ORDER : 1. The twin questions involved in the civil revision are as under:- (1) whether the executing court in decree for specific performance of contract of sale grant possession to the decree holder evenwhere the decree so passed is silent qua the decree for possession ? (2) whether the principles of res judicata enumerated in Section 11 of C.P.C. applies to execution proceeding too and MJC No.51/2003 is barred by that principle ? 2. The aforesaid twin questions arises in the instant revision on the following factual back drop :- (i) In a suit filed by the decree holder / non-applicant No.1 being civil suit No.22-A/2000 titled as N.A.Khan v. Sadik Ali and 9 others, the trial Court granted a decree for specific performance of contract in favour of non-applicant No.1 herein and against the non-applicant No.2 herein on 31.07.2022 and also ancillary decree was granted against non-applicant No.7 (Fariyad Ali), non-applicant No.8 (Brajesh Kumar Sinha), non-applicant No.9 (Smt. Sangita Singh), non-applicant No.10 (Smt. Rashmi Shrivastava) and non-applicant No.6 (Neeta Thakur). The decree so passed in favour of non-applicant No.1/ decree holder was assailed by the defendant in First Appeal No.148/2002 before this court, which was dismissed by this court by judgment and decree dated 09.09.2002 and thereafter, the SLP preferred by the defendant(s) was also dismissed by the Supreme Court being SLP (Civil) No.7498/2011 on 29.04.2011 and accordingly, the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 31.07.2002 passed in Civil Suit No.22-A/2000 had become final. (ii) In the meanwhile, on 06.10.2010, the non-applicant No.1/ decree holder levied an execution before the executing court for execution of decree passed in his favour in Civil Suit No.22-A/2000 for specific performance of contract, in which, the executing court directed for execution of sale deed in his favour and accordingly, sale deed was executed in favour of decree holder on 31.01.2011. Thereafter, on 23.10.2013, an application was filed by the decree holder in said execution case under Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. for removal of resistance/ obstruction to possession of suit property, against which the executing court registered a separate MJC No.51/2013 and separate proceeding was initiated. However, during the pendency and continuance of MJC No.51/2013, the original execution case No.22-A/2000 was dismissed by that Court holding that the decree holder has informed to the executing court that he has obtained possession of the entire suit land (one Acre). However, during the pendency and continuance of MJC No.51/2013, the original execution case No.22-A/2000 was dismissed by that Court holding that the decree holder has informed to the executing court that he has obtained possession of the entire suit land (one Acre). As such, the execution case was dismissed on 29.06.2016. However, MJC No.51/2013 was pending, in which notice was issued to the applicant herein (one of the objector) in MJC No.51/2013, which she appeared and filed an application on 25.04.2017 under Order 21 Rule 99 of C.P.C. before the executing court stating that the subject land owned by her and the land owned by the decree holder are quite different and took two specific objection, firstly that in a suit for specific performance of contract, the decree for possession has not been granted in favour of decree holder/ non-applicant No.1 and secondly, since the original execution case No.22-A/2000 had already been dismissed on the statement of the decree holder/non-applicant No.1 that he has obtained the possession of the entire suit land, therefore, the application filed by the decree holder dated 23.10.2013 deserves to be rejected, as barred by principles of res judicata. (iii) The executing court by its order dated 12.09.2017 rejected the application filed by the objector/applicant herein under Order 21 Rule 97 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. holding that though in a suit, decree granted in favour of non-applicant No.1/ decree holder was only for specific performance of the contract and it was not for the delivery of possession, but since sale deed has been executed in his favour by the court and decree holder has not been placed in possession of entire decreed land, the application filed by objector cannot be entertained. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the executing court, the instant civil revision has been filed contending that the order passed by the executing court is unsustainable and bad in law. Submissions : 3. Mr. Vijay Kumar Mishra & Mr. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the executing court, the instant civil revision has been filed contending that the order passed by the executing court is unsustainable and bad in law. Submissions : 3. Mr. Vijay Kumar Mishra & Mr. Krishna Kumar Khatri, learned counsels for the objector/applicant herein would firstly submit that since there was no decree for possession in favour of non-applicant No.1 except the decree for specific performance of the contract, therefore, the executing court could not have rejected the application filed by the objector/applicant herein and secondly, the application filed on 23.10.2013 at the instance of decree holder under Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. was barred by principles of res judicata enumerated in Section 11 of C.P.C. and they would rely upon the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter Onkarlal v. Ramchandra, 1981-II M.P. Weekly Notes 215. 