing of the act complained of." This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of this Court in Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala, 2013(4) RCR (Criminal) 365: (2013) 9 SCC 113 : 12. "Consent", for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance of the moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and asset. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances." 13. This understanding of consent has also been set out in Explanation 2 of Section 375 (reproduced above). section 3(1) (w) of the SC/ST Act also incorporates this concept of consent: "3(1) (w) - (i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, when such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is without the recipient's consent. ... section 3(1) (w) of the SC/ST Act also incorporates this concept of consent: "3(1) (w) - (i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, when such act of touching is of a sexual nature and is without the recipient's consent. ... Explanation-For the purposes of sub-clause (1), the expression "consent" means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the person by words, gestures, or any form of non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific act: Provided that a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe who does not offer physical resistance to any act of a sexual nature is not by reason only of that fact, is to be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity: Provided further that a woman's sexual history, including with the offender shall not imply or mitigate the offence;" 14. In the present case, the "misconception of fact" alleged by the complainant is the appellant's promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh 2019(2) RCR (Criminal) 852: (2019) SCC Online SC 509, this Court held 37. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry such consent can be said be consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and, in such a case such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the as defined under Sections 375 of the IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC." Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, 2013(3) RCR (Criminal) 96: (2013) 7 SCC 675 ("Deepak Gulati"): "21. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused..." 15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006(4) RCR (Criminal) 474: (2006) 11 SCC 615 the accused forcibly established sexual relations with the complainant. When she asked the accused why he had spoiled her life, he promised to marry her. On this premise, the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with the complainant. When the complainant became pregnant, the accused refused to marry her. When the matter was brought to the panchayat, the accused admitted to having had sexual intercourse with the complainant but subsequently absconded. Given this factual background, the court observed: "10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would marry her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused, completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention nor to fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception cannot be treated to be a consent.." 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact that vitiates the woman's "consent". Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed: "21 There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused: and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. ....... 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time ie at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. There of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance Section 90 LP.C. cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her." (Emphasis supplied) 17. In Uday v. State of Karnataka, 2003(2) RCR (Criminal) 99: (2003) 4 SCC 46 the complainant was a college going student when the accused promised to marry her. In the complainant's statement, she admitted that she was aware that there would be significant opposition from both the complainant's and accused's families to the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her family. The court observed that in these circumstances the accused's promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate relevance to the complainant's decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused which was motivated by other factors: "25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 LPC Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married." (Emphasis supplied) 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 19. The allegations in the FIR indicate that in November 2009 the complainant initially refused to engage in sexual relations with the accused, but on the promise of marriage, he established sexual relations. However, the FIR includes a reference to several other allegations that are relevant for the present purpose. 19. The allegations in the FIR indicate that in November 2009 the complainant initially refused to engage in sexual relations with the accused, but on the promise of marriage, he established sexual relations. However, the FIR includes a reference to several other allegations that are relevant for the present purpose. They are as follows: (1) The complainant and the appellant knew each other since 1998 intimate since 2004; (ii) The complainant and the appellant met regularly, travelled great distances to meet each other, resided in each other's houses on multiple occasions, engaged in sexual intercourse regularly over a course of five years and on multiple occasions visited the hospital jointly to check whether the complainant was pregnant; and (iii) The appellant expressed his reservations about marrying the complainant on 31 January 2014. This led to arguments between them. Despite this, the appellant and the complainant continued to engage in sexual intercourse until March 2015. The appellant is a Deputy Commandant in the CRPF while the complainant is an Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. 20. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 of the IPC has occurred." 11. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 of the IPC has occurred." 11. A similar question was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.", 2022 AIR (SC) 3901, wherein both the appellant and respondent were adults, they were in a consensual relationship for a period of four years. The respondent No.1 during the course of this period got married to someone else. Taking into consideration such facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the relationship between the parties was purely of consensual nature. Relevant portion reads as under:- "12. In the present case, the issue which had to be addressed by the High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the charge-sheet are correct as they stand, an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC was made out. Admittedly, the appellant and the second respondent were in a consensual relationship form 2013 until December 2017. They are both educated adults. The second respondent, during the course of this period, got married on 12 June 2014 to someone else. The marriage ended in a decree of divorce by mutual consent on 17 September 2017. The allegations of the second respondent indicate that her relationship with the appellant continued prior to her marriage, during the subsistence of the marriage and after the grant of divorce by mutual consent. 13. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the FIR or in the charge-sheet, the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 376 IPC. The crucial issue which is to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that the appellant had given a promise to the second respondent to marry which at the inception was false and on the basis of which the second respondent was induced into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 375 IPC are absent. The relationship between the parties was purely of a consensual nature. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 375 IPC are absent. The relationship between the parties was purely of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above, was in existence prior to the marriage of the second respondent and continued to subsist during the term of the marriage and after the second respondent was granted a divorce by mutual consent." 12. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decisions and the facts of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecutrix was having consensual relationship with the accused and as such the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC was not made out. The essential ingredients of an offence under Section 376 Cr.P.C. are missing and as such no different view is possible than the view taken by the trial Court that it was a consensual relationship. 13. This is an appeal against the judgment of acquittal. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhanapal v. State By Public Prosecutor, Madras, (2009) 10 SCC 401 , that it is well settled legal position that when the view which has been taken by the trial Court is a possible view, then the acquittal cannot be set aside by merely substituting its reasons by the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena v. The State of Karnataka 2022(1) RCR (Criminal) 493 also held that the trial Court rendered its decision by acquitting the accused, presumption of innocence gathered strength before the Appellate Court. The observations read as under:- "20. Section 378 CrPC, 1973 enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal section 384 CrPC, 1973 speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. As a consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the court of first instance has its own advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. As a consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the court of first instance has its own advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it, but is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial court is both possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty along with the advantage of having seen the witnesses. Article 21 of the Constitution of India also aids the accused after acquittal in a certain way, though not absolute. Suffice it is to state that the Appellate Court shall remind itself of the role required to play, while dealing with a case of an acquittal." 14. Having found the testimony of the victim surrounded with suspicion and there are strong indication that it was a consensual relationship of the parties, we are of the considered opinion the trial Court has rightly disbelieved the version of the victim while acquitting the respondent. 15. Keeping in view the above, we do not find any reasons to interfere with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court which are well reasoned. As such the present appeal is dismissed. 16. In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (2019) 2 SCC 703 , it is ordered that the name of the prosecutrix be deleted from the website as well as the entire record of this Court and she be described as 'AB' in CRA-AD-269-2019. The title of the appeal shall henceforth be as under:- ""AB" v. Sajid and another"