4. Mr. Amit Soni, learned counsel for the non-applicant No.1, would submit that the trial Court is absolutely justified in rejecting the applicant’s/ objector’s application filed under Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. He would submit that the relief of possession is implicit / inherent in the prayer for specific performance of the contract for sale of the property and the executing court in decree for specific performance of contract can grant possession to the decree holder and secondly, though the principles of res judicata applies to execution proceeding but infact, the said principles of res judicata would not apply in the facts of the present case, as the decree so granted in favour of non-applicant No.1 has not been executed fully and, as such, the civil revision deserves to be dismissed, as the order of the executing court is in accordance with law. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. Answer to Question No.1 : 6. In Civil Suit No.22-A/2000 (N.A.Khan v. Sadik Ali & Others), the trial Court granted the following decree for specific performance of the contract in favour of decree holder/ non-applicant No.1. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. Answer to Question No.1 : 6. In Civil Suit No.22-A/2000 (N.A.Khan v. Sadik Ali & Others), the trial Court granted the following decree for specific performance of the contract in favour of decree holder/ non-applicant No.1. ^^oknh ds i{k esa fuEu vk'k; dh vkKfIr ikfjr dh tkrh gS%& 1@ izfroknh dzekad&1 lkfnd vyh oknh ds i{k esa xzke fyafx;kfMg] i-g-ua-&20 jk-fu-ea- rglhy ,oa ftyk fcykliqj fLFkr Hkwfe [kljk UkEcj 15@237 jdck 0-50 ,dM+ vkSj [kljk uEcj 15@238 jdck 0-50 ,dM+ ds laca/k esa ,d ekg ds Hkhrj fodz; i= fu"ikfnr djsA 2@ izfroknh dzekad&7 Qfj;kn vyh }kjk izfroknh dzekad&8 czts'k dqekj flUgk] izfroknh dzekad&9 Jherh laxhrk flag vkSj izfroknh dzekad&10 Jherh jf'e JhokLro ds i{k esa fnukad 30@07@98 dks fu”ikfnr fd;s x;s fodz; i= vkSj izfroknh dzekad&4 vQlj vyh }kjk izfroknh dzekad&5 lqckas/k JhokLro vkSj izfroknh dzekad&6 uhrk ekFkqj ds i{k esa fnukad 10@12@98 dks fu"ikfnr fodz; i= voS/k vkSj 'kwU; Äksf"kr fd;s tkrs gSA 3@ izfroknh dzekad&1 lkfnd vyh Lo;a dk vkSj oknh dk bl ekeys dk O;; ogUk djsxkA 'ks”k izfroknhx.k viuk&viuk O;; Lo;a ogu djsaxsA vf/koDrk 'kqYd izekf.kr gksus ij lwph vuqlkj ns; gksxkA^^ 7. A careful perusal of the decree for specific performance would show that the decree for possession has not been specifically granted in favour of non-applicant No.1. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice, Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which states as under : 22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition, refund of earnest money, etc.— (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), any person suing for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for— (a) possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property, in addition to such performance; or (b) any other relief to which he may be entitled, including the refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or [made by] him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused. (2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically claimed: Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief. (3) The power of the court to grant relief under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be without prejudice to its powers to award compensation under section 21. 8. Sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 starts with a non-obstante clause, which inter alia provides that any person suing for specific performance of a contract for transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for, possession or partition and separate possession of the property in addition to such performance. Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Act further provides that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall “at any stage of the proceeding” allow him to amend the plaint. This is extremely important provision in getting the relief of possession, if not already claimed and granted in the suit. 9. Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act came to be considered by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the matter of Balu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Others, (1982) 1 SCC 525 , in which it has been held that section 22 of the Specific Relief Act which enacts a rule of pleading provides that a person in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property, may ask for appropriate reliefs, namely, he may ask for possession, or for partition or for separate possession including the relief for specific performance. These reliefs he can claim, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, to the contrary, sub-section (2) of this section, however, specifically provides that these reliefs cannot be granted by the Court, unless they have been expressly claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. These reliefs he can claim, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, to the contrary, sub-section (2) of this section, however, specifically provides that these reliefs cannot be granted by the Court, unless they have been expressly claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. The proviso to this sub-section (2), however, says that where the plaintiff has not specifically claimed these reliefs in his plaint, in the initial stages of the suit, the Court shall permit the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings, to include one or more of the reliefs, by means of an amendment of the plaint on such terms as it may deem proper. The only purpose of this newly enacted provision is to avoid multiplicity of suits and that the plaintiff may get appropriate relief without being hampered by procedural complications. The expression “in an appropriate case” in section 22(1) is very significant. The expression only indicates that it is not always incumbent on the plaintiff to claim possession or partition or separate possession in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of the immovable property. That has to be done where the circumstances demanding the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale embraced within its ambit not only the execution of the sale-deed but also possession over the property conveyed under the saledeed. It may not always be necessary for the plaintiff to specifically claim possession over the property, the relief of possession being inherent in the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale. Besides, the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 22 provides for amendment of the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief “at any stage of the proceedings”. In a case where exclusive possession is with the contracting party, a decree for specific performance of the contract of sale simpliciter, without specifically providing for delivery of possession, may give complete relief to the decree-holder. In order to satisfy the decree against him completely he is bound not only to execute the sale-deed but also to put the property in possession of the decree-holder. In order to satisfy the decree against him completely he is bound not only to execute the sale-deed but also to put the property in possession of the decree-holder. This is no consonance with the provision of section 55 (1) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that the seller is bound to give, on being so required, the buyer or such person as he directs such possession of the property as its nature admits. The word 'proceeding' has not been defined in the Act. That term is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is conducted. The word “proceeding” in section 22 includes execution proceedings also. 10. The principles of law laid down in Babu Lal (supra) came to be considered recently by the Supreme Court in the matter of Manickam @ Thandapani & Another v. Vasantha, 2022 Livelaw (SC) 395 {SLP (Civil) No.15653 of 2017 decided on 5.4.2022}, in which, the principle of law laid down in Babu Lal (supra) has been followed with approval after reviewing the earlier decisions on the point and it has been held that relief of possession is ancillary to the decree for specific performance and need not be specifically claimed. It has been further held by their Lordships that the expression “at any stage of proceeding” is wide enough to allow the plaintiffs to seek relief of possession even at the appellate stage or in execution even if such prayer was required to be claimed and it has been held by their Lordships in para 25 & 26 as under : 25. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments would show that relief of possession is ancillary to the decree for specific performance and need not be specifically claimed. That was the position even under the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Section 22 of the Act was introduced in pursuance of the recommendation of the Law Commission to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to cut down the delay. That was the position even under the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Section 22 of the Act was introduced in pursuance of the recommendation of the Law Commission to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to cut down the delay. Therefore, though the preponderance of judicial opinions under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 was in favour of the fact that relief of possession is ancillary to the decree for specific performance, it was further clarified by introducing Section 22 of the Act. 26. The matter can be examined from another angle as well. Section 22(2) of the Act, though is worded in negative language, “no relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub- section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically claimed”, but the proviso takes out the mandatory nature from the substantive provision of sub-section (2) when the plaintiff is allowed to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including the plaint for such relief “at any stage of the proceeding”. “At any stage of the proceeding” would include the proceeding in suit or in appeal and also in execution. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Act contemplates that the Court shall, at any stage of the proceedings, allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief. The said proviso makes the provision directory as no penal consequences follow under sub-section (2) of Section 22. Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 22 is a rule of prudence to ask for possession “in an appropriate case”. The appropriate case would not include a suit for specific performance simpliciter but may include a suit for partition or a suit when the decree is to be executed against a transferee. Sub-section (2) cannot be said to be a mandatory provision as the power to claim relief at any stage of the proceeding makes sub-section (2) directory. Sub-section (2) is a matter of procedure to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The procedural laws are handmaid of justice and cannot defeat the substantive rights. Reference may be made to M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCC 91 wherein it was held as under: “2. Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. The procedural laws are handmaid of justice and cannot defeat the substantive rights. Reference may be made to M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCC 91 wherein it was held as under: “2. Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take.” Their Lordships further held in para 30 as under : 30. The defendant in terms of the agreement is bound to handover possession of the land agreed to be sold. The expression “at any stage of proceeding” is wide enough to allow the plaintiffs to seek relief of possession even at the appellate stage or in execution even if such prayer was required to be claimed. This Court in Babu Lal has explained the circumstances where relief of possession may be necessary such as in a suit for partition or in a case of separate possession where the property conveyed is a joint property. In the suit for specific performance, the possession is inherent in such suit, therefore, we find that the decreeholders are in fact entitled to possession in pursuance of the sale deed executed in their favor. 11. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Babu Lal (Supra) and further followed in Manickam @ Thandapani (supra), it is quite vivid that in the suit for specific performance of a contract for transfer of immovable property, the possession is inherent in such decree and therefore, the decree holder is entitled to possession pursuant to the sale deed executed in his favour, though relief of possession was not claimed and granted in the suit so filed by decree holder and decree is silent, by virtue of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the objection raised on behalf of the objector has rightly been rejected by the executing court by the impugned order and this question is answered accordingly. Answer to Question No.2 - Plea of res judicata : 12. Answer to Question No.2 - Plea of res judicata : 12. The objector/applicant has also raised further objection that since the decree for specific performance of a contract has already been executed and satisfied as per order of executing court dated 29.06.2016, therefore, the MJC No.51/2013 cannot continue and it is barred by principles of res judicata enumerated in Section 11 of C.P.C. It is appropriate to notice here that prior to insertion of Explanation VII to Section 11 of C.P.C. with effect from 01.02.1977, provision contained in Section 11 of C.P.C. (Principles of Res judicata) had no application to execution proceedings. The Explanation VII to Section 11 states as under :- “11. Res judicata : -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation :- I to VI …..xxx…..xxx…..xxx Explanation :- VII – The provision of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit, shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.” 13. In Ameena Amma (Dead) Through LRs. & Others v. Sundaram Pillai & Others, (1994) 1 SCC 743 their Lordships of Supreme Court have clearly held that it is settled law that the general principles of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to execution proceedings as well, but the basic criteria for applying the principles of res judicata is that the order must be between the same parties and that the matter should have been heard and decided by such court, and it was held by their Lordships as under :- “15. ………..It is settled law that the general principles of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to execution proceedings as well but the basic criteria for applying the principles of res judicata is that the order must be between the same parties and that the matter should have been heard and decided by such court. Execution Petition No.819 of 1960 was not between the same parties as Execution Petition No.588 of 1958. Execution Petition No.588 of 1958 was filed against Subramania Pillai who was not a party to the decree for delivery of possession and it was not heard and decided on merits. It was simply dismissed on the ground that the execution did not lie against the third defendant. Hence the order in Execution Petition No.588 of 1958 did not operate res judicata for the purpose of decision of Execution Petition No.819 of 1960 or the present suit.” 14. In the instant case, admittedly the objector/ applicant herein was not party to the execution case No.22-A/2000 when the execution case was closed on 29.06.2016 on statement made by the non-applicant/ decree holder, which is apparent from Annexure-A filed along-with this civil revision and she for the first time filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. before the executing court on 10.05.2017 in MJC No.51/2013. As such, when the execution case was decided on 29.06.2016, she was neither party to the execution case herein nor in the suit for specific performance of a contract and the execution case was not heard and decided on merits, it was dismissed on the statement made by the non-applicant No.1/ decree holder. Therefore, the order in execution case No.22-A/2000 dated 29.06.2016 would not operate as res judicata for the purpose of decision in MJC No.51/2013 and accordingly, it was not barred by the principles of res judicata. This question is answered accordingly. Conclusion : 15. In view of the aforesaid legal analysis, I am of the considered opinion that, the relief of possession is ancillary to the decree for specific performance of the contract and the executing court in a decree for specific performance of the contract can grant possession to decree holder by virtue of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In view of the aforesaid legal analysis, I am of the considered opinion that, the relief of possession is ancillary to the decree for specific performance of the contract and the executing court in a decree for specific performance of the contract can grant possession to decree holder by virtue of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Secondly, the MJC No.51/2013 is not barred by the principles of res judicata enumerated in Section 11 of C.P.C. Consequently, the order passed by the executing court dated 12.09.2017 rejecting the application of the applicant herein under Order 21 Rule 97 of C.P.C. is in accordance with law, I do not find any jurisdictional error warranting interference in the said order. The order dated 12.09.2017 is hereby affirmed, leaving the parties to bear their own cost. 16. In a result, the instant civil revision is dismissed. No order as to costs.